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Abstract		
Synthetic	 biology	 is	 an	 emerging	 hybrid	 discipline	 that	 aims	 to	 apply	 an	
engineering	 approach	 to	 biology,	 in	 order	 to	 render	 biology	 controllable,	
predictable,	and	ultimately	engineerable.	Herein	I	explore	synthetic	biology	as	
a	 project	 to	 control	 life	 at	 the	 molecular	 level	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 an	
ethnographic	 study	 of	 a	 newly	 formed	 academic	 synthetic	 biology	 research	
centre.		
Within	 this	 overarching	 narrative,	 I	 tease	 out	 two	main	 stories	 regarding	
the	 field.	 First,	 I	 explore	 the	 topic	 of	 disciplinarity,	 investigating	 the	 work	
being	done	 to	 establish	 synthetic	biology	 as	 a	hybrid	discipline.	Drawing	on	
the	ideas	of	repertoire,	doability,	and	epistemic	cultures,	I	explore	the	conflicts	
and	compromises	 inherent	 in	 the	attempt	 to	 form	a	hybrid	discipline	out	of	
biology	 and	 engineering.	 I	 describe	 the	 strategies	 being	 employed	 to	 bridge	
this	epistemic	cultural	divide,	and	the	challenges	in	doing	so.		
Second,	I	explore	the	work	being	done	to	bring	the	goals	of	the	discipline	to	
fruition.	Synthetic	biology’s	dream	of	rendering	biology	engineerable	is	rooted	
in	a	reductionistic	vision	of	life.	This	approach	to	biology	raises	both	practical	
and	 conceptual	 issues.	 Thus,	 in	 exploring	 this	 story	 I	 address	 both	 the	
practical	 day-to-day	 work	 of	 synthetic	 biologists	 attempting	 to	 apply	 an	
engineering	approach	to	biology,	and	the	challenges	these	synthetic	biologists	
face	in	conceptualising	the	products	of	that	work.		
Third,	I	draw	these	stories	together	and	show	that	synthetic	biology	is	one	
among	 many	 disciplines	 emerging	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 biology	 and	
engineering.	 I	suggest	that	this	 fertile,	 if	complicated,	disciplinary	crossroads	
may	 be	 the	 site	 of	 a	 conceptual	 shift	 in	 the	 way	 we	 ‘do’	 and	 think	 about	
biology	and	ultimately,	life.	
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Chapter	One:	Introduction	
I	suppose	some	time	in	2005	.	.	.	I	started	to	think	.	.	.	systems	biology	
is	 about	 analysing	 biological	 systems,	 I	 thought,	 I’m	an	 engineer,	 I	
mean	 this	 sounds	 like	 .	 .	 .	 you	 should	 be	 able	 to	 .	 .	 .	 make	 stuff,	
synthesise	 it,	 you	 know,	 out	 of	 all	 this,	 because	 .	 .	 .	 the	 cell	 is	 the	
ultimate	manufacturing	unit,	that’s	the	term	I	used	.	.	.	which	I	think	
is	 quite	 catchy.	 OK,	 so	 I	 thought	 .	 .	 .	 cells	 should	 be	 able	 to	
manufacture	stuff	.	.	.	if	you	can	modify	DNA,	which	is	essentially	the	
code,	you	should	be	able	to	put	this	into	a	cell	and	it	should	be	able	to	
produce	something,	you	see.	I	got	quite	excited	about	this	.	 .	 .	and	I	
went	to	do	one	of	my	regular	visits	to	.	.	.	MIT,	and	.	.	.	I	.	.	.	walked	
over	to	the	civil	engineering	department,	walked	into	this	office,	and	
there	was	Drew	Endy	and	Randy	Rettberg!	 .	 .	 .	 and	 I	 told	 them	my	
ideas	 and	 I	 said,	 ‘What	 do	 you	 think	 about	 this,	 do	 you	 think	 it’s	
crazy?’	and	they	said,	‘No	it’s	not	at	all	crazy	but	it’s	called	synthetic	
biology.’		
(Alan,	senior	researcher,	engineering)1	
Some	may	contend	that	this	does	indeed	sound	crazy,	or	perhaps	that	using	
biological	cells	as	manufacturing	units	to	produce	desired	products	is	the	stuff	
of	science	fiction,	not	reality.	However,	to	a	growing,	and	international,	group	
																																								 								
1	In	order	 to	provide	 some	biographical	 information	 for	my	 research	participants,	while	 also	
maintaining	their	anonymity,	each	participant	is	referred	to	by	a	pseudonym	as	well	as	their	
broad	role	within	the	academic	research	centre	(doctoral	student,	postdoctoral	researcher	or	
senior	 researcher)	 and	 the	 ‘side’	 they	 come	 from,	 either	 biology	 or	 engineering.	 However,	
given	that	the	research	centre	is	such	a	prominent	site	within	the	UK	and	European	synthetic	
biology	community,	it	is	difficult	to	maintain	its	anonymity.	Likewise,	despite	my	efforts,	it	is	
incredibly	difficult	to	guarantee	the	confidentiality	and	anonymity	of	my	research	participants,	
especially	 those	 in	 prominent	 positions.	 This	 has	 been	 an	 issue	 both	 for	 the	writing	 of	 this	
thesis,	and	for	the	writing	of	conference	papers	and	academic	publications.	I	have	anonymised	
my	participants,	and	the	Centre,	as	much	as	possible	when	writing	or	speaking	about	them,	
but	it	is	possibly	that	someone	with	intimate	knowledge	of	the	Centre,	or	of	the	UK	synthetic	
biology	 community,	 could	 be	 able	 to	 identify	 them.	 This	 is	 something	 I	 have	 discussed	 on	
several	occasions	with	the	members	of	the	Centre,	and	is	something	that	continues	to	concern	
me.	
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of	 scientists	 and	 engineers	 like	 Alan,	 this	 is	 an	 exciting	 new	 frontier.	 Alan	
Gregg,	an	electrical	engineer	by	training,	is	one	of	two	directors	of	the	biggest,	
most	 prominent	 and	 well-funded	 synthetic	 biology	 research	 centre	 in	 the	
United	Kingdom,	a	centre	which	was	to	become	my	fieldwork	site,	and	which	
will,	 from	 here	 on	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 ‘the	 Centre.’	 Alan’s	 origin	 story	 for	 the	
Centre	started	back	in	2005	when	he	first	got	the	idea,	as	he	describes	above,	
of	 applying	 his	 engineering	 know-how	 to	 biology	 in	 order	 to	 “manufacture	
stuff.”	On	Alan’s	return	from	the	Massachusetts	Institute	of	Technology	(MIT)	
to	the	UK	he	contacted	biochemist	Malcolm	Brown,	who	he	referred	to	during	
my	 interview	 with	 him	 as	 his	 “pet	 biologist,”	 and	 told	 him	 about	 this	 new	
‘synthetic	 biology.’	 Like	 Alan,	 Malcolm	 embraced	 the	 idea	 of	 engineering	
biology	with	enthusiasm,	and	that,	Alan	claims,	 is	how	synthetic	biology	got	
underway	at	the	prestigious	university	where	they	work.		
In	 2006	 they	 entered	 their	 first	 team	 in	 the	 international	 genetically	
engineered	 machines	 competition,	 or	 iGEM.	 A	 challenge	 for	 teams	 of	
undergraduate	 students	 to	 design	 and	 construct	 synthetic	 biology	 ‘products’	
over	the	summer	and	then	compete	against	each	other	at	MIT	in	November.2	
This	was	only	the	second	year	that	teams	from	outside	the	US	were	involved	in	
iGEM	and	Alan	and	Malcolm’s	team	came	second,	a	fact	they	repeat	often,	and	
with	 great	 pride.	 Following	 this	 success,	 and	 with	 Alan’s	 enthusiasm	 and	
conviction	that	synthetic	biology	was	primed	to	be	 the	next	 ‘big	 thing,’	Alan	
and	Malcolm	successfully	appealed	to	the	university	rector	for	the	funding	to	
set	up	a	small	synthetic	biology	laboratory.	This	endowment	was	followed,	in	
2009,	by	a	 large	amount	of	 research	council	 funding	 from	the	EPSRC3	in	 the	
form	of	a	science	and	innovation	award.	Alan	and	Malcolm	used	this	money	to	
set	 up,	 and	 staff,	 a	much	 larger	 research	 centre,	 which	 opened	 its	 doors	 in	
April	2010.		
Thus,	 in	December	2009	when	I	started	my	fieldwork,	the	Centre	was	still	
getting	 up	 and	 running.	 Many	 of	 the	 staff	 were	 new,	 the	 laboratories	 were	
																																								 								
2	For	a	description	of	iGEM	see	Brown	(2007),	Carlson	(2010)	and	Cockerton	(2011).	
3	Engineering	and	Physical	Sciences	Research	Council.	
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new,	and	the	collaborative	partnerships	were	also,	mostly,	new.	Indeed,	given	
how	 young	 the	 discipline	 as	 a	 whole	 was,	 many	 of	 my	 participants	 were	
relatively	 new	 to	 academia	 as	 well,	 being	 either	 doctoral	 students	 or	
postdoctoral	 researchers.	However,	 by	 the	 time	 I	 had	 completed	my	 year	 of	
intensive	fieldwork,4	the	people	had	settled	in	and	gained	experience	and	the	
rapidly	growing	Centre	was	in	full	swing.	Alan	Gregg,	I	came	to	learn,	was	an	
enthusiastic	proponent	of	synthetic	biology,	espousing	his	vision	of	its	golden	
future,	a	new	industrial	revolution,	a	route	to	resolving	a	wide	range	of	human	
and	environmental	concerns	from	fuel	shortages	to	bacterial	 infections,	from	
contaminated	 water	 to	 cancer.	 Alan	 had	 seen	 the	 future	 and	 it	 was	 those	
“ultimate	 manufacturing	 units,”	 cells.	 To	 his	mind	 it	 was	 just	 a	 question	 of	
modifying	them,	tweaking	their	genetic	code	as	you	would	a	computer	code,	
and	plugging	 it	back	 into	the	cell	so	that	the	cell	would	produce	the	desired	
product.		
This	vision	 for	biology	was,	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	 first	championed	by	a	
group	 of	 engineers.	 These	 engineers	were	 keen	 to	 see	 biology	 as	 simply	 the	
newest	in	a	long	line	of	engineerable	materials,	no	different	from	any	other	if	
you	just	treated	it	‘correctly,’	that	is	with	logic	and	order,	and	thus	got	it	under	
control.	 Amongst	 these	 early	 proponents	 were	 the	 two	 men	 Alan	 name-
dropped	in	the	quote	above,	Drew	Endy	and	Randy	Rettberg.	Endy,	a	civil	and	
biochemical	engineer,	and	Rettberg,	an	electrical	engineer,	both	worked	with	
Tom	Knight,	regarded	as	one	of	the	‘fathers,’	if	not	“the	godfather”	(Bluestein	
2012)	of	synthetic	biology.		
Knight,	 an	 electrical	 engineer	 by	 training,	 claims	 that	 he	 first	 became	
interested	in	combining	engineering	and	biology	after	reading	a	proposal	from	
physicist-turned-biologist	 Harold	 Morowitz.	 Morowitz	 reportedly	 claimed	
that	 if	we	put	our	minds	to	 it	and	applied	all	of	our	advanced	technology	to	
biology,	 we	 could	 understand	 how	 simple	 organisms	 work	 (Bluestein	 2012).	
Knight	recalls	his	reaction	to	this	proposal	as	follows:	
																																								 								
4	I	maintained	intermittent	contact	with	the	Centre,	and	the	field,	for	several	more	years	after	
this	period	of	intensive	fieldwork.	
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	“My	general	bias	toward	biology	at	that	point	was,	oh	my	god,	it’s	
so	complicated,	we’ll	never	figure	out	what’s	going	on	-	in	contrast	
to	something	like	computers	where	you	can	understand	everything.	
It	 was	 really	 quite	 amazing	 to	 see	 somebody	 proposing	 what	 I’d	
assumed	 was	 impossible.	 I	 got	 quite	 intrigued	 by	 the	 idea	 that	 I	
could	 go	 and	 do	 something	 with	 biology”	 (Knight	 quoted	 in	
Bluestein	2012).		
Thus,	prompted	by	the	idea	that	he	could	“go	and	do	something	with	biology,”	
Knight	reports	that,	sometime	around	1990,	he	began	reading	classical	biology	
books.	Focusing	 in	particular	on	simple	organisms,	which	 in	turn	 led	him	to	
start	 sitting	 in	 on	 MIT’s	 core	 undergraduate	 and	 graduate	 biology	 courses	
(Bluestein	2012).	
In	 1996	Knight	 used	his	 growing	understanding	 of	 biology	 to	 successfully	
apply	 to	DARPA5	for	 funding	 to	pursue	his	 interests	 in	 applying	engineering	
knowledge	 to	 biology.	 It	 was	 during	 the	 tenure	 of	 his	 short	 term	 DARPA	
contract	 that	 Knight	 first	 set	 up	 a	 biology	 laboratory	 (Roosth	 2010).	 The	
laboratory	was	located	within	MIT's	Laboratory	for	Computer	Science	and	was	
staffed	 entirely	 by	non-biologists.	 It	was	here	 that	Knight	began	 to	work	on	
what	 he	 called,	 BioBricks.	 Standardised,	 well-characterised	 biological	 ‘parts’	
that	he	envisioned	could	be	used,	 like	a	biological	version	of	Lego	bricks,	 in	
the	construction	of	more	complex	biological	systems	(Restuccia	2009;	Roosth	
2010).	
Knight,	Rettberg,	and	Endy,6	were	by	no	means	 the	only	early	proponents	
of	 synthetic	 biology;	 they	 weren’t	 even	 the	 only	 early	 proponents	 at	 MIT.	
However,	due	to	their	prominence	in	the	beginnings	of	iGEM7	and	BioBricks,	
																																								 								
5	Defense	Advanced	Research	Projects	Agency.	
6	Knight	 has	 been	 called	 the	 “godfather”	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 Rettberg	 now	 serves	 as	 the	
coordinator	 of	 iGEM	 and	 as	 manager	 of	 the	 registry	 of	 standard	 biological	 parts	 (the	
repository	 of	 BioBricks),	 while	 Endy	 has	 been	 described	 as	 synthetic	 biology’s	 “most	
prominent	 spokesperson”	 (Rabinow	and	Bennett	2012:	 21)	 and	as	 the	 “figurehead	and	media	
darling	of	synthetic	biology”	(Roosth	2010:	54).	
7	Knight,	Endy	and	Rettberg	together	started	iGEM.	
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two	early	foundation	stones	of	the	discipline,	and	to	repeated	accounts	of	the	
early	 days	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 at	 MIT,	 their	 roles	 are	 written	 in	 synthetic	
biology	lore.	The	fact	that	none	of	these	three	were	trained	in	biology,	and	for	
that	 matter	 neither	 were	 other	 prominent	 early	 members	 of	 the	 synthetic	
biology	community,8	arguably	played	a	 large	part	 in	 the	early	vision	 for,	and	
approach	of,	the	field.	
Early	visions	of	synthetic	biology	
The	 introduction	 of	 the	 engineering	 framework	 to	 biology,	 which	 this	
group	of	engineers	ushered	in,	is	perhaps	most	explicit	in	efforts	to	apply	the	
engineering	 concepts	 of	 standardisation,	 abstraction,	 and	 decoupling	 to	
biology,	 and	 the	 assumed	 notion	 that	 novel	 organisms	 can	 be	 built	 from	
standardised,	 hierarchical	 parts,	 devices,	 and	 systems.	 According	 to	 Endy	
(2005),	one	of	the	most,	if	not	the	most,	vocal	proponents	of	the	engineering	
approach	to	biology,	standardisation	implies	that	parts	should	be	uniform	and	
interchangeable,	 like	 screws	 or	 Lego	 bricks.	 It	 is	 believed	 that	 such	
standardisation	of	‘biological	parts’	would	permit	them	to	be	interchanged	and	
combined	 in	 new	 ways	 allowing	 the	 building	 of	 new	 biological	 organisms.	
Abstraction,	 the	 second	of	 these	 core	 engineering	 concepts,	has	been	drawn	
from	computer	engineering	where	it	describes	the	reduction	and	factoring	out	
of	 details	 within	 a	 frequently	 large	 and	 complex	 software	 system,	 or	 data	
structure,	so	that	one	can	focus	on	a	few	concepts	at	a	time.	Within	synthetic	
biology	 it	 is	 held	 that	 abstraction	 would	 permit	 the	 ‘black-boxing’	 of	 the	
underlying	 biology	 allowing	 synthetic	 biologists	 to	 direct	 their	 efforts	 at	
producing	 novel	 biological	 ‘parts,’	 ‘devices,’	 and	 ‘systems’	 without	 having	 to	
engage	with	the	underlying	DNA	and	its	sequence	of	nucleotides	(the	As,	Ts,	
Cs,	 and	 Gs).	 Lastly,	 decoupling	 denotes	 the	 separation	 of	 the	 design	 and	
fabrication	 processes.	 Within	 synthetic	 biology	 this	 would	 see	 workers	
specialised	into	two	groups.	Those	who,	with	the	help	of	computer	modelling,	
																																								 								
8	Including	Chris	Voigt	 (a	 chemical	 engineer),	Gerald	 Sussman	 (an	 electrical	 engineer),	Ron	
Weiss	(an	electrical	engineer)	and	Robert	Carlson	(an	aeronautical	engineer).	
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design	synthetic	‘constructs,’	and	those	who	render	these	models	as	biological	
entities.	
References	 to	 these	engineering	concepts,	alongside	 the	use	of	vocabulary	
and	analogies	drawn	from	engineering,	are	scattered	throughout	the	synthetic	
biology	 literature,	highlighting	 the	pervasiveness	of	an	engineering	approach	
within	the	field	(Arkin	2008;	Baker	et	al.	2006;	Endy	2005;	Gibbs	2004;	Serrano	
2007).	 Indeed,	much	of	 the	 literature	 that	 describes	 and	promotes	 synthetic	
biology	 claims	 that	 through	 the	 adoption	 of	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	
biology,	 synthetic	 biologists	 hope	 to	 enable	 the	 design	 and	 construction	 of	
predictable,	 controllable	 living	 systems	 using	 well-defined,	 standardised,	
interchangeable	 parts	 (e.g.	 Endy	 2005).	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 in	 doing	 so	
synthetic	 biologists	 will,	 “learn	 about	 life	 by	 building	 it,”	 make	 genetic	
engineering	 “worthy	 of	 its	 name”9	and	 “stretch	 the	 boundaries	 of	 life	 and	 of	
machines	until	the	two	overlap	to	yield	truly	programmable	organisms”	(Gibbs	
2004:	76).	As	 I	was	to	discover,	Alan	 is	 far	 from	alone	 in	his	belief	 that	such	
controllable	living	systems	could	provide	a	solution	to	many	of	the	world’s	ills,	
from	 water	 pollution	 to	 our	 reliance	 on	 fossil	 fuels,	 from	 expensive	 and	
imprecise	pharmaceuticals	 to	undetected	bacterial	 infections	 (Ferber	2004a).	
He	 isn’t	 even	 alone	 in	 casting	 synthetic	 biology	 as	 the	 next	 industrial	
revolution	(Royal	Society	of	Chemistry	Science	and	Technology	2009;	Schmidt	
2008).	 Tom	 Knight	 himself	 is	 quoted	 as	 saying,	 in	 regards	 to	 synthetic	
biology’s	future:		
“I	can’t	tell	you	what’s	going	to	happen.	But	stand	back	-	this	is	the	
technology	 of	 the	 century.	 This	 is	 going	 to	 change	 how	we	 build	
things.	Biology	 is	 fundamentally	 a	manufacturing	 technology,	 and	
we’re	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 figuring	 out	 how	 to	 control	 that.	 It's	
impossible	to	predict	and	estimate	the	impact	of	that,	but	it’s	going	
to	be	massive”	(Knight	quoted	in	Bluestein	2012).		
																																								 								
9	Despite	its	name,	genetic	engineering	does	not	apply	an	engineering	approach	to	biology.	As	
one	 of	 my	 research	 participants	 claimed	 “genetic	 engineering	 involves	 absolutely	 no	
engineering”	(Malcolm,	senior	researcher,	biology).	
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(Re)coining	‘synthetic	biology’	
This	 potentially	 revolutionary	 advance	 however	 needed	 a	 name,	 one	 that	
alluded	to	both	 its	biological	and	engineering	pedigree.	However,	so	the	tale	
goes,	at	a	Nature	 cocktail	party	 in	2001	Drew	Endy	and	Robert	Carlson	were	
still	 struggling	 to	 come	 up	 with	 a	 suitable	 title	 for	 the	 new	 discipline	 they	
envisioned	(Campos	2009).	Campos	(2009)	writes	that	Endy	had	discussed	the	
notion	of	‘open	source	biology’	with	Carlson	and	Roger	Brent	in	1999,	but	the	
name,	 like	 another	 possible	 moniker	 ‘constructive	 biology’	 hadn’t	 stuck.	
‘Intentional	biology,’10	another	option	floated	by	Endy,	had	received	a	very	bad	
reception,	implying	as	it	did	that	other	approaches	to	biology,	to	which	it	was	
in	 contrast,	 were	 consequently	 ‘unintentional.’	 So	 when	 the	 cocktail	 party	
came	 about,	 and	 they	 were	 still	 searching	 for	 a	 name,	 biophysicist	 Carlos	
Bustamante	 apparently	 suggested	 to	 Endy	 and	 Carlson	 that	 they	 use	
something	 analogous	 with	 ‘synthetic	 chemistry.’	 Campos	 (2009)	 writes	 that	
this	 suggestion	 was	 not	 leapt	 upon	 immediately,	 Endy	 favoured	 ‘natural	
engineering’	for	a	time,	but	eventually	‘synthetic	biology’	took	hold,	and	thus	
the	term	was	coined	or,	more	accurately,	‘re-coined.’		
It	wasn’t	long	before	the	realisation	dawned	that	Endy	and	Carlson	had	not	
in	fact	invented	the	name	‘synthetic	biology,’	or	at	least	they	were	not	the	first	
to	 do	 so.	 Following	 this	 discovery,	 German	 biologist	 Barbara	 Hobom	 was	
frequently	 attributed	 with	 its	 coinage	 in	 1980	 (Hobom)	 (e.g.	 Benner	 and	
Sismour	2005;	Chopra	and	Kamma	2006;	Cuccato	et	al.	2009).	While	Balmer	
and	Martin	(2008)	trace	its	 introduction	back	further,	to	1974	and	the	Polish	
geneticist	Waclaw	Szybalski	(1974).	However	the	sentiment	that	biology	would	
soon	 be	 entering	 a	 “synthetic	 phase”	 was	 not,	 even	 then,	 a	 new	 one.	 As	
discussed	 in	chapter	 six,	we	have	appeared	 to	be	on	 the	cusp	of	 a	 ‘synthetic	
biology’	for	a	century,	with	the	term	being	used	by	French	biologist	Stephane	
																																								 								
10	The	Institute	for	the	Future	however	seized	upon	the	name	‘Intentional	Biology’	and	in	2006	
published	 a	 report	 on	 this	 “new	 field”	 casting	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 biomimicry	 as	 its	 two	
main	sub-fields	(Pescovitz	and	Pang	2006).	
	
 15 
Leduc	as	early	as	1912.	Yet	there	is	no	indication	that	Endy,	Carlson,	and	Brent	
were	 even	 aware	 that	 their	 ‘new’	 discipline,	 synthetic	 biology,	 had	 such	
historical	namesakes.		
But	what	does	‘synthetic	biology’	actually	mean?	
Despite	the	effort	and	thought	that	went	into	naming	synthetic	biology,	its	
appellation	is	not	without	ambiguity.	Does	the	adjective	‘synthetic,’	as	used	in	
this	 context,	 infer	 that	 the	 biology	 in	 question	 is	 artificial,	 unnatural,	man-
made?	Or	does	it	imply	that	it	is	constructed,	assembled,	built?	And	what,	for	
that	 matter,	 does	 this	 term	 say	 of	 ‘biology’?	 Does	 the	 designation	 of	 the	
biology	 in	 question	 as	 ‘synthetic’	 imply	 that	 other	 fields	 of	 biology	 are,	 by	
contrast,	 non-synthetic?	 And	 if	 so,	 does	 this	 imply	 that	 such	 biology	 is	
‘natural’	in	its	constitution	or	‘organic’	in	its	formation?	Or,	that	the	discipline	
of	 ‘normal’	 biology,	 from	which	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 a	 departure,	 focuses	 on	
analysis	rather	than	synthesis?		
There	 does	 indeed	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 shift	 in	 biology	 away	 from	 a	 focus	 on	
analysis	 and	 towards	 synthesis,	 towards	 designing	 and	 constructing	
organisms,	and	this	shift	is	discussed	in	chapter	six.	However	for	now	a	clear	
definition	 for	 the	discipline	 is	perhaps	needed.	Given	 that,	as	highlighted	by	
Evelyn	Fox	Keller	(2009b),	the	ambiguity	and	multiplicity	of	meaning	conjured	
up	by	 the	discipline’s	name	 indicates	 that	 it	 is	perhaps	 less	 than	obvious,	 to	
those	encountering	the	term,	what	synthetic	biology	actually	is.	I	have	opted	
to	 use	 the	 European	 Commission’s,	 New	 and	 Emerging	 Science	 and	
Technology,	High	Level	Expert	Group’s	definition,	which	describes	 synthetic	
biology	as	follows.		
“[T]he	engineering	of	biology:	the	synthesis	of	complex,	biologically	
based	 (or	 inspired)	 systems,	 which	 display	 functions	 that	 do	 not	
exist	in	nature”	(NEST	2005:	5).		
While	 arguably	 representative	 of	 the	 discipline	 as	 a	 whole,	 this	 broad	
definition	 nevertheless	 hides	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	 contention	 within	 the	
discipline	 over	what	 this	 actually	 entails.	 Furthermore,	 it	 hides	 the	 fact	 that	
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there	 are	 currently	 multiple	 strands	 of	 work	 going	 on	 under	 the	 label	 of	
synthetic	biology.	
Three	approaches	to	synthetic	biology	
Amongst	 these	 strands	of	work	 are	 the	 three	most	 common	categories	 of	
approach	 to	 doing	 synthetic	 biology,	 namely	 the	 parts	 and	 pathways	
approaches,	the	genomes	approach,	and	the	systems	approach.	The	parts	and	
pathways	 approaches	 to	 synthetic	 biology	 are	 most	 clearly	 aligned	 with	
attempts	to	turn	the	field	into	an	engineering	discipline.	Such	approaches	are	
underpinned	 by	 the	 assumption	 that	 simplicity	 is	 the	 key	 to	 achieving	
synthetic	 biology’s	 aims,	 and	 that	 such	 simplicity	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	
adherence	 to,	 and	 the	 application	 of,	 standardisation,	 decoupling,	 and	
abstraction.	 Essentially,	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 who	 adhere	 to	 these	
approaches	are	 trying	to	build	biological	systems	and	organisms	 in	the	same	
way	 that	 you	would	 build	 a	machine,	 from	 standardised,	 controllable,	 well-
characterised	parts	(O'Malley	et	al.	2007;	Rabinow	and	Bennett	2008).		
In	contrast,	the	genomes	approach	to	synthetic	biology	works	at	the	whole	
genome	 level	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 determining	 ‘minimal	 genomes’	 through	 the	
deletion	of	so	called	‘non-essential’	genes.	That	is,	genes	that	can	be	‘knocked	
out’	without	causing	the	death	of	the	organism.	This	is	being	pursued	with	the	
aim	 of	making	 simple,	 standardised	 ‘chassis.’	 Chassis	 being	 the	mechanistic	
term	employed	by	synthetic	biology	to	denote	a	cell/organism	within	which	a	
synthetic	 biology	 system	 can	 be	 located	 and	 ‘operated.’	 Currently	 the	 most	
common	 prokaryotic	 chassis	 is	 E.	 coli	 and	 the	 most	 common	 eukaryotic	
chassis	is	the	yeast,	S.	 cerevisiae.	It	is	hoped	that	such	chassis	can	be	used	as	
stripped	 down	 frames	 in	 which	 to	 ‘assemble’	 desired	 synthetic	 genomes	
(O'Malley	et	al.	2007;	Rabinow	and	Bennett	2008).		
The	most	prominent	example	of	this	approach	is	the	work	of	Craig	Venter	
and	his	team.11	In	1999	they	announced	the	construction	of	a	minimal	genome	
																																								 								
11	In	embracing	the	genomes	approach,	it	should	be	stressed,	these	synthetic	biology’s	do	not	
adhere	 to	 the	 parts-devices-systems	 approach	 promoted	 by	 Endy	 (2005).	 There	 approach	 is	
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for	Mycoplasma	 genitalium	 (C.	 A.	 Hutchison	 et	 al.	 1999),	 which	 the	 team	
called	Mycoplasma	laboratorium.	While	in	2016,	having	shifted	their	attention	
to	Mycoplasma	 mycoides,	 they	 succeeded	 in	 produced	 a	 second	 synthetic,	
minimal	cell,	which	 they	named	syn3.0	 (full	name	 is	 JCVI-syn3.0)12	(Clyde	A.	
Hutchison	et	al.	2016).	13	Syn3.0	 is,	 they	claim,	“a	working	approximation	of	a	
minimal	 cellular	 genome”	 being	 the	 result	 of	 a	 compromise	 between	 “small	
genome	 size	 and	 a	 workable	 growth	 rate”	 (Clyde	 A.	 Hutchison	 et	 al.	 2016:	
1414).	Containing	only	473	genes,	syn3.0	currently	has	the	smallest	genome	of	
any	autonomously	replicating	organism	(Clyde	A.	Hutchison	et	al.	2016).14	
Finally,	the	third	of	the	common	approaches	to	‘doing’	synthetic	biology	is	
the	 systems	 approach.	 This	 approach	 aims	 to	 construct	 minimal	 cellular	
systems,	 and	 to	 use	 “novel	 or	modified	 natural	 systems	 to	 test	 and	 improve	
theoretical	models	 of	 biological	 phenomena”	 (O'Malley	 et	 al.	 2007:	 59).	 It	 is	
also	hoped	that	such	systems	will	advance	discussion	around	what	constitutes	
life,	and	where	the	transition	from	non-life	to	life	occurs.	
While	 all	 three	 approaches	 are	 prominent	within	 the	 burgeoning	 field	 of	
synthetic	 biology,	 and	 all	 are	 influenced	 by	 concepts	 and	 approaches	 from	
engineering,	it	is	the	first	approach,	the	‘parts’	approach,	which	has	garnered	
the	most	attention.	It	is	also	this	approach	which	is	most	prevalent	within	the	
Centre	 and	 within	 which	 the	 discipline’s	 engineering	 approach	 is	 most	
explicit.	As	such,	it	is	this	approach	that	I	shall	focus	on	here.	
The	first	synthetic	biology	papers	
Nevertheless,	 despite	 their	 differences,	 all	 of	 these	 strands	 of	 synthetic	
biology	are	unified	in	their	broad	approach	to	biology.	An	approach	that	has	
been	 traced	 back,	 past	 the	 work	 of	 Knight	 and	 co.	 at	 MIT,	 to	 the	 work	 of	
																																								 																																								 																																								 													
arguably	 more	 similar	 to	 craftwork	 than	 to	 the	 industrial	 engineering-inspired	 approach	
promoted	by	Endy	and	embraced	by	the	Centre	directors.	
12	A	name	the	ETC	group	have	morphed	into	Synthia	3.0	(ETC	Group	2016).	
13	syn3.0	was	produced	by	 transplanting	a	pared	back	version	of	 the	genome	of	Mycoplasma	
mycoides	into	a	Mycoplasma	capricolum	cell	which	had	be	stripped	of	its	own	DNA.	
14	For	comparison,	the	human	genome	contains	more	than	20000	genes.	
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Benner	 and	 Schultz.	 In	 1989	 these	 chemists	 constructed	 two	 artificial	
nucleotides	in	order	to	extend	the	DNA	‘alphabet’	from	four	‘letters’	(A,	T,	C,	
G)	 to	six	 (Gibbs	2004).	Yet,	as	Gibb	(2004)	contends,	 the	motivation	 for	 this	
work	was	grounded	in	science,	rather	than	in	engineering,	pursuing	as	 it	did	
knowledge	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 illumination	 rather	 than	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
application. 15 	Synthetic	 biology	 as	 Keller	 (2009b)	 notes,	 and	 as	 shall	 be	
discussed	 in	 chapter	 four,	 is	 generally	 driven	 by	 the	 latter.	 Thus	 perhaps	
because	of	this	difference	in	motivation,	or	perhaps	because	the	work	of	these	
chemists	 was	 too	 early	 to	 be	 placed	 on	 the	 radar	 of	 young,	 newly	 fledged	
synthetic	 biologists,	 two	 papers	 from	 2000	 are	more	 commonly	 cited	 as	 the	
first	 examples	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 to	 emerge.	 These	 papers	 by	 Gardner,	
Cantor	 and	 Collins	 (2000)	 and	 Elowitz	 and	 Leibler	 (2000)	 introduced	 two	
‘devices,’	the	toggle	switch	and	the	repressilator	respectively.		
These	 devices,	 designed	 to	 resemble	 electrical	 parts	 in	 terms	 of	 function,	
have	had	a	significant	influence	on	the	subsequent	work	in	synthetic	biology	
(Gibbs	2004).	This	is	despite	the	fact	that	both	papers	predated	the	term	being	
(re)coined	 and	 thus	 are	 devoid	 of	 its	 mention	 and,	 for	 that	 matter,	 of	 any	
mention	 of	 the	 engineering	 concepts	 discussed	 above.	 Nevertheless	 both	
papers	could	be	said	to	embrace	an	engineering	approach	to	biology,	and	be	
focused	on	application,	as	subsequent	synthetic	biology	work	does.		
Another	early	and	influential,	though	much	more	controversial,	paper	was	
that	 by	 Cello,	 Paul,	 and	 Wimmer	 (2002).	 These	 three	 microbiologists	
synthesised	 the	 poliovirus	 by	 assembling	 oligonucleotides	 following	
instructions	 from	 the	 written	 DNA	 sequence	 of	 the	 virus.	 Following	 their	
success,	the	authors	warned	that	“[t]here	is	no	doubt	that	technical	advances	
will	 permit	 the	 rapid	 synthesis	 of	 the	 poliovirus	 genome,	 given	 access	 to	
sophisticated	resources”	(Cello	et	al.	2002:	1018)	and	therefore	that	vaccination	
programs	 should	 remain	 vigilant	 in	 case	 bioterrorists	 seize	 such	 an	
																																								 								
15	According	to	Gibb	(2004),	Benner	and	Schultz,	saw	artificial	genetics	as	a	way	of	exploring	
basic	 questions	 such	 as	 the	 origins	 of	 life	 on	 earth	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 alternative	 forms	
elsewhere	in	the	universe.	
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opportunity.	 Not	 surprisingly	 this	 contentious	 achievement	 spurred	 wide	
debate	 and	 discussion	 of	 the	 risks	 of	 synthesising	 pathogenic	 organisms.	
Including	concerns	that	if	these	scientists	could	recreate	a	deadly	virus	using	
synthetic	biology,	so	 too	could	terrorist	groups.	Concern	over	biosafety16	and	
biosecurity17	was	not	however	limited	to	the	potential	for	rare	pathogens,	such	
as	polio,	to	be	synthesised	in	the	lab.	But	rather	extended	to	the	potential	for	
novel	pathogenic	agents	to	be	designed,	created,	and	released.		
Discussing	an	uncertain	future	
This	is	the	dark	underbelly	of	all	the	hype	about	synthetic	biology.	The	two	
sides	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 coin,	 on	 one	 side	 of	 which	 are	 the	 potential	
novel	organisms	which	will	‘save	the	world,’	and	on	the	other,	those	that	could	
cause	 death	 and	 destruction.	 The	 prevalence	 of	 discussions	 regarding	 the	
threat	 of	 such	 hypothetical	 adverse	 effects,	 is	 largely	 the	 work	 of	 certain	
activists,	 predominately	 those	 from	 the	 ETC	 Group.	 The	 ETC	 Group,	 a	
Canadian-based	 social	 activism	 group	whose	 tag	 line	 is,	 “monitoring	 power,	
tracking	 technology,	 strengthening	 diversity”	 (ETC	 Group),	 have	 written	
extensively	on	synthetic	biology.	They	have	also	written	much	about	‘Synthia,’	
the	 name	 they	 gave	 to	maverick	 synthetic	 biologist	 Craig	 Venter’s	 so-called	
first	 synthetic	 organism	 (Gibson	 et	 al.	 2010).18	In	 these	 reports	 (ETC	 Group	
2007,	2010),	the	ETC	Group	have	arguably	promoted	the	notion	that	synthetic	
biology’s	 uncertain	 future,	 is	 more	 certain	 than	 it	 really	 is,	 and	 more	
problematic.		
Jim	Thomas,	a	programme	director	with	the	ETC	group,	for	example,	took	
Craig	Venter’s	claims	and	promises	regarding	 ‘Synthia’	at	 face	value	when	he	
wrote:	“[t]his	is	the	quintessential	Pandora’s	box	moment	-	like	the	splitting	of	
																																								 								
16	Biosafety	 concerns	 the	 prevention	 of	 unintentional	 exposure	 to	 pathogens	 and	 toxins,	 or	
their	accidental	release.	
17Biosecurity	concerns	the	prevention	of	loss,	theft,	misuse,	or	intentional	release	of	pathogens	
and	toxins.	
18	As	discussed	in	chapter	five,	Synthia	has	been	the	basis	of	a	lot	of	discussion	regarding	the	
potential	risks	and	benefits	of	synthetic	biology.	
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the	atom	or	the	cloning	of	Dolly	the	sheep.	We	will	all	have	to	deal	with	the	
fall-out	 from	 this	 alarming	 experiment”	 (ETC	 Group	 2010).	 Yet	 despite	 the	
disturbing	 comparisons	 and	 predictions	made	 in	 this	 statement,	 as	 shall	 be	
discussed	in	chapter	five,	the	significance	of	 ‘Synthia’	has,	according	to	those	
within	 the	 field,	 been	 overstated.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 this	 mix	 of	 utopia	 and	
dystopia	 that	 has	 led	 synthetic	 biology	 to	 be	 called	 a	 dual-use	 technology.	
Consequently	 there	 is	 now	 a	 significant	 local	 and	 global	 focus	 on	 concerns	
around	the	potential	unintentional	or	intentional	release	of	harmful	synthetic	
organisms,	and	the	potential	development	of	bioweapons.		
Such	a	 focus	on	synthetic	biology’s	biosafety	and	biosecurity19	issues	 is,	 in	
turn,	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 effort	 to	 achieve	 upstream	 engagement20	with	 social	
scientists	and	the	‘public’	in	regards	to	the	field’s	so-called	ELSI	(Ethical,	Legal	
and	 Social	 Issues/Implications).	 To	 this	 ends,	 funding	 agencies	 are	
increasingly	 requiring	 scientists	 to	 pair	 up	 with	 social	 scientists	 in	 order	 to	
receive	grants.	From	a	cynical	perspective	this	situation	may	be	motivating,	or	
at	 least	prompting,	 scientists’	 interest	 in	 forging	 such	partnerships.	Whereas	
from	 a	 social	 science	 perspective,	 the	 desire	 to	 address	 potential	 issues	 and	
implications	 early	 appears	 to	 be	 driven	 by	 the	 hope	 of	 subsequently	
influencing	the	development	of	the	technology,	and	thus	avoiding	the	scenario	
																																								 								
19	Interestingly	biosecurity	has	been	of	greater	concern	 in	 the	US	than	 in	Europe.	 Indeed,	as	
Lentzos	 (2012)	 details,	 the	 US	 has	 been	 much	 more	 aggressive	 in	 addressing	 the	 security	
dimensions	 of	 synthetic	 biology.	 For	 example,	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Health	 and	 Human	
Services	(HHS)	issued	guidelines	in	2010	for	DNA	synthesis	companies	to	follow	in	screening	
both	 customers	 and	 their	 requested	 sequences.	 While	 the	 Recombinant	 DNA	 Advisory	
Committee	proposed	expanding	the	scope	of	the	NIH	Guidelines	so	that	they	would	include	
synthetically	produced	nucleic	acid	molecules,	and	The	National	Science	Advisory	Board	 for	
Biosecurity	 (NSABB)	have	proposed	 a	novel	 form	of	oversight	 for	 synthetic	biology	 (NSABB	
2010).	In	contrast	concern	in	Europe	has	been	focused	on	biosafety	(Schmidt	et	al.	2008)	with	
the	 European	 Commission	 calling,	 in	 2005,	 for	 a	 review	 of	 the	 adequacy	 of	 existing	 safety	
regulations	for	managing	engineered	microorganisms	and	protecting	against	their	inadvertent	
release	(NEST	2005).	In	terms	of	biosecurity,	the	United	Kingdom	and	the	Netherlands	stand	
out	amongst	the	European	countries	for	having	considered	the	biosecurity	aspects	of	synthetic	
biology	 in	 some	detail,	 however	unlike	 the	US	both	have	 concluded	 that	 current	 regulatory	
frameworks	are	sufficient	to	address	the	risk	of	misuse	(Lentzos	2012).	
20	That	 is	 a	 broad	 engagement	 with	 synthetic	 biology’s	 ELSI	 before,	 rather	 than	 after,	 the	
science	is	fully	developed.	
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whereby	ethical	and	social	assessment	lags	behind	technological	development	
(Deplazes	et	al.	2009).		
To	 an	 extent	 this	 focus	 on	 ELSI	 is	 having	 a	 discernable	 impact	 on	 the	
discussion	around	and	within	synthetic	biology,	as	well	as	on	the	 field	 itself.	
‘Safety	by	design’	has,	for	example,	become	a	catchphrase.	Indicating	an	effort	
to	address	bioerror	and	bioterror	threats	by	‘designing	in’	safety	features	such	
as	 ‘kill	 switches’	 and	 ‘quorum	 sensing.’	 Features	which	would	 stop	 bacterial	
populations	 growing	 too	 big	 if	 they	were	 released,	 or	 would	 prime	 them	 to	
‘self-destruct’	 once	 they	 had	 completed	 their	 task.	 However	 critics	 of	 this	
attempt	 by	 synthetic	 biologists	 to	 assuage	 ELSI-based	 critiques	 of	 the	
discipline	argue	that	microorganisms	by	nature	evolve	and	mutate.	Therefore,	
there	is	no	guarantee	that	such	‘designed	in’	safety	features	would	work.		
A	second	catchphrase,	‘responsible	innovation21,’	has	thus	arisen	in	part	as	a	
response	 to	 the	 critique	 of	 safety	 by	 design. 22 	‘Responsible	 innovation’	
indicates	a	belief	 that	 synthetic	biologists	not	only	need	to	 include	safety	by	
design,	but	that	they	must	also	develop	socially	responsible	products.	Vincent	
(2013),	 however,	 vehemently	 questions	 this	 approach.	 Asking	 why	 each	
generation	develops	new	technologies	to	rectify	the	damage	caused	by	the	last	
generation’s	 new	 technologies	without	 stopping	 to	question	 their	 belief	 that	
their	new	technologies	are	safe	and	‘responsible.’	She	writes:	
	“synthetic	 biology	 is	 often	promoted	 as	 a	 source	 of	 technological	
fixes:	 biofuels	meant	 to	 stop	 the	 overconsumption	 of	 fossile	 [sic]	
fuels,	synthetic	bacteria	to	repair	the	damages	caused	by	chemical	
industries	 and	 nuclear	 power	 stations.	 But	 the	 concern	 with	 the	
damages	due	to	the	previous	generations	of	‘new	technologies’	does	
not	invite	reflections	about	the	next	new	generations,	i.e.	the	long-
term	unintended	consequences	of	all	technological	innovations.	To	
																																								 								
21	Also	termed	responsible	research	and	innovation	(RRI)	
22	It	 is	 also	 at	 least	 an	 attempt	 at	 developing	 a	 strategy	 to	 address	 and	 assess	 not	 only	 the	
societal	 and	 ethical	 issues	 with	 synthetic	 biology	 but	 also	 its	 technical	 aspects.	 For	 a	
discussion	of	RRI	in	regards	to	synthetic	biology	see	(Gregorowius	and	Deplazes-Zemp	2016).		
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be	sure,	the	advocates	of	synthetic	biology	include	risk	assessment	
in	 their	 programs	 in	 the	 name	 of	 ‘responsible	 innovation.’	 They	
earnestly	address	issues	of	biosafety	and	biosecurity	in	their	annual	
conferences.	 Yet	 they	 only	 rely	 on	 technological	 solutions	 of	
confinement	 (physical,	 biological,	 evolutionary	 confinements),	
which	in	turn	will	raise	new	issues.	Whatever	the	plausibility	of	the	
technical	 solutions	 for	 preventing	 the	 dissemination	 of	 and	
contamination	 by	 synthetic	 organisms,	 they	 never	 take	 into	
account	 past	 experiences,	 never	 draw	 lessons	 from	 the	 past”	
(Vincent	2013:	30).	
Based	on	my	observations	of	the	field,	I	would	agree	with	Vincent	that	the	
response	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 community	 to	 the	 potential	 risks	 of	 their	
burgeoning	 field	 often	 leaves	 a	 lot	 to	 be	 desired.	 However,	 I	 would	 also	
acknowledge,	as	Deplazes	et	al.	 (2009)	do,	 that	much	of	 the	ELSI	discussion	
around	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 based	 on	 speculation.	 Exploring	 as	 it	 does	 the	
potential	 impacts	 of	 future	 applications,	 and	 as	 yet	 unrealised	 scientific	 and	
technological	advances.		
Furthermore,	 such	 speculation,	 as	Deplazes	 et	 al.	 argue,	 can	be	grounded	
on	“exaggerated	hopes	or	unnecessarily	bleak	scenarios”	(2009:	68).	Indeed,	it	
could	be	argued	that	the	visions	of	Alan,	and	Tom	Knight,	for	the	gilded	future	
of	synthetic	biology	 fall	 into	this	 former	category.	While	 the	concerns	of	 the	
ETC	Group,	 that	 advances	 in	 synthetic	 biology	will	 see	 the	design,	 creation,	
and	release	of	dangerous	organisms	and/or	novel	pathogens,	arguably	fall,	at	
least	 currently,	 into	 the	 latter	 category.	 Tucker	 and	 Zilinskas	 for	 example	
argue	 that	 such	 a	 scenario	 is	 “extremely	unlikely”	 (2006:	 38).	While	 Lentzos	
(2009,	2012)	points	out	that	making	bioweapons	is	actually	incredibly	difficult	
and	 that,	 at	 least	 at	present,	 terrorists	do	not	have	 the	capability	 to	develop	
such	weapons	using	synthetic	biology.23	Yet	despite	 the	speculative	nature	of	
																																								 								
23 	Some	 critics	 have	 therefore	 argued	 that	 the	 focus	 of	 biosecurity	 concerns	 should	
consequently	centre	on	military	uses	of	synthetic	biology	rather	than	potential	terrorist	uses	
(Lentzos	 2009).	 Considering,	 perhaps,	 that	 before	 it	 was	 shut	 down	 in	 1969	 the	 US	
bioweapons	program	had	 succeeded	 in	weaponising	 and	mass-producing	 agents	 that	would	
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such	visions	of	a	dystopian	future,	 just	discussing	them	with	any	seriousness	
bears	risks.	For,	as	Lentzos	et	al.	write,		
“there	are	also	hazards	in	imagining	and	describing	the	future	in	a	
certain	 way;	 particularly	 when	 certain	 technological	 trajectories	
(and	 the	 actions	 of	 certain	 social	 groups)	 are	 presented	 as	
inevitable.	 The	 reason	 being,	 once	 spoken,	 there	 is	 a	 tendency	 to	
conceive	of	such	scenarios	as	real,	imminent,	and	in	need	of	action	
on	the	part	of	scientists,	regulators,	concerned	interest	groups,	and	
others”	(2012:	135).	
Yet	 such	 a	 hypothetical,	 future-oriented	 focus	 is	 common	 in	many	of	 the	
current	 ‘ELSI’	 discussions	 around	 synthetic	 biology.	 Not	 just	 in	 relation	 to	
biosafety	and	biosecurity	(e.g.	Kelle	2007,	2009;	Schmidt	2008,	2010)	but	also	
in	 regards	 to	 intellectual	 property	 (IP)	 and	 patenting	 (e.g.	 Bhutkar	 2005;	
Kumar	 and	Rai	 2007),	 the	 future	 governance	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 (e.g.	 Kelle	
2007;	Weir	 and	Selgelid	 2009),	 and	global	 equity	of	 access	 to	partake	 in	 the	
science	 and	 the	 equitability	 of	 its	 products	 (e.g.	 Deplazes	 et	 al.	 2009;	
Wellhausen	 and	Mukunda	 2009).	 Such	 discussions	 are	 both	 interesting	 and	
potentially	very	important,	given	that	without	them	there	is	a	risk	of	the	social	
and	ethical	discussions	running	behind	the	science.	However,	such	discussions	
can,	as	we	saw	with	the	disconnect	between	the	biosecurity	concerns	and	the	
scientific	reality,	instead	run	ahead	of	the	science	and	thus	be	out	of	step	with	
the	current	reality	of	the	science.		
In	the	case	of	IP	and	patenting,	concerns	around	patent	thickets	and	anti-
commons	developing	within	synthetic	biology,	while	worthy	of	discussion,	are	
more	 representative	 of	 potential	 future	 scenarios	 than	 the	 current	 situation.	
While	the	discussions	around	global	equity,	an	issue	of	great	potential	ethical	
import,	 are	 arguably	 also	 a	 little	 premature	 given	 that	 only	 a	 handful	 of	
																																								 																																								 																																								 													
cause	anthrax,	tularemia,	brucellosis,	Q-fever,	Venezuelan	equine	encephalitis,	and	botulism	
(Croddy	2000).	
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products	 have	 so	 far	 been	 brought	 to	 market.24	Such	 ELSI	 discussions	 are,	
therefore,	based	on	various	hypotheses	and	possible	scenarios,	rather	than	on	
the	 scientific	 reality.	 A	 situation	 which	 led	 Vincent	 (2013)	 to	 claim	 that	
ethicists	 and	 activists	 (she	 does	 not	 mention	 other	 social	 scientists)	 are	 so	
caught	up	in	their	own	imagined	futures	that	they	are	missing	the	chance	to	
formulate	a	meaningful	critique	of	the	promises	of	synthetic	biology.		
Tait	 (2009)	 is	 likewise	 critical	of	 the	ELSI	process,	using	 the	gap	between	
these	 ELSI	 discussions	 and	 the	 current	 reality	 of	 the	 science,	 to	 dispute	 the	
inherent	 usefulness	 of	 upstream	 engagement.	 While	 I	 recognise	 the	 gap	
Vincent	 and	 Tait	 address,	 I	 would	 nevertheless	 disagree	 with	 Tait	 on	 this	
point.	 Upstream	 engagement,	 I	 would	 contend,	 is	 potentially	 very	 valuable,	
but	 future-focused	 discussions	 should	 not	 be	 the	 sole	 pursuit	 of	 such	
engagement.	Rather,	like	Marris	and	Rose	(2012),	I	would	argue	that	a	valuable	
part	of	such	upstream	engagement	is	the	close	involvement	of	social	scientists	
and	 synthetic	 biologists	 as	 the	 field	 develops.	 As	 Marris	 and	 Rose	 (2012)	
address,	 an	 important	way	 of	 achieving	 this	 desired	 involvement	 is	 through	
embedding	 social	 scientists	 within	 the	 field	 as	 it	 develops.	 While	 such	
involvement	 can	 bolster	 discussions	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biology-specific	 ELSI,	
which	are	more	grounded	in	the	current	reality	of	the	science’s	progress,	it	can	
also	lead	to	a	greater	understanding	of	the	progress	and	process	of	the	day-to-
day	 science	 itself.	 It	was	 this	 latter	prospect	which	most	 interested	me.	 For,	
while	 I	 acknowledge	 the	 importance	 of	 discussions	 of	 biosafety,	 biosecurity,	
intellectual	 property,	 governance,	 and	 global	 equity,	 I	 am	 myself	 more	
interested	in	what	is	actually	happening	within	the	developing	discipline	on	a	
day-to-day	basis.	And	how	the	synthetic	biologists	themselves	think	about	the	
field,	its	processes,	promises,	problems,	and	potential	products.		
																																								 								
24	For	example,	Jay	Keasling’s	synthetic	version	of	the	anti-malarial	drug	Artemisinin	has	only	
recently	been	brought	to	market,	and	while	it	may	indeed	cause	issues,	 it	 is	still	too	early	to	
say	what	impact	it	will	have	in	terms	of	equity	with	any	degree	of	certainty.	
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Central	research	questions	
With	these	interests	in	mind	the	central	aim	of	this	research	project	was	to	
explore	 the	 interactions	between	engineering	and	biology,	and	thus	between	
engineers	and	biologists,	within	the	burgeoning	 field	of	synthetic	biology.	 In	
doing	 so,	 the	 project	 investigated	 the	 following	 overarching	 research	
questions:	
• Synthetic	 biology	 is	 framed	 as	 a	 hybrid	 discipline	 of	 biology	 and	
engineering.	 However,	 these	 parent	 disciplines	 bear	 significant	
differences	 in	 education,	 knowledge	 base,	 approach,	 language,	 and	
methods.	Therefore,	how	can	we	think	about,	and	make	sense	of,	the	
relationship	between	 synthetic	biology’s	 constituent,	but	divergent,	
‘halves’?25	
• How	 does	 the	 relationship	 between	 engineering	 and	 biology	
manifest	itself	in	the	day-to-day	workings	of	synthetic	biologists,	and	
what	does	it	mean	to	attempt	to	‘engineer	biology’?	
• What	 impact	 does	 applying	 an	 engineering	 framework	 to	 biology	
have	on	the	synthetic	biologists’	understandings	of	the	‘products’	of	
their	work?		
• How	does	synthetic	biology	(and	indeed	previous	efforts	to	integrate	
biology	and	engineering)	 fit	 into	the	broader	history	of	attempts	to	
investigate	 and	 shape	 the	 biological	 world?	 And	 can	 synthetic	
biology	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 part	 of	 an	 attempt	 to	 ‘do’	 and	 think	 of	
biology	differently?	
In	 order	 to	 pursue	 these	 questions	 I	 undertook	 a	 twelve-month	
ethnographic	 study	 within	 the	 Centre	 mentioned	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	
chapter,	 the	details	of	which	are	discussed	 in	 chapter	 two.	Chapter	 two	also	
provides	a	portrait	of	the	Centre	itself	and	addresses	some	of	the	issues	I	faced	
in	 gaining	 acceptance	 into	 the	 field	 and	 ultimately	 leaving	 it.	 Interestingly,	
despite	the	relative	openness	of	synthetic	biology	to	collaboration	with	social	
																																								 								
25	I	shall	address	my	rationale	for	speaking	of	synthetic	biology	as	consisting	of	two	‘halves,’	or	
being	made	up	of	two	‘groups,’	in	chapter	three.	
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scientists,	ethnographies	of	the	day-to-day	practices	of	this	community	are	so	
far	 rare.	 As	 such	 this	 thesis	 is	 a	 significant	 contribution	 to	 this	 growing	
literature	(Calvert	2010a;	Cockerton	2011;	Molyneux-Hodgson	and	Meyer	2009;	
Rabinow	and	Bennett	2012;	Roosth	2010).	It	also	draws	on,	and	contributes	to,	
literature	 on	 the	 social	 aspects	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 (e.g.	 Balmer	 and	Martin	
2008;	 Calvert	 2008;	 Frow	 and	 Calvert	 2013;	 Keller	 2009b;	 Lentzos	 2009;	
Lentzos	et	al.	2012;	O'Malley	et	al.	2007;	Rabinow	and	Bennett	2009;	Schmidt	
et	 al.	 2009),	 as	 well	 as	 the	 rich	 body	 of	 ethnographies	 that	 explore	 the	
practices,	 impacts,	 and	 implications	 of	 science	 and	 engineering	 (e.g.	
Bucciarelli	 1994;	Downey	 1998;	Knorr	Cetina	 1999;	Latour	and	Woolgar	 1979;	
Rabinow	1996,	1999;	Traweek	1988;	Vinck	and	Blanco	2003).		
Theoretical	framework	
Synthetic	 biology	 is,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 an	 emerging	 hybrid	 discipline,	
which	 combines	 the	 disparate	 disciplines	 of	 biology	 and	 engineering,	 and	
which	 raises	 a	 wide	 array	 of	 social,	 ethical,	 philosophical,	 and	 scientific	
questions.	As	 such,	 there	 are	many	bodies	 of	 sociological	 and	 STS	 literature	
within	 which	 a	 study	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 could	 find	 a	 home,	 and	 which	 I	
could	therefore	draw	upon	to	investigate	the	above	questions.	For	example	my	
research	 interests	 led	 me	 to	 explore	 historical	 literature	 addressing	 the	
beginnings	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 in	 both	 its	 current	 incarnation	 and	 the	
incarnations	 of	 its	 historical	 namesakes.	 Delving	 into	 the	 stories	 of	 these	
previous	 ‘synthetic	 biologies’	 subsequently	 led	me	 to	 literature	 that	 explores	
the	 broader	 histories	 of	 biology	 (e.g.	 Bud	 1993;	 Caron	 1988;	 Gottweis	 1998;	
Haraway	 2004;	 Kay	 1993,	 1995,	 2000;	 Keller	 2000;	 Wright	 1994),	 and	
engineering	 (e.g.	 Anderson	 and	 Tushman	 1990;	 Buchanan	 1985;	 Divall	 1990;	
Hill	 1984;	T.	Hughes	 1983;	Noble	 1977;	Vincenti	 1993),	 and	ultimately	 that	of	
previous	 attempts	 to	 take	 an	 interventionalist	 approach	 to	 biology	 and	 thus	
understand	 biology	 in	 engineering	 or	 mathematical	 terms	 (e.g.	 Bud	 1993;	
Compton	 and	 Bunker	 1939;	 Keller	 2002;	 Keller	 2009b;	 Leduc	 1910,	 1911,	 1912;	
Loeb	 1912;	 MIT	 ;	 Pauly	 1987;	 Rashevsky	 1938;	 Rasmussen	 and	 Tilman	 1998;	
Sourkes	 1955;	 Thompson	 1961;	 Turing	 1952;	 Wright	 1994).	 However,	 I	 have	
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ultimately	chosen	to	explore	synthetic	biology	as	a	case	study	of	a	new	way	of	
thinking	about	and	interacting	with	biology.		
Given	 the	nature	of	what	 synthetic	biology	 is	 attempting	 to	achieve	–	 the	
hybridisation	of	 ideas,	 language,	techniques,	and	indeed	people	from	biology	
and	engineering	 in	order	 to	render	biology,	and	thus	 life,	engineerable	–	 the	
discipline	 itself	 and	 thus	a	 case	 study	of	 it,	ultimately	possess	both	practical	
and	 conceptual	 components.	 That	 is,	 both	 practical	 and	 conceptual	 factors	
must	be	considered	 in	order	 to	answer	 the	question,	and	simultaneously	 the	
problem,	 which	 synthetic	 biology	 both	 poses	 and	 faces	 -	 how	 does	 one	
endeavour	 to	 engineer	 life?	 Practically	 speaking,	 synthetic	 biology	 is	
attempting	to	address	this	problem	by	forging	a	new	discipline	using	the	skills	
and	expertise	of	both	biologists	and	engineers.	Thus	the	following	case	study,	
which	 highlights	 the	 conflicts	 and	 compromises	 inherent	 in	 this	 exercise	 in	
discipline	 building,	 draws	 from	 and	 contributes	 to	 the	 sociological	 and	 STS	
literature	 on	 interdisciplinarity	 and	 discipline	 formation.	 Whereas	
conceptually,	synthetic	biology’s	notion	that	life	is	engineerable,	that	it	can	be	
thought	 of,	 and	 manipulated	 to	 become,	 stripped	 back,	 modular	 and	
standardised,	 links	 this	 case	 study	 to	 the	 STS	 literature	 on	 reductionism.	 In	
order	 to	 locate	 this	 study	within	 these	broad	bodies	of	 literature	 I	 shall	 first	
briefly	discuss	them	in	turn.	
Interdisciplinarity	
The	term	interdisciplinarity,	as	Klein	(1990)	discusses,	has	been	in	common	
usage	 since	 the	 latter	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 and	 broadly	 refers	 to	
various	 attempts	 and	 desires	 to	 “integrate	 different	 perspectives”	 (1990:	 15).	
However,	 as	 Klein	 makes	 clear,	 its	 definition	 remains	 contested.	 Indeed,	 it	
would	 seem	 that	 all	 cross-disciplinary	 practices,	 including	multidisciplinary,	
interdisciplinary,	and	transdisciplinary	working,	have	multiple	and	contested	
definitions	(see	for	example	Aboelela	et	al.	2007;	Callard	and	Fitzgerald	2015;	
Stock	and	Burton	2011;	Van	den	Besselaar	and	Heimeriks	2001).	Thus,	perhaps	
because	of	this	lack	of	clear	definitions,	and	what	Frickel	et	al.	(2016)	describe	
as	the	plasticity	of	meaning	surrounding	interdisciplinarity,	and	its	status	as	a	
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boundary	object,	 ‘interdisciplinary’	 is	often	taken	to	be	an	umbrella	 term	for	
all	 forms	 of	 cross-disciplinary	 practice	 (Barry	 et	 al.	 2008;	 Heimeriks	 2013).	
Nevertheless,	regardless	of	terminology	there	seems	to	be	a	general	consensus	
that	 there	 has	 been	 an	 increasing	 shift	 towards	 interdisciplinarity	 in	 recent	
decades.		
While	 Klein	 (1990,	 1996)	 provides	 a	 useful	 and	 detailed	 history	 of	
interdisciplinarity,	 linking	 it	 back	 to	 its	 historical	 antecedents,	 most	
sociological	 literature	 on	 this	 subject	 focuses	 instead	 on	 measuring	 and	
discussing	the	nature,	benefits,	and	challenges	of	implementing	various	cross-
disciplinary	working	 relationships.	 Indeed	 one	 prominent	 theme	within	 this	
literature	 addresses	 the	 formation	of	 interdisciplinary	 collaborations	 (see	 for	
example	 Derry	 et	 al.	 1998;	 Klein	 1996)	 and	 the	 barriers	 that	 need	 to	 be	
overcome	in	order	to	allow	them	to	form	(see	for	example	Bauer	1990;	Casey	
2010;	 Frodeman	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Klein	 2010;	 Laudel	 and	 Origgi	 2006;	 Lélé	 and	
Norgaard	2005;	Öberg	2009;	Repko	2012;	Winowiecki	et	al.	2011).	Another	key	
theme	 is	 the	 development	 and/or	 exploration	 of	 various	ways	 of	measuring,	
assessing,	 and	 evaluating	 the	 resultant	 interdisciplinarity	 of	 such	 teams	 (see	
for	example	Huutoniemi	et	al.	2010;	Morillo	et	al.	2003;	Porter	and	Rafols	2009;	
Rafols	and	Meyer	2010;	Van	den	Besselaar	and	Heimeriks	2001).	While	others,	
such	as	Rhoten	(2003),	Strathern	(2005),	and	Mansilla	 (2006),	argue	that	 the	
most	important	features	of	interdisciplinarity	defy	such	measurement.		
What	arguably	underlies	much	of	these	discussions	of	interdisciplinarity	is	
the	assumption	that	it	is,	itself,	a	positive	research	goal.	Indeed	much	is	made	
of	interdisciplinarity	being	both	an	antidote	to	the	shortcomings	of	traditional	
disciplinarity,26	and	 a	 panacea	 for	 research	 into	 all	 our	 contemporary	 social,	
environmental,	and	political	ills	(Lawrence	2010;	National	Science	Foundation.	
Directorate	 for	 Social	 2011;	 Stock	 and	 Burton	 2011;	 Stokols	 2014).	 Such	
																																								 								
26	Understood	as	being	the	assembling	of	sets	of	elements,	such	as	“objects	of	study,	methods	
of	 analysis,	 scholars,	 students,	 journals	 and	 grants”	 (Messer-Davidow	 et	 al.	 1993:	 3)	 into	
distinct	disciplines	which	become	embodied	in	institutions,	systems	of	training,	and	canons	of	
work	which	in	turn	set	the	frameworks	for	the	kinds	of	questions	and	answers	each	discipline	
pursues.	
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assumptions	 have	 lead	 to	 discussions	 regarding	 the	 relative	 benefits	 of	
interdisciplinarity	and	disciplinarity	(see	for	example	Austin	et	al.	2008;	T.	R.	
Miller	 et	 al.	 2008),	 and	 of	 	 Mode	 1	 vs.	 Mode	 2	 knowledge	 production	
(Heimeriks	2013).	Discussions	which,	arguably,	tend	to	be	uncritically	positive	
about	 interdisciplinarity	 while	 portraying	 disciplinary	 work	 as	 homogenous,	
oppressive	 and	 closed	 (Frickel	 et	 al.	 2016).	On	 this	 note	 Frickel	 et	 al.	 (2016)	
contend	 that	 discussions	 of	 interdisciplinarity	 tend	 to	 be	 underpinned	 by	
unquestioned	 assumptions	 regarding	 disciplinary	 and	 interdisciplinary	
research.	 Assumptions	 which	 posit	 that	 interdisciplinary	 research	 is	 better;	
that	disciplines	are	silos	which	constrain	the	development	of	interdisciplinary	
knowledge;	 and	 that	 interdisciplinary	 interactions	 are	 free	 of	 the	 status	
hierarchies	 and	 power	 dynamics	 common	 within	 disciplines	 (Frickel	 et	 al.	
2016).	Frickel	et	al.	 further	argue	 that	 insufficient	attention	has	been	paid	 to	
the	 pressure	 put	 upon	 institutions	 and	 researchers	 to	 embrace	
interdisciplinarity,	 and	 the	 long-term	 impacts	 such	 pressure	 will	 have	 on	
education	and	research	landscapes.	
Like	 Jacobs	and	Frickel	 (2009),	 and	Klein	 (1996),	Frickel	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 thus	
turn	the	spotlight	on	this	assumption	by	exploring	the	wider	institutional	and	
political	 context	 of	 interdisciplinary	 activities.	With	 this	 focus,	 Frickel	 et	 al.	
(2016)	argue	 that	 interdisciplinarity	 is	 currently	 encouraged	and	 incentivised	
from	both	within	and	outside	of	academia,	driven	by	political	and	economic	
interests,	 as	 well	 as	 academic	 interests.	 According	 to	 these	 authors,	 this	
“insistent	and	sustained	push	from	administrators,	policy	makers,	and	funding	
agencies	to	engineer	new	research	collaborations	across	disciplines”	(Frickel	et	
al.	2016:	5)	is	seldom	acknowledged.		
Bauer	 likewise	 highlights	 the	 too	 frequent	 lack	 of	 critical	 analysis	 of	
interdisciplinarity,	writing	 that,	 “[l]ike	 any	 new	 venture,	 an	 interdisciplinary	
one	must	demonstrate	its	value	and	not	expect	to	be	appreciated	before	that	
event”	(1990:	113).	While	Barry	et	al	(2008)	argue	that	contrary	to	the	sorts	of	
assumptions	Frickel	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 outline	 as	being	prevalent	 in	 the	 literature,	
disciplines	 and	 interdisciplines	 can	 be	 equally	 closed	 or	 open,	 internally	
divided	or	homogeneous.	A	point	supported	by	Heimeriks	(2013)	who	likewise	
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argues	 that	 the	 contrasts	between	disciplinary	 and	 interdisciplinary	 research	
are	not	always	convincing.		
Nevertheless	 despite	 the	 valid	 criticisms	 of	 the	 way	 interdisciplinarity	 is	
often	viewed	as	an	unquestioned	good,	Barry	et	al.	(2008)	assert	that	it	is	not	
just	political	impetus	that	is	currently	driving	interdisciplinarity.	Rather,	they	
contend	 that	 irrespective	 of	 the	 political	 and	 institutional	 pressures,	
interdisciplinary	research	does	have	the	potential	to	be	inventive	and	open	up	
new	 possibilities.	 To	 evidence	 this	 point,	 the	 authors	 highlight	 that	
interdisciplinarity	is	far	from	a	new	phenomenon,	having	been	responsible	for	
the	 development	 of	 many,	 now	 established,	 disciplines.	 What	 Barry	 et	 al.	
(2008)	 argue	 is	 new	 about	 the	 current	 trend	 in	 interdisciplinarity	 is	 the	
demand	that	research	be	better	integrated	into	society	and	the	economy.	This	
outcome	is	sought	through	the	development	of	interdisciplinary	relationships	
between	 science/engineering	 and	 social	 sciences/arts/humanities.	 Thus,	 it	 is	
now	 expected	 that	 interdisciplinary	 projects	 will	 ensure	 that	 science	 is	
accountable	to	society	and	that	scientific	research	leads	to	economic	growth.	
Nowotny	 et	 al.	 (2001)	 and	Strathern	 (2005)	 likewise	 address	 the	 relationship	
between	 the	drive	 towards	 interdisciplinarity	 and	 the	 increasing	demand	 for	
science	 to	 engage	with	 society.	While	 Strathern	 particularly	 focuses	 on	 how	
this	 political	 drive	 affects	 those	 charged	 with	 facilitating	 such	
interdisciplinarity.	A	study	which	leads	her	to	note,	rather	pithily	that,	“[t]here	
is	 nothing	 straightforward	 about	 bringing	 together	 disciplines”	 (Strathern	
2005:	82).	
Discipline	formation	
Given	synthetic	biology’s	goal	of	bringing	biology	and	engineering	together,	
and	the	pressure	synthetic	biologists	are	under	to	engage	in	collaboration	with	
social	 scientists,	 the	 emerging	 discipline	 arguably	 classifies	 as	 an	 interesting	
case	of	interdisciplinarity.	Thus	there	is,	undoubtedly,	a	story	to	be	told	about	
the	 political	 dynamics	 and	 institutional	 pressures	 driving	 the	 formation	 and	
advance	of	synthetic	biology	(such	as	the	way	Lenoir	(1993)	explores	discipline	
formation).	 Indeed,	 the	 degree	 and	 type	 of	 interdisciplinarity	 the	 field	 is	
 31 
achieving	 is	 certainly	 ripe	 for	 analysis.	 Yet,	 while	 such	 stories	 would	 be	
interesting,	I	have	chosen	instead	to	focus	on	how	the	impetus	for	novelty	and	
invention,	acknowledged	by	Barry	et	al.	(2008),	can	drive	the	formation	of	new	
disciplines	 and	 research	 communities.	 As	 Etzkowitz	 writes,	 “[d]iscipline	
formation	 through	 synthesis	 is	 the	 next	 step	 beyond	 the	 phenomenon	 of	
interdisciplinarity.	 There	 has	 been	 a	 shift	 in	 knowledge	 organization	 from	
creating	 a	 discipline	 by	 splitting	 it	 off	 and	 differentiating	 it	 from	 an	 old	
discipline	 .	 .	 .	 New	 disciplines	 are	more	 recently	 created	 through	 synthesis”	
(2003:	 327).	 By	which	 he	means	 integrating	 elements	 of	 different	 disciplines	
into	a	new	discipline.	
Synthetic	biology	is,	I	would	argue,	just	such	a	project	to	create	a	discipline	
through	synthesis.	Thus,	 in	exploring	the	early	days	of	the	Centre’s	existence	
and	its	inhabitants’	attempts	to	realise	this	project,	this	thesis	is	a	case	study	of	
such	a	strategy,	or	indeed	a	range	of	strategies,	to	create	a	new	discipline.	And	
the	most	interesting	thing	about	this	new	discipline,	I	would	contend,	is	that	it	
is	being	formed	around	the	aspiration	for	application.	That	 is,	 it	 is	driven	by	
the	desire	to	do	things	differently	in	order	to	produce	a	new	knowledge	base	
and	new	entities	for	biotechnology.	In	this	way	it	is	not	alone.	Indeed,	as	shall	
be	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 six	 there	 are	 a	 growing	 number	 of	 new	 disciplines	
emerging	at	the	intersection	of	biology	and	engineering	which	are	also	driven	
by	this	aspiration	for	application	(examples	include	neuro-engineering,	tissue	
engineering,	nanobiotechnology,	and	genome	engineering).		
In	exploring	synthetic	biology	in	this	way	I	draw	on	the	work	of	Molyneux-
Hodgson	 and	 Meyer	 (2009),	 Swazey	 (1992),	 Clarke	 (1998),	 Leonelli	 and	
Ankeny	 (2015),	 Star	 (1999),	 Powell	 et	 al.	 (2007),	 Fujimura	 (1987),	Clarke	 and	
Fujimura	(1992),	and	Knorr	Cetina	(1999)	among	others.	Swazey’s	(1992)	work	
on	 the	 Neuroscience	 Research	 Programme,	 for	 example,	 provides	 useful	
insight	 into	 the	 ultimately	 successful	 project	 to	 create	 the	 discipline	 of	
neuroscience,	a	subject	also	addressed	by	Rose	and	Abi-Rached	(2013).	Given	
that	neuroscience	is,	as	Swazey	details,	a	discipline	forged	out	of	the	fusing	of	
“historically	disparate	disciplines”	(1992:	529),	this	project	bears	similarities	to	
that	of	synthetic	biology.	Similarly	I	draw	on	Clarke’s	(1998),	exploration	of	the	
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formation	 of	 the	 discipline	 of	 reproductive	 science,	 as	 this	 too	 details	 the	
bringing	 together	 of	 incongruent	 disciplines	 (biology,	 medicine,	 and	
agriculture)	in	order	to	study	life	differently.	Disciplines,	Clarke	asserts,	“mark	
territories	and	usually	seek	to	do	so	vividly”	being	“simultaneously	constitutive	
and	controlling”	(1998:	7).	Thus	disciplinarity	is	ultimately,	she	notes,	quoting	
Messer-Davidow,	 Shumway,	 and	 Sylvan,	 “about	 the	 coherence	 of	 a	 set	 of	
otherwise	disparate	elements:	objects	of	study,	methods	of	analysis,	scholars,	
students,	 journals,	 and	 grants	 to	 name	 a	 few.”	 It	 is	 “the	 means	 by	 which	
ensembles	 of	 diverse	 parts	 are	 brought	 into	 particular	 types	 of	 knowledge	
relations	with	 each	other”	 (Messer-Davidow	et	 al.	 quoted	by	A.	Clarke	 1998:	
15),	 and	 it	 is	 these	 relations	 that	 become	 the	 objects	 of	 study	 for	 those	
studying	discipline	formation.		
Given	synthetic	biology’s	wide	array	of	inter-relating	and	diverse	parts,	it	is	
important	 to	 clarify	 my	 particular	 point	 of	 focus.	 As	 Clarke	 quite	 astutely	
acknowledges,	 sociology	asks	 the	 simple,	 yet	pivotal,	 question	 regarding	any	
given	research	project:	“What	is	this	a	story	of?”	(1998:	273).	Thus,	much	like	
Clarke’s	(1998)	answer	to	this	question,	regarding	her	work	on	the	formation	
of	reproductive	science,	I	would	answer	as	follows.	This	thesis	contains	many	
genres	of	story.	Stories	of	the	formation	of	a	research	centre,	stories	of	conflict	
and	 compromise	 for	 those	 involved	 in	 its	 emergence,	 and	 stories	 of	
conceiving,	and	struggling	to	conceive	of	life	as	engineerable.	However,	just	as	
Clarke	did,	I	would	ultimately	contend	that	this	is	primarily	a	story	of	a	project	
to	control	life.	Clarke’s	examination	of	life	took	place	at	the	complex	organism	
level	–	humans,	lab	species,	and	agricultural	animals	–	and	focused	on	the	way	
life	 is	 controlled	 through	 the	 rationalisation	 and	 industrialisation	 of	
reproductive	 processes.	 Thus,	 by	 contrast,	 my	 object	 of	 study,	 synthetic	
biology,	 is	 a	 project	 to	 establish	 a	 discipline	 with	 the	 expressed	 aim	 of	
controlling	life	at	a	molecular	level.		
There	are	subsequently	two	parts	to	this	story,	firstly	the	work	to	establish	
the	 discipline,	 and	 secondly	 the	 work	 to	 bring	 to	 fruition	 the	 goal	 of	 the	
discipline.	In	terms	of	the	first	of	these,	the	literature	on	discipline	formation	
provides	 a	 list	 of	 factors	 that	 are	 deemed	 important	 in	 the	 successful	
 33 
establishment	of	a	discipline,	and	which	I	shall	address	in	regards	to	synthetic	
biology	in	the	following	chapters.	Powell	et	al.	(2007),	for	example,	address	the	
need	 to	 name	 a	 new	 discipline,	 to	 give	 it	 a	 label	 that	 those	 involved	 can	
coalesce	 around	 and	 identify	with	 as	 they	 carve	 out	 their	 territory.	A	name,	
they	 argue,	 demarcates	 an	 area	 of	 epistemological	 territory	while	 conferring	
“unity	on	highly	diverse	scientific	activities	and	aims”	(Powell	et	al.	2007:	07).	
However	it	cannot	be	just	any	name.	Rather,	Powell	et	al.	argue	that	choosing	
the	 ‘right’	name	 is	of	 the	utmost	 importance.	For	 it	must	connect	with	both	
the	 developing	 research	 activities	 and	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 discipline.	While	
also	acting	as	“a	marketing	tool”	by	“announcing	some	sort	of	progress	to	the	
world	outside	the	pertinent	scientific	community”	(Powell	et	al.	2007:	18).		
Clarke	(1998)	and	Swazey	(1992)	likewise	address	the	importance	of	naming	
in	establishing	and	maintaining	such	boundaries,	however	Swazey	argues	that	
it	is	not	always	straightforward	to	establish	such	a	moniker.	In	their	search	for	
the	 ‘right’	 name,	 the	 endeavour	 to	 form	 neuroscience,	 she	 highlights,	
underwent	 several	 name	 changes	 before	 settling	 on	 the	 Neuroscience	
Research	Program	 (NRP).	As	detailed	above,	 synthetic	biology	 likewise	went	
through	several	proposed	names	before	one	was	settled	on,	and	while	it	is	still	
controversial,	 the	growth	of	 the	discipline	suggests	 that	 ‘synthetic	biology’	 is	
proving	successful	as	a	label	around	which	people	will	coalesce.			
According	to	the	literature,	another	important	factor	in	the	formation	of	a	
new	 discipline	 is	 the	 need	 for	 constructive,	 cohesive,	 and	 collaborative	
relationships	between	those	involved.	Swazey	(1992)	writes	of	the	importance	
of	such	relationships	in	the	success	of	the	NRP,	noting	that	they	allowed	those	
from	 divergent	 backgrounds	 to	 communicate	 and	 work	 together	 as	
neuroscientists.	Clarke	 (1998)	also	addresses	 the	 importance	of	collaboration	
but,	the	form	of	collaboration	she	studied	differs	significantly	from	that	within	
neuroscience,	 and	 indeed	 synthetic	 biology.	 Where	 the	 participants	 in	
neuroscience	 coalesced	 to	 such	 a	 degree	 that	 they	 formed	 a	 reasonably	
coherent	 and	 cohesive	 discipline,	 those	 that	 Clarke	 studied,	 within	 the	
reproductive	sciences,	shared	a	common	research	object	but	stayed	relatively	
separate	within,	what	 she	 terms,	 “distinctive	 subworlds”	 (1998:	 149)	 (located	
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within	 biology,	 medicine,	 and	 agriculture).	 While	 there	 are	 significant	
differences	between	these	two	versions	of	 interdisciplinary	collaboration,27	in	
chapter	 three	 I	 contend	 that	 we	 can	 think	 of	 them	 using	 an	 analogy	 of	
different	kinds	of	intercellular	interactions.		
A	 further	 important	 component	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 discipline,	 as	
addressed	 in	 the	 literature,	 is	 infrastructure.	Ankeny	 and	 Leonelli	 (2011),	 for	
example,	 explore	 the	 importance	 of	 infrastructure	 to	 the	 development	 and	
function	 of	model	 organism	 communities,	 while	 Swazey	 (1992)	 discusses	 its	
importance	to	the	establishment	of	neuroscience.	Swazey	also	notes	however	
that	 such	 infrastructural	 components	 as	 research	 centres,	 conferences,	
funding	 streams,	 and	 journals	 are	 factors	 that	 have	 long	 been	 key	 to	 the	
establishment	 of	 research	 communities.	 Yet,	 despite	 the	 central	 role	 of	
infrastructure	in	the	establishment	and	functioning	of	research	communities,	
Star	 (1999)	 acknowledges	 that	 such	 “hidden	 mechanisms”	 of	 processes,	 are	
often	considered	“boring.”		
Star	nevertheless	spent	a	great	deal	of	effort	ethnographically	studying	such	
‘boring’	 elements	 and	 ultimately	 established,	 with	 Ruhleder,	 a	 detailed	
definition	 of	 infrastructure	 and	 its	 necessary	 properties	 (Star	 and	 Ruhleder	
1996).	Included	in	this	list	of	properties	is	the	requirement	that	infrastructure	
is	 “learned	 as	 part	 of	 membership”	 (Star	 and	 Ruhleder	 1996:	 113).	 New	
participants	within	a	community	of	practice,	the	authors	assert,	must	“acquire	
a	naturalized	 familiarity	with	 its	objects	as	 they	become	members”	(Star	and	
Ruhleder	1996:	113).	Such	a	familiarity,	Swazey	details,	can	be	attained	through	
the	“re-education”	of	those	involved	with	a	discipline-formation	project.		
																																								 								
27	It	should	be	noted	that	the	interdisciplinary	collaborations	often	studied	by	those	exploring	
interdisciplinarity	 are	 temporary	 research	 networks,	 which	 draw	 individuals	 from	 different	
fields.	These	require	shared	language,	research	objects,	communication,	and	cooperation	but	
the	 contributing	 disciplinary	 boundaries	 remain.	 The	 kinds	 of	 collaboration	 I	 am	 exploring	
here,	and	indeed	that	of	synthetic	biology	are	different.	In	these	cases	it	is	not	a	network	that	
they	are	seeking	to	create	but	a	new	discipline,	and	this,	I	would	argue	requires	a	deeper	level	
of	collaboration.	
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In	 regards	 to	 the	 NRP,	 Swazey	 writes	 that	 such	 a	 strategy	 laid	 the	
groundwork	for	the	training	of	a	new	generation	of	neuroscientists	by	allowing	
those	 involved	 to	 “begin	 transmitting	new,	 interdisciplinary	ways	of	 thought	
and	 work	 to	 colleagues	 and	 students	 at	 their	 own	 institutions,	 helping	 to	
propagate	 a	 new	 genealogical	 tree	 of	 neuroscientists	 that	 did	 not	 exist	 a	
generation	ago”	(Swazey	1992:	542).	The	importance	of	training	students	in	a	
transdisciplinary	way,	 in	 order	 to	prepare	 them	 to	work	 in	 the	 collaborative	
manner	 mentioned	 above,	 is	 further	 discussed	 by	 Stokols	 (2014).	 While,	
Powell	et	al.	(2007)	would	add	to	this	list	of	features	of	developing	disciplines,	
the	 need	 for	 a	 proof	 of	 principle,	 an	 experimental	 result	 that	 clearly	
demonstrates	the	viability	of	the	discipline.	In	regards	to	synthetic	biology,	the	
two	 founding	 experiments	 described	 above,	 the	 repressilator	 (Elowitz	 and	
Leibler	2000)	and	the	toggle	switch	(Gardner	et	al.	2000),	have	arguably	acted	
as	such	a	proof	of	principle	for	the	discipline.	
The	importance	of	such	a	collection	of	features	to	the	process	and	success	
of	 discipline	 formation	 is	 broadly	 discussed	 by	Clarke	 (1998),	who	 examines	
the	ways	 in	which	 a	 research	 community	 remains	 interactive,	 coherent,	 and	
viable	over	 time	and	changing	 circumstances.	Here	Clarke	 takes	 a	 step	back	
from	the	particular	features	themselves	to	note	that	the	reproductive	sciences	
arose	 at	 a	 time	 when	 the	 right	 combination	 of	 factors	 in	 the	 professional,	
scientific,	 institutional,	 and	 activist	 social	 worlds	 came	 together.	 In	 Clarke’s	
work	it	seems	that	the	most	important	thing	to	the	success	of	the	reproductive	
sciences	was	 not	 that	 the	 factors	 appeared	 but	 that	 they	 appeared	 together.	
Similarly,	Molyneux-Hodgson	and	Meyer	explore	 the	emergence	of	 synthetic	
biology,	 focusing	 on	 the	 core	 elements	 of	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 research	
community	 in	 terms	 of,	 what	 they	 term,	 ‘movement	 and	 stickiness.’	 While	
their	 approach	 to	 exploring	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 useful,	 and	 is	 discussed	 in	
chapters	 three	 and	 four,	 it	 also	brings	 to	mind	Leonelli	 and	Ankeny’s	 (2015)	
notion	of	repertoires	and	Fujimura’s	(1987)	notion	of	doability	to	which	I	shall	
now	turn.		
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Repertoires,	doability,	and	epistemic	cultures	
As	shall	be	discussed	in	chapter	four,	Leonelli	and	Ankeny	(2015)	examine	
the	 material	 and	 social	 conditions	 under	 which	 research	 communities	 are	
created,	 managed	 and	 persist	 in	 the	 long	 term.	 Addressing	 the	 process	
through	 which	 short-term	 research	 projects	 acquire	 the	 resilience	 and	
flexibility	to	evolve	into	active,	productive	scientific	communities,	the	authors	
conclude	 that	 a	 group	 must	 develop	 what	 they	 term	 a	 ‘repertoire.’	 A	
repertoire,	 being	 a	 distinctive	 and	 shared	 ensemble	 of	 skills,	 behaviours,	
methods,	 and	 resources	 (such	 as	 those	 listed	 above),	 that	 both	 draw	 a	
community	together	and	which	can	be	used	to	train	newcomers.	Their	 focus	
on	practice	here	is	significant	as	Leonelli	and	Ankeny,	like	Kuhn	(1962),	Clarke	
(1998),	and	Knorr	Cetina	(1999),	reject	the	notion	that	shared	theories	are	the	
core	constitutive	factor	of	a	discipline	or	field.	Instead	they	argue	that,	while	
theoretical	 insights	 and	 disagreements	 are	 important,	 some	 research	
communities	 develop	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 common	 theories,	 being	 drawn	
together	instead	by	common	practices	and	infrastructure.		
Essentially	 then,	 the	 development	 of	 a	 repertoire	 is,	 Leonelli	 and	Ankeny	
assert,	 “an	 important	 moment	 in	 the	 growth	 of	 a	 scientific	 community,	 in	
which	 key	 goals	 and	 values	 come	 to	 be	 explicitly	 articulated	 and	 efforts	 are	
aimed	at	making	it	feasible	to	achieve	these	goals,	often	through	the	inclusion	
of	new	groups	and	approaches”	(2015:	707).	Where	Leonelli	and	Ankeny	refer	
to	 this	 “important	 moment”	 as	 the	 development	 of	 a	 repertoire,	 Fujimura	
would	call	this	the	moment	when	a	problem	becomes	‘doable.’	
According	to	Fujimura	(1987),	scientists	tend	to	pursue	problems	that	they	
consider	‘do-able’	at	three	key	levels.	At	the	experiment	level,	she	argues,	there	
needs	 to	 be	 well-defined	 tasks	 which	 can	 be	 carried	 out	 to	 address	 the	
problem.	At	the	laboratory	level	such	experiments	must	be	prioritised	and	the	
necessary	equipment	to	undertake	them	must	be	available.	While	at	the	social	
world	 level	 there	 needs	 to	 be	 a	 secured	 funding	 stream	 to	 finance	 the	
laboratory	equipment	and	the	experiments,	and	also	conferences	and	journals	
to	disseminate	any	results.	Doability,	Fujimura	(1987)	stresses,	is	thus	not	just	
a	 technological	 issue,	 but	 also	 a	 social	 issue.	 As	 such,	 she	 explores	 how	
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doability	is	manifest	in	the	actual	work	processes	of	scientists,	the	conditions	
under	 which	 problems	 are	made,	 or	 deemed	 to	 be,	 doable,	 and	 the	 way	 in	
which	doability	can	be	constrained.		
Part	of	the	articulation	work,	Clarke	and	Fujimura	(1992)	identify	as	being	
integral	 to	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 doable	 problem,	 is	 the	 alignment	 of	
experimental	 work	 with	 the	 concerns	 of	 both	 academic	 and	 commercial	
audiences	 in	order	 to	draw	resources	 from	both	worlds.	This	need	to	align	a	
research	 problem	 across	 multiple	 worlds	 is	 also	 addressed	 by	 Clarke	 who,	
drawing	 on	 Fujimura’s	 work,	 argues	 that	 doability	 equates	 to	 scientists	
assessing	whether	or	not	a	specific	line	of	work	“is	feasible	and	worthwhile	to	
undertake	 at	 a	 specific	 time	 and	 place”	 (1998:	 85).	 The	 feasibility,	 and	 thus	
doability,	of	a	line	of	work,	Clarke	contends,	is	reliant	on	investigators	aligning	
their	 research	 problems	 “across	 experimental	 capacities,	 laboratory	
organization	 and	 direction,	 and	 the	 broader	 worlds	 of	 fiscal,	 scientific,	 and	
extrascientific	support”	(A.	Clarke	1998:	85).	Thus	Clarke	notes	that	she	“would	
extend	 Fujimura’s	 definition	 to	 assert	 that	 doability	 generally	 implies	 some	
kind	of	profitability”	(1998:	89)	and	practical	output.		
The	need	for	practical	output	is	also	acknowledged	by	Clarke	and	Fujimura	
when	 they	write,	 regarding	 achieving	 doability	 that,	 “[b]efore	 beginning	 the	
work,	 scientists	must	 both	pull	 together	 and	 articulate	 –	 craft	 the	necessary	
connections	 among	 –	 a	wide	 array	 of	 requisite	 elements	 to	make	 as	 sure	 as	
possible,	given	local	and	other	circumstances,	that	something	they	think	will	
be	 recognized	 as	worthwhile	 by	 significant	 others	will	 emerge	 downstream”	
(1992:	 8).	 Thus,	 according	 to	 Fujimura	 and	 Clarke	 (A.	 Clarke	 and	 Fujimura	
1992;	 Fujimura	 1987),	 a	 scientific	 problem	must	 be	 technically	 doable	 at	 the	
experimental	 level,	prioritised	at	the	 laboratory	 level,	and	furnished	with	the	
necessary	 infrastructure,	 funding,	 and	 support	 at	 the	 laboratory	 and	 social	
world	levels	in	order	to	be	truly	doable.	
Thus	 looking	 at	 this	 work	 on	 discipline	 formation	 more	 broadly,	 the	
creation	of	a	discipline	arguably	requires	the	social,	conceptual,	and	material	
components	of	a	repertoire.	Which	is,	in	turn,	a	necessary	component	within	
the	 broader	 strategy	 of	 rendering	 an	 emerging	discipline’s	 research	problem	
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doable.	 A	 strategy	 which,	 as	 Fujimura	 and	 Clarke	 describe	 (A.	 Clarke	 and	
Fujimura	 1992;	 Fujimura	 1987),	 requires	 a	 lot	 of	 articulation	 work,	 and	 the	
alignment	 of	 factors	 across	 the	 experimental,	 laboratory,	 and	 social	 world	
levels.	However,	I	would	add	another	layer	of	analysis	here.	Indeed,	as	I	shall	
argue	 in	chapter	 four,	establishing	a	 robust	 repertoire	and	a	doable	problem	
for	an	emerging	discipline	are	key	factors	in	the	formation	of	that	discipline’s	
epistemic	 culture.	 Epistemic	 culture	 being	 a	 concept	 developed	 by	 Karin	
Knorr	Cetina	(1999),	and	investigated	in	chapters	three	and	four.	
As	 shall	 be	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 three,	 Knorr	 Cetina’s	 (1999)	 notion	 of	
epistemic	 cultures	 was	 developed	 to	make	 sense	 of	 the	 differences	 between	
scientific	disciplines	and	the	ways	in	which	they	create,	and	assess,	knowledge.	
The	 concept	was	 not,	 therefore,	 developed	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 exploring	 discipline	
formation.	 However	 in	 exploring	 the	 concepts	 of	 repertoire	 and	 doability	
described	above,	I	became	aware	of	the	similarities	between	these	notions	and	
that	of	an	epistemic	culture’s	epistemic	machinery.	All	three	concepts	address	
the	 social,	 conceptual,	 and	 practical	 aspects	 of	 a	 scientific	 endeavour.	
However,	 where	 repertoire	 and	 doability	 address	 the	 importance	 of	 these	
factors	 in	 the	 formation	of	a	 scientific	community,	Knorr	Cetina	asserts	 that	
such	factors	become	part	of	the	distinct	epistemic	culture,	which	defines	and	
cements	 an	 established	 community.	 Thus,	 in	 examining	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	
story	of	synthetic	biology,	the	work	to	establish	the	discipline,	I	draw	on	the	
ideas	 of	 repertoire	 and	 doability	 in	 order	 to	 explore	 how	 a	 hybrid	 research	
community,	can	successfully	create	a	distinct	hybrid	epistemic	culture	for	 its	
developing	discipline.		
Exploring	synthetic	biology’s	formation	
Chapter	 three	 thus	 addresses	 the	 first	 of	 the	 research	 questions	 listed	
above.	Exploring	how	we	can	think	about,	and	make	sense	of,	the	relationship	
between	 synthetic	 biology’s	 constituent,	 but	 divergent,	 ‘halves.’	 Synthetic	
biology	 is	 frequently	 framed	 as	 the	 unproblematic	 collaboration	 between	
biologists	and	engineers	intent	on	creating	a	hybrid	discipline.	Thus	in	terms	
of	 the	 discipline’s	 repertoire,	 it	would	 seem	 that	 the	 necessary	 constructive,	
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cohesive,	and	collaborative	relationships	have	emerged	smoothly,	and	without	
tension.	 Yet,	 as	 I	 discovered	 during	 my	 fieldwork,	 this	 is	 not	 an	 accurate	
depiction	 of	 the	 day-to-day	 reality	 of	 synthetic	 biology.	 Rather	 those	within	
the	field	are	seen	as	belonging	to	one	‘side’	of	the	discipline	or	the	other,	and	
these	 ‘sides’	 clash	 and	 conflict	 due	 to	 their	 vastly	 different	 expectations,	
understandings,	and	approaches.	In	order	to	make	sense	of	these	differences,	I	
draw	on	the	work	of	Knorr	Cetina	(1999),	and	her	notion	of	epistemic	cultures,	
casting	 biology	 and	 engineering	 as	 differing,	 yet	 interacting,	 epistemic	
cultures.		
Yet,	 despite	 the	 conflict	 and	 tension	 between	 the	 differing	 epistemic	
cultures	 within	 synthetic	 biology,	 I	 also	 witnessed	 a	 commitment	 to	
collaboration	 and	 compromise	 within	 the	 Centre,	 and	 an	 embracing	 of	
explanatory	pluralism	(Keller	2002),	in	order	to	‘make	it	work.’	As	discussed	in	
chapter	three,	for	some	within	the	Centre	this	desire	to	bring	the	two	sides	of	
synthetic	biology	together	was	expressed	through	their	commitment	to	close,	
collaborative	working	 relationships.	While	 for	 others	 it	 was	 evident	 in	 their	
dedication	 to	 becoming	 interdisciplinary	 individuals,	 as	 described	 by	 Eddy	
(2005).	 Eddy’s	 notion	 of	 interdisciplinary	 individuals	 is	 also	 drawn	 upon	 in	
chapter	 three	 in	 order	 to	 explore	 the	 role	 that	 training	 and	 education	 are	
playing	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 discipline	 of	 synthetic	 biology.	 Other	
elements	of	the	discipline’s	developing	repertoire,	and	thus	epistemic	culture,	
are	 discussed	 in	 chapters	 two	 and	 four.	 Chapter	 two	 touches	 on	 the	
establishment	 of	 the	 Centre’s	 infrastructure,	 and	 chapter	 four	 explores	 the	
Centre’s	attempts	to	establish	both	conceptual	and	practical	norms.	
Given	 their	 commitment	 to	 ‘making	 it	 work,’	 and	 to	 embracing	 both	
collaboration	 and	 the	 discipline’s	 engineering	 approach,	 in	 chapter	 four	 I	
address	 my	 second	 research	 question:	 how	 does	 the	 relationship	 between	
engineering	and	biology	manifest	itself	in	the	day-to-day	workings	of	synthetic	
biologists,	 and	 what	 does	 it	 mean	 to	 attempt	 to	 ‘engineer	 biology’?	 Indeed	
applying	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	 biology	 is	 the	 problem	 that	 synthetic	
biology	 is	 attempting	 to	 make	 doable.	 Thus,	 by	 exploring	 what	 taking	 an	
engineering	 approach	 to	 biology	 actually	means	 to	 synthetic	 biologists,	 and	
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how	it	affects	the	ways	in	which	they	talk	about,	think	about,	and	undertake	
their	work,	 chapter	 four	 examines	 the	 day-to-day	 practices	 of	 attempting	 to	
render	a	 research	problem	doable,	and	thus	establish	a	epistemic	culture	 for	
the	discipline.	 I	 found	that	the	adoption	of	an	engineering	approach	to	their	
work	was	strongly	promoted	by	the	directors	of	the	Centre,	and	was	embraced	
by	most	 of	 those	who	worked	within	 it,	 who	were	 equally	 keen	 to	 distance	
their	discipline	from	biology.	This	commitment	to	seeing	life	as	engineerable	
was	 most	 clearly	 manifest	 in	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Centre’s	 adoption	 of	 an	
efficient,	 rigorous,	 and	 logical	 approach	 to	 their	 work.	 An	 approach	 drawn	
from	an	idealised	notion	of	what	engineering	is,	and	evident	 in	the	language	
used,	 the	 questions	 asked,	 and	 the	 experiments	 run.	 Yet,	 despite	 their	
commitment	to	this	engineering	approach,	enacting	it	in	practice	was	not,	as	
chapter	four	addresses,	without	obstacles.		
This	leads	us	on	to	the	second	part	of	this	case	study’s	story,	the	work	done	
to	 bring	 the	 goal	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 to	 fruition.	 Synthetic	 biology,	 as	
mentioned	above,	and	examined	in	chapter	six,	is	embracing	the	notion	of	life	
as	engineerable	material,	 yet	 this	notion	requires	 the	enactment	of	a	heavily	
reductionist	approach	to	biology.	As	such	I	shall	now	turn	my	attention	to	the	
sociological	and	STS	literature	on	reductionism.	
Reductionism	
Reductionism,	much	 like	 interdisciplinarity	 and	 discipline	 formation,	 has	
been	the	subject	of	much	debate	and	discussion	within	the	STS	literature.	As	
is	examined	 in	chapter	six,	Descartes	 introduced	the	 idea	of	 reductionism	in	
the	seventeenth	century.	He	argued	that	the	world	was	like	a	machine,	and	its	
pieces	like	clockwork	mechanisms.	Thus	the	machine,	he	contended,	could	be	
understood	by	taking	the	pieces	apart,	studying	them,	and	putting	them	back	
together	 to	 see	 the	 bigger	 picture	 (Descartes	 1988).	 In	 other	 words,	 he	
proposed	that,	 in	essence,	reductionism	is	the	belief	that	you	can	reduce	the	
whole	to	 its	parts,	 it	being	no	more,	and	no	 less,	 than	their	sum,	and	thus	a	
chain	of	 causation	exists	 from	 the	parts	 to	 the	whole	 (Lewontin	et	 al.	 1984).	
Ernest	Rutherford,	for	example,	is	famously	quoted	as	saying	that	“all	science	
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is	 either	 physics	 or	 stamp	 collecting”	 (Blackett	 1962:	 108).	 Asserting	 that,	
ultimately,	 all	 scientific	 phenomena	 could	 be	 accounted	 for	 by	 their	 basic	
physical	 components.	 A	 remark	 which,	 Hayes	 (2004)	 claims,	 did	 not	 win	
physics	many	friends	among	practitioners	of	the	other	sciences.		
Nevertheless	 despite	 such	 resistance,	 Gallagher	 et	 al.	 (1999)	 contend	 that	
the	predominant	approach	used	to	relate	the	different	fields	of	science	to	one	
another	 is	 still	 reductionism.	 While	 biologists	 have	 traditionally	 been,	 and	
arguably	remain,	the	most	resistant	to	such	reductionism	(Grene	1987;	Nagel	
1998;	Alexander	Rosenberg	2008),	as	Van	Regenmortel	(2004)	and	Rosenberg	
(2008)	 detail,	 with	 the	 advent	 of	 molecular	 biology	 some	 biologists	 began	
embracing	this	approach.	Francis	Crick,	for	example,	reportedly	claimed	that,	
“[t]he	 ultimate	 aim	 of	 the	 modern	 movement	 in	 biology	 is	 to	 explain	 all	
biology	in	terms	of	physics	and	chemistry”	(quoted	in	Van	Regenmortel	2004:	
1016).	The	theory,	Van	Regenmortel	claims,	goes	as	follows:	“because	biological	
systems	are	composed	solely	of	atoms	and	molecules,	without	the	influence	of	
‘alien’	 or	 ‘spiritual’	 forces,	 it	 should	 be	 possible	 to	 explain	 them	 using	 the	
physicochemical	 properties	 of	 their	 individual	 components,	 down	 to	 the	
atomic	 level”	 (2004:	 1016).	 Yet,	 as	 Van	 Regenmortel	 also	 addresses,	 it	 has	
equally	 been	 argued	 that	 reductionism	 has	 its	 limits,	 limits	 which	
antireductionists	 have	 seized	 upon	 in	 order	 to	 “regard	 biology	 as	 an	
autonomous	discipline	that	requires	its	own	vocabulary	and	concepts	that	are	
not	found	in	chemistry	and	physics”	(2004:	1016).	
Antireductionism	
Antireductionism	 is,	 therefore,	 a	 philosophical	 position	 that	 stands	 in	
contrast	to	reductionism,	advocating	that	not	all	properties	of	a	system	can	be	
explained	by	examining	 its	 simplest	 constituent	parts	 and	 their	 interactions.	
Such	an	argument	over	whether	the	whole	is,	or	is	not,	merely	the	sum	of	its	
parts,	 has	 fuelled	many	 debates	 and	 discussions	 of	 the	 topic,	 both	 by	 those	
within	 and	 outside	 of	 the	 life	 sciences	 (see	 for	 example	 Canguilhem	 2009;	
Hoyningen-Huene	 1992;	 S.	 Rose	 1997;	 N.	 Rose	 2013;	 Alex	 Rosenberg	 and	
Kaplan	 2005;	Van	Regenmortel	 2004).	Debates,	 that	 is,	which	 have	 spanned	
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many	decades.	Philosopher	Karl	Popper	(1974),	for	example,	was	an	influential	
proponent	of	antireductionism,	characterising	all	phenomena	into	two	types.	
‘Clock’	phenomena,	which	have	a	mechanical	basis	and	thus	can	be	subjected	
to	 reductionism,	 and	 ‘cloud’	 phenomena,	 which	 are	 indivisible	 and	 thus	
depend	on	emergence	for	explanation.		
Emergence,	 as	Van	Regenmortel	 (2004)	 explains,	 is	 a	way	of	dealing	with	
the	failures	of	reductionism	by	accounting	for	new	features	which	are	absent	
in	the	isolated	components	but	which	arise	when	the	parts	interact	with	each	
other	 and	 are	 influenced	 by	 their	 environment.	 Yet	 Popper	 argued	 that	
scientists	“have	to	be	reductionists”	as	“nothing	is	as	great	a	success	in	science	
as	 a	 successful	 reduction”	 (1974:	 259),	 given	 that	 such	 reductions	 provide	 a	
way	of	 identifying	 the	unknown	with	 the	known.	Yet	Popper	also	notes	 that	
such	 attempts	 at	 reductionism	 invariably	 fall	 short	 of	 achieving	 a	 complete	
reduction.	As	such	he	ultimately	concludes	 that	 reductionism	 is	more	useful	
as	a	methodological	tool	(given	that	it	is	fruitful	to	science	even	when	it	fails),	
than	as	a	philosophical	one	(Popper	1974).	
However	 reductionism	 has	 not	 only	 served	 as	 a	 methodological	 and	
analytical	 tool	within	science.	Rather,	as	Hayden	notes,	 it	has	 “long	played	a	
central	role	in	debates	about	the	power,	folly,	and	violence	of	modern	science”	
(2012:	 272)	 (for	 further	 discussion	 see	 Haraway	 1988;	 Shiva	 1993;	 Stengers	
2000).	 That	 is	 the	 violence	 of	 imposing	 reductionism	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 it	
dismisses	other	knowledges.	As	way	of	example	Hayden	notes	that,	in	creating	
his	 ‘universal’	 system	 of	 classification,	 Linneaus	 and	 his	 proponents	 were	
accused	of	 “engaging	 in	dangerously	misguided	 substitutions	and	 reductions	
of	one	kind	of	knowledge	to	another”	(C.	Hayden	2012:	272).	Dismissing	locally	
contextualised	 knowledge	 about	 plants	 and	 their	 effects,	 and	 thus	 “placing	
indigenous	 knowledges	 on	 the	 wrong	 side	 of	 truth	 itself”	 (C.	 Hayden	 2012:	
272).	Thus,	Hayden	(2012)	stresses	that	in	‘going	small,’	reductionism	aims	to	
transcend	the	particularities	of	context,	and	in	so	doing,	much	knowledge	and	
information	is	obscured	and	discarded.	
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A	typology	of	reductionism	and	antireductionism	
In	 addressing	 the	 conceptual	 critique	 of	 reductionism,	 Nagel	 (1998)	
identifies	 a	 typology	 of	 reductionist	 and	 antireductionist	 positions.	
Constitutive	reductionism,	Nagel	(1998)	claims,	holds	that	everything	is	made	
of	the	same	elements,	while	explanatory	reductionism	maintains	that	the	laws	
governing	 those	 elements	 can	 be	 used	 as	 an	 ultimate	 explanation	 for	
everything	that	happens.	In	response,	epistemological	antireductionism	holds	
that	even	if	 ‘in	reality’	everything	can	be	explained	using	particle	physics,	we	
are	unable	to	grasp	such	‘ultimate’	explanations	for	most	complex	phenomena.	
Thus	we	must	make	do	with	 simplified	 explanations.	Nagel	 (1998)	 contends	
that	 such	 epistemological	 antireductionism	 is	 compatible	 with	 constitutive	
reductionism	 and	 is	 thus	 largely	 uncontroversial.	 Ontological	
antireductionism,	 however,	 addressing	 as	 it	 does	 what	 the	 world	 ‘really’	
consists	 of,	 instead	 of	 our	 knowledge	 of	 the	 world,	 is	 rather	 more	
controversial.		
Nagel	 (1998)	 argues	 that	 there	 are	 two	 forms	 of	 ontological	
antireductionism,	 explanatory	 and	 constitutive.	 Explanatory	 ontological	
antireductionism	holds	 that,	ontologically,	 there	are	physical	phenomena	 for	
which	 an	 explanation	 at	 the	 most	 basic,	 universal	 level	 is	 inadequate.	 For	
those	who	adopt	this	 form	of	ontological	antireductionism	it	 forms	the	basis	
of	 an	 argument	 for	 emergence	 (Nagel	 1998)	 and	 thus	 links	back	 to	Popper’s	
notion	of	cloud	phenomena.	The	other,	more	controversial	form	of	ontological	
antireductionism	 addressed	 by	 Nagel	 (1998)	 is	 constitutive	 ontological	
antireductionism,	and	includes	the	notions	of	vitalism	and	holism.		
While	both	 vitalism	and	holism	oppose	mechanism,	maintaining	 that	 the	
whole	is	greater	than	the	sum	of	its	parts,	the	main	difference	between	these	
two	concepts	 is	metaphysical.	Vitalism	can	broadly	be	defined	as	 the	notion	
that	 “living	 organisms	 are	 fundamentally	 different	 from	 non-living	 entities	
because	they	contain	some	non-physical	element	or	are	governed	by	different	
principles	 than	 are	 inanimate	 things”	 (Bechtel	 and	 Richardson	 1998).	 This	
non-physical	 element	 is	often	 referred	 to	as	 the	Élan	 vital,	 a	 term	coined	by	
Henri	Bergson	(1911)	and	translated	as	either	the	vital	 impetus	(Papanicolaou	
 44 
and	Gunter	 1987)	or	 the	vital	 force	 (Brooks	2001).	While	 traditional	vitalism,	
that	 which	 espouses	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 vital	 force	 (Bechtel	 and	 Richardson	
1998;	Mayr	2002),	is	now	widely	considered	redundant,	reductionism	remains	
unable	 to	 completely	 quell	 its	 opposition.	 As	 Morange	 (2008)	 discusses,	
although	 the	 advances	 of	 molecular	 biology	 led	 many	 to	 believe	 that	 the	
question	of	 ‘what	 is	 life?’	had	been	answered,	 in	 recent	 years	 scientists	have	
become	 increasingly	 convinced	 that	 we	 do	 not	 in	 fact	 have	 the	 complete	
answer.	 While	 Morange	 (2008)	 asserts	 that	 this	 does	 not	 necessitate	 a	
resurgence	of	vitalism’s	spiritualism,	Canguilhem	(2009)	and	Greco	(2005),	for	
example,	 follow	 in	 Bergson’s	 (1911)	 own	 footprints	 by	 arguing	 that,	 although	
the	notion	of	an	Élan	vital	may	not	explain	much	scientifically,	it	still	serves	as	
a	resistance	to	reductionism	by	highlighting	our	 ignorance	when	it	comes	to	
life.		
The	notion	of	holism	however,	a	term	coined	by	Jan	Smuts	(1926),	describes	
an	approach	to	understanding	the	world	which	Smuts	argued	had	no	need	for	
the	 explanatory	 powers	 of	 an	 Élan	 vital.	 Smuts	 instead	 contended	 that	 the	
synthesis	of	parts	to	make	a	‘whole’	“affects	and	determines	the	parts,	so	that	
they	 function	 towards	 the	 ‘whole’;	 and	 the	 whole	 and	 the	 parts	 therefore	
reciprocally	influence	and	determine	each	other”	(1926:	88)	in	such	a	way	that	
they	cannot	be	independently	understood.	Many,	including	Fodor	and	Lepore	
(1992),	 Bischof	 (1998),	 Jackson	 (2003),	 and	 Laszlo	 (2002,	 2004)	 have	
subsequently	 followed	 in	 Smuts’	 footsteps	 to	 critique	 reductionism	 by	
suggesting	 the	need	 for	 a	holistic	 approach	 to	understanding	our	world.	Yet	
despite	 not	 invoking	 the	 notion	 of	 an	Élan	 vital,	 Human	 (2015)	 argues	 that	
holism	often	 leads	to	some	form	of	mysticism.	This,	he	asserts,	 is	due	to	the	
difficulty	of	answering	the	question	of	what	exactly	the	whole	 is	and	how	we	
can	deal	with	such	a	high	degree	of	complexity	(Human	2015).		
As	is	clear	from	the	above	discussion	of	reductionism	and	antireductionism	
the	subject	is	fraught	with	philosophical	debate.	While	I	am	interested	in	this	
discussion,	it	 is	not	the	focus	of	this	thesis.	Synthetic	biology	with	its	goal	of	
rendering	 life	 as	 engineerable	 material	 is	 an,	 if	 not,	 ‘the,’	 exemplar	 of	
reductionism.	Yet	it	is	not	the	merits	or	accuracy	of	reductionism	per	se	which	
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I	am	addressing	here.	Rather,	I	am	interested	in	exploring	synthetic	biology	as	
a	case	study	to	examine	the	issues,	both	practical	and	conceptual,	which	arise	
when	 synthetic	 biologists	 attempt	 to	 enact	 their	 reductionistic	 approach	 to	
biology.	
Reductionism	in	synthetic	biology	
In	 1966	 Francis	 Crick	 gave	 a	 series	 of	 lectures	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Washington	 in	 which	 he	 discussed	 vitalism	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 life.	 During	
these	lectures	he	noted	that	a	way	to	refute	vitalism	would	be	to	create	a	living	
organism	synthetically,	something	which	synthetic	biology	is	actively	striving	
to	achieve.	Indeed,	Crick’s	book	Of	Molecules	and	Men,	opens	with	the	quote	
“Exact	knowledge	is	the	enemy	of	vitalism”	(1966).	Thus	Crick	noted	that,	“[i]t	
seems	to	me	far	more	important	to	be	able	to	understand	a	living	cell	.	.	.	than	
to	worry	about	whether	we	could	synthesize	 it	completely,	 starting	 from	the	
elements”	(1966:	64).	Such	knowledge,	of	the	structure,	function,	and	control	
mechanisms	of	a	living	cell,	Crick	maintained,	would	spell	the	end	of	vitalism	
and	thus	the	ultimate	success	of	reductionism.	However,	as	Popper	addressed	
in	1974,	and	as	Rose	acknowledged	in	2013,	such	knowledge	of	life	still	eludes	
us.	 For	 Popper	 this	 lack	 of	 understanding	 was	 partly	 responsible	 for	 his	
conclusion	that	the	philosophy	of	reductionism	was	a	failure.	He	argued	that	
even	if	we	manage	to	produce	life	from	inanimate	matter	it	would	not	amount	
to	a	complete	reduction	if	we	do	not	fully	understand	what	we	are	doing.		
In	the	intervening	years,	with	the	production	of	the	likes	of	Dolly	the	sheep	
and	Synthia,	the	so-called	‘first	synthetic	organism,’	it	would	seem	that	life	has	
indeed	 become	 amenable	 to	 intervention	 and	 control	 (N.	 Rose	 2013).	 As	
Morange	 explains,	 the	 reduction	 of	 life	 to	 physicochemical	 phenomena	 has	
had	 the	 consequence	 of	 “favouring	 research	 into	 the	 use	 of	 organisms	 for	
commercial	purposes.”	Thus,	“[i]t	 is	not	by	accident	that	the	development	of	
this	field,	biotechnology,	should	have	coincided	with	the	growing	domination	
of	 a	 reductionist	 conception	of	 life”	 (Morange	2008:	8).	Yet	Rose	 is	quick	 to	
point	 out	 that	 while	 the	 “fantasies	 of	 omnipotence”	 that	 underlie	 this	 shift	
towards	 biotechnology	 “inspire	 much	 utopian	 and	 dystopian	 speculation,”	
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they	 also	 “grossly	 overestimate	 both	 our	 knowledge	 and	 our	 technical	
capacities”	(N.	Rose	2013:	6).		
Synthetic	 biology’s	 practical	 and	 conceptual	 challenge:	 how	 to	 render	 biology	
engineerable?	
Addressing	 the	 reductionistic	vision	of	 synthetic	biology,	 itself	part	of	 the	
shift	towards	biotechnology	that	Morange	(2008)	addresses,	Rose	(2013)	notes	
that	 the	 fantasy	 of	 being	 able	 to	 remove	 bio-parts	 from	 their	 origins	 and	
functionally	 link	 them	 together,	 in	 order	 to	 synthesise	 a	 living	 cell	 from	 its	
elements,	is	misleading.	There	is,	after	all,	still	so	much	that	we	do	not	know.	
Thus	it	would	seem	that	synthetic	biology	is	doing	exactly	what	Crick	advised	
against.	 It	 is	 attempting	 to	 synthesise	 life	 completely	 from	 its	 elements	
without	 first	 acquiring	 a	 full	 understanding	 of	 its	 structure	 and	 workings.28	
While	any	success	would	be,	by	Popper’s	reckoning,	an	incomplete	application	
of	 reductionism,	 more	 importantly,	 for	 my	 purposes,	 trying	 to	 apply	 its	
stringent	version	of	 reductionism	without	 this	 full	understanding	 submerges	
synthetic	 biology	 within	 a	 quagmire	 of	 practical	 and	 conceptual	 challenges.	
Ultimately	 then,	 it	 is	 these	 challenges,	which	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	
Centre	have	to	navigate,	and	that	I	address	within	the	following	chapters.		
Synthetic	 biology	 is,	 as	 mentioned	 above,	 an	 emerging	 hybrid	 discipline,	
which	is	posing	the	question,	how	can	one	apply	an	engineering	approach	to	
biology,	and	therefore	life?	As	discussed	above,	addressing	this	question	raises	
both	 practical	 and	 conceptual	 issues.	 Thus	 examining	 it	 requires	 a	 focus	 on	
both	the	disciplines’	practical	and	conceptual	norms.	As	such,	where	chapter	
four	addresses	the	practical	day-to-day	work	of	synthetic	biologists	attempting	
to	apply	an	engineering	approach	to	biology,	and	thus	establish	an	epistemic	
culture	 for	 the	 discipline,	 chapter	 five	 examines	 how	 these	 same	 synthetic	
																																								 								
28	Indeed,	even	the	simplest,	synthetic	organism	defies	complete	understanding.	In	2016	Craig	
Venter	 and	 his	 team	 announced	 their	 creation	 of	 the	 smallest,	 simplest	 self-replicating	
organism,	 syn3.0	 (Clyde	 A.	Hutchison	 et	 al.	 2016).	 The	 authors	 note	 that	 their	 goal	 was	 to	
produce	“a	cell	so	simple	that	we	can	determine	the	molecular	and	biological	function	of	every	
gene”	(Clyde	A.	Hutchison	et	al.	2016:	1414).	Yet,	of	syn3.0’s	473	genes,	genes	that	are	deemed	
essential	to	the	organism	remaining	alive,	its	creators	admit	that	they	do	not	understand	the	
biological	function	of	149	of	them.	
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biologists	 conceptualise	 the	 products	 of	 that	 work.	 In	 this	 way	 chapter	 five	
addresses	 my	 third	 research	 question	 by	 asking	 whether	 the	 synthetic	
biologists	at	 the	Centre	 see	 their	 ‘products’	 as	machines,	 as	organisms,	or	as	
hybrid	entities	that	blur	the	boundary	between	the	two?	Drawing	on	a	range	
of	more	 conceptual	 literature	 (e.g.	Arthur	 2009;	Canguilhem	2009;	Deplazes	
and	Huppenbauer	2009;	Haraway	1997;	Keller	2002;	Latour	1987;	Woese	2004)	
chapter	 five	 thus	 taps	 into	 the	 reductionism	 debate	 discussed	 above	 by	
addressing	 how	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	 approach	 the	 age-old	
question	‘what	is	life?’	as	well	as	the	analogous,	but	less	controversial,	‘what	is	
a	machine?’		
Keller	 writes	 that	 “the	 question	 ‘what	 is	 life?’	 is	 a	 historical	 question,	
answerable	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 categories	 by	 which	 we	 as	 human	 actors	
choose	to	abide,	the	differences	that	we	as	human	actors	choose	to	honor,	and	
not	 in	either	 logical,	 scientific,	or	 technical	 terms.	 It	 is	 in	this	sense	that	 the	
category	of	life	is	a	human	rather	than	a	natural	kind”	(2002:	294).	I	argue	in	
chapter	 five	 that	 a	 similar	 argument	 could	 be	made	 regarding	 the	 question	
‘what	is	a	machine?’	As	such,	instead	of	engaging	in	the	accuracy	of	synthetic	
biology’s	 reductionistic	 claims,	 by	 examining	 whether	 the	 ‘products’	 of	
synthetic	 biology	 are	 ‘really’	 machines	 or	 organisms,	 I	 focus	 instead	 on	 the	
conceptual	categories	the	synthetic	biologists	are	creating,	and	the	differences	
they	are	honouring,	in	regards	to	synthetic	biology’s	‘products.’	Exploring	the	
ways	 in	 which	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	 make	 sense	 of	 their	
products	 therefore,	 provides	 an	 interesting	 insight	 into,	 what	 Rose	 (2007)	
would	term,	their	philosophy	of	life.	
However	 the	roots	of	synthetic	biology’s	 reductionism,	 that	which	has	 led	
the	 discipline	 to	 this	 point,	 are	 examined	 in	 chapter	 six.	 Indeed	 chapter	 six	
explores	the	fourth	of	my	research	questions	by	asking	how	synthetic	biology	
fits	into	the	broader	history	of	attempts	to	investigate	and	shape	the	biological	
world?	As	detailed	in	chapter	six,	scientists	and	engineers	have	long	attempted	
to	artificially	create	 life,	create	artificial	 life,	and	understand	biology	through	
mathematical	models	and	similarities	with	physical	and	mechanical	processes	
and	 devices.	 Chapter	 six	 thus	 draws	 on	 this	 rich	 historical	 literature	 in	 an	
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attempt	 to	 explore	 synthetic	 biology’s	 diverse	 heritage	 and	 to	 investigate	
whether	this	emergent	hybrid	discipline	can	be	thought	of	as	part	of	a	wider	
attempt	to	both	‘do’	and	think	of	biology	differently.		
In	exploring	whether	synthetic	biology	is	part	of	a	potential	conceptual	shift	
within	 biology,	 I	 draw	 on	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 contemporary	 and	 historical	
literature	looking	at	previous	shifts	in	the	conception	of	biology	dating	back	to	
Aristotle’s	 time.	 Exploring	 Canguilhem’s	 (2000)	 conceptual	 chain	 of,	 life	 as	
animation,	 life	 as	 mechanism,	 life	 as	 organisation,	 and	 life	 as	 information,	
chapter	 six	 explores	 the	 gradual	 creep	 of	 reductionism	 and	mechanism	 into	
our	understanding	of	life	throughout	these	conceptual	shifts.	Chapter	six	then	
explores	how	this	embrace	of	reductionism	and	mechanism	has	brought	us	to	
a	 point	 of	 convergence	 between	 biology	 and	 engineering	whereby	 the	most	
recent	 of	 Canguilhem’s	 conceptions	 of	 life,	 life	 as	 information,	 is	 arguably	
being	replaced	by	that	of	life	as	engineerable	material.		
Finally,	Chapter	 seven	serves	as	a	conclusion.	Placing	 synthetic	biology	 in	
the	 historical	 context	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 six,	 chapter	 seven	 reiterates	 that	
this	emerging	discipline	 is,	 in	a	significant	sense,	a	response	to,	and	an	echo	
of,	 previous	 approaches	 to	 both	 doing	 and	 thinking	 about	 biology.	 Yet	
synthetic	biology	is,	ultimately,	a	project	to	control	life	at	the	molecular	level.	
In	taking	this	approach	to	biology	and	life,	synthetic	biology	is,	as	detailed	in	
chapter	 six,	 embracing	 the	 reductionism	 and	 interventionism	 common	
amongst	 others	 who	 have	 attempted	 to	 engineer	 life.	 However,	 synthetic	
biology	 appears	 to	 be	 taking	 its	 brand	 of	 interventionalist	 biology	 to	 a	 new	
extreme,	 one	 that	 may	 prove	 to	 be	 part	 of	 a	 wider	 conceptual	 shift	 within	
biology	 towards	 seeing	 life	 as	 engineerable	 material.	 Nevertheless,	 despite	
their	 embrace	 of	 reductionism	 and	mechanism,	 as	 chapter	 seven	 highlights,	
there	 is	 much	 about	 life	 and	 biology	 that	 still	 defies	 understanding	 and	
control.	 Furthermore,	 despite	 claims	 that	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 the	
uncomplicated	hybrid	of	engineering	and	biology,	which	is	unproblematically	
applying	an	engineering	approach	to	biology,	as	highlighted	in	chapters	three,	
four,	and	five,	there	is,	ultimately,	a	lot	more	going	on	 ‘under	the	hood’	as	it	
were.		
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Yet,	despite	the	obstacles	and	tensions	addressed	in	the	previous	chapters,	
chapter	seven	highlights	the	ways	in	which	the	concerted	efforts	of	synthetic	
biologists	 to	 see	 life	 in	 these	 terms	 influences	 the	ways	 in	which	 they	 speak	
about,	 think	 about,	 and	 practice	 biology.	As	well	 as	 their	 understandings	 of	
the	‘products’	of	their	work,	and	thus	their	categorisations	and	interpretations	
of	‘life’,	‘organisms,’	and	‘machines.’	Ultimately	then,	chapter	seven	draws	the	
two	halves	of	this	case	study’s	story	together.	The	work	being	done	to	establish	
a	discipline	with	the	expressed	goal	of	engineering,	and	thus	controlling,	life	at	
the	molecular	level,	and	the	work	being	down	to	bring	this	goal	to	fruition.		
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Chapter	Two:	Methodology	
Science	has	been	studied	‘in	practice’	since	the	late	1970s	and	early	1980s.	A	
time	when	the	first	laboratory	ethnographies	were	undertaken	by	the	likes	of	
Latour	and	Woolgar	(1979),	Knorr	(1981),	and	Lynch	(1985).	Hess	refers	to	such	
works	 as	 “the	 first	 generation	 of	 STS29	ethnographies,”	 a	 generation	 which	
challenged	 the	 “naïve	 view	 of	 scientific	work	 as	 a	 purely	 rational	 process	 of	
representing	 a	 nature	 that	 revealed	 itself	 in	 transparent	 observations”	 (Hess	
2001:	234).	Through	utilising	ethnographic	methodology,	these	ethnographers	
investigated	science	and	technology	through	direct	observation	and	discourse	
analysis,	 focusing	 their	 attention	 on	 “the	 root	 of	 where	 knowledge	 is	
produced,	in	modern	science	typically	the	scientific	laboratory”	(Knorr	Cetina	
1995:	 140).	 As	 Karin	 Knorr	 Cetina	 addresses,	 this	 generation	 of	 STS	
ethnographies	 were	 influential	 in,	 and	 influenced	 by,	 the	 rise	 of	
constructivism	 in	 STS,	 a	 theory	 which	 “holds	 reality	 not	 to	 be	 given	 but	
constructed”	(1995:	147).	Thus	these	early	laboratory	ethnographers	worked	to	
uncover	 the	 everyday,	 mundane	 processes	 of	 knowledge	 production	 in	
science.	Processes	that,	arguably,	lead	to	scientific	findings	being	black-boxed	
as	‘objective’	facts	and	‘given’	entities	(Knorr	Cetina	1995).	
With	 time,	 this	 first	 generation	 of	 STS	 ethnographies	 was	 followed	 by	 a	
second	 generation	 and	 with	 this	 generational	 shift	 came	 a	 broader	 focus.	
According	to	Hess,	second	generation	STS	ethnographies	tended	“to	be	more	
oriented	toward	social	problems	(environment,	class,	race,	sex,	sexuality,	and	
colonial)	 in	addition	to	theoretical	problems	in	the	sociology	and	philosophy	
of	 knowledge”	 (2001:	 236).	Moving	 outside	 of	 the	 laboratory	 and	 away	 from	
expert	 knowledge,	 the	 second	 generation	 of	 STS	 ethnographies	 have,	 Hess	
argues,	taken	a	multi-sited	approach	to	look	at	the	likes	of	activists,	lay	groups	
and	 the	 media.	 Relying	 more	 and	 more	 on	 documentary	 sources	 and	
																																								 								
29	STS	variably	stands	for	Science,	Technology,	and	Society,	or	Science	and	Technology	Studies,	
both	 of	 which	 denote	 the	 social	 scientific	 study	 of	 science	 and	 technology	 in	 their	 social	
context.	
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interviews	 and	 less	 on	 fieldwork	 in	 order	 to	 explore	 the	 “contours	 of	
orthodoxy	and	heterodoxy	in	a	discipline’s	development”	(2001:	236).		
Yet,	despite	their	differences	in	focus	and	approach,	the	combined	efforts	of	
these	 two	 generations	 of	 ethnographies	 have	 clearly	 shown	 science	 to	 be	 a	
social	practice	(see	for	example:	Forsythe	2001;	Gusterson	1996;	Knorr	Cetina	
1999;	 Latour	 and	Woolgar	 1979;	 Martin	 1995;	 Rabinow	 1996,	 1999;	 Traweek	
1988).	Thus,	in	my	efforts	to	study	the	social	dynamics	of	synthetic	biology	in	
practice	I	have	drawn	theoretical	and	practical	assistance	from	across	both	of	
these	‘generations’	of	work.		
Like	 the	 first	 generation	 ethnographies	 my	 research	 relied	 heavily	 on	
fieldwork	 and	was	 focused	within	 the	 laboratory,	 and	while	 it	 is	multi-sited	
like	 the	 second	 generation	 ethnographies,	 like	 the	 first	 it	 is	 scientists	
themselves,	rather	than	other	interested	parties,	that	are	the	participants.	Yet	
unlike	 the	 first	 generation	 I	 have	 not	 focused	 exclusively	 on	 scientific	
knowledge	or	on	unpacking	any	particular	fact	claim.	Rather,	I	am	interested	
in	 how	 synthetic	 biologists’	 attempts	 to	 ‘engineer	 biology’	 shape	 both	 their	
day-to-day	work	 and	 the	way	 ‘biology’	 and	 ‘the	 biological’	 are	 consequently	
understood	 and	 interacted	 with	 within	 this	 emergent	 hybrid	 discipline.	 My	
lens	 for	exploring	these	questions	was	the,	 then	newly	established,	academic	
synthetic	biology	 research	centre	 located	within	a	prestigious	UK	university,	
which	was	discussed	in	chapter	one,	and	which	I	refer	to	as	‘the	Centre.’	Thus,	
as	Woolgar	(1982)	urged	ethnographers	of	science	to	do,	I	undertook	a	study	
in	 a	 laboratory,	 not	 of	 a	 laboratory,	 focusing	 on	 questions	 with	 broader	
relevance	than	just	the	day-to-day	work	of	the	laboratory	itself.	
Entering	the	field	
In	November	 2009	 I	 began	making	 contact	with	 people	 at	 the	Centre	 via	
email.	 I	 contacted	 Sara,	 the	 person	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 Centre’s	 laboratory	
meeting	series,	and	Peter,	the	lecturer	in	charge	of	the	Centre’s	undergraduate	
synthetic	biology	course,	to	see	if	I	could	sit	in	on	both.	While	Sara	and	Peter	
were	 both	 seemingly	 puzzled	 by	 my	 requests,	 and	 uncertain	 of	 my	
motivations,	 they	 thankfully	 consented.	 I	 had	 to	wait	 until	 February	 for	 the	
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course	to	begin,	but	by	December	I	had	begun	attending	the	Centre’s	weekly,	
alternating	 laboratory	 and	 journal	 club	meetings.	 This	 proved	 to	 be	 a	 good	
way	of	easing	myself	into	the	‘field’	and	starting	to	get	to	know	more	about	the	
Centre	 and	 those	who	worked	within	 it.	My	 first	 attendance	 at	 a	 laboratory	
meeting	was,	as	I	noted	in	my	fieldnotes,	rather	awkward.	I	had	arrived	at	the	
University	with	ten	minutes	to	spare,	carrying	a	map	of	the	campus,	with	the	
biochemistry	building	circled	in	yellow	highlighter,	my	notebook	and	several	
back-up	pens.	After	winding	my	way	 through	 the	maze	of	buildings	 I	 found	
the	 Biochemistry	 Department	 and	 climbed	 its	 front	 steps.	 The	 glass	 sliding	
doors	opened	into	a	reception	area	containing	a	large	security	desk	flanked	by	
swipe	 card-activated	gates,	which	 stopped	me	 in	my	 tracks.	 I	 had	no	 choice	
but	to	approach	the	security	guard	and	ask	him	to	let	me	through.	However,	
rather	 than	 admit	 me	 to	 the	 building	 he	 telephoned	 Sara	 to	 tell	 her	 I	 had	
arrived	and	asked	her	to	come	and	fetch	me.	Five	minutes	later	Sara,	a	blond	
haired,	 bespectacled	 woman,	 who	 appeared	 to	 be	 slight	 annoyed	 by	 the	
inconvenience,	came	down	the	stairs	to	greet	me	and	I	followed	her	back	up	to	
the	sixth	floor	doing	my	very	best	to	make	small	talk	and	feeling	every	bit	the	
untrusted,	bothersome	outsider.		
We	finally	arrived	at	the	sixth	floor	landing	and	went	through	a	swipe	card	
activated	security	door	 into	a	narrow	hallway	before	veering	off	 into	a	small,	
windowless	room	containing	a	large	table,	too	many	chairs,	and	a	white	board.	
The	 room	 was	 empty,	 but	 people	 soon	 started	 to	 arrive.	 I	 began	 to	 feel	
increasingly	awkward	as	each	new	person	assessed	me	with	querying	looks	but	
did	 not	 actually	 speak	 to	me.	 I	 decided	 to	 introduce	myself	 to	 people,	 and	
tried	hard	to	engage	them	in	small	talk,	but	not	one	of	them	would	commit	to	
a	 conversation.	 Malcolm,	 one	 of	 the	 Centre’s	 directors,	 finally	 arrived	 and	
actually	 asked	me	 a	 question	 “Are	 you	 from	 LSE30?,”	 but	 he	 responds	 to	my	
affirmation	 with	 nothing	 more	 than	 a	 simple	 nod.	 To	 my	 great	 relief	 the	
meeting	finally	commenced,	taking	the	silent	focus	off	the	lone	social	scientist	
in	the	room.		
																																								 								
30	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science.	
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After	my	initial	attempts	at	conversation	I	spoke	very	little	during	this	first	
meeting	as,	despite	racking	my	brain,	I	could	think	of	no	intelligent-sounding	
questions	 to	 ask,	 or	 comments	 to	make.	On	 bidding	 everyone	 farewell,	 and	
having	 received	 permission	 to	 continue	 attending	 the	 meetings,	 I	 was	
determined	to	do	two	things;	one,	drag	the	knowledge	obtained	through	my	
own	 degree	 in	 Biochemistry	 back	 into	 the	 light,	 and	 two,	 build	 trust	 and	
rapport	with	the	inhabitants	of	the	Centre,	my	‘subjects’,	even	if	it	required	my	
attendance	at	many	more	meetings	before	they	spoke	to	me.	
At	this	time	I	also	began	attending	various	meetings	and	conferences	of	the	
wider	 synthetic	 biology	 community.	 In	 2007	 the	 Engineering	 and	 Physical	
Sciences	 Research	 Council,	 the	 Biotechnology	 and	 Biological	 Sciences	
Research	 Council,	 the	 Arts	 and	 Humanities	 Research	 Council,	 and	 the	
Economic	and	Social	Research	Council	jointly	funded	seven	synthetic	biology	
networks	across	the	UK.	The	purpose	of	these	networks	was	“to	develop	and	
establish	 communication	 and	 networking	 between	 researchers	 in	 the	
biosciences,	 engineering	 and	 the	 physical	 sciences	 in	 the	 area	 of	 synthetic	
biology,	 with	 associated	 input	 from	 the	 social	 sciences	 and	 humanities”	
(Biotechnology	and	Biological	Sciences	Research	Council).	 It	was	hoped	 that	
the	 networks	 would	 help	 to	 break	 down	 disciplinary	 language	 barriers	 and	
build	 an	 interdisciplinary	 synthetic	 biology	 community	 in	 the	 UK	 through	
which	new	research	partnerships	could	be	formed.		
To	 this	 ends,	 the	 networks	 each	 organised	 annual	 one	 and	 two-day	
meetings	 of	 their	members	 and	 other	 interested	 parties.	 In	 order	 to	 explore	
the	interactions	between	engineers	and	biologists,	as	well	as	the	conception	of	
biology	 evident	within	 the	broader	 synthetic	 biology	 community,	 I	 attended	
five	 of	 these	 meetings	 during	 2010.	 During	 2009	 and	 2010	 I	 also	 attended	
several	synthetic	biology	public	engagement	events,	to	witness	how	synthetic	
biology	 was	 being	 presented	 in	 this	 context,	 and	 two	 synthetic	 biology	
symposia	held	at	the	Centre	for	the	wider	disciplinary	community.	In	June	2011	
I	attended,	and	presented	a	poster	at	SB5.0,	the	most	prominent	international	
synthetic	 biology	 conference	 series,	 which	 was	 held	 at	 Stanford	 University,	
California.	This	conference,	like	those	in	the	UK,	proved	an	interesting	forum	
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for	exploring	the	conceptions	of	biology	within	the	broader	synthetic	biology	
community	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 biology	 and	 engineering	 as	 it	 was	
being	presented.		 	
Yet	all	of	 these	activities	 served	 to	supplement	my	main	research	activity,	
an	ethnographic	study	of	the	day-to-day	practice	of	synthetic	biology	within	a	
newly	formed	research	centre.	My	aim	at	the	beginning	of	my	fieldwork	was	to	
explore	the	interactions	between	biology	and	engineering,	and	thus	biologists	
and	 engineers,	 working	 within	 the	 Centre.	 I	 intended	 to	 focus	 on	 their	
attempts	to	embrace	the	engineering	approach	to	biology,	central	to	synthetic	
biology’s	 aim,	 and	 to	 explore	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 ‘the	 biological’	 and	 ‘the	
engineered’	were	 being	 constructed,	 understood,	 and	 interacted	with	within	
the	Centre.	However	when	 I	began	my	 fieldwork	 the	Centre	 itself	was	more	
conceptual	 than	 it	was	concrete.	 Its	members	were	scattered	throughout	the	
University	 or,	 having	 recently	 been	hired,	 still	 resident	 at	 other	universities.	
Indeed,	it	was	not	until	April	2010	that	the	Centre	finally	moved	into	its	long	
awaited	office	and	lab	space	within	the	Engineering	School,	and	thus	became	
more	of	a	tangible	reality.		
I	 had	 been	 promised	 space	 within	 the	 Centre	 to	 work,	 and	 I	 knew	 my	
ethnographic	 research	 would	 benefit	 from	more	 continual	 contact	 with	 the	
synthetic	biologists,	so	I	was	eager	to	‘move	in.’	I	hoped	to	take	on	the	tasks	of	
a	 laboratory	 assistant,	 as	 Latour	 (1979)	 had	 for	 Laboratory	 Life,	 in	 order	 to	
participate	 in	 the	 workings	 of	 the	 Centre	 as	 fully	 as	 possible.	 Such	
participation,	which	is	central	to	ethnographic	research,	would,	I	reasoned,	aid	
my	 understanding	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biologists’	 behaviour	 and	 thoughts.	 As	
Emerson	et	al.	claim,	through	“participating	as	fully	and	humanly	as	possible	
in	another	way	of	 life,	the	ethnographer	 learns	what	 is	required	to	become	a	
member	 of	 that	 world,	 to	 experience	 events	 and	 meanings	 in	 ways	 that	
approximate	members’	experiences”	(1995:	2).	What	I	experienced	and	 learnt	
while	 in	 the	 Centre	 shapes	 all	 that	 is	 to	 come	 in	 the	 following	 chapters.	
However	before	moving	on	 to	 a	discussion	of	 these	 findings	 it	 is	 important,	
and	hopefully	interesting,	to	further	describe	and	reflect	on	both	my	fieldwork	
site	and	my	experience	of	and	approach	to	this	ethnography.	
 55 
The	Centre	
My	 fieldnotes	 from	my	 first	 visit	 to	 the	 new	 space,	 in	May	 2010,	 paint	 a	
picture	 of	 the	 Centre	 where	 I	 was	 to	 spend	 every	 weekday,	 and	 several	
evenings	 until	 mid-December.	 Sara	 had	 agreed	 to	 show	 me	 around	 the	
Centre’s	new	space,	and	to	help	me	find	a	desk	to	work	at,	so	I	met	her	in	her	
office	 in	 the	 biochemistry	 department	 and	 together	 we	 walked	 across	 the	
university	 campus	 to	 a	 large,	 modern,	 glass	 building	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	
Engineering	 School.	We	 entered	 through	 its	wide	 sliding	 doors	 and	 crossed	
the	foyer	to	the	lifts.	My	newly	acquired	University	ID	card,	proclaiming	me	to	
be	a	Visiting	Researcher	within	the	Division	of	Molecular	Biosciences,	had	to	
be	touched	on	the	sensor	pad	within	the	lift	before	I	could	select	a	floor.	This	
requirement,	like	the	swipe	card	gates	I	had	entered	on	attending	my	first	lab	
meeting,	 served	 as	 a	 reminder	 of	 the	 security	 measures	 which	 bar	 all	
unaccompanied	 outsiders	 from	 accessing	 the	 university’s	 laboratories.	 On	
exiting	 into	 the	 sixth	 floor	 lobby	my	 attention	was	drawn	 to	 a	 set	 of	 locked	
double	doors	beneath	a	sign	displaying	the	Centre’s	name.	Using	her	own	ID	
card,	Sara	 swiped	us	 through	 this	 threshold	and	 started	 showing	me	around	
what	 would	 become	 the	 centre	 of	 my	 fieldwork	 world.	 To	 my	 eager	 eyes	
everything	appeared	shiny,	new,	and	expectant.	There	were	no	scuffmarks	on	
the	 floors,	 the	 walls	 were	 brilliantly	 white,	 and	 the	 labs	 and	 equipment	
immaculately	clean.	
Just	inside	and	to	the	right	of	these	first	double	doors	was	a	glass	wall	with	
a	door	 leading	 into	 the	empty	PhD	office.	The	 room	was	mainly	white,	with	
highlights	 of	 fuchsia	 pink,	 and	 a	 bright	 green	 door,	 a	 colour	 scheme	 that	
continued	 out	 into	 the	 corridor	 and	 throughout	 the	 Centre.	 The	 dark-grey,	
flecked	 carpet	 in	 the	 office	 blended	 into	 the	 hallway	 linoleum,	 which	
mimicked	its	shade	and	pattern.	The	room	at	the	time	contained	four	desks,	
two	facing	the	sidewalls,	and	two	facing	the	exterior	glass	wall	of	the	building.	
However	with	time,	and	the	expansion	of	the	Centre,	this	number	swelled	to	
eight.	Through	this	exterior	wall,	from	the	desk	that	would	become	my	own,	I	
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could	 see	 down	 to	 the	 grey	 courtyard	 below	 and	 over	 to	 the	 roof	 of	 the	
adjacent	building.		
On	returning	to	 the	hallway	we	were	confronted	by	a	second	set	of	swipe	
card	 accessible	 swing	 doors	 leading	 through	 to	 the	 laboratories	 themselves.	
Four	signs	were	prominently	displayed	on	these	doors	each	bearing	an	image	
surrounded	 by	 the	 iconic	 red	 circle	 with	 a	 line	 through	 it,	 indicating	
something	 forbidden,	and	the	corresponding	 imperatives	 “No	Smoking,”	 “No	
Drinking,”	“No	Eating,”	and	“No	gloves	past	this	point.”	The	image	for	this	last	
one	was	the	most	unusual	of	the	four,	being	a	set	of	clasped	hands	in	bright	
blue	latex	gloves.		
Six	 rooms	 lay	 on	 the	 other	 side	 of	 these	 double	 doors,	 all	 of	 them	
unoccupied	at	the	time.	The	first	of	which,	to	our	left,	was	the	‘prep	room,’	a	
small	 windowless	 room	 containing	 an	 array	 of	 chemicals,	 solution	 bottles,	
eppendorf	 tubes,	 and	 several	 electrophoresis	 machines	 for	 running	 gels.	
Directly	opposite	 its	open	door	was	 the	 first	of	 the	 three	 laboratories	with	a	
handwritten	 sign	 on	 the	 door	 bearing	 the	 words	 “Johnson/Roberts	 lab,”	
referring	to	Martin	Johnson	and	Michael	Roberts,	two	of	the	newly	appointed	
synthetic	biology	lecturers.	As	with	the	PhD	room,	the	hallway-facing	walls	of	
the	 three	 laboratories	were	made	 entirely	 of	 glass,	 so	 anyone	 in	 the	hallway	
could	 observe	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 inside	 as	 if	 they	 were	 part	 of	 a	 live	
action	museum	exhibit.	Through	 the	wall	of	 this	 first	 lab	 I	 could	 see	 several	
clean	 bench	 tops,	 a	 tap	 that	would	 become	notorious	 for	 drenching	 anyone	
who	turned	it	on,	and	two	small	PCR	machines.		
The	other	two	laboratories	were	located	on	the	opposite	side	of	the	hallway,	
past	 the	prep	 room.	The	 first	of	 these	 laboratories	housed	 the	PhD	students	
working	 with	 Alan	 Gregg	 and	 contained	 both	 ‘the	 robot’	 and	 ‘the	 FACS	
machine.’	On	being	shown	the	FACS	machine	or,	as	my	untrained	ear	heard	it,	
the	 ‘fax	machine,’	 I	was	 confused	 to	 see	 a	 contraption	bearing	 a	mechanical	
arm	with	a	line	of	pipette	tips	suspended	from	it.	It	was,	as	I	quickly	learnt,	a	
fluorescence-activated	cell-sorting	machine,	while	the	robot	was	nowhere	near	
as	exciting	as	it	had	sounded,	being	a	very	large	piece	of	nondescript	apparatus	
sitting	on	the	floor	on	the	far	side	of	the	lab.	Indeed	it	remained	on	the	floor	
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for	several	months,	waiting	patiently	for	the	bench	above	to	be	extended	and	
strengthened	in	order	to	accommodate	 it.	Like	the	FACS	machine,	 the	robot	
was	 designed	 for	 the	 high-throughput	 work	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	
Centre	 were	 hoping	 to	 perform	 as	 they	 strived	 towards	 characterising	 and	
assembling	synthetic	biology	‘parts.’	
The	 third	 and	 final	 laboratory	 was	 introduced	 to	 me	 as	 ‘Janet’s	 lab,’	
referring	 to	 another	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 lecturers,	 and	 the	 only	woman	
above	 the	 level	 of	PhD	 student	 actively	working	within	 the	Centre.	Like	 the	
other	 two	 laboratories,	 this	 one	 contained	 work	 benches,	 small	 freezers,	
shelves	of	 supplies,	 camping	gas	 stoves	 (due	 to	 a	 lack	of	piped-in	gas	 in	 the	
Engineering	School),	coat	racks	hung	with	white	lab	coats,	pipettes,	boxes	and	
boxes	of	different	sized	and	coloured	latex	gloves,	bright	blue	pipette	tips,	and	
eppendorf	tubes.	Centrifuges	and	mass	spectrometers	sat	on	bench	tops,	and	
sinks	 and	 rubbish	 bins	 with	 bags	 colour	 coded	 for	 different	 types	 of	 waste	
were	by	 the	doors	–	clear	bags	 for	waste	 that	had	been	 in	contact	with	cells	
and	therefore	needed	to	be	autoclaved31	before	disposal,	and	coloured	bags	for	
everything	else.	Opposite	 Janet’s	 lab	was	a	 small	 room	containing	a	series	of	
incubators	 and	 freezers,	 and	 the	 ‘hot	 desk’	 room,	 another	 small	 room	
containing	 three	 or	 four	 desks	 which	 was,	 at	 the	 time,	 being	 used	 by	 the	
undergraduate	 students	doing	 their	practical,	 small	 scale	projects	within	 the	
Centre.		
Having	 shown	me	 around	 these	 labs	 and	offices,	 Sara	 then	 led	me	 to	 the	
Centre’s	 extra	 office	 space	 directly	 upstairs.	 The	 seventh	 floor	 area	 was	 a	
jumble	of	office	furniture,	with	a	maze	of	filing	cabinets,	desks,	drawers,	and	
shelves.	Indeed	way	too	much	stuff	for	the	size	of	the	space,	all	of	it	waiting	to	
find	 a	 home.	 There	was	 a	 sink	 and	 a	 small	 fridge	 in	 one	 corner,	 just	 past	 a	
glass-walled,	locked,	and	darkened	office,	which,	Sara	informed	me,	belonged	
to	Michael	and	Janet.	The	glass	wall	into	their	office	was	scrawled	all	over	with	
biological	diagrams,	and	half	 thought-through	reactions	 in	what	appeared	to	
be	 a	black	whiteboard	marker	pen.	There	were	no	whiteboards	up	 yet,	 so	 it	
																																								 								
31	Sterilised	with	high-pressure	steam.	
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seemed	 that	 someone	had	been	making	do	with	what	was	available.	Against	
the	left	wall	of	the	central	open-plan	area	were	two	more	glass-walled	offices.	
Through	 the	 glass	 I	 could	 see	 Grant	 Butler	 (the	 fourth	 new	 lecturer)	 and	
Martin	in	the	first,	and	said	hello	to	them	both.	Sara	mentioned	to	them	that	I	
would	now	be	in	the	Centre	fulltime,	and	to	my	great	relief,	they	both	reacted	
positively.	 The	next	 office,	which	was	 still	 bare	 except	 for	 two	 empty	 desks,	
was	 apparently	 for	 the	 Centre’s	 directors	 Alan	 and	Malcolm,	 though	 at	 the	
time	 I	was	unconvinced	 that	 either	would	 leave	 their	 respective	department	
offices	 to	 take	 up	 residence	 in	 it.	 As	 it	 turned	 out	my	 doubt	was	 justifiable	
given	 that	 I	 never	 once	 saw	 either	 of	 them	 in	 there.	We	 then	 headed	 back	
downstairs	and,	on	saying	goodbye	to	Sara,	I	headed	back	to	LSE	to	gather	up	
my	belongings	in	order	to	take	up	residence	at	my	new	desk	in	the	Centre	the	
following	day.	
Life	in	the	Centre	
From	 my	 desk	 in	 the	 PhD	 room	 I	 had	 easy	 access	 to	 the	 laboratories,	
offices,	and	their	inhabitants.	During	the	eight	months	of	my	residence	in	the	
Centre	 I	 continued	 to	 attend	 the	 journal	 club	 discussions,	 laboratory	
meetings,	 Centre	 meetings,	 public	 symposiums	 and	 presentations,	 informal	
afternoon	cake	sessions	(which	I	instigated),	and	networking	and	collaborative	
events	 for	 both	 the	Centre	 and	 the	wider	UK	 synthetic	 biology	 community.	
However,	between	these	engagements	I	spent	my	days	shadowing	the	Centre’s	
inhabitants	 as	 they	 worked	 in	 the	 laboratories	 or	 at	 their	 desks,	 providing	
assistance	where	 I	 could,	 from	 loading	and	 running	electrophoresis	 gels	 and	
taking	 optical	 density	 readings,	 to	 helping	 to	 select	 diagrams	 for	 papers.	
Throughout	my	time	in	the	Centre,	and	the	various	meetings	and	conferences	
I	attended,	I	took	detailed	fieldnotes	recording	what	I	saw,	experienced,	heard,	
felt,	 and	 thought	 as	 I	 went	 about	 my	 days	 in	 the	 ‘field.’	 These	 were	 either	
written	 into	 my	 fieldwork	 journal	 and	 later	 typed	 up,	 or	 they	 were	 typed	
directly	into	my	laptop.		
Writing	 fieldnotes,	 as	 Emerson	 et	 al.	 (1995)	 address,	 is	 central	 to	 any	
undertaking	of	participant	observation.	However	“writing	descriptive	accounts	
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of	 experiences	 and	 observations	 is	 not	 as	 straightforward	 and	 transparent	 a	
process	as	it	might	initially	appear”	(Emerson	et	al.	1995:	5)	for	there	are	many	
possible	ways	in	which	the	same	events	and	situations	can	be	described.	Thus	
Emerson	 et	 al.	 see	 fieldnotes	 as	 inscriptions	 of	 social	 life	 and	discourse	 that	
transform	 “witnessed	 events,	 persons	 and	 places	 into	 words	 on	 paper”	
(Emerson	et	al.	1995:	9)	which,	depending	on	the	person	doing	the	inscribing,	
emphasise	and	exclude	certain	elements.	As	such,	fieldnotes	can	be	described	
as	 “written	 accounts	 that	 filter	members’	 experiences	 and	 concerns	 through	
the	 person	 and	 perspectives	 of	 the	 ethnographer;	 fieldnotes	 provide	 the	
ethnographer’s,	 not	 the	 members,’	 accounts	 of	 the	 latter’s	 experiences,	
meanings,	and	concerns”	(Emerson	et	al.	1995:	13).		
Consequently	 my	 fieldnotes,	 which	 inform	 much	 of	 the	 substantive	
material	in	this	thesis,	must	be	seen	as	partial,	ultimately	representing	my	own	
account	of	the	synthetic	biologists’	experiences	and	concerns	rather	than	their	
own.	The	partiality	of	my	fieldnotes	is	further	increased	by	the	fact	that	I	did	
not	 take	notes	while	 I	was	 ‘in	 the	 field.’	Being	 imbedded	within	my	research	
site,	 the	building	of	 rapport	with	 the	synthetic	biologists	 I	was	 studying	was	
essential.	 Therefore	 I	 avoided	making	 ‘open	 jottings’	 for	my	 fieldnotes,	 as	 I	
believed	 that	 the	practice	 of	 note	 taking	during	 informal	 conversations,	 and	
Centre	or	 laboratory	activities,	would	have	been	distracting	 for	 the	synthetic	
biologists	and	would	have	inhibited	my	ability	to	participate.	So	instead	I	took	
what	Emerson	et	al.	(1995)	refer	to	as	 ‘headnotes,’	committing	situations	and	
conversations	to	memory	so	I	could	later	write	them	down	in	my	notebook	or	
type	them	into	my	laptop	when	I	returned	to	my	desk.		
Interviews	
As	Fontana	and	Frey	 (2000)	acknowledge,	participant	observation	and	 in-
depth	 unstructured	 interviewing	 go	 hand-in-hand,	 as	 much	 of	 the	 data	
gathered	during	participant	observation	comes	from	informal	conversations	in	
the	 field.	However,	 being	 aware	 of	 the	 partiality	 of	my	 fieldnotes	 led	me	 to	
also	 undertake	 in-depth	 semi-structured	 interviews	 with	 the	 Centre’s	
inhabitants.	Towards	 the	end	of	my	 time	 in	 the	Centre	 I	 contacted	all	of	 its	
 60 
immediate	members,	and	several	associated	members,	via	email	or	 in	person	
and	asked	 them	to	participate.	Of	 the	 twenty-four	 individuals	 I	 identified	as	
potential	 interviewees,	 twenty-two	 agreed	 to	 be	 interviewed.	The	 other	 two,	
who	were	associates	of	the	Centre,	did	not	respond	despite	multiple	attempts	
to	contact	them.	Written	consent	was	obtained	prior	to	each	of	the	interviews,	
which	were	undertaken	 in	private	and	 lasted	between	forty-five	minutes	and	
two	 hours.	 Preliminary	 analysis	 of	 the	 themes	 emerging	 from	my	 fieldwork	
helped	to	shape	the	questions	I	used	for	the	interviews,	allowing	me	to	further	
explore,	 and	 challenge,	 these	 themes.	 I	 took	 a	 semi-structured	 approach	 to	
these	interviews	as	I	wished	to	avoid	both	the	rigidity	of	structured	interviews	
and	the	free-form	approach	of	unstructured	interviews,	having	already	utilised	
the	 latter	 during	 my	 participant	 observation.	 I	 audiotaped	 each	 of	 the	
interviews	 and	 sent	 the	 digital	 files	 to	 a	 professional	 stenographer	 to	
transcribe.	In	order	to	maintain	the	interviewees’	anonymity	I	ascribed	each	a	
number,	which	was	attached	to	both	the	audio	file	and	the	transcript	of	their	
interview.	 The	 twenty-two	 interview	 transcripts	 I	 received	 back	 from	 the	
stenographer,	 and	 all	 of	my	 detailed	 fieldnotes,	 were	 uploaded	 into	NVivo8	
where	I	coded	them	for	emergent	themes,	first	broadly	and	then	more	finely.	
These	themes	are	explored	in	the	following	substantive	chapters.	
Although	 I	undertook	 these	 interviews	as	 a	way	of	both	uncovering	more	
in-depth	 information	 than	 I	 was	 able	 to	 elucidate	 through	 the	 participant	
observation,	and	giving	those	at	the	Centre	a	chance	to	reflect	on	the	practices	
I	was	observing,	I	was	undoubtedly	also	an	active	participant	in	the	interviews,	
helping	 to	 shape	 the	 information	 I	 received.	 As	 Fontana	 and	 Frey	 write	
“[i]nterviewers	are	increasingly	seen	as	active	participants	in	interactions	with	
respondents,	and	 interviews	are	seen	as	negotiated	accomplishments	of	both	
interviewers	and	respondents	that	are	shaped	by	the	contexts	and	situations	in	
which	they	take	place”	(Fontana	and	Frey	2000:	663).	Thus	although	I	wished	
to	 hear	 the	 synthetic	 biologists’	 own	 accounts	 of	 how	 they	 understood	 and	
experienced	 the	 work	 they	 do,	 it	 must	 be	 conceded	 that	 “what	 the	
ethnographer	 finds	 out	 is	 inherently	 connected	 with	 how	 she	 finds	 it	 out”	
(Emerson	et	al.	1995:	11).	Consequently,	not	only	did	I	shape	what	I	found	out	
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through	 the	 questions	 I	 asked	 but	 also,	 as	 the	 interviews	 were	 transcribed	
from	audio	 files	 into	transcripts,	and	 it	was	these	transcripts	that	 I	analysed,	
certain	dimensions	of	meaning	were	lost.	Through	the	exclusion	of	emphasis,	
silences,	 incomprehensible	 words,	 and	 overlapping	 speech,	 transcripts	 lose	
nonverbal	 cues	 to	 meaning	 which	 aid	 in	 the	 understanding	 of	 discourse	
(Emerson	et	al.	1995).		
Embracing	subjectivity	and	reflexivity	
Barnard	 writes	 that	 “[i]t	 is	 impossible	 to	 engage	 in	 ethnography	 without	
some	 idea	 of	 what	 is	 important	 and	 what	 is	 not”	 (Barnard	 2000:	 4-5).	 A	
comment	that	is	distinctly	different	from,	and	to	my	mind	more	accurate	than,	
Oakley’s	(2000)	claim	that,	“[i]t	is	generally	true	that	what	people	look	for	they	
will	 find,	 and	 that	what	 they	are	not	 looking	 for	will	probably	 escape	 them”	
(Oakley	 2000:	 52).	 For,	 while	 my	 interview	 questions	 undoubtedly	 affected	
what	I	found,	and	I	indeed	only	recorded	certain	things	during	my	participant	
observation,	 I	 dispute	 that	 this	 led	me	 to	 only	 find	what	 I	 set	 out	 to	 find.	 I	
entered	 the	 field	 with	 what	 Bronislaw	 Malinowski,	 arguably	 the	 father	 of	
participant	 observation,	 would	 call	 ‘foreshadowing	 problems.’	 That	 is,	
problems	or	topics	of	interest,	which,	as	he	argues,	is	not	the	same	as	having	
preconceived	conclusions.	On	this	Malinowski	wrote:		
“[g]ood	training	in	theory,	and	acquaintance	with	its	latest	results,	
is	not	identical	with	being	burdened	with	‘preconceived	ideas.’	If	a	
man	 set	 out	 on	 an	 expedition,	 determined	 to	 prove	 certain	
hypotheses,	if	he	is	incapable	of	changing	his	views	constantly	and	
casting	 them	 off	 ungrudgingly	 under	 the	 pressure	 of	 evidence,	
needless	to	say	his	work	will	be	worthless.	But	the	more	problems	
he	 brings	 with	 him	 into	 the	 field,	 the	more	 he	 is	 in	 the	 habit	 of	
moulding	his	theories	according	to	fact,	and	of	seeing	facts	in	their	
bearing	 upon	 theory,	 the	 better	 he	 is	 equipped	 for	 the	 work.	
Preconceived	 ideas	 are	 pernicious	 in	 any	 scientific	 work,	 but	
foreshadowed	 problems	 are	 the	 main	 endowment	 of	 a	 scientific	
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thinker,	and	these	problems	are	first	revealed	to	the	observer	by	his	
theoretical	studies”	(1922:	7).		
This	 need,	 for	 ethnographers	 to	 remain	 open	 to	 the	 unexpected,	 is	 also	
highlighted	by	Hammersley	and	Wilkinson	who	write	that,	for	ethnographers	
“their	orientation	is	an	exploratory	one”	(2007:	3).	Thus,	they	continue,	“[i]t	is	
expected	 that	 the	 initial	 interests	 and	questions	 that	motivated	 the	 research	
will	be	refined,	and	perhaps	even	transformed,	over	the	course	of	the	research;	
and	 that	 this	 may	 take	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 time”	 (Hammersley	 and	
Wilkinson	 2007:	 3).	 As	 my	 own	 research	 progressed,	 new,	 unanticipated	
avenues	 of	 investigation	 opened	 up	 as	 I	 learnt	 and	 experienced	 more	 of	
synthetic	biology	at	the	Centre.	Thus	these	unexpected	findings	in	turn	altered	
and	 refined	my	 initial	 research	questions	and	 interests	much	as	Malinowski,	
and	Hammersley	and	Wilkinson,	describe.	
Oakley’s	 (2000)	 questioning	 of	 the	 trustworthiness	 of	 qualitative	 research	
however	 goes	 further.	 She	 claims	 that	 as	 the	 findings	of	qualitative	 research	
are	 uncontrolled	 and	 cannot	 be	 reproduced	 and	 repeated,	 they	 are	
untrustworthy;	 unreliable	 that	 is	 rather	 than	 false.	 Oakley	 asserts	 that	
researchers	cannot	shed	the	power	of	being	the	researcher	and	interpreter	of	
their	 findings,	 that	 is	 “the	 power	 to	 define”	 (Oakley	 2000:	 72),	 and	 thus	 the	
work	 they	 produce	 is	 not	 inherently	 a	 reliable	 account.	Denzin	 and	 Lincoln	
also	 acknowledge	 this	 predicament	 in	 relation	 to	 research	 observations,	
writing,	 “[t]here	 are	 no	 objective	 observations,	 only	 observations	 socially	
situated	in	the	worlds	of	–	and	between	the	observer	and	the	observed”	(2005:	
19).	Thus	given	the	 inherent	subjectivity	of	 such	research,	 it	 is	 important	 for	
researchers	 to	 embrace	 reflexivity.	 Regarding	 reflexivity,	 Hammersley	 and	
Wilkinson	write:	
“[t]he	 concept	of	 reflexivity	 acknowledges	 that	 the	orientations	of	
researchers	 will	 be	 shaped	 by	 their	 socio-historical	 locations,	
including	the	values	and	interests	that	these	locations	confer	upon	
them.	What	 this	 represents	 is	 a	 rejection	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 social	
research	is,	or	can	be,	carried	out	in	some	autonomous	realm	that	is	
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insulated	 from	 the	 wider	 society	 and	 from	 the	 biography	 of	 the	
researcher,	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 its	 findings	 can	 be	 unaffected	 by	
social	 processes	 and	 personal	 characteristics”	 (Hammersley	 and	
Wilkinson	2007:	15).		
Nevertheless,	 this	 subjectivity,	 and	 the	 recognition	 that	 research	 is	 an	active	
process	of	observation,	interpretation,	and	writing,	does	not,	and	should	not,	
devalue	 the	 findings	 of	 qualitative	 social	 research.	 As	 Hammersley	 and	
Wilkinson	write,	“to	say	that	our	findings,	and	even	our	data,	are	constructed	
does	 not	 automatically	 imply	 that	 they	 do	 not	 or	 cannot	 represent	 social	
phenomena”	(Hammersley	and	Wilkinson	2007:	16).	
In	the	interests	of	reflexivity	then,	it	is	important	to	address	elements	of	my	
own	 biography	 that	 have	 had	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 the	 findings	 of	 this	
research,	both	in	terms	of	the	way	I	interpreted	my	observations	and	findings	
and	in	terms	of	how	my	presence	 in	the	Centre	altered	what	went	on.	As	an	
undergraduate	student	my	interest	in	science	generally,	and	in	the	workings	of	
biology	 specifically,	 drew	me	 to	 university	 studies	 in	 biochemistry	 and	 later	
(when	 courses	 became	 available)	 in	 genetics.	However,	 as	 I	 also	 had	 a	 keen	
interest	 in	 learning	 about	 the	 social	 world,	 I	 simultaneously	 undertook	 a	
degree	 in	 anthropology.	 Following	 the	 completion	 of	 my	 BSc	 and	 BA	 I	
embarked	on	two	further	research	degrees	in	Anthropology,	an	Honour’s	and	
a	 Master’s	 degree,	 both	 of	 which	 explored	 social	 aspects	 of	 medicine	 and	
science	 through	 the	 use	 of	 ethnography.	 Following	 the	 completion	 of	 my	
Master’s	 degree	 I	 undertook	 three	 separate	 academic	 research	 jobs	 in	
ethnographic	 projects,	 one	 in	 my	 native	 New	 Zealand	 and	 two	 in	 the	 UK,	
which	 likewise	 explored	 the	 social	 aspects	 of	 science	 and	 medicine.	 It	 was	
from	 this	 hybrid	 academic	 background	 that	 I	 embarked	 upon	 my	 doctoral	
research	on	synthetic	biology.		
Synthetic	biology	was	a	subject	that	interested	me	both	for	the	advances	in	
science	 it	 promised	 and	 for	 the	 social	 and	 scientific	 implications	 that	 come	
with	 such	advances,	 or	 attempts	 at	 such	advances.	My	academic	 experience,	
alongside	my	knowledge	of	science	and	of	biology	in	particular,	undoubtedly	
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shaped	the	way	I	interpreted	what	I	saw	and	experienced	during	my	fieldwork.	
The	Centre,	 and	 its	 laboratories,	while	 a	new	environment	 for	me,	were	not	
foreign	and	strange	 in	the	way	Latour	and	Woolgar	describe	(1979).	Nor	was	
their	scientific	language	completely	alien	to	my	ear,	as	it	would	perhaps	have	
been	for	an	ethnographer	with	no	training	in	science.	Throughout	the	project	
I	 have	 drawn	 heavily	 on	 my	 knowledge	 and	 experience	 of	 biology	 to	
understand	the	science	utilised	and	produced	within	synthetic	biology	and	to	
help	build	 rapport	with	 the	 synthetic	biologists.	My	 science	background,	 for	
example,	appeared	to	reduce	some	of	the	synthetic	biologists’	suspicions	of	me	
and	 my	 research.	 Indeed,	 on	 more	 than	 one	 occasion	 I	 was	 introduced	 to	
visitors	to	the	Centre,	by	Malcolm	Brown,32	as	“our	resident	social	scientist,	but	
really	she’s	a	biologist.”		
I	 further	 utilised	 my	 familiarity	 and	 experience	 within	 biological	
laboratories	 to	 help	 those	 I	 shadowed	with	 their	 experiments,	 adopting	 the	
role	 of	 a	 lab	 assistant,	much	 as	Bruno	Latour	did	 in	Laboratory	 Life	 (Latour	
and	Woolgar	 1979).	This	helped	me	to	 fulfil	both	the	 ‘participant’	half	of	my	
participant	observation,	 and	my	desire	 for	 reciprocity.	Nevertheless	 it	would	
be	naïve	to	believe	that	the	inhabitants	of	the	Centre	did	not	see	me	as	‘other.’	
I	was	clearly	an	anomaly	in	the	Centre,	being	the	only	resident	social	scientist,	
and	 at	 times	 they	 were	 visibly	 perplexed	 by	 my	 research	 methods	 and	
interests.	 Furthermore,	 due	 to	 the	 impetus	within	 synthetic	 biology	 (largely	
due	to	the	requirements	of	funders)	to	address	Ethical,	Legal,	and	Social	Issues	
(ELSIs),	 the	 inhabitants,	 familiar	 with	 the	 rhetoric	 which	 was	 expected	 of	
them,	may	have	told	me	what	they	thought	I	wanted	to	hear.	
My	knowledge	of	science	was,	however,	at	times	a	hindrance.	I	arguably	did	
not	 look	 on	 the	 field	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 with	 the	 same	 ‘fresh	 eyes’	 that	 I	
would	 have	 if	 I	 had	 never	 studied	 biology,	 so	 I	 may	 well	 have	 overlooked	
aspects	 of	 their	 practice	 that	 would	 have	 interested	 other	 ethnographers.	
Furthermore,	knowing	I	had	a	degree	in	Biochemistry,	the	synthetic	biologists	
at	the	Centre	would	often	over-estimate	my	familiarity	with	the	concepts	and	
																																								 								
32	The	Centre’s	director	with	a	background	in	biology.	
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procedures	utilised	within	synthetic	biology;	assuming	that	I	understood	what	
was	going	on,	or	what	they	were	saying,	when	sometimes	I	did	not.	This	either	
led	to	me	requesting	that	they	repeat	or	explain	things	to	me	again	(feeling	all	
the	time	like	I	should	not	require	the	explanation),	or	to	me	remaining	in	the	
dark	 rueing	 that	 my	 biological	 knowledge	 had	 grown	 rusty.	 If	 I	 had	 no	
background	 in	 biology	 at	 all,	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	may	 have	 been	 better	
primed	to	explain	things	to	me,	and	I	may	have	felt	less	self-conscious	about	
asking.	Or	 it	 is	 equally	possibly	 that	 I	may	 simply	have	 suffered	 in	 the	dark	
more	often.	Or	indeed	I	may	have	experienced	both.	
These	feelings,	that	I	wasn’t	collecting	all	the	data	I	could,	or	should	be,	and	
others	 such	 as	 the	 fear	 that	 I	 had	 ‘found	 nothing’	 or	 that	 I	 wasn’t	 doing	
enough,	 that	 I	 was	 missing	 things,	 are	 common	 amongst	 ethnographers	 as	
they	 embrace	 the	 position	 Hammersley	 and	 Wilkinson	 refer	 to	 as	 being	 a	
‘marginal	 native.’	 This	 insider/outside	 role	 sees	 ethnographers	 “intellectually	
poised	 between	 familiarity	 and	 strangeness”	 (Hammersley	 and	 Wilkinson	
2007:	89)	as	they	endeavour	to	maintain	some	social	and	intellectual	distance	
from	the	group	they	study.	Negotiating	this	marginal	role	can	be	particularly	
difficult	 when	 you	 cannot	 escape	 ‘the	 field.’	 As	 such	 I	 was	 grateful	 that	my	
research	site	was	located	in	the	city	in	which	I	lived,	so	I	could	exit	‘the	field’	
and	 return	 home	 each	 evening,	 and	 also	 in	 the	 same	 city	 as	 my	 ‘home’	
research	 centre.	The	 ability	 to	 leave	 the	 company	of	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	
and	 reconnect	 with	 a	 group	 of	 social	 scientists	 arguably	 enabled	 me	 to	
maintain	 some	distance	 from	my	 research	 participants,	 as	my	 social	 science	
colleagues	 would	 help	 me	 to	 question	 and	 challenge	 my	 findings	 as	 they	
emerged.	
Access	and	power	
Access	 to	 ‘the	 field’	 is	 frequently	 tricky	 to	negotiate	 for	 the	ethnographer.	
However	in	this	respect	I	was	incredibly	lucky.	My	‘home’	research	group	BIOS	
at	 the	 LSE,	 had	 formed	 a	 partnership	 with	 the	 Centre	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
applying	 for	 an	 EPSRC	 grant	 on	 synthetic	 biology.	 The	 grant	 required	 the	
successful	 applicants	 to	 include	an	element	of	 social	 science	 research	within	
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their	 programme	 of	 work,	 and	 thus	 the	 joint	 application	 included	 the	
provision	of	a	PhD	studentship	for	a	social	scientist.	As	luck	would	have	it,	I	
was	granted	that	studentship.	While	this	position	undoubtedly	helped	me	to	
gain	access	to	the	synthetic	biologists	and	the	Centre	itself,	my	role	within	my	
fieldwork	site	was	not	straightforward.	 I	was,	 like	many	ethnographers,	both	
an	insider	and	an	outsider	 in	my	fieldwork	site,	a	position	that	often	left	me	
feeling	I	was	simultaneously	a	member	of	the	Centre,	and	an	interloper.		
For	 example,	 after	 several	months	of	 attending	 laboratory	meetings	 I	was	
asked	to	lead	a	laboratory	meeting	myself	and	present	my	own	work.	This	was	
a	 daunting	 prospect,	 as	 the	 language,	 methods,	 and	 approaches	 of	 social	
science	were	foreign	to	most	in	the	room,	and	gaining	their	good	opinion	felt	
crucial	 at	 that	 stage	 in	 my	 research.	 I	 was	 still	 building	 rapport	 with	 the	
members	 of	 the	 Centre,	 and	 I	 hoped	 that	 I	 would	 get	 their	 approval	 to	
undertake	 a	 more	 in-depth	 ethnography	 with	 them.	 To	 my	 great	 relief	 my	
presentation,	on	the	history	of	attempts	to	apply	an	engineering	approach	to	
biology,	 seemed	 to	 go	 down	well.	However,	 as	well	 as	 some	 interesting	 and	
gentle	 questions	 from	 those	 in	 the	 audience	 I	 also	 received	 a	 couple	 of	
questions	 and	 comments	 from	 Malcolm	 Brown,	 which	 were	 rather	 loaded.	
First	he	asked	me	about	the	point	of	social	science	research.	Is	it,	he	queried,	
“just	 for	 fun”	 or	 does	 it	 actually	 have	 a	 wider	 (and,	 by	 implication,	 more	
worthwhile)	 purpose?	 Later	 on,	 when	 the	 discussion	 turned	 to	 the	 recent	
hassles	over	acquiring	equipment	for	the	Centre’s	new	space,	he	turned	to	me	
and	 said	 “see	 what	 we	 have	 to	 deal	 with,	 you	 just	 have	 to	 hope	 the	 internet	
connection	is	working”.	He	then	followed	this	comment	with,	“it	must	be	nice	
just	having	to	sit	at	a	desk	and	read.”		
While	all	of	these	comments	were	said	in	a	friendly,	joking	tone,	he	made	it	
very	clear	that	he	thought	we	social	scientists	have	 it	easy	and	that	we	don’t	
produce	anything	of	real	use.	One	of	the	newly	hired	lecturers,	Martin,	did	at	
this	 point	 jump	 to	 my	 defence	 saying,	 in	 reference	 to	 a	 BMJ	 paper	 I	 had	
quoted,	“she	 is	 digging	up	papers	 from	 1910!”	 to	which	Malcolm	replied,	 “yes,	
I’m	 sure	 it’s	 not	 as	 easy	 as	 it	 seems.”	 Thus	 while	 I	 was	 ostensibly	 welcome	
within	 the	 Centre,	 at	 least	 some	 of	 its	 members,	 and	 most	 prominently	
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Malcolm,	were	sceptical	of	my	research.	Over	the	twelve	months	that	I	was	a	
constant	presence	within	the	Centre	there	were	several	such	occasions	where	I	
found	myself	needing	to	explain	social	science,	or	having	to	listen	while	social	
scientists	 and	 social	 science	 were	 openly,	 albeit	 good	 naturedly,	 mocked.	
However	despite	this,	I	was	always	treated	well	by	the	members	of	the	Centre,	
helped	in	part	as	discussed	above,	by	my	own	background	in	science.		
Nevertheless,	 given	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 partnership	 between	 BIOS	 and	 the	
Centre,	 I	 was	 not	 simply	 viewed	 as	 an	 independent	 researcher	 who	 was	
spending	 time	 in	 the	 Centre,	 but	 rather	 I	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 member	 of	 the	
collaboration	with	a	role	to	play.	Thus	on	several	other	occasions	Malcolm	and	
Alan,	 as	 directors	 of	 the	 Centre,	 attempted	 to	 make	 use	 of	 me	 as	 a	
spokesperson	for	the	Centre’s	commitment	to	‘ELSI,’	to	convince	visitors	that	
the	 Centre	 was	 taking	 such	 issues	 seriously	 and	 was	 actively	 engaging	 with	
them.	This	was	 always	 an	 awkward	 situation,	 as	 I	 felt	 torn	 between	being	 a	
compliant	 and	 helpful	 insider/member	 of	 the	 Centre	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	
being	 honest	 about	 the	 shortfall	 of	 their	 engagement	 with	 ELSI	 as	 an	
outsider/ethnographer	on	the	other.	It	also	seemed	at	times	that	the	directors	
believed	my	mere	presence	within	the	Centre	was	all	the	evidence	necessary	to	
fulfil	 the	 social	 science	 requirement	 of	 their	 funders.	 Thus,	 despite	 being	
informed	 about	 the	nature	 of	my	 research	 on	multiple	 occasions	 and	 giving	
their	approval	for	it,	Malcolm	and	Alan	did	not	always	seem	to	recognise	the	
potential	 output	 of	 ethnographic	 fieldwork.	To	 this	 ends,	Malcolm	 joked	on	
several	 occasions	 that	 there	 should	 be	 a	 formal	 agreement	 that	 the	 social	
scientists	working	with	them	would	not	“write	a	book	about	them	like	Rabinow	
and	 Bennett	 did!”	 referring	 to	 the	 book	 Paul	 Rabinow	 and	Gaymon	 Bennett	
wrote	 about	 their	 own	 collaboration	 and	 ethnographic	 interactions	 with	
synthetic	biologists	(Rabinow	and	Bennett	2012).		
As	 one	 desired	 outcome	 of	 my	 own	 ethnographic	 fieldwork	 is	 published	
work,	which	will	logically	be	based	around	findings	from	my	fieldwork	in	the	
Centre,	 this	 ‘joke’	was	decidedly	unsettling.	Given	the	nature	and	 location	of	
my	 fieldwork	 I	could	almost	guarantee	 that	anything	 I	did	publish	would	be	
read	by	at	 least	one	person	within	the	Centre,	and	this	came	with	a	concern	
 68 
that,	 should	 they	 disagree	 with	 what	 I	 had	 written,	 or	 feel	 uncomfortably	
exposed	by	it	despite	my	commitment	to	maintaining	their	anonymity,	I	could	
jeopardise	my	future	access	to	the	field,	not	to	mention	their	friendship.		
This	 situation	 is	 indicative	 of	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 power	 dynamic	 between	 the	
ethnographer	and	her	informants.	For	unlike	traditional	ethnographies	where	
the	 ethnographers	 would	 retreat	 from	 their	 fieldwork	 sites	 to	 write	 up	 and	
publish	 their	 work	 in	 locations	 and	 languages	 frequently	 foreign	 to	 their	
informants,	 in	 ethnographies	 of	 science,	 as	 in	 other	 contemporary	
ethnographies,	 the	 informants	 are	 likely	 to	 carefully	 read	 what	 the	
ethnographer	 studying	 them	 has	 written	 (Forsythe	 2001;	 Hess	 2001).	 While	
this	more	equal	distribution	of	power	is	welcome	within	ethnography,	it	does	
place	 ethnographers	 in	 a	 more	 challenging	 position.	 One	 where	 their	
informants	 may	 attempt	 to	 sensor	 their	 work,	 or	 bar	 their	 access	 to	 future	
research	should	they	dislike	what	they	read	(Forsythe	1999).	
Hess	 (2001)	 notes	 that	 a	 further	 challenge	 of	 ethnographies	 of	 science	 is	
that	their	fieldwork	site(s)	are	often	part	of	a	rapidly	changing	and	emerging	
world,	thus	both	the	ethnographer	and	the	informants	are	trying	to	figure	out	
what	 is	 happening.	 This	was	most	 certainly	 the	 case	 for	my	 informants,	my	
research	site,	and	me,	for	neither	the	Centre	nor	for	that	matter	the	discipline	
of	synthetic	biology,	seemed	fully	formed	at	the	time	of	my	fieldwork.	As	such,	
the	ethnographic	findings	that	follow	are,	perhaps	more	so	than	most,	tied	to	
a	certain	time	and	place.	They	capture	my	own	ethnographic	understandings	
of	the	field	of	synthetic	biology,	the	Centre	I	studied,	and	the	individuals	who	
worked	 there,	 as	 they	were	 in	 2009-2010.	Things	have,	 as	 one	might	 expect,	
moved	 on	 and	 changed	 in	 the	 interim.	However	 as	 the	Centre	was	 the	 first	
academic	synthetic	biology	research	centre	 in	the	UK,	and	was	touted	at	the	
time	 of	 my	 fieldwork	 as	 the	 most	 important	 site	 for	 synthetic	 biology	 in	
Europe,	I	believe	that	the	site	itself	maintains	its	significance.	Furthermore,	as	
I	was	interested	in	studying	the	emergence	of	this	discipline	and	the	ways	in	
which	people,	ideas,	and	approaches	from	different	disciplines	came	together	
within	it,	I	maintain	that	the	findings	of	this	ethnography	are	significant	and	
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important,	 even	 if,	 and	perhaps	especially	 if,	 the	discipline	has	 subsequently	
matured	and	become	less	messy.	
Exiting	the	field	
Having	spent	twelve-months	actively	trying	to	build	rapport	and	trust	with	
the	 members	 of	 the	 Centre,	 I	 had	 developed	 friendships	 and	 working	
relationships	 with	 many	 of	 the	 people	 there.	 As	 such	 the	 attitude	 of	 the	
Centre’s	members	towards	me	had	shifted	a	long	way	since	that	first	awkward	
meeting	where	they	viewed	me	with	suspicion.	I	was	part	of	the	Centre	now,	
admittedly	an	idiosyncratic	part,	but	a	part	nonetheless.	I	had	been	a	member	
of	the	team	of	advisors	 for	the	 iGEM33	team,	I	had	presented	my	work	at	 lab	
meetings	like	everyone	else,	they	were	used	to	seeing	me	in	a	lab	coat,	and	we	
had	talked	through	our	work	with	each	other.		
Members	of	the	Centre	would	share	titbits	of	gossip	and	information	from	
meetings	 with	 me	 that	 they	 thought	 I	 would	 find	 interesting.	 And	 I	 had	
become	the	‘go	to’	person	for	any	questions	about	‘the	public,’	ethics	(despite	
stressing	 countless	 times	 that	 I	was	not	 an	 ethicist),	 and	how	 to	make	 their	
work	more	 socially	 acceptable.	While	 I	did	not	 always	 feel	 comfortable	with	
these	 questions,	 being	 the	 person	 to	 speak	 to	 about	 them	 gave	 me	 a	 role	
within	 the	 Centre	 alongside	 that	 of	 the	 general	 ‘dogs-body’	 who	 could	 be	
relied	 upon	 to	 willingly	 perform	 tedious	 tasks	 such	 as	 labelling	 eppendorf	
tubes.	Both	roles	gave	me	a	sense	that	I	was	delivering	a	degree	of	reciprocity,	
especially	when,	 after	 a	 chat	 about	whether	 synthetic	 biology	was	 playing	 a	
role	 in	 changing	 the	 focus	 of	 biology,	 David	 said	 “it’s	 good	 to	 think	 about	
things	other	than	our	research	and	you	make	us	do	that.”	Thus	exiting	from	the	
field	was	always	going	to	be	difficult.		
I	did	however	have	a	very	good	excuse	to	retreat	from	the	workplace;	I	was	
pregnant	 and	 about	 to	 go	 on	 maternity	 leave.	 I	 therefore	 thought	 I	 had	
avoided	the	awkwardness	of	exiting	the	field,	but	it	turned	out	that	I	had	just	
delayed	 it.	 I	 received	 many	 emails	 from	members	 of	 the	 Centre	 asking	 me	
																																								 								
33	International	Genetically	Modified	Machine’s	competition.	
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when	I	would	return,	and	assuring	me	that	Hayden,	who	had	taken	over	my	
desk,	could	be	made	to	shift.	While	it	was	flattering	to	hear	that	they	wanted	
me	back,	 it	 also	meant	 that	 I	had	 to	 explain	 that	 I	was	not	 coming	back,	 at	
least	 not	 permanently.	 I	 would	 attend	 the	 occasional	 meeting,	 and	 pop	 by	
when	 I	 needed	 to	 clarify	 something,	 or	 ask	 further	 questions,	 but	 I	was	 not	
moving	 back	 in.	On	 one	 of	my	 first	 days	 of	 fieldwork	Grant	 had	 joked,	 as	 I	
explained	ethnography	 to	him,	 “so,	we’ll	 be	 your	 E.	 Coli?”	but	with	 time	and	
effort	 the	 fact	 that	 I	 was	 studying	 them	 had	 stopped	 overshadowing	 our	
interactions	 and	 they	 had	 relaxed.	 Sadly	 however,	 on	 exiting	 the	 field,	 and	
thus	leaving	the	Centre,	it	felt	as	if	the	fact	that	I	had	been	‘studying	them’	had	
been	brought	back	into	the	spotlight.	
	 	
 71 
Chapter	 Three:	 Negotiating	 an	
Epistemic	Cultural	Divide	
The	 lab	 meeting	 began	 like	 any	 other.	 People	 filtered	 in	 and	 found	
themselves	a	 seat	at	 the	 table	 if	 they	were	early	enough,	or	against	 the	back	
wall	 if	 they	weren’t.	Once	 everyone	had	 arrived	 the	 general	 chatter	 stopped	
and	we	 sat,	 cramped	 into	 the	 same	 tiny,	windowless	 room	where	 I	had	 first	
encountered	most	of	the	members	of	the	Centre.	Everyone	listened	attentively	
to	Christian34	talk	about	his	work	on	in	vitro	E.	coli	cell-free	transcription	and	
translation	systems,	which	he	referred	to	as	a	“a	new	 ‘chassis’,	 if	we	 carry	 on	
with	 the	 synthetic	biology	 language.”35	Christian’s	talk	outlined	his	 interest	 in	
developing	 a	 cell-free	 chassis	 that	 can	 be	 used	 in	 biosensors,	 specifically	 a	
biosensor	 that	 can	 detect	 the	 pathogenic	 biofilms	 that	 spread	 infection.	 As	
was	 the	 norm	 at	 such	 meetings,	 Christian’s	 lab	 talk	 prompted	 a	 probing	
discussion	of	experimental	protocols	and	preliminary	results.	This	discussion	
began	 with	 a	 series	 of	 questions	 directed	 at	 Christian,	 but	 it	 was	 not	 long	
before	 I	 noticed	 that	 the	murmurs,	 comments,	 and	questions	 had	 coalesced	
into	two	very	separate	conversations.	The	first,	to	my	left,	was	between	several	
of	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Centre	 who	 had	 backgrounds	 in	 biology,	 Malcolm,	
Peter	 (both	 lecturers),	 Martin	 (the	 Centre	 Director),	 and	 Christian.	 They	
turned	towards	each	other	and	began	a	discussion	of	the	biological	details	of	
Christian’s	experiments	and	the	ways	in	which	they	could	be	improved.		
Grant	 (a	 lecturer	 with	 a	 background	 in	 electrical	 engineering)	 sat	 beside	
this	 group,	 but	 rather	 than	 join	 the	discussion	his	 attention	was	 focused	on	
disassembling	and	reassembling	his	pen.	I	watched	with	interest	as	he	did	this	
for	 several	 minutes	 before	 looking	 up,	 clearly	 mulling	 something	 over.	
																																								 								
34	A	 doctoral	 student	 who	 had	 come	 to	 synthetic	 biology	 via	 an	 undergraduate	 degree	 in	
biology	 in	 which	 he	 specialised	 in	 biochemistry,	 before	 subsequently	 moving	 into	 the	
synthetic	biology	masters	and	then	doctoral	programmes.	
35	The	adoption	of	engineering	terms	into	the	language	of	synthetic	biology	shall	be	discussed	
in	chapter	four.	
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However,	rather	than	direct	the	questions	and	comments	he	was	formulating	
towards	Christian,	Grant	 turned	 in	his	 seat	 towards	 two	other	men	who	are	
considered,	 within	 the	 dichotomous	 divisions	 of	 the	 Centre,	 to	 be	 on	 the	
engineering	 side,	David,	 a	 doctoral	 student	 hailing	 from	biotechnology,	 and	
George,	 a	 postdoctoral	 researcher	with	 a	 background	 in	mathematics.	Grant	
then	proceeded	to	engage	David	and	George	in	a	discussion	of	the	engineering	
potential	 of	 Christian’s	 work.	 I	 sat	 perfectly	 positioned	 between	 these	 two	
conversations,	marvelling	at	their	separation	and	varying	content.	Not	a	single	
question	 was	 shot	 across	 the	 divide,	 and	 at	 no	 point	 during	 the	 remaining	
discussion	 time	 did	 these	 two	 conversations	 merge	 into	 one.	 The	 question	
arose	 for	 me	 then,	 as	 it	 has	 so	 many	 times,	 how	 can	 we	 understand	 the	
division	between	the	engineering	and	biological	sides	of	synthetic	biology?	A	
division	 that	 persists	 within	 a	 discipline	 that	 is	 so	 clearly	 and	 explicitly	
dedicated	to	interdisciplinarity,	to	becoming	hybrid.	
A	hybrid	endeavour	
As	 addressed	 in	 chapter	 one,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 general	 shift	 towards	
interdisciplinarity	 in	 recent	 decades.	 Budtz	 Pedersen	 (forthcoming)	 explores	
this	shift	as	it	affects	science	and	innovation,	highlighting	that	a	large	amount	
of	funding	has	been	poured	into	the	endeavour	in	recent	years	from	a	variety	
of	sources.36	According	to	a	2005	report	from	the	American	National	Academy	
of	Sciences,	entitled	Facilitating	 Interdisciplinary	Research,	there	are	however	
a	 number	 of	 drivers	 for	 this	 current	 interdisciplinary	 turn	 in	 science	 and	
innovation,	 other	 than	 simply	 funding.	 It	 states	 that,	 “[i]nterdisciplinary	
thinking	is	rapidly	becoming	an	integral	feature	of	research	as	a	result	of	four	
powerful	 drivers:	 1)	 The	 inherent	 complexity	 of	 nature	 and	 society;	 2)	 The	
desire	 to	 explore	 problems	 and	 questions	 that	 are	 not	 confined	 to	 a	 single	
discipline;	 3)	 The	need	 to	 solve	 societal	 problems;	 and	 4)	 the	 power	 of	 new	
technologies”	 (National	 Academy	 of	 Sciences	 2005:	 40).	 Synthetic	 biology	 is	
																																								 								
36	A	prominent	example	being	“Horizon	2020,”	the	European	Union’s	framework	programme	
for	research	and	innovation	which	has	a	total	budget	of	€7billion	(2014-2020).	
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motivated	by	all	 four	of	 these	drivers	and,	as	 such,	 the	 relationship	between	
biology	and	engineering	is	seen	as	vital	to	its	endeavour	(Andrianantoandro	et	
al.	2006;	Endy	2005;	Heinemann	and	Panke	2006;	NEST	2005).	Yet	synthetic	
biology	doesn’t	just	desire	to	be	interdisciplinary	in	its	approach;	as	discussed	
in	chapter	one	it	wants	to	go	further	and	become	a	hybrid	discipline.		
It	 is	 this	 hybridity	 that	 is	 hailed	 as	 promising	 both	 a	 new	 approach	 to	
biology,	which	shall	be	discussed	in	chapter	six,	and	a	way	of	overcoming	the	
“failures”	 of	 biotechnology	 (Heinemann	and	Panke	 2006).	Yet,	 despite	being	
framed	 as	 unproblematic	 (Andrianantoandro	 et	 al.	 2006),	 forging	 this	
promised	 hybrid	 discipline	 of	 biology	 and	 engineering	 requires	 the	
reconciliation	 of	 two	 fundamentally	 different	 approaches.	 This	 chapter	 thus	
aims	 to	 address	 this	 conundrum	 through	 an	 exploration	 of	 the	 relationship	
between	engineering	and	biology	and	an	examination	of	what,	I	argue,	can	be	
seen	 as	 synthetic	 biology’s	 constituent	 epistemic	 cultures,	 in	 order	 to	
ultimately	 examine	 what	 is	 going	 on	 ‘under	 the	 hood,’	 as	 it	 were,	 of	 the	
attempts	to	establish	synthetic	biology	as	a	new	discipline.	
The	Oxford	 English	Dictionary	 defines	 ‘hybrid’	 as	 “anything	 derived	 from	
heterogeneous	 sources,	 or	 composed	 of	 different	 or	 incongruous	 elements”	
(OED	2009).	Touching	on	the	essential	disparities	between	synthetic	biology’s	
incongruous	elements,	Ferber	writes	“[t]his	fledgling	field,	which	is	attracting	
engineers	and	biologists	in	equal	measure,	means	different	things	to	different	
people.	 Engineers	 view	 it	 primarily	 as	 an	 engineering	 discipline,	 a	 way	 to	
fabricate	useful	microbes	that	do	what	no	current	technology	can.	But	many	
biologists	 see	 it	 instead	 as	 a	powerful	new	way	 to	 learn	 about	 cells”	 (2004b:	
158).	Such	differences	are	hardly	surprising	given	that	engineering	and	biology	
have	 traditionally	 been	 very	 different	 fields,	 with	 very	 different	 goals.	 As	
Vincenti	writes:		
“[e]ngineering	research	.	 .	 .	has	as	its	ultimate	goal	the	production	
of	 knowledge	 useful	 for	 design	 (as	 well	 as	 production	 and	
operation);	 scientific	 research	 aims	 basically	 at	 explanation	 and	
understanding.	As	a	result,	research	in	engineering	is	pursued	with	
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different	priorities	and	attitudes	and	remains	more	intimately	tied	
to	 specific	 devices.	 It	 emphasizes	 application	 rather	 than	
illumination”	(1993:	231).		
Thus	Vincenti	(1993)	argues,	as	Rheinberger	(1997)	and	Keller	(2009b)	do,	that	
such	 significant	 differences	 between	 engineering	 and	 science	 should	 not	 be	
ignored.		
Yet,	as	Keller	asserts,	synthetic	biology	denies,	at	least	tacitly,	that	there	is	
any	 such	 meaningful	 distinction	 between	 engineering	 and	 science	 (2009b).	
Synthetic	 biology	 is,	 she	 argues,	 the	 poster	 child	 of	 technoscience.	 A	 site	
where	 knowing	 is	 making	 and	 making	 is	 knowing,	 where	 the	 boundary	
between	science	and	engineering,	representing	and	intervening,	blurs	to	such	
an	 extent	 that	 it	 does	 not	make	 sense	 to	 speak	 of	 them	 as	 separate.	 Yet,	 to	
speak	of	science	and	engineering	as	being	essentially	the	same	is	a	step	too	far,	
according	to	Keller.	She	writes,	“[w]hile	there	may	be	-	arguably,	even	can	be	-	
no	looking	without	touching,	it	does	not	follow	that	looking	and	touching	are	
the	same”	(2009b:	294).	Furthermore,	Keller	asserts,	such	a	dissolution	of	their	
differences,	 erases	 not	 only	 disciplinary	 boundaries,	 but	 also	 a	 variety	 of	
conceptual	 aims	 which,	 she	 argues,	 still	 retain	 differences	 that	 need	 to	 be	
marked	(2009b).		
Such	 differences	 in	 conceptual	 aims	 can,	 I	 believe,	 be	 explained	 and	
explored	using	Karin	Knorr	Cetina’s	notion	of	 ‘epistemic	cultures’	 (1999).	An	
epistemic	 culture,	 according	 to	 Knorr	 Cetina,	 refers	 to	 the	 sets	 of	 practices,	
arrangements,	 and	 mechanisms	 that	 comprise	 a	 culture’s	 attitude	 towards	
knowledge	 and	 its	 way	 of	 justifying	 knowledge	 claims.	 These	 practices	 and	
beliefs	 are	 shaped	 by	 affinity,	 necessity,	 and	 historical	 coincidence,	 and	
ultimately	determine	how	we	know	what	we	know.	In	her	work	on	epistemic	
cultures,	 Knorr	 Cetina	 highlights	 the	 disparities	 between	 two	 cultures	 of	
knowing,	molecular	biology	and	high-energy	physics.	Knorr	Cetina	describes	
epistemic	 cultures	 as	 thriving	 “in	 internally	 referential	 systems,”	 noting	 that	
“[s]cience	and	expert	systems	are	obvious	candidates	for	cultural	division;	they	
are	pursued	by	groupings	of	specialists	who	are	separated	from	other	experts	
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by	 institutional	 boundaries	 deeply	 entrenched	 in	 all	 levels	 of	 education,	 in	
most	 research	 organizations,	 in	 career	 choices,	 in	 our	 general	 systems	 of	
classification”	 (Knorr	 Cetina	 1999:	 2).	 Knorr	 Cetina	 explores	 the	 epistemic	
cultural	 differences	 between	 molecular	 biology	 and	 high-energy	 physics	 in	
terms	 of	 their	 relationship	 to	 the	 empirical,	 their	 enactment	 of	 object	
relations,	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 internal	 social	 relations.	 Through	 her	
explication	 of	 these	 differences	 Knorr	 Cetina	 ultimately	 challenges	 the	
previously	accepted	view	that	the	sciences	are	all	part	of	a	unified	pursuit.	
In	developing	the	concept	of	epistemic	cultures,	Knorr	Cetina	drew	on	the	
work	 of	 anthropologist	 Clifford	 Geertz,	 adopting	 the	 idea	 of	 ‘symbolic	
structurings’	as	a	way	of	bringing	a	sensitivity	for	symbols	and	meaning	to	the	
study	of	practice.	Consequently,	she	follows	Geertz	in	defining	‘culture’	as	“an	
historical	transmitted	pattern	of	meanings	embodied	in	symbols,	a	system	of	
inherited	 conceptions	 expressed	 in	 symbolic	 form	 by	 means	 of	 which	 men	
communicate,	 perpetuate,	 and	 develop	 their	 knowledge	 about	 and	 attitudes	
towards	 life”	 (Geertz	 1973:	 89).	 Knorr	 Cetina	 carries	 the	 focus	 on	 practice	
inherent	 in	 this	 definition	 of	 culture	 into	 her	 use	 of	 ‘epistemology.’	 “The	
issue,”	 she	 writes,	 is	 “to	 recover	 ‘epistemology’	 from	 studying	 finished	
products	 (restrictively	 defined	 as	 scientific	 theories)”	 and	 instead	 “concern	
epistemology	with	process	–	with	 the	concrete,	mundane,	everyday	practices	
of	 inquiring	 and	 concluding	 through	 which	 participants	 establish,	 for	
themselves	 and	 for	 others,	 knowledge	 claims”	 (Knorr	 Cetina	 1991:	 108),	
practices	which	Knorr	Cetina	refers	to	as	epistemic	machinery.		
Two	distinct	epistemic	cultures	
The	epistemic	machinery,	or	machineries	of	knowing,	within	an	epistemic	
culture	thus	affect	everything	from	the	way	its	members	communicate,	define	
entities,	 and	 classify	 things,	 to	 the	 methods	 they	 use,	 their	 epistemic	
strategies,	 and	 their	 ways	 of	 collaborating.	 As	 noted	 above,	 Knorr	 Cetina	
contends	 that	 scientific	 disciplines	 and	 expert	 systems,	 such	 as	 biological	
science	 and	 engineering,	 are	 obvious	 candidates	 for	 epistemic	 cultural	
division.	 However,	 before	 exploring	 the	 differences	 and	 divisions	 between	
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these	 two,	 and	 the	 role	 they	 are	 having	 in	 shaping	 the	 Centre	 and	 the	
emerging	 discipline	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 let	 us	 briefly	 explore	 what	
engineering	 and	 biology	 are,	 and	 why	 we	 can	 see	 them	 as	 two	 distinct,	
epistemic	cultures.		
Epistemic	 cultures,	 like	 all	 cultures,	 develop	 and	 change	 over	 time.	
Practices	 and	 concepts	which	were	 at	 first	 new,	 revolutionary	 even,	 become	
mundane	and	taken	 for	granted.	They	become	the	epistemic	machinery	 that	
shapes	the	emerging	epistemic	culture	and	come	to	define	it	and	what	counts	
as	knowledge	for	those	within	it.	Thus	it	is	important	to	be	clear	about	what	is	
meant	when	I	speak	of	engineering	and	biology.	
Engineering	
Engineering,	 at	 its	 most	 basic	 level,	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 “the	 creative	
application	of	scientific	principles	 to	design	or	develop	structures,	machines,	
apparatus,	 or	 manufacturing	 processes”	 (Engineers'	 Council	 for	 Professional	
Development	1947).	This	definition	may	seem	self-evident	to	some,	but	it	may	
also	jar	with	others.	It	encompasses	much	of	what	we	think	of	as	engineering,	
but	 it	 sets	 the	 discipline	 apart	 from	 what	 came	 before	 it	 and,	 as	 so	 often	
happens	with	such	things,	 it	now	seems	a	 little	out-dated.	To	briefly	explain	
what	I	mean	we	must	look	back	to	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	and	the	
early	 twentieth	 centuries.	 It	 was	 at	 this	 time	 that,	 through	 the	 adoption	 of	
scientific	 and	 theoretical	 methods,	 engineering	 shifted	 away	 from	 being	 a	
traditional	craft	enterprise.	Historian	of	technology	Robert	Buchanan	writes	of	
the	 development	 of	 engineering	 that,	 “[w]hat	 had	 still	 been	 essentially	 a	
traditional	craft	based	upon	the	acquisition	of	 skill	by	practice	as	 late	as	 the	
Great	Exhibition	of	1851,	was	converted	by	the	outbreak	of	World	War	I	in	1914	
into	 a	 sound	 theoretical	 discipline	 based	 on	 scientific	 principles,	 albeit	 in	 a	
highly	 practical	 context”	 (1985:	 229).	 According	 to	 Divall,	 the	 practices	 and	
concepts	that	saw	engineering	being	performed	and	presented	as	an	efficient,	
systematic	 and	 rational	 enterprise,	 rather	 than	 a	 messy,	 intuitive	 one,	
implemented	through	trial	and	error,	arose	at	this	time	following	a	concerted	
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effort	to	adopt	the	methods	of	academic	science.37	A	shift	that	was	motivated,	
at	least	in	part,	by	a	desire	for	the	new	discipline	of	engineering	to	be	viewed	
as	a	legitimate	academic	pursuit	and	profession	(Divall	1990).38		
This	 systematic,	 theoretical	 approach	 has,	 regardless	 of	 its	 original	
motivation,	become	a	defining	feature	of	engineering39	and,	I	would	argue,	the	
belief	in	it	is	a	key	element	of	its	epistemic	culture.	Yet,	despite	this	focus	on	
the	incorporation	of	scientific	knowledge,	engineering	remains	a	very	practical	
endeavour.	Vincenti,	an	aeronautical	engineer	turned	historian	of	technology,	
contends	 that	 the	practical	work	of	engineers	 is	always	aimed	at	achieving	a	
utilitarian	end,	and	as	such	can	be	divided	into	three	main	tasks;	the	design	of	
artefacts,	 the	 construction	 or	 production	 of	 artefacts,	 and	 the	 operation	 of	
artefacts	to	meet	a	recognised	need.	The	different	branches	of	engineering	can	
therefore	be	seen	to	arise	from	the	application	of	these	tasks	to	varying	aspects	
of	 the	 physical	 world.	 Resulting	 in	 the	 likes	 of	 electrical	 engineering,	
mechanical	 engineering,	 civil	 engineering,	 and	 chemical	 engineering,	 a	 far	
from	 exhaustive	 list	 as	 the	 disciplines	 and	 sub-disciplines	 of	 engineering	
spread	across	an	impressive	range	of	specialities.	
																																								 								
37	However,	 this	vision	of	engineering	as	a	rational,	efficient,	and	systematic	endeavour	does	
not,	according	to	Bucciarelli	(1994)	(himself	an	engineer	turned	ethnographer	of	engineering),	
capture	how	engineering	is	really	practiced,	but	rather	how	it	presents	itself.	Bucciarelli	(1994)	
argues	that	engineering	is,	in	practice,	much	messier	and	more	reliant	on	trial	and	error	than	
engineers	usually	acknowledge.	Likewise	Petroski	notes	 that	 “Modern	engineering	 is	a	more	
highly	mathematical	 and	 scientific	 endeavour,	 but	 its	 practice	 still	 requires	 a	 good	 deal	 of	
commonsense	reasoning	about	materials,	structures,	energy,	and	the	like”	(1996:	2).	
38	Noble	outlines	 that	 throughout	 the	nineteenth	and	early	 twentieth	centuries,	 the	classical	
US	 colleges	 chose	 to	 explore	 science	 at	 a	 solely	 theoretical	 level	 and	 thus	 opposed	 the	
development	 of	 technical	 education.	 However	 as	 the	 development	 of	 the	machine	 and	 the	
railroad	industries	 intensified,	so	too	did	the	demand	for	engineers.	This	demand	ultimately	
led	to	the	establishment	of	technical	education	outside	of	the	classical	colleges	in	the	US	with	
the	 aim	 of	 teaching	 the	 practical	 application	 of	 science.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 classical	 colleges	
were	 still	 resistant	 to	 the	 teaching	 of	 engineering,	 and	 while	 empiricism	 was	 eventually	
introduced	into	the	classical	colleges’	science	courses,	engineers	were	deemed	to	be	second-
class	 scholars	 (Noble	 (1977).	 Thus,	 Divall	 contends,	 adopting	 science’s	 systematic	 and	
theoretical	approach	was	a	conscious	attempt	to	shed	this	second-class	status	and	legitimise	
the	discipline	(1990).	
39	As	can	be	seen	in	contemporary	engineering	literature	(e.g.	Pahl	et	al.	2007).	
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However,	to	return	to	the	Engineers’	Council	for	Professional	Development	
definition	 above,	 if	 we	 think	 of	 contemporary	 engineering	 as	 being	 the	
scientific	 and	 theoretically-based	 design,	 development,	 and	 operation	 of	
artefacts,	where	modern	engineering	has	moved	away	 from	this	definition	 is	
not	so	much	in	terms	of	this	process	and	these	practices,	but	rather	in	terms	of	
the	 artefacts	 themselves.	 Since	 this	definition	was	written	 in	 1947,	 engineers	
have	 increasingly	 broadened	 their	 focus	 from	 the	 inanimate	 objects	
encompassed	 within	 the	 definition	 (“structures,	 machines,	 apparatus,”	 and	
“manufacturing	 processes”)	 to	 the	 world	 of	 animate	 objects.	 As	 shall	 be	
discussed	 in	 chapter	 six,	 attempts	 to	 apply	 some	 form	 of	 an	 engineering	
approach	to	biology	date	back	at	least	as	far	as	the	1860s,	yet	it	was	not	until	
1936	 that	 the	 term	 biological	 engineering	 was	 introduced40	(Compton	 and	
Bunker	 1939).	Since	 this	 time	several	engineering	 sub-disciplines	and	 related	
disciplines	 have	 emerged	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 biology	 and	 engineering	
including	 biomedical	 engineering,	 molecular	 engineering,	 biomolecular	
engineering,	protein	engineering,	tissue	engineering,	biochemical	engineering,	
and	genetic	engineering.	As	such,	it	would	seem	that	biology	has	become	the	
new	 frontier	 for	 applications	 of	 engineering’s	 concepts	 and	 practices.	
Nevertheless,	as	shall	be	discussed	below,	it	is	not	always	a	hospitable	frontier	
to	the	notions	and	approaches	of	the	engineer.	
Biology	
Most,	 if	 not	 all,	 are	 familiar	 with	 the	 discipline	 of	 biology,	 but	 as	 with	
engineering,	the	study	of	life	has	not	always	taken	the	form	we	think	of	today.	
As	shall	be	discussed	in	chapter	six,	according	to	Foucault	(1970)	biology	did	
not	even	exist	before	 the	nineteenth	century,	 acquiring	 it’s	modern	usage	 in	
1802.	 Since	 this	 time	 the	 scale	 at	 which	 life	 is	 examined	 has	 shifted	
																																								 								
40	Biological	 engineering	was	used	 to	denote	 a	new	branch	of	 biology	 taught	 at	MIT,	which	
would	 utilise	 basic	 knowledge	 of	 physics,	 mathematics,	 chemistry,	 and	 several	 fields	 of	
engineering.	 The	MIT	 Biology	 department’s	 name	was	 even	 changed	 to	 the	Department	 of	
Biology	and	Biological	Engineering	in	1942,	however	this	only	lasted	until	1944	when	the	name	
was	changed	back	to	the	Department	of	Biology	(MIT).	
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significantly,	as	has	the	language	used	to	describe	life	and	the	methods	used	to	
scrutinise	it	(a	history	which	will	also	be	addressed	in	chapter	six).	But,	since	
its	inception,	biology	has	maintained	a	focus	on	life	and	living	organisms,	and	
an	emphasis	on	understanding	the	processes	of	life.	Biology	as	a	field	of	study	
is	 vast	 and	 eclectic,	 covering	 the	 structure,	 function,	 growth,	 evolution,	
distribution,	 and	 taxonomy	 of	 all	 living	 organisms,	 thus	 it	 has	 long	 been	
divided	into	sub-disciplines	or	branches.	These	branches,	like	the	branches	of	
engineering,	indicate	various	specialities	of	focus,	either	in	terms	of	the	kinds	
of	organisms	studied	(for	example	botany	and	zoology)	or	in	terms	of	the	scale	
or	 level	 of	 organisation	 at	 which	 organisms	 are	 studied	 (such	 as	 molecular	
biology,	 physiology,	 and	 ecology).	 Yet,	 despite	 the	 broad	 scope	 of	 biology,	
there	 are	 certain	 concepts	 that	 govern	 and	 unify	 all	 biological	 study	 and	
research.	 In	 general,	 biologists	 identify	 the	 cell	 as	 the	 basic	 unit	 of	 life,	 the	
gene	as	the	basic	unit	of	heredity,	and	evolution	and	adaptation	as	being	the	
basic	 mechanisms	 by	 which	 species	 develop,	 change,	 and	 survive.	 It	 is	 also	
understood	 that	 all	 organisms	 share	 certain	 characteristics;	 they	 respire,	
consume	 nutrients,	 excrete,	 grow	 via	 assimilation,	 respond,	 move,	 and	
reproduce	(Roberts	et	al.	2000).	Thus,	aside	from	their	obvious	differences	in	
focus,	 a	 significant	 disparity	 between	 engineering	 and	 biology	 is	 their	
relationship	to	knowledge.		
Where	 engineering	 is	 focused	 on	 designing,	 building,	 and	 operating	
artefacts,	biology	is	focused	on	understanding	life	and	it’s	processes.	Vincenti	
addresses	the	differing	relationships	of	science	and	engineering	to	knowledge	
in	 his	 1993	 book,	What	 Engineers	 Know	 and	 How	 They	 Know	 It:	 Analytical	
Studies	from	Aeronautical	History.	He	contests	the	notion	that	engineering,	as	
a	discipline,	simply	applies	the	knowledge	that	science	reveals.	Technology,	he	
asserts,	 may	 “apply	 science,”	 however	 this	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 claiming	 it	 is	
“applied	 science.”	 Engineering,	 he	 contends,	 is	 an	 “autonomous	 body	 of	
knowledge,	 identifiably	different	 from	the	scientific	knowledge	with	which	it	
interacts”	(Vincenti	 1993:	3-4).	For	scientists,	he	asserts,	knowledge	is	an	end	
in	 itself	 and	 the	 central	 objective	 of	 their	 profession,	whereas	 for	 engineers,	
knowledge	is	a	tool,	a	means	to	a	utilitarian	end.	This	disparity	seems	to	create	
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a	 space	 for	 collaboration;	 wherein	 engineers	 could	 use	 the	 knowledge	
obtained	 by	 biology	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 achieve	 a	 utilitarian	 end.	 However	 despite	
many	 attempts,	 such	 a	 successful	 collaboration	 has,	 until	 recently,	 proven	
difficult	to	achieve	(2002).	
As	mentioned	in	chapter	one	and	discussed	in	chapter	six,	synthetic	biology	
is	one	of	a	growing	number	of	emerging	disciplines,	which	are	attempting	to	
colonise	this	collaborative	space	between	biology	and	engineering.	As	biology	
as	a	whole	becomes	increasingly	interventionist	we	are	seeing	more	and	more	
disciplines	which	have	 ‘buy-in’	 from	both	biologists	and	engineers.	However,	
as	 in	 the	 relatively	 unsuccessful	 attempts	 at	 combining	 the	 disciplines	
addressed	 by	 Keller	 (2002),	 tensions,	 misunderstandings,	 and	
miscommunications	still	arise.	
Epistemic	cultural	differences	within	synthetic	biology	
To	some	extent	they	are	very	definitely	two	tribes		
(David,	doctoral	student,	biology)		
In	 public,	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 so	 often	 framed	 as	 the	 unproblematic	 and	
systematic	assimilation	of	engineering	and	biology.	 Indeed	my	 fieldnotes	are	
filled	 with	 examples	 of	 Malcolm	 and	 Alan’s	 (the	 Centre	 Directors)	
presentations	to	groups	both	inside	and	outside	the	university41	where	any	and	
all	 tensions	 are	 glossed	 over	 in	 favour	 of	 presenting	 synthetic	 biology	 as	 a	
harmonious,	straightforward	endeavour.	According	to	one	such	presentation,	
rolled	out	 for	every	group	visiting	 the	Centre,	 the	 straightforward	process	of	
designing	 and	 building	 a	 synthetic	 biological	 ‘product’	 is	 analogous	 to	 the	
engineering	of	 a	BMW.	The	parts	used	 in	both	cases,	 according	 to	Alan,	 are	
equally	 high	 spec,	 controlled,	 and	 standardised,	 and	 slot	 just	 as	 easily	 into	
their	awaiting	chassis.	While	the	work	to	achieve	this	ends	is	undertaken	by	a	
coherent	group	of	synthetic	biologists.	Yet	such	presentations	so	often	jarred	
																																								 								
41	Presentations	to	the	likes	of	prospective	students,	new	students,	potential	industry	partners,	
academics	 from	 other	 universities,	 the	 Guild	 of	 Worshipful	 Engineers,	 and	 government	
representatives,	the	list	could	go	on	and	on.	
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with	 my	 observations	 behind	 the	 Centre’s	 closed	 doors,	 where	 not	 only	
technical	difficulties,	but	also	differences	and	tensions	between	the	two	‘sides’	
of	synthetic	biology,	were	apparent.		
So,	to	return	to	the	lab	meeting	with	which	I	started	this	chapter,	how	can	
we	understand	 the	events	using	 the	concept	of	epistemic	cultures?	To	begin	
with	I	wish	to	assert	that	the	members	of	the	Centre,	and	indeed	of	synthetic	
biology	 more	 broadly,	 hail	 from	 two	 distinct	 epistemic	 cultures	 associated	
with	 biology	 and	 engineering.	 Two	 internally	 heterogeneous	 but	 coherent	
groups	of	participants	who	find	much	more	in	common	with	other	members	
of	 their	own	 ‘group’	 than	 they	do	with	 the	members	of	 the	other	 ‘group.’	 In	
some	ways	the	existence	of	these	two	‘groups’	defies	logic.	Especially	when	one	
considers	 those	 participants	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 who	 have	 had	 interesting	
trajectories	 into	 the	 field,	 weaving	 between	 the	 life	 sciences	 and	 the	 more	
‘engineering’	 disciplines.	 Yet,	 even	 those	 within	 the	 Centre	 with	 such	
interesting	backstories	defined	themselves	as	belonging	 in	one	 ‘group’	or	the	
other,	identifying	themselves	more	closely	with	members	of	one	‘group’	or	the	
other	 and	 describing	 the	 discipline	 as	 consisting	 of	 two	 separate	 ‘groups.’	
Furthermore,	and	as	I	shall	discuss	below,	I	observed	key	differences	between	
these	so	called	two	‘groups’	that	support	the	notion	of	their	existence	whether	
that	existence	is	logical	or	not.		
Indeed	 I	 found	 the	 ‘biologists’	 to	have	more	 in	 common	with	 each	other,	
than	 with	 the	 engineers,	 when	 it	 came	 to	 their	 research	 questions,	
methodologies,	 organisation,	 time	 frames,	 patterns	 of	 collaboration,	
relationships	with	data	and	experimentation,	and	required	skills.	I	also	found	
them	 to	 share	 language,	 research	 objects,	 a	 common	 knowledge	 base	 and,	
according	to	several	of	the	members	of	the	Centre,	a	‘world	view.’	All	of	which	
differed	from	those	of	the	‘engineers,’	who	likewise	shared	commonality	with	
each	other,	and	all	of	which	shaped	the	day-to-day	work	of	both	groups.		
As	 I	 watched	 members	 of	 the	 Centre	 interact	 with	 colleagues	 from	 the	
other	‘side,’	this	cluster	of	differences	became	apparent,	leading	me	to	wonder	
whether	we	can	view	these	two	groups	as	distinct	epistemic	cultures.	Clearest	
amongst	 the	 differences	 I	 identified	 (which	 I	 shall	 evidence	 below)	was	 the	
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lack	 of	 a	 shared	 knowledge	 base	 between	 the	 biologists	 and	 the	 engineers.	
Each	of	the	epistemic	cultures	had	their	own	distinct	systems	of	classification,	
their	 own	 conceptions	 of	 their	 research	 entities,	 their	 own	 empirical	
procedures,	 and	 their	 own	 epistemic	 strategies,	 all	 of	 which	 had	 produced,	
through	 time,	 very	 different	 bodies	 of	 knowledge.	 Yet,	 here	 they	 were	
attempting	 to	 collaborate	 with	 each	 other	 on	 projects	 that	 drew	 from	 the	
strengths	of	both	sides,	without,	in	some	cases,	even	the	most	basic	knowledge	
of	each	other’s	discipline.		
Unshared	knowledge		
I	first	met	Grant	at	the	Centre’s	inaugural	annual	symposium	where	people	
from	the	Centre,	 and	 invited	guests	 from	the	 international	 synthetic	biology	
community,	 spoke	 to	 an	 audience	 of	 interested	 parties	 (including,	 among	
others,	 fellow	 synthetic	 biologists,	 doctoral	 students,	 university	 colleagues,	
funding	 bodies,	 and	 potential	 industry	 partners)	 about	 their	 work	 and	 the	
goals	of	the	Centre	and	the	discipline.	I	had	arrived	after	much	of	the	lecture	
theatre,	 in	 which	 the	 symposium	 was	 taking	 place,	 had	 already	 filled	 and	
claimed	the	last	seat	in	a	row,	next	to	a	friendly-looking,	bespectacled	man	in	
his	mid-thirties.	It	soon	became	apparent	that	he	knew	very	little	biology	as,	
after	 establishing	 that	 I	 had	 a	 background	 in	 biochemistry,	 he	 spent	 the	
morning	quietly	seeking	my	help	to	understand	the	presentations.	Grant	was	
an	 electrical	 engineer	by	 training,	 and	 a	 very	 skilful	 one	 at	 that,	 but	he	had	
never	studied	biology	and	felt	he	had	a	lot	of	ground	to	make	up.		
So,	 after	 attending	 his	 first	 journal	 club	 meeting,	 where	 he	 listened	
attentively	and	took	copious	notes,	he	again	sought	my	help	 to	comprehend	
the	 biology,	 inviting	me	 back	 to	 his	 new	 office	 in	 the	 empty,	 un-renovated	
shell	of	what	would	soon	become	the	overcrowded	Centre’s	hub.	Sitting	on	his	
desk	was	a	copy	of	Essential	Cell	Biology,	a	basic	biology	textbook	that	Grant	
was	 systematically	working	 his	way	 through,	 chapter	 by	 chapter,	 and	 it	was	
this	that	he	now	consulted	as	he	asked	me	to	explain	the	journal	club	paper	to	
him.	 “What,”	 he	 asked,	 “were	 ‘oligos’	 and	 primers,	 and	 how	 exactly	 did	 PCR	
work?”	 Oligonucleotides,	 primers,	 and	 Polymerase	 Chain	 Reaction,	 while	
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understandably	confusing	for	someone	without	any	biology	training,	would	be	
seen	as	entry-level	knowledge	for	someone	from	the	biology	side	of	synthetic	
biology,	and	yet	they	were	things	that	Grant	had	never	encountered	before.		
This	 degree	 of	 unfamiliarity	 with	 biology	 and	 experimental	 work	 was	
frowned	upon	by	 the	biologists,	 as	 it	was	believed	 to	 result	 in	 the	engineers	
having	 unrealistic	 expectations	 for	 what	 could	 be	 achieved	 using	 biological	
materials.	Grant	was	new	to	the	field	and	working	hard	to	overcome	his	lack	of	
experience	 but,	 as	 Martin	 highlighted,	 a	 lack	 of	 biological	 knowledge	 was	
prevalent	among	even	the	most	senior	engineers	involved	in	synthetic	biology.	
As	Martin	explained	it:	
So	 some	of	us	have	 come	 to	 it	 from	biology	and	gone	OK	yeah,	we	
want	 to	now	 incorporate	 the	engineering	side	because	 it	does	make	
more	 sense,	 we	 want	 to	 actually	 build	 things	 and	 do	 this	 in	 a	
predictable	way,	and	for	that	we	have	to	thank	those	who’ve	come	in	
with	engineering	ideas.	But	you	know	every	now	and	again	you	have	
to	 slap	 them	 [Laughs].	 So	 a	 lot	 of	 what	 Drew	 Endy	 says	 kind	 of	
doesn’t	make	sense	when	you	go	down	to	the	biology	in	the	everyday	
wet	 lab,	and	 it’s	 exactly	 the	same	with	 Jim	Collins,	and	 it’s	because	
neither	of	them	could	actually	go	 into	the	 lab	and	start	doing	these	
experiments,	because	 they	never	did,	 you	know,	 they’ve	never	 really	
done	 them,	 especially	 Jim.	 I	mean	 Jim	Collins	has	 this	 amazing	 lab	
doing	all	this	biology	but	he’s	never	done	an	experiment.		
(Martin,	senior	researcher,	biology)		
Yet,	 despite	 his	 unfamiliarity	 with	 biology,	 Grant	 was	 still	 expected	 to	
plough	 forward	with	modelling	biological	constructs.	Thus,	while	 shadowing	
David	for	a	day,	we	encountered	Grant	as	he	and	a	synthetic	biology	Masters’	
student,	Anita	(hailing	from	an	engineering	undergraduate	degree),	attempted	
to	 design	 a	 model	 for	 a	 toggle	 switch	 system	 that	 involved	 the	 use	 of	
microarrays.	On	seeing	us	across	the	computer	lab,	Grant	rushed	over	to	seek	
David’s	help	 in	understanding	how	microarrays	work.	The	problem	was	 that	
neither	 Grant	 nor	 Anita	 had	 ever	 seen,	 let	 alone	 performed,	 a	 microarray.	
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Grant	 had	 looked	 it	 up	 on	 Wikipedia	 but	 wanted	 to	 check	 if	 he	 had	
understood	 it	 correctly.	 He	 couldn’t	 figure	 out	 what	 was	 used	 as	 a	 control,	
how	 many	 RNAs 42 	bind	 to	 each	 probe,	 or	 whether	 it	 would	 give	 you	
meaningful	 data	 if	 the	 toggle	 switch	 was	 in	 a	 static	 state.	 While	 David	
patiently	gave	Grant	a	crash	course	in	microarrays	I	wondered	what	effect	the	
kind	of	lack	of	experience	Grant	and	Anita	displayed	with	microarrays,	and	the	
underlying	 lack	 of	 biological	 knowledge,	 would	 have	 on	 the	 models	 being	
designed	for	synthetic	biology	by	engineers.		
Many	months	later	I	found	a	possible	answer	to	this	question	as	I	spent	the	
day	shadowing	Janet,	helping	her	in	the	lab	where	I	could	and	discussing	the	
various	 ‘goings-on’	 of	 the	 Centre.	 As	 we	 sorted	 out	 the	 contents	 of	 an	
overloaded	 laboratory	 freezer,	 separating	 well-labelled	 and	 useful	 samples	
from	 those	 considered	 superfluous	 or	 whose	 contents	 was	 a	 mystery,	 the	
conversation	 turned	 to	 the	 doctoral	 project	 Simon	 (a	 student	 with	 a	
background	in	bioinformatics)	was	planning.		
We	had	been	discussing	 the	biology/engineering	divide	within	 the	Centre	
(something	that	many	members	of	the	Centre	were	keen	to	discuss	with	me)	
and	 Janet	had	commented	that	overall	 the	engineers	within	 the	Centre	were	
“getting	better”	and	becoming	“more	realistic.”	By	which	she	meant	they	were	
gaining	more	 knowledge	 of	 biology	 and	 as	 a	 consequence	 their	 ideas	 about	
biology	 were,	 to	 her	 mind,	 less	 simplistic	 and	 unrealistic.	 However	 this	
improvement,	 she	 was	 quick	 to	 add,	 was	 not	 across	 the	 board.	 Grant,	 she	
noted	 was	 trying	 hard	 to	 understand	 the	 biology	 he	 was	 working	 with	 and	
was,	according	 to	 Janet,	becoming	a	better	 synthetic	biologist	 for	his	efforts.	
However,	 Patrick	 (a	 theoretical	 physicist	 by	 training	 who	was	 now	working	
primarily	in	biomathematics	in	association	with	the	Centre)	was,	according	to	
Janet,	 the	most	removed	from	reality	and	Patrick	was	to	be	Simon’s	doctoral	
supervisor.		
																																								 								
42	Ribonucleic	Acids.	
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Patrick	 was	 suggesting	 that	 Simon’s	 doctoral	 project	 should	 involve	 an	
attempt	 to	 build	 a	more	 complex	 version	 of	 the	 repressilator,43	one	with	 six	
genes	rather	than	three.	He	was,	apparently,	basing	this	advice	on	the	work	of	
one	 of	 his	 previous	 doctoral	 students	who	had	 already	modelled	 the	 system	
and	 had	 shown	 that	 the	 six	 different	 genes	 of	 the	 proposed,	 upgraded,	
repressilator	would	 ‘just’	be	 required	 to	have	expression	 levels	within	 10%	of	
each	other.	At	this	point	in	her	account	Janet	laughed	aloud.	While	10%	clearly	
sounded	like	a	workable	margin	of	error	to	Patrick	and	his	engineering-based	
student,	 Janet	 noted	 that	 she	 would	 not	 be	 able	 to	 achieve	 this	 degree	 of	
uniformity	 even	 if	 she	 had	 six	 copies	 of	 the	 same	 gene.	 With	 six	 different	
genes	it	was	nigh	on	impossible.		
This	 disparity,	 between	 the	 parameters	 of	 the	 model	 designed	 by	 an	
engineer	and	the	biological	 ‘reality’	as	viewed	by	a	biologist,	was	 interesting.	
Janet	 clearly	 believed	 that	 Patrick	 and	 his	 student	 did	 not	 have	 sufficient	
understanding	of	the	biology	to	model	 it	 in	a	meaningful	and	useful	manner	
from	an	experimental	perspective.	While	Patrick	clearly	believed	his	 student	
had	 developed	 a	 model	 that	 could	 be	 used	 as	 a	 road	 map	 to	 meaningful	
experimental	 data.	 This	 example	 not	 only	 highlighted	 the	 lack	 of	 shared	
common	knowledge	between	the	engineers	and	the	biologists,	but	also	 their	
very	different	relationships	with	experimentation,	data,	and	models.		
Contentious	models	
The	accuracy,	applicability,	and	usefulness	of	models	were	common	topics	
of	 conversation	 within	 the	 Centre.	 For	 example,	 while	 discussing	 the	
unrealistic	conditions	that	some	engineers	assume	for	their	models	of	biology,	
David	humorously	explained	that	it	was	the	equivalent	of	them	assuming	“that	
the	 chicken	 is	 round	 and	 is	 in	 a	 vacuum.”	 Such	 attitudes	 and	 differences	 of	
opinion	 over	 the	 role	 and	 usefulness	 of	models	was	 the	 occasional	 cause	 of	
tension	 and	 frustration	 between	 the	 engineers	 and	 the	 biologists	within	 the	
																																								 								
43	A	synthetic,	genetic	regulatory	network,	which	was	an	early	and	highly	significant	synthetic	
biology	project	reported	on	in	Elowitz	and	Leibler	(2000).		
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Centre.	Peter,	one	of	the	iGEM	team	advisors,	recounted	for	me	the	following	
example,	which	demonstrates	this	tension.		
I	remember	an	argument	about	this	occurring	between	people	in	the	
iGEM	 team	where	 the	 advisor	was	 telling	 the	 student	 to	model	 cell	
growth,	 and	 he	 just	 said,	 ‘model	 it	 by	 just	 making	 a	 sphere	 grow	
bigger.	 It	 just	gets	bigger	and	bigger.’	And	 the	 student	was	 like	 .	 .	 .	
‘but	that’s	not	how	it	works,	so	why	model	it	that	way	if	it’s	not	how	
it	works?’	And	the	engineer	was	like,	‘it	doesn’t	matter,	it	will	give	you	
something	 that	 will	 be	 a	model	 for	 cell	 growth.’	 And	 she	 was	 like,	
‘yeah,	but	it’ll	be	meaningless	because	it’s	not	how	it	works.’	And	they	
never	 resolved	 it,	 you	 know.	 They	 both	 thought	 each	 other	 was	
stupid.		
(Peter,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
This	argument	illustrates	both	the	frustration	and	conflict	that	occasionally	
arose	 between	 the	 two	 sides	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 and	 also	 the	 differing	
notions	of	what	counts	as	meaningful	data	-	what	makes	sense	for	the	model	
or	what	makes	sense	for	the	biology?	It	would	seem	that	the	biologist	 in	the	
above	example	considers	a	model	that	is	not	a	close	reflection	of	reality	to	be	
meaningless,	 and	 thus	 any	 data	 generated	 by	 it	 to	 be	 equally	 meaningless.	
Whereas,	it	would	also	seem	that	the	engineer	is	adhering	here	to	the	notion	
of	 the	 ‘good	enough’	model.44	In	 engineering,	 after	 all,	 the	 aim	of	 creating	 a	
model	is	not	to	recreate	reality,	but	rather	to	devise	something	that	is	simpler	
and	 easier	 to	work	with	 than	 reality,	 but	 that	 is	 still	 close	 enough,	 or	 ‘good	
enough,’	 to	 provide	 meaningful	 data.	 Using	 this	 principle,	 engineers	 revisit	
and	 revise	 models	 if	 the	 data	 produced	 is	 not	 considered	 to	 be	 sufficiently	
meaningful.45	
																																								 								
44	For	a	discussion	of	‘good	enough’	modelling	see	Bach	(1997).		
45	As	Favre	(2004)	argues,	a	model	could	be	considered	to	be	good	enough,	until	 it	 is	shown	
that	it	provides	bad	answers	about	a	given	situation.	
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David	also	spoke	to	me	about	this	tension	on	a	separate	occasion,	and	his	
explanation	 goes	 some	way	 to	 clarify	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 conflict	 recounted	 by	
Peter.	 “Approximations”,	 David	 said,	 “just	 do	 not	 work	 in	 biology.”	 This,	 he	
claimed,	set	biology	apart	from	the	physical	sciences	that	the	engineers	were	
more	 familiar	 with	 where	 “assumptions	 and	 approximations	 can	 be	 plugged	
into	equations	and	be	useful.	But,	in	biology,”	he	continued,	“biologists	will	just	
say,	‘but	that	is	not	how	it	is	in	reality,	so	the	results	are	meaningless’”	(David,	
doctoral	student,	biology).	I	do	not	wish	to	debate	whether	assumptions	and	
approximations	are	useful	or	useless	within	biology,	but	it	was	very	clear,	from	
both	of	 these	accounts	and	other	events	during	my	fieldwork,	 that	this	 issue	
was	a	bone	of	contention	within	the	Centre.	
The	engineers	were,	however,	largely	aware	that	the	models	they	produced	
were	 contentious	 and	 that	 there	 was	 a	 need	 to	 improve	 their	 accuracy.	
However	 even	 these	 efforts	 could	 be	 viewed	 by	 the	 biologists	 as	 having	
uncertain	value.	For	example,	I	spoke	to	Janet	while	she	was	in	the	middle	of	
writing	part	of	a	funding	proposal,	one	that	was	being	submitted	by	a	multi-
institutional	group	of	modellers,	including	Grant.	Janet	was,	as	she	put	it	“the	
token	 biologist,”	but	when	I	asked	her	what	 the	proposal	was	about	she	 told	
me	 she	 didn’t	 really	 understand	 it	 herself.	 That	 is,	 except	 to	 say	 that	 it	was	
about	 trying	 to	develop	a	modelling	 tool	 that	would	 separate	out	 linear	 and	
non-linear	variability	in	order	to	make	the	design	and	modelling	of	synthetic	
biology	 parts	 more	 accurate.	 The	 aim	 was,	 she	 thought,	 “to	 figure	 out	 in	 a	
biological	system	which	knobs	were	too	complex	to	fiddle	with	and	which	ones	
we	know	enough	about	that	we	can	use	them	to	tune	the	system.”	However,	she	
immediate	commented	that	she	wasn’t	sure	we	know	any	parts	well	enough	to	
be	able	to	use	them	to	tune	the	system.	Yet	despite	her	misgivings	about	the	
feasibility	 of	 the	 project	 Janet	 had	 chosen	 not	 to	 raise	 them	 with	 her	
engineering	colleagues.		
Janet	 explained	 that	 the	 difficulty	 with	 highlighting	 problems	 with	 the	
modelling	approach	within	synthetic	biology	is	that	you	so	easily	get	called	a	
naysayer	biologist	who	just	thinks	biology	is	too	hard	to	model.	The	notion	of	
the	 ‘naysayer	 biologist’	 comes	 from	 the	 judgement	 by	 some	 engineers	 that	
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biologists	do	not	know	enough	about	engineering	and	modelling	 in	order	 to	
determine	whether	or	not	biology	is	 ‘too	hard	to	model	or	engineer.’	 I	heard	
the	refrain	several	times	from	engineers	that	biology	is	not	as	complicated	as	
biologists	 like	 to	 think	 it	 is,	 as	 it	 is	 no	more	 complicated	 than	many	 of	 the	
materials	and	systems	 that	engineers	have	successfully	modelled	 in	 the	past.	
The	 reason	 the	 engineers	 gave	 me	 for	 the	 biologists’	 misapprehension	 was	
their	unfamiliarity	with	both	engineering	and	modelling.		
To	make	 this	 point	 Stephanie	 recounted	 a	 recent	 visit	 she	 had	 paid	 to	 a	
polymer	plant	where	she	was	telling	an	engineer	about	a	model	she	was	trying	
to	construct	of	 the	Golgi	apparatus,46	which	has	many	different	 ‘species’	 and	
potential	 behaviours.	 The	 engineer	 responded	 that	 it	 sounded	 just	 like	
modelling	 polymers,	 except	 that	 polymers	 have	more	 possibilities	 and	more	
‘species.’	 This,	 Stephanie	 said,	 just	 goes	 to	 show	 that	 engineers	 are	 not	
unfamiliar	 with	 complexity,	 and	 that,	 despite	 what	 some	 biologists	 believe,	
complex	 systems	 absolutely	 can	 be	 modelled.	 Stephanie	 put	 some	 of	 the	
biologists’	 apprehension	 about	models	 down	 to	 their	 unfamiliarity	 with	 the	
ubiquity	of	modelling	in	the	modern	world.	Using	the	takeaway	cup	of	coffee	
she	held	in	her	hand	to	illustrate	her	point,	Stephanie	explained	that	from	the	
beans	 to	 the	 cup,	 all	 of	 the	processes	had	been	 industrialised	 and	 each	 step	
would	 have	 been	 modelled.	 Each	 piece	 of	 technology,	 and	 every	 industrial	
product,	she	went	on,	has	been	through	modelling.	Thus,	given	that	modelling	
is	 everywhere,	 and	 is	 deemed	 useful	 in	 so	many	 areas,	 Stephanie	 exclaimed	
that	 she	 really	 could	 not	 understand	why	 biology	would	 be	 any	 different	 or	
why	biologists	are	so	reluctant	to	embrace	it.	The	only	possible	explanation,	as	
she	 saw	 it,	 was	 that	 “Biology	 is	 the	 poor,	 backward	 cousin,	 lagging	 behind	
Chemistry	 and	 Physics,	 both	 of	 which	 have	 embraced	 engineering	 and	
modelling”	(Stephanie,	senior	researcher,	engineering).	
The	 paired	 stereotypes	 that	 underlie	 these	 conflicts	 over	 the	 importance	
and	usefulness	of	modelling,	those	of	the	backward	biologist	and	the	ignorant	
																																								 								
46	The	Golgi	Apparatus	is	an	organelle	found	within	most	eukaryotic	cells.	It	has	a	central	role	
in	the	modification	and	packaging	of	proteins	for	transport	around	or	outside	of	the	cell.	
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engineer,	 are	 arguably	 neither	 fair	 nor	 helpful	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 a	
functioning	 hybrid	 discipline.	 Yet,	 they	 do	 help	 to	 indicate	 the	 division	 and	
differences	 between	 the	 two	 epistemic	 cultures	 within	 synthetic	 biology.	 As	
indicated	above,	these	differences	are	observable	in	the	knowledge	base	of	the	
two	 sides	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 also	 their	 attitude	 towards,	 and	
expectations	of,	mathematical	models	and	biological	material.	Another	place	
that	 the	 epistemic	 cultural	 differences	 between	 engineers	 and	 biologists,	
within	 synthetic	 biology,	 are	 visible	 is	 in	 their	 expectations	 of	 each	 other’s	
work	time	frames.	
Time	frames	
Yeah	it’s	tough	when	they	[engineers]	don’t	get	 it,	when	you’re	 like,	
‘yeah	 this	didn’t	work	because	 the	cell	got	a	mutation	and	evolved,’	
and	 they	 just	 stare	 at	 you	 like,	 ‘what?	 Fix	 it!’	 .	 .	 .	Which	 is	 a	 good	
view,	but	not	one	for	 like,	 fix	 it	 for	next	week.	But	yeah,	 it	would	be	
good,	I’ll	bear	that	in	mind,	next	decade	let’s	have	an	engineered	cell	
that	doesn’t	evolve	and	an	engineered	cell	that	behaves,	right?		
(Martin,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
As	 the	 above	 quote	 indicates,	 the	 lack	 of	 basic	 familiarity	 with,	 and	
understanding	 of,	 each	 other’s	 disciplines	 also	 affected	 the	 synthetic	
biologists’	 appreciation	 of	 each	 other’s	 workable	 timelines.	 This	 is	 arguably	
what	 underlay	 the	 engineer’s	 request	 that	Martin	 “fix”	 the	 cellular	mutation	
immediately.	 A	 fix	 that	 the	 engineers	 were	 probably	 unaware	 would	 take	
many,	many	hours	of	 lab	work.47	Yet,	 this	 lack	of	understanding	of	workable	
timelines	cut	both	ways.	
Lewis,	 a	 doctoral	 student	 hailing	 from	 engineering,	 has	 embraced	 both	
laboratory	and	modelling	work	within	his	project,	and	has	both	a	biologist	and	
an	engineer	as	supervisors.	While	he	strives	to	successfully	combine	synthetic	
biology’s	 two	 sides	 he	 struggles	 at	 times	 with	 the	 expectations	 of	 his	
																																								 								
47	A	 lack	 of	 awareness	 that	 is	 not	 entirely	 surprising	 given	 synthetic	 biology’s	 rhetoric	 that	
suggests	cells	can	easily	be	designed	and	controlled.	
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supervisors,	 who	 have,	 he	 believes,	 unrealistic	 expectations	 for	 how	 he	 will	
divide	his	time	between	the	two	sides	of	his	work.	According	to	Lewis,	Martin,	
his	supervisor	 from	the	biology	side,	does	not	seem	to	appreciate	how	much	
work	and	time	is	involved	in	modelling,	claiming	that	Lewis	should	only	need	
to	 spend	 one	 hour	 on	 modelling	 for	 every	 ten	 hours	 he	 spends	 in	 the	
laboratory.		
Lewis,	who	believes	 that	his	modelling	and	 laboratory	work	 require	equal	
amounts	of	time,	described	modelling	as	being	creative,	and	requiring	a	lot	of	
thinking,	which	he	 conceded,	may	not	 look	 like	 ‘work’	 to	 a	 biologist	who	 is	
used	 to	 doing	 practical	 tasks	 in	 the	 laboratory.	 Yet	 he	 also	 noted	 that	
modelling	 work	 is	 a	 lot	 more	 immediate,	 explaining	 that	 when	 you	 have	 a	
good	idea	for	how	to	do	something	in	a	model,	you	can	immediately	check	the	
equations	to	see	if	it	will	work.	Whereas	in	biology,	if	you	come	up	with	a	new	
idea	for	how	to	do	something,	you	then	have	to	do	all	of	the	lab	work	in	order	
to	see	how	it	 functions,	and	this	can	take	quite	some	time,	a	 fact	 that	 is	not	
always	appreciated	by	his	engineering	supervisor.		
The	 incorrect	assumptions,	on	both	 sides,	 about	 the	workable	 time	 frame	
for	any	particular	task	on	the	other	side,	are	arguably	due	to	the	unfamiliarity	
and	 lack	of	 experience	 the	 two	 sides	have	with	 each	other’s	work.	However,	
these	assumptions	are	also	influenced	by	the	weight	individuals	place	on	the	
importance	 of	 the	work	 done	 by	 each	 of	 the	 two	 sides	 of	 synthetic	 biology.	
Lewis	addressed	this	point	in	relation	to	his	two	supervisors,	each	of	whom,	he	
felt,	clearly	viewed	their	own	‘side’	of	the	discipline,	and	it’s	inherent	goals,	as	
central	 to	 synthetic	 biology’s	 endeavour,	 with	 the	 other	 discipline	 playing	 a	
supporting	 role.	 Lewis	 encountered	 these	 biases	 in	 his	 interactions	with	 his	
supervisors	 regarding	his	 doctoral	 project.	 Lewis	 felt	 pressured	by	Martin	 to	
quickly	complete,	what	Martin	saw	as,	the	‘supporting’	modelling	work	so	that	
he	could	get	on	with	 the	 ‘important’	work	of	biological	experimentation	and	
discovery.	 While	 Grant	 encouraged	 Lewis	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 ‘important’	 and	
‘central’	modelling	work,	testing	biological	feasibility	when	required	with	the	
view	 of	 improving	 the	 model.	 Interestingly	 Kwok	 noted	 a	 similar	 attitude,	
quoting	Christina	Agapakis	 (then	 a	 grad	 student	 at	Harvard	Medical	 School	
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doing	 synthetic	 biology	 research	 and	 now	 the	 creative	 director	 at	 organism	
design	company,	Gingko	Bioworks)	as	saying,	“there’s	a	lot	of	biology	that	gets	
in	the	way	of	the	engineering”	(2010:	288).	
This	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 each	 other’s	 discipline	 is,	 according	 to	
Malcolm,	a	result	of	the	members	of	the	two	hemispheres	of	synthetic	biology	
having	been	trained	in	different	ways	of	thinking	and	in	distinct	approaches	to	
research.		
The	disciplines	tend	to	be	taught	in	different	ways.	So	the	biologists’	.	
.	 .	 they’re	 not	 there	 to	 solve	 problems,	 you	 know,	 engineers	 solve	
problems,	 biology,	 biochemistry	 are	 there	 to	 explore	 hypotheses,	
looking	 at	 fundamental	 mechanisms,	 work	 out	 how	 things	 work,	
[they]	 are	 driven	 by	 .	 .	 .	 fundamental	 knowledge	 generation	 I	
suppose,	 and	 an	 engineer’s	 there	 to	 solve	 problems,	 there	 to	 build	
things,	do	things,	make	things	happen.	So	that’s	a	very	different	way	
of	training,	so	you’ve	got	two	communities	that	have	been	trained	in	
very	different	ways	.	.	.	that’s	challenging,	to	bring	that	together.		
(Malcolm,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
Malcolm’s	 acknowledgment	 that	 training	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	
generation	of	distinct	academic	communities,	echoes	Knorr	Cetina’s	assertion	
that	 epistemic	 cultural	 divisions	 are	 deeply	 entrenched	 in	 all	 levels	 of	
education.	For	it	is	through	their	education	that	the	members	of	each	of	these	
groups	 have	 learnt	 to	 prioritise	 certain	 goals	 and	 ask	 certain	 research	
questions,	goals	and	questions	 that	differ	 from	each	other.	 It	 is	also	 through	
their	 training	 that	 they	 have	 learnt	 to	 speak	 the	 distinct	 language	 of	 their	
discipline,	of	their	epistemic	culture.		
Language	
Language	 use,	 like	 knowledge	 base,	 attitude	 towards	modelling,	 research	
priorities,	 and	 ideas	 about	 time	 scales,	 acts	 to	 set	 the	 two	 sides	 of	 synthetic	
biology	apart,	again	demarcating	them	as	separate	epistemic	cultures.	Firstly,	
and	perhaps	most	obviously	 to	anyone	venturing	 into	 the	world	of	 synthetic	
biology,	 there	 is	 the	 problem	 of	 jargon.	 There	 is	 a	 fair	 amount	 of	 shared	
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terminology	 and	 jargon	 within	 the	 lexicon	 of	 this	 emerging	 discipline,	
biobricks,	 chasses,	 parts,	 devices,	 and	 systems	 being	 the	 most	 obvious	
examples.48	But	there	is	also	a	fair	amount	of	unshared	language,	and	it	is	this	
that	 can	 make	 comprehension	 difficult	 for	 all.	 As	 Lewis	 said,	 in	 regards	 to	
meaningful	communication	between	engineers	and	biologists:	
It’s	 difficult	 because	 like	 each	 discipline	 has	 their	 own	 jargon	 and	
stuff,	so	it’s	sort	of	like	.	.	.	‘sorry,	explain	what	that	means?’	And	it’s	
like,	‘you	know!	Oh,	of	course,	you	don’t	understand	what	I	mean.’		
(Lewis,	doctoral	student,	engineering)	
As	Lewis	addresses,	members	of	both	sides	of	synthetic	biology	can	be	guilty	
of	 assuming,	 like	 arrogant	 tourists	 abroad,	 that	 everyone	 speaks	 their	
language.	 Forgetting	 that	 both	 the	 words	 they	 use	 and	 the	 concepts	 these	
words	 denote	 may	 be	 completely	 foreign	 to	 their	 collaborators	 and	 thus	
require	patient	translation	and	explanation.		
I	 remember	 sitting	 in	 the	 audience	 of	 a	 RoSBNet49	workshop	 in	 Oxford	
listening	 to	 back-to-back	 talks	 from	 biologist	 Michael	 Hecht	 and	 electrical	
engineer	Murat	Arcak.	Hecht	presented	an	artificial	molecular	parts	kit,	 and	
Arcak	 discussed	 the	 synergistic	 relationship	 between	 synthetic	 biology	 and	
control	 theory.	 These	 two	 men	 used	 strikingly	 different	 languages	 and	
presentation	 methods	 to	 convey	 their	 work.	 Arcak’s	 slides	 were	 full	 of	
mathematical	equations,	models,	and	diagrams	(matrices),	while	Hecht’s	talk	
and	 slides	 centred	 around	 protein	 diagrams,	 pictures	 of	 petri	 dishes,	
eppendorfs,	and	protein	sequences.	Yet,	both	men	clearly	assumed	that	their	
talks	 were	 straightforward	 and	 simple.	 Hecht’s	 complex	 biological	
presentation,	 for	example,	was	filled	with	comments	 like:	“we	all	 know	 .	 .	 .	 ,”	
“this	is	simple	stuff,”	“the	electrical	engineers	in	the	room	will	all	get	this,”	and	
“this	is	biochemistry	101.”	While	halfway	through	Arcak’s	talk,	a	talk	dominated	
																																								 								
48	The	 engineering	 discourse	 entering	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 discussed	 in	 greater	 detail	 in	
chapter	four.	
49RoSBNet	stands	for	Robust	Synthetic	Biology	Network.	
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by	complex	mathematical	formulas,	he	said,	much	to	my	amusement,	“this	 is	
the	only	slightly	technical	element	of	the	talk.”		
After	 Arcak’s	 talk,	 Janet	 and	 I	 looked	 at	 each	 other	 with	 shared	
incomprehension,	and	she,	a	senior	synthetic	biology	researcher,	commented	
that	she	was	 impressed	that	I	had	been	taking	notes	at	all	during	the	talk	as	
she	had	no	 idea	what	was	 going	on.	Whereas	Grant	 (also	 a	 senior	 synthetic	
biology	 lecturer	 and	 researcher),	 who	 had	 struggled	 through	 Hecht’s	 talk,	
commented	 that	 Arcak’s	 presentation	was	 from	his	world,	 and	was	 the	way	
that	he	looks	at	things.	The	specialised	nature	of	the	content	of	both	talks	was	
obviously	 a	 hindrance	 to	 their	 widespread	 comprehension	 by	 even	
experienced	 members	 of	 the	 mixed	 synthetic	 biology	 audience.	 A	 situation	
which	 further	 illustrates	 that	 the	 two	 sides	of	 synthetic	biology	do	not	have	
the	shared	language	requisite	for	a	shared	body	of	knowledge.	Both	speakers	
employed	a	lot	of	jargon	and	terminology	in	their	talks	that	would	have	been	
unfamiliar	to	at	 least	some,	 if	not	half,	of	the	audience,	and	yet	they	did	not	
explain	 themselves	 at	 all,	 assuming,	 incorrectly,	 that	 everyone	 would	
understand	them.		
Nevertheless,	 as	 Grant	 stressed	 on	 another	 occasion,	 the	 difficulties	 with	
comprehension	 within	 synthetic	 biology	 are	 not	 only	 due	 to	 the	 use	 of	
‘foreign’	words	and	concepts,	as	was	the	case	with	these	talks,	but	also	due	to	
variations	in	the	use	of	the	same	words.	
Engineers	and	biologists	do	not	necessarily	speak	the	same	language,	
in	the	sense	that	the	vocabulary	is	not	necessarily	the	same,	and	the	
level	of	precision	is	not	the	same	either.		
(Grant,	senior	researcher,	engineering)	
Grant,	 who	 would	 often	 find	 himself	 lost	 in	 conversations	 with	 biologists,	
especially	early	on,	mentioned	the	 issue	of	precision	to	me	several	 times.	He	
stressed	that	in	engineering,	words	are	given	precise	meanings	and	when	they	
are	used,	 they	always	mean	the	same	thing,	and	when	someone	means	 ‘that’	
thing	they	always	use	‘that’	word.	Whereas,	in	his	opinion,	biologists	are	a	lot	
less	 stringent	 and	will	 use	multiple	words	 to	mean	 the	 same	 thing	 “just	 for	
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variety.”	This	decision	to,	as	Grant	saw	it,	make	their	writing	more	interesting	
rather	 than	 clearer,	 confused	 and	 frustrated	 him.	 Meanwhile	 Grant’s	
frustration	 and	 confusion	 amused	 Janet.	 However	 despite	 her	 amusement,	
Janet	 conceded	 that	 this	 variation	 in	 word-usage,	 where	 the	 biologists	 and	
engineers	take	a	word	to	mean	different	things,	could	also	lead	to	problems.	
I	think	the	bigger	problem	is	that	people	think	they	know	what	other	
people	 are	 saying	 but	 they	 don’t	 actually	 know,	 and	 so	 then,	 you	
know,	you	find	out	six	months	later	that	.	.	.	‘I	thought	you	said	this	
but	actually	what	you	meant	is	that,’	and	you	know,	now	we’ve	kind	
of	gone	round	in	circles	several	times.		
(Janet,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
Thus	variations	in	language	use,	and	the	resulting	misunderstandings,	are	not	
only	 an	 indicator	 of	 epistemic	 cultural	 difference,	 but	 also	 a	 potential	
impediment	to	successful	collaborative	work.		
Spatial	and	conceptual	separation	
Potential	 fuel	 for	 this	 misunderstanding,	 which,	 as	 Janet	 notes,	 can	 be	
maintained	 undetected	 for	 months,	 is	 the	 spatial	 separation	 that	 exists	
between	 the	 engineers	 and	 biologists	 at	 the	 Centre.	 For	 while	 the	 Centre	
houses	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 collaboration,	 there	 exists	 a	 disciplinary	 division	
nonetheless,	with	the	biologists	spending	most	of	their	time	at	the	‘bench’	in	
the	laboratories	downstairs	and	the	engineers	spending	most	of	their	time	at	
computers	in	the	offices	upstairs.	This	divide	is	thus	embedded	into	the	built	
environment,	with	the	computers	and	whiteboards	predominantly	used	by	the	
engineers,	 and	 the	 lab	 benches	 and	 equipment	 primarily	 used	 by	 the	
biologists,	 being	 separated	 by	 a	 floor	 and	 three	 locked	 doors.	 Indeed,	 even	
when	 they	 are	 not	 working,	 the	 engineers	 tend	 to	mill	 around	 the	 upstairs	
desks,	 and	 the	 biologists	 around	 the	 lab	 benches	 and	 the	 downstairs	 office,	
which	contains	desks	and	computers	used	exclusively	by	those	who	hail	from	
biology.	
This	 division	 continued	 even	 when	 the	 engineers	 and	 biologists	 were	
‘working	together.’	For,	while	they	would	meet	regularly,	they	would	not	work	
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alongside	 each	 other.	 Thus,	 even	 when	 they	 were	 working	 on	 a	 common	
research	 object,	 this	 object	 would	 take	 a	 very	 different	 form	 for	 each.	
Consequently	 not	 only	 did	 they	 look	 at	 the	 same	 words	 and	 see	 different	
meanings,	 but	 they	 would	 look	 with	 very	 different	 perspectives	 at	 very	
different	representations	of	the	same	research	object.		
A	prime	example	of	biologists	 and	engineers	 seeing	 their	 research	objects	
differently	 is	E.	 coli.	 E.	 coli.,	 and	 its	constituent	genes,	are	perhaps	 the	most	
common	research	objects	in	synthetic	biology.	Yet,	while	biologists	encounter	
these	objects	in	the	laboratory	in	their	biological	form,	the	organisms	smeared	
in	vast	colonies	on	petri	dishes	(see	for	example	figure	1),	or	spun	down	into	
pellets	of	cells	in	test	tubes,	and	the	component	parts	of	its	genome	as	bands	
of	 black	 on	 a	 Southern	 blot,	 for	 the	 engineer	 this	 same	 organism	 and	 its	
elements	are	rendered	as	a	series	of	data	points,	it’s	messy	biology	reduced	to	
a	 sequences	 of	 numbers.	 For	 the	 engineer	 it	 is	 these	 numbers	 that	 they	
interact	 with	 and	 interrogate	 rather	 than	 the	 organism	 itself,	 and	 it	 is	 the	
sequence	of	numbers	that	are	fed	into	models,	such	as	the	model	represented	
in	figure	2.		
The	 form	 that	 their	 common	 research	 object	 takes	 within	 their	 work	
dictates,	and	is	dictated	by,	the	research	methods	they	use	in	their	day-to-day	
Figure	1:	E.	 coli	colonies	growing	on	an	Agar	
plate	(Ball	2007).	
Figure	 2:	 A	 synthetic	 genetic	 oscillator	
system	 in	 E.	 coli	 represented	 by	 a	
nonlinear	 dynamic	 equation	 (Chen	 and	
Hsu	2012).	
x˙i(t)=f(xi(t))+∑j=1Ncijg(xj(t)),i=
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practices.	 The	 biologists	 are	 generally	 much	 more	 at	 home	 at	 the	 bench	
running	assays	with	mutating,	reproducing	organisms	than	they	are	sitting	at	
computers	constructing	predictive	models	from	first	principals,	and	vice	versa	
for	 the	 engineers,	 who	 are	 very	 comfortable	 with	 the	 inner	 workings	 of	
mathematical	formulas	but	have	no	idea	how	to	load	an	electrophoresis	gel.	As	
such	it	 is	not	surprising	that	the	conflicts	and	misunderstandings	mentioned	
above,	between	the	engineers	and	the	biologists	within	the	Centre,	arise.	It	is	
perhaps	hard	for	members	of	both	sides	to	fully	reconcile	living,	reproducing,	
mutating	organisms	with	predictable	mathematical	models.50		
Reconciling	synthetic	biology’s	epistemic	cultural	differences	
Thus,	what	 I	have	 attempted	 to	 show	above	 is	 that	 there	 exist	 significant	
differences	 between	 the	 engineers	 and	 the	 biologists	 within	 the	 synthetic	
biology	 research	 centre	where	 I	 undertook	my	 research.	These	differences,	 I	
argue,	 are	 located	 within	 a	 cluster	 of	 disciplinary	 features,	 namely	 their	
research	 objects,	 methodologies,	 research	 questions,	 time	 frames,	
relationships	 with	 data	 and	 experimentation,	 required	 skills,	 language	
(including	their	differing	strategies	of	language	use	–	precision	versus	variety),	
and	 their	knowledge	base.	 I	would	contend	 that	 these	differences	ultimately	
stem	from	the	fact	that	synthetic	biology’s	parent	disciplines,	engineering	and	
biology,	can	be	seen	as	two	distinct	epistemic	cultures.	Furthermore,	I	would	
maintain	that	such	differences	also	prove	to	be	obstacles	to	the	formation	of	
synthetic	biology	as	a	hybrid	discipline.		
That	 is,	 while	 this	 cluster	 of	 characteristic	 differences	 is	 arguably	
constitutive	of	the	epistemic	cultures	of	synthetic	biology’s	parent	disciplines,	
I	would	contend	that,	they	are	also	the	negative	side	of	epistemic	cultures.	For	
it	was	around	 this	 cluster	of	differences	 that	 the	 tension	and	conflict	within	
synthetic	 biology’s	 attempt	 at	 disciplinary	 merging	 took	 hold.	 Given	 the	
constituent	nature	of	these	features	within	disciplines,	and	the	current	science	
policy	 drive	 towards	 interdisciplinarity,	 further	 examination	may	 find	 that	 a	
																																								 								
50	This	will	be	discussed	further	in	chapter	five.	
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similar	cluster	of	epistemic	cultural	differences	proves	equally	troublesome	as	
others	 attempt	 to	 align	 themselves	 with	 the	 current	 science	 policy	 drive	
towards	interdisciplinarity.	
However,	 for	now	let’s	return	to	the	lab	meeting	with	which	I	started	this	
chapter,	 the	parallel	discussions	begin	 to	make	sense	 if	we	 think	 in	 terms	of	
the	existence	of	these	two	epistemic	cultures.	The	members	of	each	of	the	two	
conversations	were	discussing	the	research	questions	that	interested	them,	the	
methods	 they	 would	 use	 to	 investigate	 these	 questions,	 and	 the	 potential	
outcomes	 of	 doing	 so,	 all	 the	 time	 using	 language,	 and	 drawing	 on	 a	
knowledge	 base,	 shared	 with	 the	 others	 in	 the	 conversation.	 These	
conversations	were	easy.	They	required	no	translation,	no	simplification,	and	
no	 explanation.	 Indeed	 they	 required	 no	 concession	 to	 the	 ‘other	 side’	 of	
synthetic	 biology	 at	 all	 and	 thus	 suffered	 none	 of	 the	 difficulties	 of	
collaboration.	
However,	 despite	 the	 ease	of	 such	 conversations,	 those	within	 the	Centre	
have,	to	varying	degrees,	committed	to	the	synthetic	biology	endeavour.	Thus	
they	have	committed	themselves	to	this	collaborative	effort	and,	despite	their	
frustrations,	I	observed	that	they	do	try	hard	to	make	it	work.	As	such,	having	
established	that	drawing	synthetic	biology	together	can	be	difficult	because	it	
is	ultimately	a	discipline	forming	at	the	interface	of	two	distinct	and	differing	
epistemic	cultures,	the	remainder	of	the	chapter	will	explore	the	attempts	that	
are	being	made	within	the	Centre	to	bridge	this	epistemic	cultural	divide.		
An	emerging	epistemic	cultural	community	
As	mentioned	in	chapter	one,	Molyneux-Hodgson	and	Meyer	(2009)	argue	
that	 central	 to	understanding	 scientific	 communities	 is	 the	need	 to	consider	
how	they	change	and	reproduce	over	time.	Drawing	on	Gingras’	work	on	the	
emergence	 of	 the	 physics	 community	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century	 (1991),	
Molyneux-Hodgson	 and	 Meyer	 explore	 the	 contemporary	 emergence	 of	 a	
synthetic	biology	community	in	the	UK	and	Europe.	They	argue	that	emerging	
scientific	 communities,	 such	 as	 synthetic	 biology,	 “can	 be	 analysed	 through	
identifying	the	mixture	of	movement	and	stickiness”	(Molyneux-Hodgson	and	
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Meyer	 2009:	 142).	 Here	 ‘movement’	 refers	 to	 the	 gathering	 of	 what	 they	
consider	 to	 be	 the	 building	 blocks	 of	 a	 community,	 such	 as	 individual	
scientists	 and	 resources,	 and	 the	 convergence	 of	 these	 building	 blocks	 on	
some	 central	 position.	 They	 also	 use	 the	 term	 ‘movement’	 to	 refer	 to	 the	
articulation	 of	 future	 promises	 and	 expectations	 in	 order	 to	 present	 the	
community	as	being	on	a	trajectory.	‘Stickiness,’	however,	is	used	here	to	refer	
to	efforts	to	tie	an	emerging	community	down	and	together	through	the	likes	
of	 specialised	 associations,	 conferences,	 and	 journals.	 Devices,	 that	 is,	 that	
create	 for	 the	 community	 “a	 visible,	 demarcated	 and	 powerful	 niche”	
(Molyneux-Hodgson	 and	 Meyer	 2009:	 143).	 At	 the	 time	 of	 their	 work,	
Molyneux-Hodgson	 and	 Meyer	 contended	 that	 the	 synthetic	 biology	
community	was	only	 just	 emerging	 and	 that	 it	 “remains	 to	be	 seen	whether	
‘synthetic	 biology’	 will	 become	 a	 separate	 discipline	 with	 a	 delineated	
community	 of	 practitioners,	 a	 sub-field	 of	 one	 of	 its	 constituent	 parents,	 or	
segue	into	some	other	configuration”	(2009:	143).		
Several	 years	 have	 passed	 since	 this	 paper	 was	 written	 and	 while	 things	
have	not	changed	drastically	in	that	time,	they	have	inevitably	changed.	There	
are	 clear	 examples	 of	 the	 sort	 of	movement	Molyneux-Hodgson	 and	Meyer	
argue	is	indicative	of	an	emerging	scientific	community,	with	a	steady	flow	of	
both	 people51	and	 resources52	into	 the	 field,	 and	 a	 continual	 assertion	 that	
																																								 								
51	The	 influx	of	people	 into	 synthetic	biology	has	 seen	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	numbers	
attending	 the	 international	 synthetic	 biology	 conference	 series.	 Indeed	 the	 number	 of	
participants	 has	more	 than	 doubled	 since	 the	 first	 conference,	 SB1.0	 in	 2004.	 The	 first	 four	
Synthetic	Biology	Conferences,	SB1.0	through	to	SB4.0	(held	 in	2004,	2006,	2007,	2008),	had	
around	1500	participants	 in	total,	while	the	two	most	recent	conferences	 in	the	series,	SB5.0	
and	 SB6.0	 (held	 in	 2011	 and	 2013)	 have	 between	 them	 attracted	 over	 1500	 participants	
(BioBricks	Foundation).	
52	Large	 amounts	of	money	 continue	 to	pour	 into	 the	 synthetic	biology	 research	endeavour.	
With	 £20	 million	 worth	 of	 research	 grants	 announced	 by	 the	 BBSRC	 in	 November	 2012	
(Biotechnology	 and	 Biological	 Sciences	 Research	 Council	 2012).	 The	 EPSRC	 is	 another	
significant	contributor	to	the	development	of	the	field,	with	over	£45	million	worth	of	grants	
currently	 dedicated	 to	 synthetic	 biology	 research	 (EPSRC).	 The	 two	 research	 councils	 also	
paired	up	towards	the	end	of	2013	 to	offer	£40	million	to	set	up	three	new	multidisciplinary	
synthetic	biology	research	centres	in	the	UK	(Biotechnology	and	Biological	Sciences	Research	
Council	 2014).	 They	 have	 also	 funded	 a	 Centre	 for	 Doctoral	 Training	 in	 Synthetic	 Biology,	
which	offers	a	four-year	fully	funded	doctoral	programme	for	students	from	the	physical	and	
life	sciences	(SynBioCDT	2014).	
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synthetic	biology	is	on	a	promising	path	towards	solving	many	of	the	world’s	
ills,	 while	 also	 bolstering	 the	 economy	 (see	 for	 example	 Osborne	 2012;	 UK	
Synthetic	Biology	Roadmap	Coordination	Group	2012).	Furthermore,	there	are	
increasing	 signs	 of	 the	 ‘stickiness’	 Molyneux-Hodgson	 and	 Meyer	 contend	
signals	 the	 development	 of	 a	 demarcated	 scientific	 community.	 The	
international	 synthetic	 biology	 community	 has,	 for	 example,	 developed	 a	
conference	 series,	 the	 SBx.0	 series,	 which	 is	 growing	 in	 numbers	 and	
significance.	 These	 conferences	 are	 now	 held	 every	 two	 years	 and	 draw	
upwards	 of	 700	 international	 participants,	 including	 some	 very	 high	 profile	
speakers.		
I	 attended	 the	 SB5.0	 conference	 held	 at	 Stanford	 University	 in	 2011,	 an	
impressive	setting	that,	in	itself,	spoke	volumes	about	the	growing	legitimacy	
of	the	field.	Sitting	amongst	hundreds	of	the	leading	lights	and	new	disciples	
of	the	international	synthetic	biology	community,	at	the	centre	of	the	Stanford	
University	campus	in	Silicon	Valley,	 it	definitely	felt	 like	the	community	was	
established,	recognised,	and	cutting-edge.	Moreover,	this	is	far	from	the	only	
conference	 series	 devoted	 to	 synthetic	 biology.	 Alongside	 the	 large,	
preeminent	 SBx.0	 series,	 there	 are	 several	 smaller	 dedicated	 meetings	
throughout	 the	 world,	 for	 example	 the	 SynBioBeta	 conference	 series	
(SynBioBeta)	 and	 the	 Synthetic	 Biology	 Congress	 (Global	 Engage).	
Additionally,	 alongside	 the	 conferences	 and	 meetings,	 there	 are	 a	 growing	
number	 of	 academic	 journals	 dedicated	 to	 synthetic	 biology,	 which	 provide	
additional	‘stickiness,’	adhering	the	community	together.53		
These	 increased	 efforts	 to	 establish	 synthetic	 biology	 as	 a	 defined	 and	
recognised	community,	alongside	the	 influx	of	resources	and	people	 into	the	
field,	suggest	that	the	synthetic	biology	community	has	further	developed	and	
cemented	since	Molyneux-Hodgson	and	Meyer	wrote	their	piece.	Indeed,	the	
community	 appears	 to	 be	 on	 its	 way	 to	 becoming	 an	 established	 discipline	
with	 a	 delineated	 community	 of	 practitioners,	 and	 a	 coherent	 epistemic	
																																								 								
53	For	example:	ACS	 Synthetic	 Biology,	Systems	 and	 Synthetic	 Biology,	 Current	 Synthetic	 and	
Systems	Biology,	International	Journal	of	Systems	and	Synthetic	Biology.	
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culture	or,	as	Leonelli	and	Ankeny	(2015)	term	such	a	collection	of	conceptual	
and	practical	norms,	repertoire.	Arguably,	however,	a	significant	factor	in	the	
growth	 and	 strengthening	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	 developing	 repertoire	 is	
training,	which	Molyneux-Hodgson	and	Meyer	neglect	to	address.	
As	discussed	previously,	synthetic	biology	is	explicit	in	its	desire	to	be	seen	
as	a	hybrid	discipline,	not	an	interdisciplinary	discipline,	but	something	much	
more	 complex.	 An	 interdisciplinary	 discipline	 is	 generally	 made	 up	 of	
individuals	who	hail	 from	various	contributory	disciplines	and	who	maintain	
the	 identity	 of	 these	 contributory	 disciplines.	 Whereas	 within	 synthetic	
biology	 there	 is	 a	 desire	 for	 the	 discipline	 to	 be	 made	 up	 of	 synthetic	
biologists,	 individuals	 who	 are	 themselves	 interdisciplinary,	 having	 at	 least	
some	 skills	 and	expertise	 in	both	biology	 and	engineering.	Kuldell	 expresses	
this	desire	clearly	in	the	following	excerpt:		
“despite	 seeming	 inherently	 interdisciplinary,	 synthetic	 biology	 is,	
in	 fact,	 not.	 It	 does	 not	 simply	 put	 biologists	 and	 engineers	 in	
adjoining	offices	and	wait	to	see	what	fireworks	erupt	at	the	water	
cooler.	 Instead,	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 a	 distinct	 discipline	 that	
requires	its	practitioners	to	work	in	ways	remarkably	different	from	
the	work	that	defines	any	traditional	niche.	Biologists	who	come	to	
synthetic	 biology	 must	 manage	 complexity,	 rather	 than	 describe	
and	 celebrate	 it.	 Engineers	 must	 build	 using	 material	 under	
evolutionary	 pressures.	 Students	 who	 enter	 synthetic	 biology	
perceive	the	promise	and	limitations	of	the	emerging	discipline	and	
because	they	have	yet	to	categorize	themselves	as	either	‘engineer’	
or	 ‘scientist,’	 these	 students	do	not	 see	 the	need	 to	 collaborate	as	
much	 as	 they	 see	 the	need	 to	 parse	 out	 the	 problems	 themselves	
and	then	systematically	develop	the	skills	to	solve	them”	(2007:	1-2).	
Sean	Eddy	argues	that	such	a	focus	on	interdisciplinary	people	rather	than	
interdisciplinary	 teams	 is	preferably	and	much	more	 likely	 to	yield	 scientific	
progress.	 He	 writes,	 “when	 I	 think	 of	 new	 fields	 in	 science	 that	 have	 been	
opened,	 I	 don’t	 think	 of	 interdisciplinary	 teams	 combining	 existing	 skills	 to	
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solve	a	defined	problem	-	 I	 think	of	single	 interdisciplinary	people	 inventing	
new	ways	to	look	at	the	world.	Focusing	on	interdisciplinary	teams	instead	of	
interdisciplinary	 people	 reinforces	 standard	 disciplinary	 boundaries	 rather	
than	 breaking	 them	 down”	 (Eddy	 2005:	 3).	 Indeed,	 Eddy	writes,	 while	 “new	
disciplines	 eventually	 self-organize	 around	 new	 problems	 and	 approaches,	
creating	a	new	shared	culture,”	what	is	important	for	the	establishment	of	this	
shared	culture	is	that	it	“coalesces	into	the	next	essential	training	regimen	for	
the	next	generation	of	scientists.”	“Interdisciplinary	science,”	he	continues,	“is	
just	 the	 embryonic	 stage	 of	 a	 new	discipline”	 (Eddy	 2005:	 3).	 Yet,	 as	will	 be	
discussed	below,	creating	such	a	shared	culture	within	a	new	discipline	is	not	
as	easy	as	Eddy	suggests.	
Bridging	the	epistemic	cultural	divide	
In	my	exploration	of	the	epistemic	cultures	within	synthetic	biology	I	was	
drawn	to	 the	work	of	Helge	Torgersen	(2009).	Torgersen’s	work	 investigated	
the	 development	 of	 genomics,	 questioning	 whether	 the	 epistemic	 cultural	
tensions	 she	 identified	 between	 the	 participating	 biologists	 and	 computer	
engineers	could	lead	to	the	development	of	a	new	epistemic	culture.	However,	
despite	 their	 goal	 of	 forming	 a	 coherent	 discipline,	 she	 found	 that	 the	
individual	participants	“remained	either	computer	engineers	or	biologists	with	
their	 particular	 mindsets	 and	 approaches	 to	 science	 as	 instilled	 by	 their	
different	intellectual	formations”	(Torgersen	2009:	81).	This	finding	ultimately	
led	 Torgersen	 to	 conclude,	 in	 regards	 to	 genomics,	 that	 “[t]he	 multi-
disciplinary	bridging	of	the	epistemic	gap	has	not	been	accomplished”	(2009:	
81).	 Such	 a	 finding	 of	 tension	 and	 lack	 of	 coherence	 within	 emerging	
interdisciplines	 is	 not	uncommon,	 being	 echoed	by	 Sankar	 et	 al.	 (2007)	 and	
O’Day	et	al.	(2001).	Indeed,	as	these	authors,	and	others	(such	as	Bartlett	et	al.	
2016;	Calvert	2010b;	Etkin	and	Elisabetsky	2005;	Lewis	and	Bartlett	2013)	have	
shown,	the	difficult,	messy,	conflicted	process	of	merging	disciplines,	which	I	
encountered	 within	 synthetic	 biology,	 is	 common	 to	 many	 emerging	
interdisciplines.	 Thus,	 despite	 the	 promise	 of	 Eddy’s	 claims,	 Torgersen’s	
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findings	sounded	very	familiar,	bearing,	as	they	do,	similarities	with	my	own	
observations	from	the	Centre.		
Where	I	found	references	to	the	‘naysayer	biologist’	who	‘ignorantly’	thinks	
biology	 is	 too	 difficult	 to	model,	 Torgersen	 found	 that	 the	 engineers	within	
genomics	 looked	 down	 on	 the	 way	 their	 biologist	 colleagues	 undertook	
research.	They,	like	some	of	the	engineers	at	the	Centre,	viewed	the	biological	
approach	 as	 “a	 sort	 of	 handicraft”	 while	 perceiving	 their	 own	 field	 to	 be	 “a	
technical	 science	 with	 a	 profoundly	 different	 way	 of	 thinking”	 (Torgersen	
2009:	 75-76).54 	The	 biologists	 Torgersen	 interviewed,	 like	 the	 biologists	 I	
encountered,	were	equally	suspicious	of	the	engineers’	approach,	questioning	
how	the	 results	 the	engineers	produced	were	 related	 to	biological	questions.	
Ultimately,	 Torgersen	 found	 there	 to	 be	 a	 clear	 division	 of	 labour	 within	
genomics,	wherein	“each	part	has	its	function	but	does	not	interfere	with	the	
tasks	of	the	other”	(2009:	82).		
These	findings	are	reminiscent	of	both	the	epistemic	cultural	clashes	Keller	
(2002)	identified	(though	she	does	not	identify	them	as	such)	as	instrumental	
in	 the	 failure	 of	 past	 attempts	 to	 integrate	 an	 engineering	 approach	 into	
biology,	 and	my	 own	 findings	 from	within	 the	Centre.	 Initially	 the	 parallels	
between	 Torgersen’s	 findings	 and	my	 own	 led	 me	 to	 question	 whether	 the	
epistemic	 gap	 within	 synthetic	 biology	 was	 likewise	 too	 wide	 to	 be	 easily	
bridged,	 and	 thus	 the	 internal	 differences	 too	 fundamental	 for	 a	 coherent	
discipline	to	form.	Indeed,	even	though	those	within	the	Centre	were	eager	for	
synthetic	biology	 to	 succeed	as	 a	hybrid	discipline,	 and	appreciated	 the	 role	
played	by	those	from	both	biology	and	engineering,	some	were	uncertain	how	
exactly	this	could	be	achieved.		
During	 a	 conversation	 at	 the	 lab	 bench,	Maria,55	in	 what	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	
clear	description	of	synthetic	biology’s	epistemic	cultural	divide,	insisted	that	
while	biologists	and	engineers	can	learn	each	other’s	techniques	and	methods,	
																																								 								
54	This	 bears	 a	 striking	 resemblance	 to	 the	 attitudes	 expressed	 by	 several	 members	 of	 the	
Centre,	which	are	discussed	in	chapter	four.	
55	A	Masters	student	with	a	background	in	biochemistry.	
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they	cannot	so	easily	learn	their	way	of	thinking.	She	told	me,	“biologists	and	
engineers	 have	 very	 different	ways	 of	 looking	 at	 things,	 different	 perspectives,	
different	 ways	 of	 thinking,	 different	 languages,	 and	 while	 they	 can	 appreciate	
each	other’s	approach,	they	don’t	really	ever	get	into	the	mode	of	thinking	of	the	
other.”	 “Biologists,”	 she	 explained,	 “can’t	 reach	 the	 extra	 level	 of	 engineers’	
thinking,	 and	 engineers	 can’t	 reach	 the	 extra	 level	 of	 biologists’	 thinking.	
Ultimately	 they	 can’t	 fully	 see	 things	 from	 the	 other’s	 perspective,	 they	 can’t	
engage	in	the	‘abstract	thinking’	of	the	other.”	Consequently,	Maria	concluded	
that	the	best	she	believes	synthetic	biology	can	hope	for	is	collaboration,	not	
“true	 hybrid	 synthetic	 biologists”	 (that	 is	 synthetic	 biologists	 who	 are	 fully	
trained	as	both	engineers	and	biologists).		
Maria	 justified	 this	 perspective	 by	 claiming	 that	 “people	 naturally	 tend	
towards	one	way	of	thinking	or	the	other,	and	this	cannot	easily	be	taught.	Even	
if	 you	 train	 people	 in	 both	 [disciplines]	 at	 the	 Masters	 level	 they	 will	 tend	
towards	one	or	the	other	perspective.”56	Thus	Maria	maintained	that	having	an	
understanding	of	each	other’s	perspective,	and	an	ability	to	speak	each	other’s	
language	 is	 important	 to	 foster	 collaboration	 but	 it	 won’t	 produce	 “hybrid”	
workers.	Furthermore,	Maria	stressed	that	she	doesn’t	believe	that	such	dual	
training	“would	be	of	benefit	anyway	as	if	people	really	do	get	an	equal	training	
in	each,	their	knowledge	of	both	would	be	superficial	and	they	would	not	be	able	
to	engage	in	the	abstract	thinking	of	either.”	Ultimately	then,	Maria	fears	that	
attempts	 to	 create	 interdisciplinary	 individuals,	 of	 the	 type	 Eddy	 (2005)	
promotes,	will	result	in	a	generation	of	synthetic	biologists	who	are	Jacks	of	all	
trades,	but	masters	of	none.		
																																								 								
56	This	is	rather	a	big	claim	from	Maria,	and	it	is	one	I	cannot	find	literature	to	substantiate	so	
I	will	not	attempt	to	do	so.	I	did	indeed	find	that	the	members	of	the	Centre,	even	those	who	
were	currently	being,	or	had	been,	trained	at	Masters	 level	 in	both	engineering	and	biology,	
did	 tend	 towards	one	way	of	 thinking	or	 the	other.	However,	 this	may	well	be	due	 to	 their	
undergraduate	 and	 secondary	 school	 training	 specializing	 in	 one	 field	 or	 the	 other,	 rather	
than	 due	 to	 some	 innate	 tendency.	 As	 discussed	 above,	 Knorr	 Cetina	 (1999)	 asserts	 that	
epistemic	 cultural	 divisions	 are	 deeply	 entrenched	 in	 all	 levels	 of	 education.	With	 students	
being	taught	to	prioritise	certain	goals,	ask	certain	questions,	and	speak	in	certain	ways,	all	of	
which	differ	between	disciplines,	and	thus	between	epistemic	cultures.		
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If	 one	 were	 to	 solely	 judge	 by	 Maria’s	 adamant	 assertions	 about	 the	
prospects	of	producing	hybrid	synthetic	biologists,	then	it	would	seem	like	the	
epistemic	 cultural	 divide	 between	 biologists	 and	 engineers	 within	 synthetic	
biology	 is	 too	 wide	 to	 easily	 bridge	 and	 that	 attempts	 to	 do	 so	 would	
compromise	the	success	of	the	discipline.	However,	as	I	shall	discuss	below,	I	
observed	 two	 distinct	 strategies	 adopted	 by	 members	 of	 the	 Centre	
determined	to	overcome	the	difficulties	Maria	addressed	and	ultimately	bridge	
this	 divide.	 The	 first	 of	 which	 was	 the	 embracing	 of	 close,	 respectful	
collaboration.	
Close	collaboration	
Like	Maria,	Stephanie	was	also	adamant	that	the	best	synthetic	biology	can	
and	 should	 hope	 for	 is	 respectful	 collaboration	 between	 biologists	 and	
engineers,	rather	than	individuals	who	possess	all	of	the	knowledge	and	skills	
of	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 discipline.	 She	 asserted	 that,	 while	 the	 discipline	 of	
synthetic	biology	is	a	hybrid,	the	synthetic	biologists	themselves	are	not,	and	
she	does	not	believe	it	would	be	beneficial	to	make	them	so.	To	try	and	teach	
synthetic	biology	as	a	hybrid	discipline	(part	engineering	and	part	biology)	to	
undergraduates	 would,	 Stephanie	 claimed,	 result	 in	 students	 with	 “a	
superficial	understanding	of	both	disciplines,	but	not	enough	depth	of	knowledge	
in	 either,”	a	claim	that	echoed	Maria’s	concerns.	Thus	Stephanie	believes	the	
University57	is	 correct	 in	 only	 offering	 degrees	 in	 synthetic	 biology,	 as	 an	
integrated	 course,	 at	 postgraduate	 level,	 once,	 that	 is,	 “the	 students	 already	
have	 a	 good	 grounding	 in	 a	 sole	 discipline”	 (Stephanie,	 senior	 researcher,	
engineering).	
There	 is	 sense	 in	 Stephanie’s	 argument,	 a	 support	 for	 depth	 rather	 than	
breadth	 of	 training.	However,	 I	 cannot	 help	wondering	 if	 this	 singular	 early	
training	is,	at	least	in	part,	the	cause	of	the	difficulties	Maria	claimed	synthetic	
biologists	 have	 engaging	 in	 the	 abstract	 thinking	 of	 the	 other	 side	 of	 the	
discipline.	Would	they	be	better	able	to	engage	in	“the	mode	of	thinking	of	the	
																																								 								
57	‘The	University’	here	refers	to	the	university	where	the	Centre	was	located.	
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other”	 if	 they	 had	 a	 broader	 undergraduate	 training?	 But	 if	 they	 did,	would	
this	be,	as	Stephanie	and	Maria	claim,	at	the	expense	of	their	ability	to	work	at	
the	forefront	of	either	discipline	and	thus	be	a	detriment	to	synthetic	biology?	
As	there	are	currently	no	undergraduate	degrees	in	synthetic	biology,	it	is	not	
yet	possible	to	answer	this	question,	but	it	is	one	that	the	discipline	is	going	to	
have	to	confront	as	decisions	are	made	about	the	best	way	of	training	future	
synthetic	 biologists.	 Given	 that	 Stephanie	 supports	 the	 University’s	 current	
system,	 where	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 taught	 only	 at	 postgraduate	 level,58	she	
argued	that	“it	shouldn’t	be	about	producing	synthetic	biologists	who	can	do	the	
biology	and	 the	 engineering	 themselves,	 but	 rather	 about	producing	biologists	
and	 engineers	 with	 an	 appreciation	 for	 what	 they	 can	 gain	 from	 working	
together.”	 It	 was	 this	 type	 of	 collaboration	 that	 she	 engaged	 in	 herself,	
primarily	with	Janet.		
As	 a	 result	 of	 their	 commitment	 to	 respectful	 partnership	 Stephanie	 and	
Janet	 are	 ultimately	 the	 prime	 example	 of	 collaboration	 within	 the	 Centre.	
These	two	women	have	enough	experience	in,	and	knowledge	of,	each	other’s	
discipline	 to	 be	 able	 to	 work	 closely	 and	 respectfully.	 They	 understand	 the	
potential	and	the	limitations	of	the	other’s	input,	and	above	all	else,	they	are	
willing	to	compromise	and	adapt	to	work	in	with	the	other.	However,	not	to	
the	extent	that	they	become	a	consultant	on	the	other’s	project	rather	than	a	
collaborator	 on	 a	 joint	 project.	 Ultimately	 then	 it	 is	 through	 such	 close,	
respectful	 collaboration	 that	 they,	 and	 others	 like	 them,	 are	 attempting	 to	
bridge	 synthetic	 biology’s	 epistemic	 divide.	 They	 view	 themselves	 as	 having	
different	strengths,	different	skills,	and	different	approaches	 from	each	other	
and	 they	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 they	 can	 individually	 embody	 both	 sides	 of	
synthetic	biology.	Thus,	by	banding	 together	 in	collaboration,	 they	can	each	
embody	 half	 of	 the	 discipline	 and	 together	 they	 can	 produce	 the	 desired	
hybrid	work.	Here	Stephanie	explains	this	approach	to	collaboration,	and	why	
																																								 								
58	With	the	exception	of	a	single	undergraduate	course	which	students	from	both	biology	and	
engineering	sub-disciplines	can	take	as	part	of	their	separate	degrees.	
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she	 views	 the	 engagement	 of	 those	 higher	 up	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 in	 such	
collaboration	as	important.	
It’s	not	enough	to	sort	of	have	a	joint	student	and	for	the	student	to	
become,	 if	 you	 like,	 the	 new	 generation	 of	 synthetic	 biologists,	 to	
represent	what	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 about.	 It’s	 not	 enough	 to	 bring	
the	 supervisors	 closer	 together,	 because	 you	 can	 have	 the	 student	
going	to	one	and	being	told	about	maths	and	non-linear	dynamics59	
and	 going	 to	 the	 other	 and	 being	 told	 about	Western	 blotting	 and	
qPCR.60	So,	inevitably	if	people	higher	up	don’t	start	making	an	effort	
then	 it’s	 not	 going	 to	work	 out.	 So	 that’s	why	 I’m	 always	 sceptical	
about	joint	projects	because	unless	you	make	an	effort	it’s	not	going	
to	be	fruitful.	But	.	 .	 .	 if	you’re	going	to	start	a	collaboration	I	think	
you	need	to	start	with	something	that	both	people	can	contribute	to,	
otherwise	you’re	not	going	to	have	the	commitment	from	both.	One	
is	just	going	to	be	an	advisor	of	some	sort.	
(Stephanie,	senior	researcher,	engineering)	
In	 this	way	Stephanie	 explained	both	 the	 approach	 to	 collaboration	 she	 and	
Janet	 take,	 an	 approach	 that	 sees	 them	 developing	 projects	 together	 and	
working	on	them	as	equal	partners,	albeit	in	their	separate	locations,	and	also	
her	belief	that	synthetic	biology	cannot,	and	will	not,	work	if	it	is	solely	reliant	
on	 the	next	 generation.	As	 she	 states	 above,	 the	 supervisors,	 in	other	words	
the	more	senior	participants	 in	synthetic	biology,	also	need	to	be	committed	
to	collaboration,	 to	understanding	each	other	and	working	together.	That	 is,	
they	also	need	to	be	committed	to	bridging	the	divide.	For	Stephanie,	a	central	
aspect	 of	 her	 belief	 that	 synthetic	 biology	 needs	 to	 embrace	 collaboration	
between	those	with	different	areas	of	expertise,	is	her	concern,	reminiscent	of	
																																								 								
59	Non-linear	dynamics	is	the	study	of	systems	governed	by	equations	in	which	a	small	change	
in	one	variable	can	induce	a	large	systematic	change.	The	discipline	is	more	popularly	known	
as	chaos	theory.		
60	Western	 blotting	 is	 an	 analytical	 technique	 used	 to	 detect	 certain	 proteins	 in	 a	 tissue	
sample	 or	 cell	 culture.	 qPCR	 stands	 for	 quantitative	 polymerase	 chain	 reaction,	 which	 is	 a	
methodology	for	studying	gene	expression.		
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Maria’s,	that	training	everyone	in	both	biology	and	engineering	will	not	yield	
synthetic	biologists	with	enough	skill	in	either	to	drive	the	discipline	forward.		
However,	 to	 look	 at	 this	 another	 way,	 those	 within	 the	 Centre,	 such	 as	
Stephanie,	who	had	received	the	entirety	of	their	training	in	one	of	synthetic	
biology’s	 parent	 disciplines,	 rather	 than	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 itself,	 find	
themselves	 in	 a	 challenging	 position.	 They	 are	 trying	 to	 embrace	 the	
discipline’s	 hybridity,	 but	without	 the	 training	 to	 be	 able	 to	 perform	 all	 the	
necessary	tasks	themselves.	Yet,	from	my	conversations	with	those	within	the	
Centre	who	fit	this	description,	it	would	seem	that	these	same	individuals	are	
keen	 to	 avoid	 the	 kind	 of	 conflict	 and	 division	 Torgersen	 identified	 within	
genomics.	 To	 this	 end,	 these,	 largely	 senior,	 members	 of	 the	 Centre	 were	
attempting,	 as	 Janet	 and	 Stephanie	 were,	 to	 forge	 close,	 respectful	
collaborative	 relationships.	 While	 this	 is	 arguably	 a	 valid	 and	 potentially	
productive	approach	to	their	work,	it	is	also,	arguably,	the	only	approach	open	
to	them,	unless	they	wish	to	retrain	or	leave	the	discipline.		
Stephanie	 may	 well	 be	 right	 that	 to	 train	 everyone	 in	 both	 biology	 and	
engineering	would	not	produce	interdisciplinary	individuals	capable	of	driving	
the	discipline	forward.	However,	should	she	believe	that	this	was	the	only	way	
of	 driving	 the	 discipline	 forward,	 or	 that	 training	 in	 both	was	 essential,	 she	
would,	 given	 that	 she	 is	 only	 trained	 in	 engineering,	 be	 simultaneously	
excluding	 herself,	 and	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 senior	 figures	 in	 synthetic	
biology	 (who	 likewise	 are	 only	 trained	 in	 one	 of	 the	 ‘sides’	 of	 synthetic	
biology),	 from	having	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 discipline’s	 success.	 I	 do	not	
wish	 to	 suggest	 that	 interdisciplinary	 training	 is	 essential,	 nor	 that	 close	
collaboration	 cannot	 yield	 success,	 but	 rather	 I	 wish	 to	 highlight	 that	 it	 is	
perhaps	 not	 surprising	 to	 hear	 such	 views	 from	 senior	 members	 of	 the	
discipline,	 and	 that	 such	 adamant	 claims	 that	 interdisciplinary	 individuals	
cannot	and	will	not	succeed	may	be	driven,	at	least	in	part,	by	self-interest.		
Furthermore,	while	Stephanie	and	 Janet’s	working	relationship	 is	clearly	a	
model	 example	 of	 such	 collaboration,	 the	 reality	 did	 not	 always	match	 this	
ideal.	Despite	every	member	of	the	Centre	at	some	point	espousing	to	me	the	
benefits	of	collaboration,	I	also	witnessed	tensions	between	the	two	‘sides’	of	
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such	 collaborations,	 albeit	 usually	 surreptitious	 (eye-rolling	 during	meetings	
for	 example)	 or	 divulged	 in	 private	 (such	 as	 vented	 frustrations	 and	 name-
calling).	These	tensions	were	often	the	result	of	frustrations	with	the	perceived	
ignorance	or	arrogance	of	those	on	the	other	‘side.’	However	in	a	few	cases,	a	
belief	 in	the	superiority	of	his	or	her	own	half	of	the	collaboration	saw	some	
individuals	within	the	Centre	unwilling	to	be	flexible	or	to	compromise	within	
their	collaborations.	Sara,	for	example,	told	me	of	her	experiences	with	Philip	
(senior	 researcher,	 engineering)	 who	 was	 steadfastly	 unprepared	 to	
compromise	on	his	models:	
	He	 would	 always	 say,	 ‘This	 is	 what	 I	 want,	 and	 nothing	 else!’	
[Laughs]	 ‘I	want	this,	this,	and	this.	That’s	it,	come	back	to	me	with	
that.’	
(Sara,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
Such	tensions	in	interdisciplinary	relationships	are	common,61	and	can	stifle	
collaboration.	However	 rather	 than	avoiding	collaboration,	 there	was	a	 clear	
desire	within	 the	 Centre	 to	 compromise.	 Anna	 described	 the	 importance	 of	
this	commitment	while	also	acknowledging	the	difficulty	of	enacting	it.	
You	might	 have	 these	 great	 skills	 but	 then	 if	 .	 .	 .	 you	 can’t	merge	
them	together	then	what’s	the	point	of	being	in	the	same	centre?	So	.	
.	 .	 everyone	needs	 to	 think	more	 .	 .	 .	 think	of	 it	 from	a	modeller’s62	
point	of	view	and	think	of	it	from	a	biological	point	of	view.	That’s	a	
difficult	thing	.	.	.	at	the	initial	stages	I	think	that	everyone	wants	to	
work	 together	 but	 you	 need	 to	 learn	 to	 gel	 .	 .	 .	 and	 actually	
compromise	a	bit.		
(Anna,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
For	 some	 the	 solution	 to	 such	 tension	 was	 indeed	 to	 compromise	 and,	
according	to	Grant,	trust	more.	
																																								 								
61	See	for	example	Lélé	and	Norgaard	(2005).	
62	Given	 the	prevalence	of	modelling	within	 the	work	of	 the	 ‘engineers’	 in	synthetic	biology,	
they	were	often	referred	to	as	‘modellers’	even	though	they	do	not	necessarily	self-identify	as	
such.	
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If	 biologists	 come	 to	 me	 and	 say,	 ‘OK,	 we	 would	 need	 a	 tool	 to	
analyse	those	data	and	to	represent	them	in	a	particular	way,’	it	will	
take	me	time	to	develop	it	and	I	will	probably	not	see	the	immediate	
benefit	scientifically	speaking	for	the	work	I	do	now,	but	there	will	be	
probably	 benefit	 in	 the	 long-run.	 So	 investing	 time	 and	 energy	 in	
developing	things	that	are	not	directly,	immediately	.	.	.	of	particular	
use	for	you,	requires	some	trust	relationship.		
(Grant,	senior	researcher,	engineering)	
Such	a	commitment	to	collaboration,	in	the	absence	of	immediately	personal	
benefit,	 may	 have	 been	 driven	 by	 another	 key	 component	 in	 successful	
collaborative	relationships,	a	component	that	Peter	described	as,	a	willingness	
“to	step	outside	of	 their	comfort	zone	and	 to	 listen	and	 to	 try	and	understand	
the	 other	 perspective”	 (Peter,	 senior	 researcher,	 biology).	 This	willingness	 to	
understand	the	other	perspective	came	up	repeatedly	in	the	descriptions	I	was	
given	 of	 positive	 collaborative	 relationships.	 However	 it	 also	 arose	 as	 a	
motivator	 for	 some	 within	 the	 Centre	 to	 move	 beyond	 collaborative	
relationships	 and	 towards	 the	 academic	 self-sufficiency	 of	 becoming	
interdisciplinary	individuals.	
Interdisciplinary	individuals	
	The	 importance	 Eddy	 places	 on	 the	 training	 of	 the	 next	 generation	 of	
scientists,	so	that	they	may	become	the	interdisciplinary	individuals	necessary	
for	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new	 discipline,	 got	 me	 thinking	 about	 the	 role	 of	
training	 in	 the	 development	 of	 a	 coherent	 epistemic	 culture	 for	 synthetic	
biology,	and	thus	the	students	within	the	Centre.	 In	the	 last	couple	of	years,	
students	 have	 started	 emerging	 from	 the	 university,	 where	 the	 Centre	 is	
located,	 with	 masters	 and	 doctoral	 degrees	 in	 synthetic	 biology.	 Given	 the	
requirements	 that	 all	 synthetic	 biology	 students	 incorporate	 elements	 from	
both	biology	and	engineering	into	their	projects,	these	graduates	may,	despite	
Stephanie	and	Maria’s	misgivings,	be	 some	of	 the	 first	examples	of	 synthetic	
biology’s	 trained	 interdisciplinary	 individuals.	 However	 the	 degree	 to	 which	
students	 within	 the	 Centre	 embraced	 this	 interdisciplinarity	 differed.	 Some	
 110 
were	keen	to	maintain	the	academic	identity	of	their	undergraduate	discipline,	
possibly	because	this	felt	more	secure,63	while	others	were	eager	to	shed	such	
an	identity	in	favour	of	calling	themselves	synthetic	biologists.		
Adopting	 such	 an	 interdisciplinary	 approach	 to	 their	 work	may	 well	 feel	
risky	 but,	 as	 Zerubavel	 writes,	 it	 is	 also	 a	 potential	 route	 to	 innovation.	
“Creativity,”	 he	 asserts,	 “usually	 involves	 defying	 existing	 divisions	 and	
integrating	 mental	 realms	 and	 domains	 that	 are	 traditionally	 perceived	 as	
distinct	and	separate	from	one	another”	(Zerubavel	1995:	1098).	Furthermore,	I	
would	argue	that	those	who	eagerly	embraced	their	interdisciplinary	training	
were,	like	those	who	pursued	close,	respectful	collaborations,	finding	a	way	to	
bridge	 synthetic	 biology’s	 epistemic	 cultural	 divide.	 For,	 as	 Knorr	 Cetina	
makes	clear,	education	plays	a	significant	role	in	the	development	of	epistemic	
cultures.	 Thus,	 where	 separate	 training	 has	 yielded	 two	 distinct	 academic	
communities	within	synthetic	biology,	as	Malcolm64	acknowledged	in	the	first	
half	 of	 this	 chapter	 a	 well-balanced,	 interdisciplinary	 synthetic	 biology	
education	could	not	only	provide	students	with	a	broad	knowledge	base	and	a	
fluency	 in	 both	 languages,	 but	 also	 teach	 them	 to	 balance	 the	 goals	 and	
research	 interests	 of	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 endeavour.	 Ultimately	 then,	 such	 an	
education	 would	 be	 instrumental	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 hybrid	 epistemic	
culture	 for	synthetic	biology.	While	 I	would	not	currently	go	so	 far	as	 to	say	
such	 a	 culture	 exists,	 given	 the	 emphasis	 Knorr	 Cetina	 (1999)	 places	 on	 the	
role	 of	 education	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 epistemic	 cultures,	 it	 is	 certainly	 a	
potential	 outcome	 as	 more	 and	 more	 synthetic	 biologists	 emerge	 from	
dedicated	training	courses.	
In	 considering	 who	 at	 the	 Centre	 best	 embodied	 Eddy’s	 notion	 of	
interdisciplinary	 individuals,	 four	 doctoral	 students	 in	 particular	 came	 to	
																																								 								
63	There	 is	 arguably	a	 certain	 security	provided	by	an	established	academic	 identity,	 such	as	
being	a	mechanical	engineer	or	a	biochemist,	that	is	missing	when	one	identifies	as	belonging	
to	a	discipline	many	have	never	heard	of.	 Indeed,	despite	promoting	 the	notion	of	having	a	
“flexible	mind”	when	considering	the	boundaries	of	disciplines,	Zerubavel	(1995)	notes	that	it	
can	 be	 difficult	 to	 occupy	 an	 academic	 grey	 area,	 especially	when	 encountering	 those	with,	
what	he	terms,	“rigid	minds.”	 
64	One	of	the	Centre’s	directors.	
 111 
mind.	Two	of	whom	had	come	to	synthetic	biology	from	biology	and	two	from	
engineering.	 These	 four,	 Lewis,	 David,	 Simon,	 and	 Trevor,65	all	 specifically	
expressed	a	desire	to	overcome	the	division	between	biology	and	engineering	
in	their	own	work	by	incorporating	equal	amounts	of	both	sides	of	synthetic	
biology	 into	 their	 projects,	 a	 desire	 they	 worked	 hard	 to	 put	 into	 practice.	
They	 all	 read	 widely	 on	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 divide	 and	 saw	 themselves	 as	
intellectually	 and	 practically	 inhabiting	 the	 whole,	 rather	 than	 half,	 of	 the	
discipline.	However,	despite	their	enthusiasm	such	individuals	are,	as	yet,	the	
minority	within	synthetic	biology	and	they	are	a	minority	located	exclusively	
in	 the	 lower	 tiers	 of	 the	 discipline,	 as	 students	 and	 postdocs.	 As	 such,	 they	
encountered	 some	 resistance	 and	 difficulty	 as	 they	 strove	 to	 achieve	 the	
desired	hybridity.	
Lewis,	who	frequently	spoke	of	his	wish	to	embody	the	hybridity	synthetic	
biology	is	aiming	to	achieve,	despite	often	struggling	to	do	so,	proves	a	useful	
case	 study	 to	 explore	 the	 challenges	 facing	 these	 budding	 interdisciplinary	
individuals.	As	previously	addressed,	Lewis	struggled	against	what	he	termed	
the	 “academic	 arrogance”	 of	 his	 supervisors.	 According	 to	 Lewis,	 his	
supervisors,	a	biologist	and	an	engineer	by	training,	saw	their	own	discipline	
as	providing	the	central	component	to	his	project,	while	Lewis	himself	wanted	
to	find	an	equal	balance	between	the	two.	He	stated	that	the	main	difficulty	he	
was	encountered	in	achieving	this	balance	was	his	supervisors’	biases,	as	each	
had	a	different	idea	about	where	the	project	was	headed.	To	demonstrate	this	
point	Lewis	drew	me	a	picture	 in	 the	air,	 saying	 that	he	and	his	 supervisors	
were	 currently	 standing	 relatively	 close	 together,	 but	 that	 Grant	 sees	 the	
project	angling	off	to	the	left	towards	modelling,	and	Martin	sees	it	angling	off	
to	the	right	towards	biology,	while	Lewis	is	aiming	for	a	straight	path	between	
the	 two.	 Yet,	 despite	 finding	 it	 difficult	 to	 strike	 this	 balance	 and	 keep	 the	
project	on	track,	Lewis	went	on	to	say	that	he	is	determined	to	hold	this	line	
																																								 								
65	These	four	are,	 like	the	vast	majority	of	the	members	of	the	Centre,	all	male.	When	I	 first	
started	my	fieldwork	there	was	only	one	female	doctoral	student	at	the	Centre,	though	by	the	
time	I	left	there	were	three.	
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as	he	fears	that,	if	he	doesn’t,	his	project	could	end	up	thinly	spread	across	the	
entire	 spectrum	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 from	 engineering	 to	 biology,	 without	
integrating	them	into	something	more	coherent.		
To	Lewis’	mind,	lots	of	collaborations	in	synthetic	biology	do	not	manage	to	
retain	 the	 benefits	 of	 both	 contributing	 arms	 of	 the	 discipline.	 Again	
describing	a	situation	in	terms	of	a	diagram,	Lewis	drew	me	a	Venn	diagram	in	
the	air,	saying	that	some	collaborations	only	manage	to	capture	the	small	area	
where	biology	and	engineering,	or	as	he	termed	this	half	of	synthetic	biology	
“modelling,”	 overlap	 or	 are	 more	 compatible	 and	 in	 so	 doing	 miss	 the	 real	
richness	and	value	that	each	brings	to	the	table.	His	diagram,	if	noted	down,	
would	have	looked	something	like	this:	
Lewis	believes	that	people	settle	for	this	form	of	collaboration,	as	it	is	much	
easier	to	achieve	than	actually	bringing	the	two	disciplines	together	in	a	more	
complete	way.	“Many	 synthetic	biology	projects,”	Lewis	contends,	“are	 simply	
biology	projects	with	a	bit	of	modelling	tacked	on,	or	modelling	projects	that	do	
a	 little	bit	of	wet-lab	work	 to	 test	 feasibility.”	That	is,	they	include	either,	the	
red	and	 the	orange	 in	 figure	3,	or	 the	yellow	and	 the	orange,	but	 seldom	all	
three	areas	as	Lewis	intended	to.		
This,	it	must	be	noted,	is	not	the	kind	of	collaboration	Janet	and	Stephanie	
engage	in,	and	indeed	is	exactly	the	kind	of	situation	they	are	determined	to	
avoid.	However,	if	this	asymmetry	is	indeed	the	norm,	as	Lewis	suggests,	this	
may	 help	 to	 explain	 why	 Lewis	 encountered	 the	 resistance	 and	
misunderstanding	that	he	did	from	his	supervisors.	They	may	well	expect	him	
Biology	 Modelling	
Figure	3:	Lewis'	Venn	diagram	of	the	overlap	between	biology	
and	modelling	in	relation	to	synthetic	biology	collaborations	
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to	 produce	 a	 synthetic	 biology	 project	 that	 incorporates	 their	 own	 area	 of	
interest,	and	the	area	of	cross	over	with	the	other	side,	but	little	beyond	that.	
Or	they	may	be	so	unfamiliar	with	the	demands	and	potential	of	the	other	side	
of	the	discipline	that	they,	while	eager	to	encompass	all	that	synthetic	biology	
has	to	offer,	do	not	fully	appreciate	what	this	would	entail.	I	cannot	determine	
which,	if	indeed	either,	of	these	theories	is	more	accurate	as,	given	that	Lewis	
spoke	to	me	in	confidence,	I	did	not	question	either	of	his	supervisors	about	
this.	
Yet,	 despite	 the	difficulties	 Lewis	 faced	pursuing	his	 goal	 of	 becoming	 an	
interdisciplinary	 individual,	both	 in	 terms	of	 resistance	 from	his	 supervisors,	
and	 indeed	 the	 larger	 hurdle	 of	 having	had	 to	 learn	 biology,	 and	 laboratory	
practices,	 for	 the	 first	 time	 as	 a	Masters	 student,	 Lewis	 never	 opted	 for	 the	
easier	 option	 of	 pursing	 collaboration	 over	 personal	 hybridity.	 Rather,	 and	
inadvertently	 in	 line	 with	 Eddy’s	 position	 on	 the	matter,	 Lewis	 commented	
that	 he	 believes	 it	 is	 better	 and	 more	 successful	 when	 the	 hybridity	 of	
synthetic	biology	 is	embodied	within	a	single	person,	a	belief	that	ultimately	
fuelled	his	determination.		
Nevertheless,	despite	 the	 emphasis	Eddy	places	on	 training,	 it	 is	not	only	
students	 like	 Lewis	 who	 can	 become	 interdisciplinary	 individuals.	 Calvert	
(2010b)	 suggests	 that	 some	 participants	 in	 interdisciplines	 can	 shift	 from	
engaging	 in	 collaborative	 interdisciplinarity	 to	 becoming	 interdisciplinary	
individuals	 themselves	 as	 they	 gain	 experience,	 skills,	 and	 knowledge	 from	
across	 the	discipline.	 Pam	Silver,	 a	 senior	 synthetic	 biologist	 at	Harvard,	 for	
example	wrote,	 “I	come	to	synthetic	biology	as	one	of	 the	biologists	 .	 .	 .	But	
having	 worked	 in	 the	 field	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 for	 the	 last	 few	 years,	 my	
thinking	has	evolved	somewhat	from	a	biologist’s	perspective	to	an	engineer’s	
approach”	(Silver	2009:	283).	Suggesting	that	with	both	time	and	experience,	
even	senior	participants	within	the	field,	such	as	Silver,	can	and	are	beginning	
to	have	a	much	more	interdisciplinary	perspective	on	their	work.		
Eddy	 asserts	 that,	 “[p]rogress	 is	 driven	by	new	 scientific	 questions,	which	
demand	new	ways	of	thinking.	You	want	to	go	where	a	question	takes	you,	not	
where	 your	 training	 left	 you”	 (Eddy	 2005:	 3).	As	 such,	 it	 is	 not	necessarily	 a	
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hindrance	that	most	of	the	current	participants	in	synthetic	biology	were	not	
trained	in	synthetic	biology,	but	rather	in	branches	of	biology	or	engineering.	
For,	 to	 follow	Eddy’s	 line	of	 argument,	 even	 though	 these	parent	disciplines	
have	strong	epistemic	cultures	that	differ	from	each	other	in	significant	and	at	
times	conflicting	ways,	if	the	individuals	are	committed	to	following	where	the	
questions	take	them	into	the	realms	of	each	other’s	disciplines,	to	break	down	
the	epistemic	cultural	divides,	a	new	science	will	emerge,	and	its	participants,	
regardless	of	their	training,	will	become	interdisciplinary	individuals.		
As	 such,	 synthetic	 biology	may	 be	 driven	 forward	 by	 both	 newly	 trained	
interdisciplinary	 individuals,	 and	 those	 from	 differing	 disciplines	 who	 are	
committed	to	exploring	new	and	challenging	questions	in	new	ways,	through	
close,	respectful	collaboration.	Indeed,	rather	than	seeing	such	collaborations	
as	 the	 best	 that	 can	be	 achieved	 if	we	want	 to	 ensure	 that	 a	 high	degree	 of	
expertise	in	both	biology	and	engineering	is	fed	into	synthetic	biology,	there	is	
an	 argument	 that	 having	 participants	 with	 differing	 perspectives	 should	 be	
seen	as	a	positive;	a	strength	rather	than	a	weakness	or	an	unfortunate	reality.	
Interestingly	it	was	Lewis	who	first	put	this	argument	to	me.	
Explanatory	pluralism	
Despite	 his	 personal	 commitment	 to	 becoming	 an	 interdisciplinary	
individual,	and	his	belief	that	hybridity	is	better	embodied	in	one	person	than	
two,	Lewis	did	not	believe	that	synthetic	biology	would	benefit	from	everyone	
sharing	 the	 same	 perspective	 on	 the	 discipline.	 Rather,	 he	 questioned	 the	
notion	that	in	order	to	succeed,	such	uniformity	within	synthetic	biology	was	
required,	arguing	instead	that	the	idea	of	everyone	sharing	a	perspective,	and	
thus	 asking	 the	 same	 sorts	 of	 questions,	 was	 a	 potential	 problem	 for	 the	
discipline.	Admittedly	Lewis	believes	that	synthetic	biology	should	ultimately	
aim	for	a	united	perspective	in	the	future,	however	as	he	saw	it	such	a	united	
perspective	would	not	be	a	narrow	perspective,	but	 rather	would	encompass	
all	of	the	explanatory	tools	of	the	currently	contributing	perspectives.	As	I	sat	
and	listened	to	Lewis	speak	of	the	benefits	of	the	differing	perspectives	within	
synthetic	biology,	the	concept	of	explanatory	pluralism	came	to	mind.		
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De	 Vreese	 et	 al	 (2010)	 explore	 the	 role	 of	 explanatory	 pluralism	 in	 the	
medical	sciences,	contending	that	the	explanatory	practices	of	scientists	show	
how	their	different	epistemic	interests	can	lead	them	to	choose	different	forms	
of	 explanation	 at	 different	 levels.	 They	 argue	 that	 a	 combination	 of	 such	
explanations	gives	a	much	more	holistic	response	to	a	question	than	any	of	the	
single,	 contributing	 explanations	 could.	 As	 such,	 they	 define	 explanatory	
pluralism	as	“the	view	that	the	best	form	and	level	of	explanation	depends	on	
the	 kind	 of	 question	 one	 seeks	 to	 answer	 by	 the	 explanation	 and	 that	 one	
needs	more	than	one	form	and	level	of	explanation	to	answer	all	questions	in	
the	 best	 way	 possible”	 (De	 Vreese	 et	 al.	 2010:	 372).	 Evelyn	 Fox	 Keller	 goes	
further	 writing,	 in	 regards	 to	 the	 field	 of	 biological	 development,	 that	 after	
exploring	“the	de	facto	multiplicity	of	explanatory	styles	in	scientific	practice”	
and	 the	 “diversity	 of	 epistemological	 goals	 which	 researchers	 bring	 to	 their	
task,”	 (2002:	300),	 she	has	come	to	believe	 that	 such	diversity	may	well	be	a	
requirement	in	investigating	this	inherently	complex	field.	Thus	she	suggests	
that	 explanatory	 pluralism	 “is	 now	 not	 simply	 a	 reflection	 of	 differences	 in	
epistemological	 cultures	 but	 a	 positive	 virtue	 in	 itself,	 representing	 our	 best	
chance	of	coming	to	terms	with	the	world	around	us”	(2002:	300).		
Synthetic	biology	is	arguably	an	equally	complex	field,	consisting	as	it	does	
of	 individuals	 who	 hail	 from	 differing	 epistemic	 cultures.	 Thus	 it	 seems	
plausible	 that,	 as	 those	within	 the	discipline	 seek	 to	 come	 to	 terms	with	 its	
limitations,	 its	 capabilities,	 and	 its	 potential	 promise	 for	 the	 future	 of	
biotechnology,	it	would	similarly	benefit	from	explanatory	pluralism.	I	put	this	
idea	 to	 Lewis	who,	 not	 only	 agreed,	 but	 also	 illustrated	 his	 agreement	with	
another	 of	 his	 fantastic	 verbal	 diagrams.	 Lewis	 stated	 that,	 to	 his	 mind,	
synthetic	biology	is	really	a	hybrid	discipline	as	a	whole	but,	if	you	zoom	in,	it	
is	made	up	of	lots	of	heterogeneous,	rather	than	homogeneous,	researchers.	As	
such,	he	said,	“synthetic	biologists	are	like	the	colours	red	and	yellow”	(meaning	
that	biologists	are	one	colour	and	engineers	the	other),	and:	
“in	 forming	 the	 discipline	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 they	 do	 not	 mix	
together	so	that	everyone	becomes	orange,	but	rather	stay	as	dots	of	
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red	and	yellow.	However,	from	a	distance,	and	because	of	the	way	the	
dots	are	situated	close	together,	they	appear	as	a	whole	to	be	orange.	
Thus	 it	 is	 through	the	collaboration	of	 the	 two	groups	 that	you	get	
something	 new,	 but	 they	 still	 maintain	 their	 different	 perspectives	
individually.”		
(Lewis,	doctoral	student,	engineering)	
Surprisingly,	 despite	 his	 determination	 that	 synthetic	 biologists	 should	
ultimately	 become	 self-reliant	 interdisciplinary	 individuals,	 Lewis	 has	 hailed	
here	 the	 role	 of	 collaborations	 such	 as	 Stephanie	 and	 Janet’s.	 Indeed,	 like	
Stephanie,	Lewis	concluded	that	the	most	important	things	for	the	success	of	
the	 discipline	 are	 communication	 and	 respect	 for	 each	 other’s	 perspectives	
and	expertise.	
Jessica,	a	doctoral	student	with	a	biological	background,	also	spoke	of	 the	
benefits	of	explanatory	pluralism.	During	our	interview,	and	while	speaking	of	
the	way	biologists	and	engineers	work	together	within	the	Centre,	Jessica	said:		
“So	for	me,	in	a	way,	it’s	been	a	very	positive	change	where	I’ve	been	
made	aware	that	I	can	do	more	than	I	previously	thought,	and	that	
kind	 of	 goes	 back	 to	 what’s	 good	 about	 putting	 engineers	 and	
biologists	 together,	 you	 suddenly	 realise	 there’s	 more	 ways	 of	
answering	 the	 questions,	 and	 I’ve	 sort	 of	 realised	 that	 for	 myself	
personally	as	well.”		
(Jessica,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
Thus	Jessica	not	only	saw	the	benefits	of	having	different	people	with	different	
perspectives	 attempting	 to	 answer	 research	 questions,	 but	 she	 was	 also	
learning	 to	 challenge	 her	 own	 approach	 to	 questions	 and	 hence	 attempt	 to	
apply	the	approach	of	her	engineering	colleagues	to	her	own	work.	This	quote	
from	Jessica	reminded	me	of	a	quote	from	microbiologist	and	biophysicist	Carl	
Woese	 regarding	 physics	 and	 biology.	 Woese	 railed	 against	 the	 all	 too	
common	 notion	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 these	 sciences	 was	 one	 of	
hierarchy,	contending	 instead	 that	 it	 should	be	viewed	as	one	of	 reciprocity.	
As	 such,	 he	 wrote,	 “both	 physics	 and	 biology	 are	 primary	 windows	 on	 the	
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world;	they	see	the	same	gem	but	different	facets	thereof	(and	so	inform	one	
another)”	(Woese	2004:	185).	In	striving	to	view	as	many	facets	of	the	‘gem’	of	
synthetic	 biology	 as	 she	 can,	 Jessica,	 like	 Lewis,	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 both	 an	
advocate	 of	 explanatory	 pluralism	 and	 an	 emerging	 interdisciplinary	
individual	herself.			
As	Rheinberger	writes,	and	as	I	believe	these	quotes	from	Lewis	and	Jessica	
indicate,	 such	 inconsistencies	 in	 individual	 synthetic	 biologists’	 epistemic	
cultures,	 in,	 that	 is,	 their	 knowledge	 and	 approach	 to	 the	 field,	 are	 not	
necessarily	impediments	to	the	discipline’s	progress.	Rheinberger,	 in	his	1997	
book,	Towards	a	History	of	Epistemic	Things:	Synthesizing	Proteins	in	the	Test	
Tube,	writes,	 “[r]ecombination	and	reshuffling,	bifurcation	and	hybridization	
within	 and	 between	 experimental	 systems,	 are	 prerequisites	 for	 producing	
unprecedented	 events.	 Such	 events	 could	not	 happen	 if	 the	 lines	 of	 descent	
were	bred	too	‘pure’”	(1997:	184-85).		
This	clearly	fits	with	Keller’s	notion	that	explanatory	pluralism	is	of	benefit	
in	understanding	the	world,	but	it	also	fits	with	Eddy’s	notion	that	progress	is	
driven	 by	 an	 interdisciplinary	 rather	 than	 a	 singular	 disciplinary	 approach.	
Eddy,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 contends	 that	 such	 progress	 is	 best	 pursued	 by	
interdisciplinary	 individuals,	 but	 as	Rheinberger	 (1997),	Keller	 (2002),	 Lewis,	
Stephanie,	 and	 Jessica	 assert,	 close	 and	 respectful	 collaboration	 can	 also	
produce	the	desired	unprecedented	events	that	drive	a	new	discipline	forward.	
Ultimately,	 both	 strategies	 to	 overcome	 the	 discipline’s	 epistemic	 cultural	
divides	 (close,	 respectful	 collaborations	 and	 learning	 to	 become	
interdisciplinary	 individuals)	 stem	 from	 the	 same	desire:	 to	 embrace	all	 that	
biology	 and	 engineering	 can	 offer	 synthetic	 biology.	 Furthermore,	 these	
strategies	are	key	factors	in	the	effort	to	establish	synthetic	biology	as	a	clear,	
coherent,	and	well-defined	discipline	in	its	own	right.	Thus	it	would	seem	that	
synthetic	 biology,	 as	 it	 currently	 stands,	 is	 being	 held	 together	 and	 driven	
forward	by,	using	Lewis’	analogy,	a	sea	of	closely	situated	red	and	yellow	dots,	
with	a	growing	number	of	orange,	interdisciplinary	individuals	among	them.		
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A	metaphor	for	synthetic	biology’s	interdisciplinarity	
Lewis’	 analogy	 of	 interdisciplinary	 collaboration	 being	 like	 differently	
coloured	interacting,	and	merging,	dots	not	only	helped	me	to	make	sense	of	
the	interdisciplinary	interactions	which	are	driving	the	emergence	of	synthetic	
biology,	but	it	did	so	by	bringing	to	mind	images	of	intercellular	interactions.	
Clearly	 my	 years	 of	 sitting	 through	 biology,	 biochemistry,	 and	 genetics	
lectures	 have	 had	 a	 lasting	 impact	 on	my	 conceptual	 image	 banks.	 Yet,	 the	
more	 I	 thought	about	 this,	 the	more	 intercellular	 interactions	came	to	make	
sense	as	an	analogy	 for	 the	 type	of	 interdisciplinarity	 I	was	observing	within	
synthetic	biology,	and	how	it	contrasted	with	the	type	of	 interdisciplinarity	I	
was	reading	so	much	about	in	the	literature.		
Indeed,	many	of	the	accounts	of	interdisciplinarity	in	the	literature	discuss	
cases	where	the	internal	disciplinary	boundaries	remain	clear	but	where	lines	
of	communication	and	cooperation	are	opened	between	them.	Such	examples	
are	primarily	 interdisciplinary	 research	networks	 rather	 than	new	disciplines	
(see	 for	 example	 Boix	Mansilla	 et	 al.	 2016).	 There	 are	 some	 new	 disciplines	
amongst	 them	 (see	 for	 example	A.	 Clarke	 1998;	 Etkin	 and	 Elisabetsky	 2005)	
however	 these	 seem	 to	be	 interdisciplinary	disciplines	which	maintain	 clear,	
internal,	 divisions.	 This	 kind	 of	 interdisciplinarity	 is,	 I	 believe,	 analogous	 to	
the	kind	of	intercellular	interactions	that	occur	within	the	immune	system.		
Within	 the	 immune	 system	 there	 are	 situations	 whereby	 two	 or	 more	
different	types	of	cells	interact,	and	arguably	collaborate,	with	each	other	on	a	
common	 problem.	 Yet,	 despite	 their	 close	 interactions,	 these	 contributing	
cells	 ultimately	 remain	 distinct	 and	 independent	 from	 each	 other.	 Figure	 4	
displays	 an	 example	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 intercellular	 interaction	 with	 three	
different	cells	(a	dendritic	cell,	T	helper	cell	[Helper	CD4+	T	cell],	and	killer	T	
cell	[Cytotoxic	CD8+	T	cell]),	interacting	to	deal	with	the	unwelcome	antigen	
material.66		
																																								 								
66	Within	 the	 immune	 system	 many	 cell	 types,	 including	 T	 cells,	 B	 cells	 (both	 types	 of	
lymphocytes),	 and	dendritic	 cells	 (a	 variety	of	 antigen-presenting	 cell)	 interact.	These	 three	
cell	types,	for	example,	interact	in	the	lymph	nodes	to	initiate	and	shape	the	adaptive	immune	
response,	yet	they	nevertheless	remain	distinct	from	each	other.	
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I	would	argue	that	the	subworlds	of	the	reproductive	sciences	Clarke	(1998)	
explored	 interact	 similarly.	 These	 subworlds	 fit	 within	 the	 world	 of	 the	
reproductive	sciences	like	the	various	cells	fit	within	the	immune	system.	They	
interact,	communicate,	and	cooperate	with	each	other	as	they	address	 issues	
and	factors	of	reproduction,	but	they	remain	separate	and	distinct	from	each	
other.	Much	like	the	cells	of	the	immune	system	interact,	communicate,	and	
cooperate	with	each	other	in	response	to	antigens,	but	remain	distinguishably	
different	 cells	 throughout	 the	 process.	 By	 contrast,	 interdisciplines	 such	 as	
neuroscience	 (Swazey	 1992)	 and	 physics	 (Kuhn	 1962),	 which	 engage	
interdisciplinary	 collaboration	 as	 a	 step	 towards	 the	 formation	 of	 new,	
cohesive,	 disciplines,	 employ	 a	 different	 form	 of	 interdisciplinarity,	 a	 form	
which	lends	itself	to	a	different	cellular	analogy.		
Figure	 4:	 Intercellular	 Interactions	 in	 the	 Immune	 System	 (Boston	
University	School	of	Public	Health)	
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This	 second	 form	 of	 interdisciplinary,	 I	 would	 argue,	 is	 analogous	 to	 cell	
fusion,	 a	 process	 by	which	 different	 types	 of	 cells	merge	 together	 to	 form	 a	
new	hybrid	organism,	or	 cell	 line.	 In	 such	a	 situation	 the	merging	 cells	 fuse	
their	cellular	walls	(their	external	boundaries),	and	often,	eventually,	also	their	
nuclei	(their	bounded,	DNA-containing	cores),	thus	producing	a	new	kind	of	
hybrid	cell.	The	stages	of	such	a	merger	of	cells	are	shown	in	figure	5.	
The	parent	disciplines	 in	 this	model	of	 interdisciplinarity,	 like	 the	cells	 in	
this	 figure,	 start	 out	 with	 distinct,	 separate	 identities.	 They	 then	 become	
attracted	to	each	other,	 in	cells	due	to	pheromones	and	in	interdisciplinarity	
due	 to	 the	 knowledge	 and/or	 materials	 the	 other	 can	 provide	 them.	 They	
move	closer	to	each	other,	begin	to	interact,	and,	professionally	speaking,	bind	
themselves	together	forming	a	new	disciplinary	boundary	which	encompasses	
them	all,	like	a	new	cell	wall.	However,	for	a	time,	this	new	singular	discipline,	
or	 cell,	 is	 not	 internally	 cohesive,	 but	 rather	 maintains	 the	 disciplinary	
identities,	or	nuclei,	of	the	parent	disciplines	or	cells.	Until,	that	is,	these	too	
Figure	5:	Heterotypic	Cell	Fusion	(Aguilar	et	al.	2013)	
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merge	in	nuclear	fusion,	thus	creating	a	hybrid	discipline,	 like	a	new	kind	of	
cell,	which	contains	elements	from	its	parents	but	is	now	clearly	distinct	from	
them.	
Disciplines	 which	 started	 out	 as	 ‘interdisciplines,’	 if	 you	 will,	 such	 as	
physics,	and	biochemistry,	have	arguably	completed	this	process.	That	is,	they	
have	merged	their	constituent	nuclei	(mathematics	and	natural	philosophy	in	
the	case	of	physics,	and	biology	and	chemistry	in	the	case	of	biochemistry)	to	
become	 like	 the	 synkaryon	 (Aguilar	 et	 al.	 2013)	 depicted	 in	 the	 final	 step	 in	
figure	5,	a	completely	hybrid	entity.	Whereas	genomics,	as	Torgersen	depicted	
it	 in	2009,	and	as	discussed	above,	had	not	achieved	 this	 status.	Despite	 the	
existence	 of	 a	 disciplinary	 ‘cellular	 wall,’	 Torgersen	 describes	 genomics	 as	
being	 internally	 divided,	 perhaps	 like	 the	 heterokaryon	 (Aguilar	 et	 al.	 2013)	
depicted	in	the	second	to	last	step	of	figure	5,	a	cell	that	is,	with	two	or	more	
separate	nuclei	within	it	that	may,	or	may	not,	merge.	That	is,	there	were	two	
or	more	disciplinary	identities,	and	thus	epistemic	cultures,	within	genomics,	
rather	than	one.		
It	must	however	be	stressed	that	such	disciplinary	merging,	as	 that	which	
physics	 and	 biochemistry	 have	 undergone,	 does	 not	 produce	 a	 uniformly	
coherent	 discipline	 with	 all	 adherents	 ascribing	 to	 the	 exact	 same	 theories,	
methods,	and	approaches	 to	 their	work.	Rather	 the	key	word	here	 is	hybrid.	
Arguably	all	disciplines,	regardless	of	their	process	of	formation,	are	internally	
hybrid.	Uniting	as	they	do	individuals	with	widely	varying	approaches	to	their	
common	 field	 of	 inquiry.	 Such	 divergent	 strands	 of	 research	 within	 a	
discipline	 are	 entirely	 normal.	 Yet,	 I	 would	 contend	 that	 such	 divergent	
strands	maintain	 enough	 common	 ground,	 as	 well	 as	 enough	 of	 a	 common	
identity,	 to	 remain	 strands	 of	 the	 same	 disciplinary	 bow.	 Thus	 despite	 such	
internal	differences,	each	discipline,	as	Knorr	Cetina	(1999)	stresses,	maintains	
its	 own	 epistemic	 culture,	 with	 its	 own	 set	 of	 practices	 and	 arrangements	
which	shape	the	epistemic	machinery	of	those	within	the	discipline.	Thus	the	
result	of	disciplinary	nuclear	fusion	is,	I	would	argue,	a	new	hybrid	epistemic	
culture.	 Not	 a	 uniform	 stream	 of	 automaton-like	 scientists	 ‘doing’	 that	
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discipline	 in	 the	 exact	 same	way,	 but	 rather	 a	 group	with	 enough	 common	
ground	to	tie	them	together.	
Thus	 in	 terms	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 I	 would	 argue	 that,	 like	 Torgersen’s	
description	 of	 genomics,	 it	 is	 similarly	 a	 discipline	 that	 is	 poised	 between	
having	 two	 distinct,	 conflicting,	 yet	 interacting,	 internal	 epistemic	 cultures,	
and	having	 a	 singular,	 but	hybrid,	 epistemic	 culture.	As	 an	 emerging	hybrid	
discipline	it	has	a	shared	disciplinary	boundary,	its	‘cell	wall,’	and	it	is	working	
towards	 a	 universal	 sharing	 of	 disciplinary	 components	 such	 as	 language,	
methods,	 research	 objects,	 and	 knowledge	 base.	 Even	 though	 different	
individuals	 will	 undoubtedly	 apply	 such	 common	 epistemic	machinery	 very	
differently.	Yet,	as	discussed	above	there	remains	enough	tension	and	division	
between	the	discipline’s	two	 ‘sides,’	or	epistemic	cultures,	that	I	would	argue	
that	synthetic	biology	has	not	yet	reached	this	point.	It	has	not	yet	undergone	
the	 disciplinary	 equivalent	 of	 nuclear	 fusion,	 the	 merging	 of	 its	 epistemic	
cultures	 into	a	hybrid	epistemic	culture,	and	as	such	is	currently	more	like	a	
heterokaryon	than	a	synkaryon.		Thus,	I	would	contend,	that	synthetic	biology	
is	 currently	 occupying	 a	 grey	 zone	 on	 the	 path	 of	 interdisciplinarity,	 a	
boundary	spanning	zone	between	being	two	distinct	disciplines	and	being	one	
hybrid	discipline.	
Conclusion	
As	 laid	 out	 above,	 the	hybrid	discipline	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 the	 site	 of	
conflict	 and	 compromise.	 Synthetic	 biology	 is	 a	 young	 discipline	 that	 is	
drawing	 participants	 from	 two	 very	 different	 academic	 realms,	 biology	 and	
engineering.	These	participants	are	determined	to	see	their	fledging	discipline	
succeed,	however	 in	order	 to	make	 this	happen	they	are	having	 to	negotiate	
and	 overcome	 many	 challenges,	 including	 differences	 in:	 language	 use,	
knowledge	 base,	methods,	 research	 questions,	 research	 objects,	 and	 general	
approach	to	research	and	data.	I	have	argued	above	that	these	disparities	are	
due	 to	 epistemic	 cultural	 differences,	 and	 that	 the	 cluster	 of	 differences	 I	
identify	 not	 only	 highlight	 the	 negative	 side	 of	 epistemic	 cultures,	 but	 that	
such	 epistemic	 cultural	 differences	may	 be	 implicated	 as	 obstacles	 to	 other	
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attempts	 at	 interdisciplinarity,	both	 future	 and	past.	 For,	 as	Keller	 (2002)	 so	
clearly	 addresses,	 biology	 and	 engineering	 have	 never	 been	 easy	 bedfellows,	
with	several	significant	attempts	to	bring	them	together	having	failed,	at	least	
in	part,	because	of	such	disciplinary	differences.		
Thus	 it	 is,	 as	 I	 outlined	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 this	 chapter,	 biology	 and	
engineering	 are	 not	 easy	 bedfellows	 within	 synthetic	 biology	 either.	 For,	
despite	 public	 protestations	 that	 biology	 and	 engineering	 are	 being	 brought	
together	through	a	process	of	unproblematic	and	systematic	assimilation,	as	I	
have	 discussed	 above	 the	 reality	 within	 the	 Centre	 was	 quite	 different.	
Tensions	 and	 frustrations	 were	 regularly	 in	 evidence	 as	 those	 within	 the	
Centre	 toiled	 to	 achieve	 the	 desired	 disciplinary	 hybridity.	However	 despite	
these	difficulties,	the	discipline	continues	to	grow	and	strengthen,	a	process	of	
emergence	that	can	be	tracked	using	Molyneux-Hodgson	and	Meyer’s	notion	
of	movement	and	stickiness	(2009).	Indeed,	with	its	continual	influx	of	people	
and	resources	and	the	growing	number	of	 journals,	conferences,	and	courses	
dedicated	 to	 the	 subject,	 synthetic	 biology	 appears	 to	 be	 moving	 further	
towards	success	than	its	predecessors.	This	progress,	I	have	argued,	is	at	least	
partly	due	to	the	dedication	of	those	involved,	who,	in	their	different	ways,	are	
attempting	 to	 overcome	 the	 epistemic	 cultural	 barriers	 between	 synthetic	
biology’s	parent	disciplines,	biology	and	engineering.		
Some,	especially	 those	 in	more	senior	positions	who	were	 trained	entirely	
in	 one	 of	 these	 disciplines,	 rather	 than	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 itself,	 are,	 like	
Stephanie	 and	 Janet,	 attempting	 to	 overcome	 these	 barriers	 and	 undertake	
truly	hybrid	projects	through	the	formation	of	close,	respectful,	collaborative	
working	 relationships.	 Those	 working	 in	 this	 way	 are,	 through	 necessity,	
learning	the	language,	methods,	approaches,	potentials,	and	limitations	of	the	
other	 side	 of	 the	 discipline,	 and	 thus	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 they	 may	 find	
themselves,	as	Pam	Silver	and	Jessica	did,	adopting	a	more	hybrid	approach	to	
their	 own	work	 as	 a	 result.	Others,	 especially	 those	 like	 Lewis	who	 are	 still	
undertaking	 their	 academic	 training,	 have	 opted	 for	 a	 different	 approach	 to	
overcoming	the	epistemic	cultural	separation	between	synthetic	biology’s	two	
‘sides.’	Rather	than	engaging	in	close	collaboration	with	those	from	the	other	
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‘side,’	 they	 are	 instead	 attempting	 to	 straddle	 the	 divide	 themselves,	 by	 not	
only	 learning	 the	 theory	of	 the	other	 side,	but	also	 the	practice	 so	 that	 they	
can	undertake	both	the	lab	work	and	the	modelling	work	themselves.		
Such	 a	 commitment	 to	 becoming	 hybrid	 not	 only	 suggests	 that	 these	
synthetic	 biologists	 will	 emerge	 from	 their	 training	 as	 interdisciplinary	
individuals	(Eddy	2005),	but	also	that	they	may,	with	their	knowledge	of,	and	
familiarity	 with,	 the	 epistemic	 cultures	 of	 both	 parent	 disciplines,	 be	
instrumental	 in	forging	a	new	hybrid	epistemic	culture	for	synthetic	biology.	
An	 epistemic	 culture	 that	 incorporates	 not	 only	 the	 hybrid	 language	 of	
synthetic	biology	but	also	the	languages	of	biology	and	engineering,	the	wide-
ranging	 lab	 and	 computer-based	 practices	 of	 synthetic	 biologists,	 and	 an	
understanding	 of	 the	 needs,	 timelines,	 and	 limitations	 of	 the	 whole	 of	 the	
endeavour,	and	not	just	half	of	it.		
While	 this	 exploration	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 reveals	more	 complexity	 than	
the	 claim	 that,	 it	 is	 simply,	 and	uncomplicatedly,	 a	 hybrid	discipline,	would	
suggest,	 it	 is,	 I	maintain,	a	more	accurate	depiction	of	what	happens	behind	
closed	 doors.	 Given	 that	 the	 senior	 members	 of	 the	 discipline	 are,	 by	 and	
large,	 trained	 in	 only	 one	 side	 of	 the	 discipline,	 this	 mixed	 approach	 to	
achieving	 the	 discipline’s	 desired	 outcome	 of	 hybridity,	 seems	 to	 be	what	 is	
driving	the	discipline	forward.	As	it	allows	the	senior	members	to	contribute	
and	 lead	 the	 discipline,	 as	 a	 whole,	 through	 close	 collaboration	 and	 an	
appreciation	 for	 explanatory	 pluralism,	 while	 the	 next	 generation	 gain	
sufficient	experience,	training,	and	perspective	in	synthetic	biology	as	a	hybrid	
discipline.	Whether	this	next	generation	of	interdisciplinary	individuals	come	
to	 dominate	 synthetic	 biology,	 and	 whether,	 through	 their	 bridging	 of	
synthetic	 biology’s	 dual	 contributing	 epistemic	 cultures,	 they	 forge	 a	 fully-
fledged	hybrid	epistemic	culture	for	the	discipline,	remains	to	be	seen.		
Yet,	 the	 challenges	 of	 undertaking	 such	 a	 merging	 of	 the	 contributing	
disciplines’	 epistemic	 cultures,	 of	 their	 practical	 and	 conceptual	 norms,	may	
be,	I	contend,	simply	par	for	the	course	in	the	formation	of	a	new,	coherent,	
hybridised	interdiscipline.	As	two,	or	more,	disciplines	strive	to	create	a	new	
hybrid	discipline	at	their	intersection,	rather	than	just	a	collaborative	research	
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network	 of	 contributing	 disciplines,	 they	 undergo	 a	 process	 of	 disciplinary	
merging	which,	 I	 contend,	 bears	 similarities	 to	 that	 of	 cells	 undergoing	 cell	
fusion.	A	process	whereby	 a	disciplinary	boundary	 is	 first	 formed,	 and	 then,	
within	this	boundary,	the	contributing	disciplines	begin	to	increasingly	share	
components	 to	 such	 a	 degree	 that,	 should	 a	 complete	 merger	 occur,	 their	
disciplinary	nuclei,	or	epistemic	cultures,	fully	fuse,	establishing	the	academic	
entity	as	a	new	cohesive	hybrid	discipline.		
While	synthetic	biology	needs	to	mature	more	before	we	will	see	if	such	a	
coherent	 epistemic	 culture	 does	 fully	 emerge	 for	 the	 discipline	 as	 a	 whole,	
synthetic	 biology’s	 interdisciplinary	 individuals,	 both	 those	 who	 are	 newly	
trained	 and	 those	 in	 senior	 positions,	 do,	 through	 their	 commitment	 to	
hybridity	 and	 to	 going	 where	 the	 question	 takes	 them	 and	 not	 where	 their	
training	left	them,	appear	to	be	moving	the	discipline	towards	this	final	step	of	
fusion.	However,	in	the	meantime,	I	suggest	that	synthetic	biology	is	moving	
through	a	interdisciplinary	grey	zone,	being	no	longer	made	up	of	two	distinct	
disciplines,	but	not	yet	being	the	hallowed	single,	hybrid	discipline	either.	
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Chapter	Four:	Engineering	Biology	
Following	 the	 work	 of	 Karin	 Knorr	 Cetina	 (1999),	 each	 discipline	 can	 be	
thought	 of	 as	 having	 its	 own	 epistemic	 culture.	 The	 distinct	 collection	 of	
practices,	 beliefs,	 arrangements,	 and	 mechanisms,	 which	 shape	 both	 the	
knowledge	claims	of	a	particular	discipline	and	determine	how	those	within	it	
come	to	know	what	they	know.	Knorr	Cetina	(1999)	developed	the	concept	of	
epistemic	 cultures	 in	 order	 to	 both	 challenge	 the	 notion	 of	 scientific	 unity,	
and	 to	 explain	 the	 differences	 she	 encountered	 between	 two	 branches	 of	
science,	 molecular	 biology	 and	 experimental	 high	 energy	 physics.	 However,	
while	Knorr	Cetina	(1991,	1999)	discussed	the	ensemble	of	elements	which	she	
believes	constitute	an	epistemic	culture,	the	mundane	practices	and	concepts	
that	 shape	 such	 things	as	 the	 language	and	methods	used,	 the	way	 research	
entities	 are	 engaged	 with,	 and	 the	 methods	 of	 collaboration,	 she	 did	 not	
explore	 the	 process	 by	 which	 such	 practical	 and	 conceptual	 norms	 are	
developed.	However	as	discussed	in	chapter	three,	within	synthetic	biology	it	
was	 just	 such	 a	 process	 of	 discipline,	 and	 thus	 epistemic	 culture,	 formation	
that	I	encountered.		
Synthetic	 biology,	 as	 explored	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 is	 an	 emerging	
discipline	located	at	the	intersection	of	biology	and	engineering.	An	emerging	
discipline	striving	to	hybridise	 its	constituent	halves	and	yet	struggling	with,	
what	 I	 argue	 are,	 their	 epistemic	 cultural	 differences.	 Yet	 despite	 these	
differences,	I	conclude	in	chapter	three	that	synthetic	biology	is	immersed	in	
the	 process	 of	 disciplinary	 formation.	 Having	 moved	 beyond	 being	 two	
separate	 disciplines	 but	 not	 yet	 having	 reached	 the	 point	 of	 being	 one	
coherent	discipline.	This	lack	of	coherency,	I	contend,	is	due	to	the	lingering	
epistemic	 cultural	 divide	 at	 the	 discipline’s	 centre.	 A	 divide	 that	 is	 being	
bridged	 by	 interdisciplinary	 collaboration,	 and	 interdisciplinary	 individuals,	
both	of	which	 are,	 I	would	 argue,	 establishing	new	practical	 and	 conceptual	
norms	 for	 synthetic	 biology.	 Practical	 and	 conceptual	 norms	 which	 are	
founded	 in	 their	 interdisciplinary	 work,	 and	 which	 are	 slowly	 but	 surely	
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establishing	 a	 coherent,	 and	 distinct	 hybrid	 epistemic	 culture	 for	 synthetic	
biology.	It	is	the	work	to	establish	this	hybrid	epistemic	culture	that	I	turn	to	
now	 drawing	 on	 Leonelli	 and	 Ankeny’s	 (2015)	 concept	 of	 repertoire,	 and	
Fujimura’s	(1987)	notion	of	doability.	Both	of	which,	I	contend,	can	be	drawn	
upon	to	investigate	the	process	by	which	a	robust	epistemic	culture	emerges.	
Like	 Knorr	 Cetina	 (1999),	 and	 indeed	 Kuhn	 (1962),	 and	 Clarke	 (1998),	
Leonelli	 and	 Ankeny’s	 (2015)	 take	 on	 disciplinary,	 or	 research	 community,	
formation	 focuses	 on	 practice.	 They	 argue	 that	 common	 practices	 and	
infrastructure	not	only	play	an	 integral	 role	 in	 the	 formation	of	 a	discipline,	
but	that	a	discipline’s	practical	and	conceptual	norms	provide,	what	they	term,	
the	 blueprint	 for	 the	 way	 science	 should	 be	 done	 within	 that	 developing	
research	community.	Their	concept	of	a	repertoire	can	therefore,	they	argue,	
be	thought	of	as,	“a	distinctive	and	shared	ensemble	of	elements	that	make	it	
practically	possible	for	individuals	to	cooperate,	including	the	norms	for	what	
counts	as	acceptable	behaviors	and	practices	together	with	the	infrastructures,	
procedures,	 and	 resources	 that	make	 it	 possible	 to	 implement	 such	 norms”	
and	conduct	 research	 (Leonelli	and	Ankeny	2015:	701).	By	making	 it	possible	
for	individuals	to	cooperate	on	a	set	of	common	goals,	the	authors	assert	that	
it	 is	 just	 such	 a	 repertoire,	 with	 its	 material,	 social,	 and	 conceptual	
components,	that	first	draws	a	research	community	together	and	then	allows	
it	to	persist	in	the	long	term	(Leonelli	and	Ankeny	2015).	Given	Knorr	Cetina’s	
(1999)	 assertion	 that,	 academic	 ‘disciplines’	 and	 ‘specialties’	 can	 be	
reconceptualised	 as	 epistemic	 cultures,	 I	 would	 argue	 that	 individual	
epistemic	cultures	can	also	be	thought	of	as	having	repertoires.		
The	 development	 of	 a	 repertoire	 is,	 Leonelli	 and	 Ankeny	 assert,	 “an	
important	 moment	 in	 the	 growth	 of	 a	 scientific	 community,	 in	 which	 key	
goals	 and	 values	 come	 to	 be	 explicitly	 articulated	 and	 efforts	 are	 aimed	 at	
making	 it	 feasible	 to	 achieve	 these	 goals”	 (2015:	 707).	 Where	 Leonelli	 and	
Ankeny	refer	to	this	“important	moment”	as	the	development	of	a	repertoire,	
Fujimura	(1987)	might	argue	that	it	 is	the	moment	when	a	problem	becomes	
‘doable.’	Introducing	the	concept	of	doability,	Fujimura	notes	that	“[s]cientists	
typically	choose	to	pursue	problems	which	are	ripe,	that	is,	both	intellectually	
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interesting	and	 ‘do-able’”	 (1987:	 257).	The	doability	of	 a	 scientific	problem	 is	
established,	Fujimura	argues,	through	“the	alignment	of	several	levels	of	work	
organization”	(1987:	258)	with	scientists	needing	to	align	factors	at,	what	she	
terms,	 the	 experiment	 level,	 the	 laboratory	 level,	 and	 the	wider	 social	world	
level	in	order	for	a	problem	to	be	doable.		
The	 concept	 of	 doability	 was	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 one	 but,	 in	 summary,	
Fujimura	 and	 Clarke	 (A.	 Clarke	 and	 Fujimura	 1992;	 Fujimura	 1987)	 contend	
that,	 in	 order	 for	 a	 scientific	 problem	 to	 be	 doable	 it	 not	 only	 has	 to	 be	
technically	doable	at	the	experimental	level,	but	it	has	to	be	prioritised	at	the	
laboratory	level,	it	must	have	the	required	infrastructure	at	the	laboratory	and	
social	world	 level,	and	both	 the	pursuit	of	 the	problem	and	the	outcomes	of	
the	 research	must	 be	 viewed	 as	 worthwhile	 by	 those	 in	 academia,	 those	 in	
funding	 agencies,	 and	 those	 in	 the	 wider	 society	 where	 the	 research	 takes	
place.		
Looking	at	 this	work	on	discipline	 formation	more	broadly	 it	would	seem	
that	Leonelli	 and	Ankeny’s	 (2015)	notion	of	 a	 repertoire,	 as	 the	 set	of	 social,	
conceptual,	 and	 material	 components	 which	 draw,	 and	 ultimately	 bind,	 a	
research	community	together,	can	be	considered	to	be	a	necessary	component	
within	 the	broader	strategy	of	making	a	 research	project	doable.	While	both	
the	building	of	a	repertoire,	and	the	rendering	of	a	research	strategy	as	doable,	
are	 key	 factors	 in	 the	 development	 of	 a	 resilient	 discipline	with	 a	 clear	 and	
coherent	epistemic	culture.		
Given	the	espoused	hybridity	of	synthetic	biology,	the	emerging	discipline’s	
repertoire,	 the	problem	 it	 is	 attempting	 to	 render	doable,	 and	 the	 epistemic	
culture	 it	 is	 forging,	 are	 all	 located	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 biology	 and	
engineering.	 What	 is	 more,	 they	 are	 all	 predicated	 on	 the	 successful	
application	 of	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	 biology.	 As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	
one,	the	introduction	of	this	engineering	approach	within	synthetic	biology	is	
most	explicit	in	efforts	to	apply	concepts	such	as	standardisation,	abstraction,	
and	decoupling	to	biology,	and	the	notion	that	novel	biological	organisms	can	
be	 designed	 via	 modelling	 and	 then	 ‘built’	 from	 standardised,	 hierarchical	
parts,	 devices,	 and	 systems.	 References	 to	 these	 engineering	 concepts,	
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alongside	 the	 use	 of	 vocabulary	 and	 analogies	 drawn	 from	 engineering,	 are	
scattered	 throughout	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 literature,	 highlighting	 the	
pervasiveness	 of	 engineering	 ideas	within	 the	 field	 (Arkin	 2008;	 Baker	 et	 al.	
2006;	 Endy	 2005;	 Gibbs	 2004;	 Serrano	 2007).	 While	 the	 prevailing	 rhetoric	
suggests	that	all	that	is	required	for	the	successful	emergence	of	the	discipline,	
and	its	epistemic	culture,	is	the	simple	enactment	of	this	engineering	ideal.		
Indeed,	 in	 many	 ways	 synthetic	 biology	 already	 has	 the	 appearance	 of	 a	
distinct	 discipline	 with	 a	 robust	 repertoire,	 a	 doable	 problem,	 and	 a	 hybrid	
epistemic	culture.	After	 all	 it	 already	has	hybrid	 infrastructure,	 funding,	 and	
people.	 There	 are	 biological	 laboratories	 located	 in	 engineering	 schools,	
staffed	by	a	mix	of	engineers	and	biologists.	There	are	substantial	grants	and	
funding	 streams	 from,	 amongst	 others,	 the	 BBSRC67	and	 the	 EPSRC.68	There	
are	journals	and	conferences,	which	draw	authors,	speakers,	participants,	and	
audiences	 from	 both	 sides	 of	 the	 discipline.	 There	 is	 a	 developing	 hybrid	
discourse,	and	hybrid	research	projects	and	strategies,	which	are	garnering	the	
backing	of	the	UK	government	(Osborne	2012).	Thus,	from	a	distance,	the	lack	
of	 internal	epistemic	cultural	cohesion	within	synthetic	biology,	 identified	 in	
chapter	three,	is	often	obscured,	and	instead	synthetic	biology	is	presented	as	
a	 sound	 discipline,	 built	 around	 the	 application	 of	 a	 straightforward,	 and	
rational	engineering	approach	to	biology.		
This	hallowed	engineering	approach,	as	it	is	described	by	the	likes	of	Endy	
(2005),	 often	 underpins	 the	 prevailing	 rhetoric	 of	 synthetic	 biology.	 A	
dominant	 strand	of	 the	 synthetic	biology	 rhetoric	which	 is	 found	within	 the	
many	 articles	 ostensibly	 promoting	 synthetic	 biology	 as	 an	 emerging	
discipline	(e.g.	Andrianantoandro	et	al.	2006;	Arkin	2008;	Endy	2005,	2008),	as	
well	 as	 reports	 and	 statements	 that	 address	 and	 describe	 the	 field	 (e.g.	
Bhattachary	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Osborne	 2012;	 UK	 Synthetic	 Biology	 Roadmap	
Coordination	Group	2012).	The	rhetoric	within	such	sources,	focused	as	many	
of	 them	are	on	discipline	building,	presents	 synthetic	biology	 in	an	arguably	
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overly	simplistic	manner.	Brushing	under	the	carpet	the	very	real	difficulties	of	
hybridising	 engineering	 and	 biology	 and	 of	 applying	 engineering	 ideas	 and	
methods	to	biology.	Such	difficulties	are	increasingly	being	acknowledged	and	
discussed	within	the	synthetic	biology	literature	(see	for	example	Bryner	2015;	
Silver	 et	 al.	 2014;	Way	 et	 al.	 2014).	 However	 even	 these	 acknowledgements	
often	 go	 hand-in-hand	 with	 assertions	 that	 it	 is	 still	 early	 days	 for	 the	
discipline	 and	 thus	 it	 is	 only	 a	 matter	 of	 time	 before	 such	 difficulties	 are	
overcome.	As	such,	despite	the	variation	within	the	broader	synthetic	biology	
rhetoric,	 I	 would	 contend	 that,	 at	 this	 point	 in	 time,	 the	 notion	 that	 the	
‘engineering	 approach’	 can	 be,	 and	 will	 be,	 applied	 to	 biology	 remains	
prevalent.		
Thus	 I	 found	 myself	 wondering	 how	 accurately	 this	 prevailing	 rhetoric	
represents	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 conceptual	 and	 practical	 norms,	 which	 are	
emerging	within	 the	discipline.	Norms,	which	ultimately,	 support	 and	 shape	
the	discipline,	its	repertoire,	and	its	epistemic	culture.	Thus,	just	as	I	explored	
the	day-to-day	reality	of	the	relationship	between	biology	and	engineering,	so	
too	 did	 I	 explore	 the	 practical	 and	 conceptual	 norms	 emerging	 within	 the	
Centre,	 as	 those	 located	 within	 it	 attempted	 to	 apply	 their	 engineering	
approach	to	biology.	What	I	found	was	a	more	complex,	and	interesting	story.	
Is	biology	‘engineerable’?	
According	 to	 the	 prevailing	 rhetoric,	 a	 core	 component	 of	 synthetic	
biology’s	engineering	approach	is	the	adoption	of	standardisation,	abstraction,	
and	 decoupling.	 As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 one,	 these	 three	 core	 engineering	
concepts	 are	 being	 ushered	 into	 biology	 under	 the	 assumption	 that	 novel	
biological	 organisms	 can	 be	 built	 from	 standardised,	 hierarchical	 parts,	
devices,	 and	 systems.	For	 example,	 it	 is	believed	by	 the	 likes	of	Endy	 (2005)	
that	should	biology	be	simply	rendered	into	well	characterised,	standardised,	
interchangeable	parts,	 then	 the	building	of	new	biological	organisms	will	be	
significantly	simpler	and	more	predictable.		
Once	such	standardised	parts	have	been	produced	and	characterised,	 it	 is	
maintained	that	 their	 internal	 ‘biology,’	 their	nucleotide	sequences,	could	be	
 131 
‘black-boxed’	and	ignored.	Allowing	those	who	work	with	them	to	treat	them	
as	discreet	functional	parts	without	the	need,	nor	necessarily	the	knowledge,	
to	tinker	with	them	internally.	The	idea,	drawn	from	software	engineering,	is	
then	 that	 these	 discreet,	 functional	 bioparts	 can	 be	 built	 into	 devices,	 and	
then	into	systems.	Thus,	ultimately	producing	synthetic	biology	products	via	a	
process	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 abstraction	 hierarchy	 (Endy	 2005).	 As	 for	
decoupling,	within	engineering	it	refers	to	the	separation	of	previously	linked	
systems	 so	 that	 they	 can	 operate	 independently.	 Whereas	 within	 synthetic	
biology	 this	 translates	 to	 a	 desire	 to	 be	 able	 to	 separate	 the	 design	 and	
fabrication	 processes,	 so	 that	 those	 who	 design	 synthetic	 ‘constructs’	 using	
computer	modelling,	 are	 not	 necessarily	 the	 same	 people	 who	 render	 these	
designs	 as	 physical	 entities.	 Thus	 like	 abstraction,	 decoupling	 also	 relies	 on	
standardisation.	
Yet,	 despite	 its	 ubiquity	 in	 early	 papers	 on	 synthetic	 biology	
(Andrianantoandro	et	al.	2006;	Arkin	2008;	Endy	2005;	Heinemann	and	Panke	
2006),	 there	 is	 a	 growing	 ambivalence	 to	 this	 model	 for	 the	 discipline.	 An	
ambivalence	rooted	in	the	belief	that	this	model	requires	serious	modification	
in	 order	 to	 be	 appropriate	 to	 biology.	 I	 encountered	 this	 ambivalence	 at	
workshops,	such	as	the	2010	RoSBNet69	meeting	in	Oxford,	where	during	the	
breakaway	 groups	 people	 started	 advocating	 putting	 the	 rhetoric	 aside	 in	
order	 to	 actually	 discuss	 how	 problematic	 the	 approach	 really	 was.	 I	 also	
encountered	 it	 within	 the	 Centre.	 Michael,	 for	 example,	 raised	 concerns	 in	
relation	to	the	use	of	the	abstraction	hierarchy	within	synthetic	biology.		
I’d	say	five,	ten	years	ago	it	had	a	definite	role	as	.	.	.	a	hypothesis	for,	
‘how	do	we	make	biology	easier	to	engineer?’	.	.	.	and	the	hypothesis	
was	we	do	it	the	way	we’ve	done	it	in	software,	we	do	this	abstraction	
hierarchy.	.	.	.	I	think	we’ve	reached	this	point	where	it’s	become	this	
transition	from	a	useful	hypothesis	to	now	it’s	sort	of	neutral,	 I	 feel	
like	soon	it’s	going	to	be	on	the	harmful	side	when	we	start	pouring	
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resources	 into	 this	 idea	 .	 .	 .	 it’s	 just	 going	 to	 be	 an	 unproductive	
avenue.	
(Michael,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
Michael’s	 concerns	 stem	 from	 his	 belief	 that	 the	 abstraction	 hierarchy	 has	
outlived	its	usefulness	in	synthetic	biology	given	that,	to	his	mind,	it	does	not	
make	sense	in	terms	of	the	underlying	biology.	Thus	to	continue	to	pursue	it	
is,	according	to	Michael,	a	waste	of	time	and	resources.	As	such,	Michael	and	
his	research	group	have	ceased	using	the	term	‘biological	parts’	completely.	
In	my	group	we	don’t	 talk	about	parts	at	all.	 I	haven’t	 talked	about	
biological	parts	in	five,	six	years,	to	be	honest.		
(Michael,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
Others	at	the	Centre	shared	Michael’s	concerns	regarding	biological	parts,	
as	 they	 are	 described	 by	 Endy.	 Martin,	 for	 example	 commented	 that,	
“fundamentally	 BioBricks	 are	 a	 bit	 old-fashioned	 now.”	 However,	 unlike	
Michael	most	within	the	Centre	had	not	abandoned	this	approach	altogether.	
Rather,	like	Martin	himself,	they	were	seeking	new,	better,	more	feasible	ways	
of	 assembling,	 characterising,	 and	 using	 bioparts.	 Thus,	 despite	 the	 general	
enthusiasm	 I	 encountered	 within	 the	 Centre	 for	 the	 application	 of	 an	
engineering	approach	 to	biology,	every	one	of	 the	synthetic	biologists	 in	 the	
Centre	acknowledged	potential	 challenges	 in	actually	applying	 it	 in	practice.	
Indeed	many	 raised	 concerns	 that	 biology	 is	 either	 too	 complicated,	 or	 too	
unknown,	 for	 the	 successful	 and	 smooth	 incorporation	 of	 the	 engineering	
approach	as	it	is	outlined	in	the	prevailing	rhetoric.		
Janet	 for	 example,	 a	 senior	 researcher	 with	 a	 background	 in	 biology,	
commented	over	 lunch	 that	 she	had	noticed	 a	 general	 shift	 in	 the	 synthetic	
biology	 community	 away	 from	 the	notion	 that	biology	 can	be	 engineered	 in	
the	 same	 way	 as	 inanimate	 products.	 Like	 Michael,	 whose	 rejection	 of	 the	
abstraction	hierarchy	was	previously	discussed,	Janet	questioned	whether	the	
parts,	 devices,	 and	 systems	 approach	 was	 feasible,	 and	 whether	 abstraction	
and	 decoupling	 were	 achievable.	 Yet	 she	 concluded	 that	 she	 was	 “scared	 of	
saying	that	publicly”	as	it	may	result	in	“a	chorus	of	voices	saying	the	emperor	
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has	 no	 clothes.”	 Implying	both	 that,	 the	 idea	 that	biology	can	be	engineered	
easily	 is	 like	 the	 fairy-tale	 of	 the	 emperor’s	 new	 clothes,	 and	 that	 people	
believing	this	to	be	the	case	is	something	she	wishes	to	avoid.	For,	while	she	
concedes	that	the	approach	 is	problematic,	being	slow	to	apply	and	far	 from	
straightforward	 and	 easy,	 she	 still	 sees	 it	 as	 worthwhile.	 Others	 within	 the	
Centre,	 including	 Sam	 quoted	 below,	 echoed	 this	 mix	 of	 concern	 and	
commitment.	
Biology	is	by	far	the	most	complicated	thing	.	.	.	that	engineering	has	
ever	 been	attempted	 to	be	applied	 to.	 So	 .	 .	 .	we’re	 still	 in	 the	 early	
days	 and	 the	 question	 still	 hasn’t	 been	 entirely	 answered	 as	 to	
whether	you	can	successfully	apply	engineering	to	biology.	It	may	be	
that	it’s	just	too	complicated	and	that	we	can’t	characterise	things	to	
the	degree	 that	we	need	 to	 .	 .	 .	The	question	 is	 can	you	get	around	
that	 with	 engineering	 or	 	 .	 .	 .	 can	 you	 incorporate	 it	 into	 your	
engineering	approach	in	some	way	so	that	you	can	utilise	that.	Or	at	
least	not	.	.	.	intentionally	go	at	loggerheads	with	it	.	.	.	I	think	we’re	
still	at	the	stage	where	people	are	confident	that	they	can	do	this	and	
apply	 engineering	 to	 biology	 but	 they’re	 not	 quite	 sure	 yet	 .	 .	 .	 it	
might	just	be	too	complex	to	apply	engineering	to.	But	hopefully	not!		
(Sam,	postdoctoral	fellow,	biology)	
Difficulties	 in	 applying	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	 biology	 are	 not,	
therefore,	 necessarily	 seen	 as	 deterrents,	 but	 rather,	 by	 the	 likes	 of	 Sam,	 as	
obstacles	 that	 need	 to	 be	 successfully	 negotiated	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 this	
ultimate	goal.	For	Sam,	a	key	to	the	successful	engineering	of	biology	will	be	
working	with	the	biology,	rather	than	going	“at	loggerheads	with	it.”	However	
for	 others	 at	 the	 Centre,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 quotes	 below,	 a	 key	
component	in	achieving	this	goal	is	the	further	alignment	of	synthetic	biology	
with	 engineering,	 whilst	 subsequently	 distancing	 it	 from	 biology,	 and	
biologists.	
It’s	basically	just	engineering	but	on	biology,	so	.	.	.	more	than	seeing	
synthetic	biology	as	a	field	inside	molecular	biology,	I	prefer	to	see	it	
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as	 a	 new	 field	 inside	 engineering	 which	 draws	 from	 biology	
knowledge	 but	 really	 wants	 to	 just	 be	 engineering	 and	 not	 biology	
any	more.		
(Hayden,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
I	think	anyone	with	a	healthy	view	of	what	synthetic	biology	is	says	
that	one	of	the	main	aims	of	synthetic	biology	is	to	get	it	out	of	the	
hands	of	the	biologists.		
(Martin,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
I	 think	what	 [the	Centre	directors]	 describe	 is	 less	 of	 a	 hybrid	 and	
more	of	an	engineering	[discipline]	 .	 .	 .	and	the	biology	is	there	sort	
of	lurking	.	.	.	but	you	.	.	.	try	to	ignore	the	fact	that	it’s	a	biological	
thing	that	you’re	working	with,	and	treat	it	as	if	it’s	not.		
(Janet,	senior	researcher,	biology)		
Hayden’s,	Martin’s,	and	indeed	the	Centre	Directors,’	desires	to	align	synthetic	
biology	 with	 engineering,	 and	 to	 put	 the	 control	 into	 the	 hands	 of	 the	
engineers,	echo	the	aims	and	claims	of	Drew	Endy.	While	Janet,	 it	should	be	
noted,	did	not	agree	with	the	approach	she	describes	above.	However,	as	more	
and	more	synthetic	biologists	are	trained	to	view	biology	in	this	way	Janet,	and	
those	who	agree	with	her,	may	find	themselves	in	the	minority.		
Yet,	 despite	 internal	 debates	 about	 whether	 synthetic	 biology	 can,	 or	
cannot,	be	engineered	as	readily	as	inanimate	products,	and	whether	it	should	
be	seen	as	an	engineering	or	a	life	science	discipline,	every	synthetic	biologist	I	
spoke	to	within	the	Centre	acknowledged	a	prioritisation	within	the	discipline	
of	 synthesis,	 over	 analysis.	 Such	 a	 research	 agenda	 would,	 according	 to	
historian	of	 technology	Walter	Vincenti’s	description,	align	synthetic	biology	
with	engineering.	 “Engineering	 research,”	he	writes,	 “has	as	 its	ultimate	goal	
the	 production	 of	 knowledge	 useful	 for	 design	 (as	 well	 as	 production	 and	
operation);	 scientific	 research	 aims	 basically	 at	 explanation	 and	
understanding.	As	a	 result,	 research	 in	engineering	 is	pursued	with	different	
priorities	and	attitudes	.	.	.	It	emphasizes	application	rather	than	illumination”	
(2006:	 231).	 Such	 an	 emphasis	 on	 application	 rather	 than	 illumination	 was	
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prevalent	at	the	Centre,	both	in	the	way	the	synthetic	biologists	spoke	about	
their	 work	 and	 the	 research	 projects	 they	 pursued.	 It	 is	 also	 clear	 in	 the	
following	 interview	 excerpts,	 as	 is	 the	 belief	 that	 this	 change	 in	 focus	 sets	
synthetic	biology	apart	for	more	mainstream	biology.	
As	 I	got	 interested	and	 involved	 in	 synthetic	biology	 I	 found	 that	 it	
did	make	me	think	about	things	in	a	different	way	.	.	.	as	a	biologist	
you	come	at	problems	by	wanting	to	understand	biology	.	.	.	you	want	
to	understand	the	world,	you	want	to	understand	how	it	works,	and	
that’s	 .	 .	 .	 just	 observational.	 	 .	 .	 .	 The	 synthetic	 biology	 aspect	 is	
much	 more	 .	 .	 .	 applied	 .	 .	 .	 it’s	 not	 just	 looking	 at	 biology	 to	
understand	it,	it’s	then	looking	at	it	and	thinking,	what	can	I	do	with	
it?	How	can	I	use	that	as	a	tool?	.	.	.	I	think	it’s	part	of	why	I	enjoy	it	.	
.	 .	 I	 used	 to	 play	with	Meccano,	 I	 like	 building	 stuff,	 and	 synthetic	
biology	is	about	building	stuff.		
(Peter,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
Biologists	don’t	build	 things,	 they	 just	don’t	build	 things!	Biologists	
deconstruct	things,	they	don’t	reconstruct	.	.	.	Engineers	build	stuff	to	
do	stuff,	and	this	is	this,	but	we’re	just	using	biological	bits	and	bobs	
to	build	stuff	and	do	stuff,	so	it	has	to	be	an	engineering	discipline.		
(Malcolm,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
Here	 Peter	 and	 Malcolm	 not	 only	 outline	 ideas	 about	 what	 synthetic	
biology	is,	but	do	so	by	drawing	attention	to	the	ways	in	which	they	deem	it	to	
differ	 from	biology.	Something	they	are	well	qualified	to	speak	on	given	that	
they	 are	 both	 senior	 researchers	with	backgrounds	 in	 biology.	However,	 the	
acknowledged	 difficulties	 of	 applying	 an	 engineering	 approach	 in	 practice	
raised	 many	 questions	 for	 me,	 including	 whether	 the	 application	 of	 this	
approach	 is,	 in	 reality,	 primarily	 conceptual?	 Or	 whether	 there	 are,	 indeed,	
elements	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biologists’	 material	 practice	 that	 clearly	 set	 them	
apart	 from	 the	 biologists	 many	 seem	 determined	 to	 delineate	 themselves	
from?	In	order	to	explore	these	questions	I	began	investigating	the	conceptual	
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and	practical	manifestations	 of	 the	 engineering	 approach	within	 the	Centre,	
starting	with	discourse.	
A	new	discourse	for	biology?	
One	of	the	first	things	that	struck	me	about	the	synthetic	biologists	at	the	
Centre	was	the	way	they	spoke.	After	 the	very	 first	 lab	meeting	I	attended,	 I	
wrote	in	my	field	notebook	that,	“the	 language	 they	use	 is	 fascinating.”	I	was	
previously	aware	of	 the	use	of	engineering	 terminology	and	analogies	within	
synthetic	biology	from	the	synthetic	biology	literature	(e.g.	Andrianantoandro	
et	al.	2006;	P.	Ball	2004;	Endy	2005)	and	from	public	presentations	(e.g.	Man-
Made	 Nature	 2010;	 The	 Royal	 Academy	 of	 Engineering	 2009).	 Ball,	 for	
example,	 uses	 terms	 like	 “retooling”	 proteins,	 “refitting”	 bacteria,	 “tuning”	
expression	 levels,	 and	 “tinkering”	 with	 the	 “building	 blocks”	 of	 genes	 and	
proteins	 (P.	Ball	 2004:	625).	However,	 it	was	 still	 striking	 to	hear	 such	 ideas	
spoken	aloud,	so	I	started	jotting	down	examples	of	this	discourse	whenever	I	
could.	 Before	 long,	 amongst	 the	 many	 snippets	 of	 engineering-derived	
discourse	 I	 encountered,	 I	 had	 overheard	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 design	 and	
production	 strategy	 described	 in	 terms	 of	 an	 abstraction	 hierarchy	 of	
biological	 ‘parts,’	 ‘devices,’	and	‘systems;’	I	had	heard	cells	being	described	as	
machines	 containing	 ‘switches,’	 ‘wires,’	 and	 ‘circuits,’	 and	 I	 had	 heard	 them	
being	compared	to	cars	with	mechanical	and	design	features.	This	latter	image	
was	conjured	by	several	members	of	the	Centre,	but	perhaps	most	clearly	by	
David	 during	 a	 journal	 club	 meeting	 when	 he	 described	 how	 he	 might	 go	
about	designing	an	organism	to	have	particular	capabilities.	
I	want	 this	 powerhouse,	 this	 engine	 to	 go	 in	my	 vehicle	 of	 the	 cell,	
and	I	then	want	this	trim,	or	this	steering	system	to	go	in	it.		
(David,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
As	de	Lorenzo	and	Danchin	quite	 rightly	note,	 “many	synthetic	biologists	
adopt	 the	 implicit	 or	 explicit	metaphor	 of	 the	 cell	 as	 a	 complex	mechanical	
machine”	 (2008:	825).	The	use	of	 such	discourse	 is,	 according	 to	de	Lorenzo	
and	Danchin,	part	 of	 synthetic	biology’s	 adoption	of	 an	 engineering	 agenda,	
and	 is	 perhaps	 the	most	 outwardly	 observable	 outcome	 of	 this	 adoption.	 In	
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comparing	 synthetic	 biology’s	 language	 to	 that	 of	 molecular	 biology,	 de	
Lorenzo	 and	 Danchin	 write,	 “[a]lthough	 molecular	 biologists	 often	 believe	
that	 their	 abstractions	 and	 representations	 -	many	 of	 which	 are	 taken	 from	
physics	 -	 are	 the	 ultimate	 means	 to	 represent	 biological	 phenomena,	 their	
language	 might	 not	 be	 sufficient	 to	 fulfil	 the	 strong	 engineering	 agenda	 of	
synthetic	 biology.”	 As	 such,	 “[a]	 robust	 language	 to	 describe	 engineering	
biological	entities	is	needed”	(de	Lorenzo	and	Danchin	2008:	823).	Aside	from	
fulfilling	their	“strong	engineering	agenda,”	the	use	of	this	unique	and	common	
discourse	can	also	be	seen	as	a	key	element	of	synthetic	biologists’	repertoire	
and	 thus	 their	 discipline	 building	 efforts.	 For,	 adopting	 this	 novel	 language	
helps	 to	 set	 synthetic	 biology	 apart	 from	 similar	 biological	 fields,	 such	 as	
genetic	engineering,	that	came	before	it	but	lacked,	de	Lorenzo	and	Danchin	
claim,	“a	common	descriptive	language”	(2008:	823).		
The	adoption	of	a	novel,	common	descriptive	language,	as	part	of	discipline	
building,	is	however	not	new	to	biology.	Keller	writes	that,	in	the	1950s,	use	of	
the	 information	metaphor	and	its	associated	terminology	served	“as	a	means	
of	 demarcating	 the	 disciplinary	 boundary	 of	 the	 new	 molecular	 biology,	
especially	 from	 the	 traditions	 of	 biochemistry”	 (2000:	 29).	 Thus	 in	 turn,	
synthetic	 biology’s	 adoption	 of	 the	 engineering	metaphor	 and	 its	 associated	
terminology	can	be	seen	as	a	means	of	demarcating	the	disciplinary	boundary	
between	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 the	 traditions	 of	molecular	 biology.	However	
this	is	arguably	not	the	only	role	that	synthetic	biology’s	new	language	plays	in	
terms	of	disciplinary	formation.		
Aside	 from	 distinguishing	 synthetic	 biology	 from	 similar	 disciplines,	 the	
adoption	of	 a	new	 language	 also	plays	 a	 role	 in	 creating	 internal	 coherence,	
providing	 a	 common	 language	 for	 those	 drawn	 to	 the	 discipline	 from	
engineering	and	from	biology.	The	difficulties	presented	by	not	speaking	the	
same	language,	which	were	discussed	in	chapter	three,	are	encapsulated	in	the	
following	quote	from	Max.	
I	think	the	other	[challenge]	 is	our	ability	to	speak	together.	I	think	
the	way	in	which	we	communicate	and	understand	each	other	is	all-
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important	for	the	field	to	survive,	because	unless	we	can	feel	like	we	
get	our	 ideas	across	–	not	as	 individuals,	as	a	group	–	 I	 think	we’re	
never	 going	 to	 succeed	 and	 we’re	 going	 to	 .	 .	 .	 part	 ways	 again,	
because	that	kind	of	merging	didn’t	work.	But	also	I’d	say	that	there	
are	advantages	to	that	whole	breaking	through	the	language	barrier	
because	.	.	.	we	can	see	what	each	other’s	doing	and	comment	on	it,	
and	be	separate	but	not	completely	distinct	to	each	other’s	work	and	
that,	I	think,	is	going	to	be	the	best	way	for	the	field	to	evolve.		
(Max,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
According	 to	Max	 therefore,	 and	 others	 in	 the	 Centre	who	 echoed	Max’s	
claims,	breaking	 through	 the	 language	barrier	 so	 that	all	 synthetic	biologists	
regardless	 of	 background	 are	 speaking,	 or	 at	 least	 understanding,	 the	 same	
language	is	key	for	the	coherence	and	success	of	the	discipline.	He	argues	that	
to	try	and	merge	the	disciplines	without	merging	the	languages	will	not	work,	
and	will	 ultimately	 lead	 to	 the	 discipline	 splitting	 in	 two.	He	 also	 however,	
sees	shared	language	as	an	area	of	commonality	that	allows	the	two	‘sides’	of	
synthetic	biology,	while	 still	 separate	 from	each	other,	 to	work	 together	and	
avoid	becoming	completely	distinct	from	each	other.	Thus	I	would	argue	that,	
for	 synthetic	 biology,	 the	 adoption	 of	 this	 common,	 engineering-inspired	
discourse	 is	 one	 of	 its	 developing	 repertoire’s	 norms	 of	 behaviour	 (Leonelli	
and	Ankeny	2015).	
Yet,	 despite	 its	 roles	 in	 discipline	 building,	 in	 defining	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
discipline,	 and	 in	 reshaping	 the	 way	 synthetic	 biologists	 understand	 the	
natural	world,	such	discourse	does	not	necessarily	come	naturally	to,	nor	does	
it	 sit	 well	 with,	 everyone	 within	 the	 field.	 I	 decided	 to	 sit	 in	 on	 the	
undergraduate	 synthetic	 biology	 course	 run	 by	 the	 Centre	 in	 order	 to	 get	 a	
better	 idea	 of	 how	 the	 discipline	was	 being	 presented	 to	 students	who	may	
themselves	 enter	 the	 field	 in	 the	 future.	 During	 the	 very	 first	 class	 of	 the	
course	 Malcolm	 (senior	 researcher,	 biology)	 introduced	 the	 students	 to	
synthetic	 biology’s	 engineering-derived	 discourse.	 Telling	 them	 that	 while	
“biologists	 would	 never,	 ever	 use	 the	 engineering	 words	 that	 are	 used	 in	 the	
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vision	of	synthetic	biology,”	he	hoped	that	the	students	would	be	“familiar	with	
them	by	 the	 end	of	 the	 course.”	He	also	warned	them	that,	 “you	will	 come	 to	
love	 it	or	hate	 it	depending	on	your	taste.”	Malcolm’s	comments	stress	several	
important	points	about	synthetic	biology’s	discourse.	Firstly,	that	it	is	distinct	
from	 that	 of	 biology,	 secondly	 that	 learning	 it	 is	 deemed	 important,	 and	
thirdly	that	not	all	synthetic	biologists	like	it.		
While	 I	 did	not	 encounter	 anyone	within	 the	Centre	who	 spoke	of	 either	
loving	or	hating	synthetic	biology’s	language,	I	did	encounter	some	who	were	
ambivalent	 towards	 it	or	 feared	 it	would	prove	detrimental	 to	 the	 field.	This	
discomfort	 may	 have	 been	 due	 to	 a	 perceived	 disjuncture	 between	 the	
language	 itself	 and	 the	 underlying	 biological	 reality	 it	 was	 supposed	 to	
represent.	De	Lorenzo	and	Danchin	highlight	such	a	concern	in	relation	to	the	
synthetic	 biology	 concepts	 PoPS70 	and	 RiPS,71 	claiming,	 “they	 represent	 a	
straight	 and	 overtly	 simplistic	 projection	 of	 electrical	 engineering	 concepts	
into	supposedly	biological	counterparts”	(2008:	824).	However,	language	use	is	
not	 the	 only	 area	 where	 the	 overly	 simplistic	 projection	 of	 engineering	
concepts	 onto	 biology	has	 proved	problematic.	As	 I	 shall	 discuss	 below,	 the	
ideas	that	such	engineering	language	have	heralded	into	biology,	that	biology	
is	 ultimately	 engineerable,	 are	 shaping	 both	 wet-lab	 and	 dry-lab72	practices,	
but	not	without	modification,	compromise,	and	constraint.		
Where’s	the	engineering?	
When	I	first	entered	the	Centre’s	laboratories	to	undertake	my	fieldwork	it	
had	been	seven	years	since	I	had	finished	my	own	studies	in	biochemistry,	but	
the	 smell	 that	 greeted	 me	 immediately	 transported	 me	 back	 to	 my	 hours	
standing	at	a	laboratory	bench.	The	smell	is	hard	to	describe,	slightly	vinegary	
																																								 								
70	PoPS	stands	for	polymerase	per	second,	a	quantitative	measure	of	the	input/output	signals	
of	genetic	circuits.	
71	RiPS	stands	for	ribosomes	per	second,	referring	to	the	flow	of	translation	machinery	through	
messenger	RNA.	
72	“Wet-lab”	refers	to	the	laboratory	and	is	contrasted	with	“dry-lab”	where	computational	and	
modelling	work	is	undertaken.	
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and	 not	 entirely	 unpleasant,	 but	 instantly	 recognisable	 as	 belonging	 to	 a	
biological	laboratory.	Every	weekday	morning	for	seven	months	I	would	arrive	
on	campus	early,	before	most	of	the	Centre’s	residents,	and	make	my	way	up	
to	 the	 Centre’s	 offices	 and	 laboratories	 on	 the	 six	 floor	 of	 the	 Engineering	
Building,	and	everyday	 I	would	encounter	 that	 smell.	The	 senior	 researchers	
and	 lecturers	 would	 arrive	 first	 and	 then,	 as	 the	 morning	 advanced,	 the	
masters	and	doctoral	 students	would	 file	 in,	and	 the	offices	and	 laboratories	
would	start	to	fill	up.		
Despite	how	busy	they	would	become,	the	labs	were	generally	quiet	places,	
filled	 with	 white-coated	 individuals	 hovering	 around	 benches,	 working	
independently.	 Spectrophotometers	 would	 beep,	 freezers	 would	 hum,	 and	
centrifuges	 would	 whir.	 The	 occasional	 joke,	 or	 question	 would	 unite	 the	
inhabitants	of	one	of	the	glass-walled	laboratories	in	conversation.	Such	as	the	
time	when	the	PCR	machine	mysteriously	started	displaying	the	year	as	1979,	a	
cause	 of	 great	 hilarity	 as	 this	 time	 jump	 landed	 four	 years	 before	 PCR	 was	
invented.	However,	once	the	laughing,	or	problem	solving,	subsided	everyone	
would	return	silently	to	his	or	her	experiments.	Running	assay	after	assay,	gel	
after	gel,	the	synthetic	biologists	would	toil	away	in	the	laboratories	late	into	
the	evenings	and	over	many	weekends.	
Milling	 around	 the	 Centre’s	 laboratories,	 providing	 assistance	 with	
electrophoresis	 gels,	 PCR	 runs,	 and	 protein	 assays,	 I	 initially	 felt	 a	 tad	
confused.	For,	despite	 the	synthetic	biology	discourse	and	rhetoric	discussed	
above,	 at	 first	 glance	 the	 Centre’s	 laboratories	 appeared	 to	 be	 just	 like	 any	
other	life	science	laboratories,	 filled	with	the	same	sorts	of	people,	doing	the	
same	 sorts	 of	 tasks.	 Thus,	 given	 that	 synthetic	 biology	 defines	 itself	 by	 it’s	
hybridisation	 of	 biology	 with	 engineering,	 where,	 I	 asked	 myself,	 was	 the	
engineering?	 For,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 the	 Robot	 (which	 I	 shall	 discuss	
below),	there	was	nothing	that	I	could	immediately	identify	within	the	wet-lab	
that	 would	 amount	 to	 my	 naïvely	 mechanistic	 notions	 of	 ‘engineering.’	
Concerned	that	I	was	missing	something	I	asked	Andrew	to	point	me	towards	
the	engineering	and	he	patiently	replied:	
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If	 you	 pin	 down	 someone	 working	 in	 the	 lab	 here	 and	 said,	 ‘what	
engineering	are	 you	doing	 right	now?’	 .	 .	 .	 they	wouldn’t	 know.	But	
once	you	work	in	the	field	it	does	seem	like	the	stuff	you’re	doing	that	
is	 engineering,	 like	 standardisation	 .	 .	 .	 that’s	 all	 come	 from	
engineering,	 characterisation	 on	 that	 page	 [pointing	 to	 the	
datasheet	he	was	working	on],	engineering.	But	.	.	.	you	kind	of	take	
it	for	granted	.	.	.	like	this	is	how	it	should	be	done	.	.	.	Engineering	is	
a	way	of	life	.	.	.	it’s	an	approach,	and	[synthetic	biology]	is	using	an	
engineering	approach.		
(Andrew,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
It	was	the	logical,	taken	for	granted,	though	not	immediately	apparent	nor	
easily	 identifiable,	approach,	which	Andrew	spoke	of,	 that	I	needed	to	get	to	
grips	with.	So,	with	Andrew’s	assessment	ringing	 in	my	ears,	 I	began	to	 look	
more	closely	in	order	to	explore	this	so-called	engineering	approach	and	how	
synthetic	biology’s	drive	 to	apply	 it	was	not	only	manifest	 in	 their	 language,	
but	also	within	the	physical	laboratory	environment.	
Engineers	in	lab	coats	
Perhaps	the	most	significant	outcome	of	the	drive	to	hybridise	biology	and	
engineering	is,	as	shall	be	addressed	in	chapter	six,	the	presence	of	engineers	
within	 the	 laboratories.	However,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 engineers	 have	
little	 or	 no	 background	 in	 biology,	 in	 their	 white	 lab	 coats	 and	 brightly	
coloured	 latex	gloves,	 they	are	 visually	 indistinguishable	 from	 the	biologists.	
Yet,	 if	 you	watch	 them	 closely	 as	 they	work	 at	 the	 bench,	 there	 is	 a	 telltale	
hesitancy	 about	 them	 that	 marks	 them	 out	 from	 the	 biologists.	 This	
uncertainty	is	thoroughly	understandable	given	that	some	of	these	individuals	
have	 never	 before	 set	 foot	 in	 a	 laboratory,	 nor	 experimented	 with	 living	
organisms,	and	 thus	 they	are	 learning	very	basic	 laboratory	practices	 for	 the	
first	time.		
Since	 all	 synthetic	 biology	 projects	 within	 the	 Centre	 require	 aspects	 of	
both	biology	and	engineering,	all	of	the	Centre’s	synthetic	biologists,	including	
those	from	engineering	backgrounds,	require	at	least	a	passing	familiarity	with	
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biology,	just	as	they	all	require	at	least	basic	knowledge	of	modelling.	Some	of	
those	 from	engineering,	especially	 those	 in	senior	positions,	spend	very	 little	
time	in	the	laboratories,	but	others,	such	as	the	iGEM,	Masters,	and	Doctoral	
students	 do,	 after	 their	 crash	 courses	 in	 biology	 and	 lab	 practices,	 begin	 to	
spend	 a	 significant	 proportion	 of	 their	 time	 at	 the	 bench.	 With	 time	 their	
hesitancy	 fades,	 and	 they	 begin	 to	 perform	 their	 experiments	with	 ease	 and	
confidence,	but	this	mix	of	biologists	and	engineers	within	the	laboratories	is	
nonetheless	unusual.	Indeed	it	is	a	feature	that,	in	itself,	sets	the	Centre	apart	
from	other	 life	science	 laboratories	I	was	used	to.	However	a	more	headline-
grabbing	factor	than	the	presence	of	engineers	in	biological	laboratories	is	the	
presence	of	engineering	driven	projects.	
Engineering	biology	in	practice		
As	Andrew	noted	above,	 the	engineering	within	 synthetic	biology	 is	most	
readily	observable	in	the	use	and	development	of	standardised	parts	and	their	
characterisation.	 Such	 parts	 were,	 as	 I	 will	 address	 below,	 designed,	
constructed,	 and	 characterised	within	 the	 Centre,	 but	what	 struck	me	most	
when	I	 first	entered	the	Centre,	was	 that	 they	would	also	arrive	 through	the	
mail.	 On	 my	 first	 day	 as	 a	 Centre	 resident	 I	 accompanied	 Sara	 (doctoral	
student,	biology)	 to	 fetch	 the	Centre’s	parcels	 from	the	University	mailroom	
on	the	other	side	of	campus.	The	parcels	themselves	were	not	extraordinary,	
but	the	synthetic	genetic	constructs	they	contained	struck	me	as	such	a	clear	
sign	of	synthetic	biology’s	engineering	approach.	These	sections	of	DNA	had	
been	 designed	 and	 ordered	 via	 computer	 and	 then	 assembled	 by	 a	 DNA	
synthesis	company	before	being	sent	via	the	post	to	arrive	within	a	matter	of	
days	of	the	order.	I	found	it	strange	to	think	of	these	tiny	stretches	of	designed	
DNA	 being	 pieced	 together,	 nucleotide	 by	 nucleotide,	 before	 winging	 their	
way	 through	 the	postal	 service	 to	be	 inserted	 into	awaiting	cellular	 ‘chassis.’	
Yet,	working	alongside	the	synthetic	biologists	at	the	bench,	watching	them	as	
they	 sought	 to	 characterise	 their	 ‘parts,’	 listening	 as	 they	 discussed	 the	
benefits	 of	 various	 chassis,	 and	 assisting	 them	 as	 they	 ran	 repetition	 after	
repetition	of	their	experiments,	seeking	results	to	plug	into	their	mathematical	
 143 
models,	I	came	to	see	that	while	such	engineering	was	present	in	their	work	it	
was	more	complex	that	the	prevailing	rhetoric	permits.		
Indeed,	 in	response	to	the	growing	ambivalence	towards	the	 ‘Endy’	model	
of	engineering	biology,	more	nuanced	approaches	to	engineering	biology	have	
begun	to	crop	up	in	the	synthetic	biology	literature	(Silver	et	al.	2014;	Way	et	
al.	 2014)	 and	 in	 the	 research	 projects	 of	 those	 in	 the	 Centre.	Where,	 rather	
than	turn	their	backs	on	the	notion	of	parts,	devices,	and	systems,	many	at	the	
Centre	are	tackling	the	problems	they	perceive	with	the	abstraction	hierarchy	
by	 modifying	 this	 approach	 in	 ways	 they	 deem	 more	 appropriate.	 Two	
doctoral	students	in	particular,	David	and	Christian,	are	clear	examples	of	this	
strategy	in	practice.	
During	 an	 otherwise	 ordinary	 day	 in	 the	 usually	 quiet	 laboratory	 David	
started	getting	very	excited	about	his	data,	loudly	exclaiming	“phwoar!	That	is	
heaven!”	 as	 he	 examined	 an	 excel	 spreadsheet	 overlaid	 with	 small,	 colour-
coded	 line	 graphs.	 David	 had	 been	 exploring	 growth	 rates	 of	 E.	 coli	 cell	
cultures	at	different	volumes	(200µL	and	100µL)	and	his	graphs,	plotted	from	
the	 plate	 reader	 data,	 were	 consistently	 showing	 the	 100µL	 samples	 to	 be	
growing	quickly	 before	 reaching	 a	 stationary	 state,	while	 the	 200µL	 samples	
were	growing	more	slowly	and	not	reaching	a	stationary	state.	I	asked	David	
why	those	with	a	lower	volume	grew	faster	and	he	explained	that,	due	to	their	
lower	 volume,	 there	 was	 room	 for	 a	 greater	 air	 supply	 and	 thus	 they	 were	
growing	 aerobically,	 whereas	 the	 higher	 volume	 cultures	 were	 growing	
anaerobically.		
The	importance	of	such	work	to	synthetic	biology,	David	explained,	is	that	
most	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	 standardised	 parts	 are	 being	 characterised	while	
growing	 aerobically	 in	 flasks	 however,	 should	 they	 be	 scaled	 up	 for	 high	
throughput	production	processes	they	would	likely	be	grown	anaerobically	in	
huge	vats.	Thus	only	knowing	how	they	perform	aerobically	is,	David	argued,	
“useless.”	 As	 you	 might	 have	 gathered,	 given	 his	 focus	 on	 characterisation,	
David’s	 doctoral	 research	 falls	 well	 within	 the	 parts	 approach	 to	 synthetic	
biology.	Specifically	he	is	working	on	mapping	out	how	different	constitutive	
(rather	than	induced)	promoters	work	under	a	range	of	conditions.	As	part	of	
 144 
his	experiments	he	is	testing	each	of	three	different	strains	of	E.	coli	 in	three	
different	media	and	examining	growth,	both	aerobic	verses	anaerobic	growth,	
and	 the	 transfer	 from	 logarithmic	 to	 stationary	 growth.	 His	 interest	 in	 cell	
culture	 growth	 stems	 from	 his	 observations	 that	 modellers	 often	 feed	 into	
their	models	 the	assumption	that	 the	growth	 is	consistent,	 something	which	
David	is	busy	proving	does	not	match	the	biological	reality.	Later	on	the	same	
day,	still	high	on	his	results,	David	laid	out	for	me	his	idea	of	a	useful	synthetic	
biology	project.	A	project	 that	would	see	the	development	of	promoters	 that	
work	between	certain	parameters	of	activity,	rather	than	only	at	specific	levels	
of	 activity.	 This,	 David	 contends,	 would	 allow	 for	 the	 fluctuation	 caused	 by	
different	growth	phases	and	thus	would	be	a	way	of	shifting	synthetic	biology’s	
engineering	work	so	that	it	is	more	in	line	with	the	biological	reality.		
Like	 David,	 Christian’s	 doctoral	 research	 also	 falls	 within	 the	 parts	
approach	to	synthetic	biology	and,	also	like	David,	Christian	is	busy	trying	to	
correct	 some	 of	 the	 mistaken	 assumptions	 of	 synthetic	 biologists	 who	 hail	
from	engineering.	Christian	is	working	on	developing	both	a	cell-free	system,	
which	can	be	used	for	bio-part	characterisation,	and	a	biosensor	for	detecting	
the	presence	of	pathogenic	biofilms	that	can	spread	infection.	Christian’s	 lab	
work	 involved	 mixing	 up	 stocks	 of	 his	 cell-free	 substrate,	 a	 chemical	 soup	
assembled	using	the	contents	of	various	bottles	found	on	the	shelf	above	him,	
and	in	the	freezer	below.	The	‘soup’	itself	includes	all	of	the	transcription	and	
translation	‘machinery’	taken	from	lysed	cells,	but	no	actual	living	cells	and	no	
extraneous	material	such	as	cellular	membranes.	To	this	he	adds	the	DNA	of	
interest,	 the	 ‘biopart,’	 and	 waits	 to	 measure	 the	 florescent	 output	 of	 the	
incorporated	GFP73	in	order	to	determine	whether	or	not	the	protein	coded	for	
by	the	DNA	has	been	transcribed	and	translated.		
Christian	hopes	 to	 show	 that	using	his	 cell-free	 system	 is	both	easier	 and	
more	efficient	 than	using	 the	 in	vivo	systems,	which	are	 the	current	norm.74	
																																								 								
73	GFP	 stands	 for	 green	 fluorescent	 protein,	 a	 protein	 first	 isolated	 from	 jellyfish	 that	 glows	
green	under	light	in	the	range	of	blue	to	ultraviolet.	For	more	information	see	Tsien	(1998).	
74	The	in	vivo	system	requires	PCR,	then	the	creation	of	a	vector,	insertion	of	the	vector	into	a	
cell	and	then	testing,	whereas	the	cell-free	system	directly	uses	the	PCR	products	for	testing.	
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But	more	 than	 just	 being	 faster	 and	 easier,	 Christian	 believes	 his	 system	 is	
more	 useful	 and	 appropriate	 for	 synthetic	 biology.	 The	 current	 system,	
Christian	explained	to	me,	produces	vast	amounts	of	 information	about	each	
part	being	tested,	however	this	information	is	frequently	useless	as	it	is	based	
on	 the	 idea,	drawn	 from	engineering,	 that	knowing	how	the	part	behaves	 in	
isolation	 is	 meaningful.	 Whereas	 Christian	 maintains	 that	 what	 you	 really	
need	 to	 know,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 bioparts,	 is	 how	 they	 behave	 when	 they	
interact	with,	and	alter,	each	other.		
The	 cell-free	 system	 Christian	 is	 working	 on	 would	 instead	 provide	 a	
skeleton	list	of	characterisation	information	about	the	part	which,	he	believes,	
would	be	enough	to	be	useful	in	modelling	and	would	give	you	an	idea	of	its	
function,	 but	 without	 spending	 too	 much	 time	 getting	 the	 detailed,	 and	
ultimately	useless,	information.	Once	parts	had	been	combined	into	systems,	
Christian	asserted,	it	would	make	more	sense	to	characterise	them	more	fully.	
Yet	despite	his	conviction,	Christian	was	concerned	that	he	would	not	be	able	
to	make	a	strong	enough	argument	for	his	case	to	convince	those	within	the	
discipline	 who	 were	 committed	 to	 the	 current	 system.	 Christian’s	 interest	
clearly	 lay	 in	 this	 foundational	 aspect	of	his	project,	however	his	 supervisor,	
Malcolm,	had	insisted	that	he	‘tack	on’	the	biosensor	work	in	order	to	have	an	
application.	This	Christian	put	down	to	the	Centre’s	“obsession”	with	the	need	
for	synthetic	biology	applications	to	come	out	of	the	research	they	performed.	
These	projects	are	but	two	of	the	many	examples	I	encountered	within	the	
Centre	 where	 the	 engineering	 approach,	 specifically	 the	 parts	 approach	 to	
synthetic	biology,	was	strongly	evident.	There	were	others	within	the	Centre	
who,	 for	 example,	 undertook	 promoter	 characterisation	 under	 various	
conditions,	 addressed	 modular	 chromosome	 assembly	 methods,	 examined	
device-chassis	 interactions,	 and	 designed	 cell-free	 microfluidic	 systems	 for	
part	 characterisation.	 However	 I	 have	 focused	 on	 David	 and	 Christian’s	
projects	here	as	they	highlight	some	of	the	myriad	ways	that	synthetic	biology	
projects	are	being	shaped	by	the	discipline’s	engineering	approach.	They	also	
highlight	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 those	 at	 the	 Centre	 were	 trying	 to	modify	 the	
engineering	approach	in	order	to	make	it	more	appropriate	for	the	realities	of	
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biology,	 rather	 than	 the	 ideals	of	engineering.	Yet,	despite	 the	complexity	of	
applying	an	engineering	approach	to	synthetic	biology,	which	both	David	and	
Christian	encountered	and	attempted	to	navigate,	their	projects	also	indicated	
the	ways	in	which	this	same	engineering	approach	is	shaping	the	practical	and	
procedural	 norms	 of	 those	 at	 the	 Centre.	 The	 questions	 they	 ask,	 the	
experiments	 they	 run,	 the	 equipment	 they	use,	 the	models	 they	design,	 and	
the	data	they	produce	are	all,	as	we	shall	see,	underpinned	by	their	embrace	of	
the	engineering	approach.	
Questions	
Alan,	 one	 of	 the	 Centre	 directors,	 is	 adamant	 that	 “synthetic	 biology	 is	 a	
technology	not	a	science”	and	that,	in	regards	to	bioparts,	“if	you’ve	got	input-
output	characteristics,	then	that’s	enough,	you	don’t	need	to	know	what	goes	on	
inside.”	 Admittedly	 Alan	 hails	 from	 engineering	 himself,	 and	 is	 enamoured	
with	 the	 perceived	 potential	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	 engineering	 approach.	
However,	 as	 a	 guiding	 voice	 for	 the	 Centre	 his	 proclamation	 has	 power,	
shaping	 the	 questions	 those	 within	 the	 Centre	 ask,	 and	 the	 projects	 they	
undertake.	As	David	 (doctoral	 student,	 biology)	 explained,	 in	 regards	 to	 the	
engineering	 approach	 to	 biology	 that	 Alan	 heavily	 promotes,	 “it’s	 basically	
changed	a	‘what’	question	to	a	‘how’	question.”	David	is	referring	here	to	a	shift	
from	the	analytical	questions	predominant	in	biology,	which	address	‘what’	is	
happening	in	a	system,	to	a	greater	focus	on	‘how’	to	make	the	system	work.	
This	shift	towards	addressing	how	to	make	systems	work	in	order	to	use	them	
for	the	purposes	of	production,	rather	than	exploring	the	systems	themselves	
for	 the	 purpose	 of	 knowledge	 generation,	 is	 evident	 in	 the	 drive	 to	
characterise	bioparts	that	underlies	both	David	and	Christian’s	projects.	It	also	
underlies	the	pressure	Christian	felt	to	direct	his	project	towards	designing	an	
application	rather	than	the	foundational	techniques	he	is	more	interested	in.	
Experiments	
The	 second	 way	 in	 which	 I	 observed	 the	 application	 of	 an	 engineering	
approach	 influencing	 the	 synthetic	 biologists’	 practice	 involved	 the	
experimental	 focus	 of	 their	 wet-lab	 work.	 The	 synthetic	 biologists	 were	 not	
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just	shaping	their	research	questions	around	this	approach,	but	also	the	way	
they	went	about	exploring	these	questions.	As	detailed	above,	David	was	not	
only	asking	research	questions	about	how	best	to	characterise	bioparts,	he	was	
also	 designing	 his	 characterisation	 experiments	 with	 an	 eye	 on	 which	
experiments	 would	 best	 provide	 meaningful	 data	 for	 future	 industrial	
production	 processes,	 rather	 than	 on	which	 experiments	 would	 provide	 the	
most	biologically	interesting	data.	
For	 others	within	 the	Centre,	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 engineering	 approach	 on	
their	wet-lab	experiments	saw	them	concentrating	on	aspects	of	interest	to	the	
modellers,	 but	 of	 no	 real	 interest	 for	 biologists.	 For	 Peter	 this	 meant	
experimentally	exploring	elements	of	a	system	that	he	would	not	investigate	if	
he	were	still	doing	biology.	
In	 terms	of	designing	systems	 .	 .	 .	 it’s	not	 just	about	characterising	
this	part	it’s	about	looking	at	what	else	is	around	that	part	and	how	
that	influences	its	behaviour	.	.	.	as	a	biologist	you	would	not	bother	
doing	that	experiment.		
(Peter,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
The	robot	
A	 further,	 very	 visible	 sign	 of	 the	 Centre’s	 adherence	 to	 the	 engineering	
approach,	 and	 to	 the	goal	 of	 characterising	bioparts,	was	 the	 robot.	A	huge,	
heavy	piece	of	equipment	that	sat	upon	its	own	reinforced	bench	along	a	wall	
of	 one	 of	 the	 laboratories.	Alan	 (senior	 researcher,	 engineering)	 had	bought	
the	robot	for	‘his’	lab,	though	I	never	once	saw	him	in	there.	He	was,	perhaps,	
the	member	of	 the	Centre	 least	acquainted	with	 the	practices	of	a	biological	
laboratory,	but	he	knew	machines,	and	the	idea	of	automating	and	validating	
processes	and	results	using	a	high	throughput	robot	appealed	to	him.	At	least	
that	is	how	David,	who	was	one	of	his	doctoral	students,	explained	it	to	me.	It	
was	hoped	 that	 the	 robot	would	help	with	 some	of	 synthetic	biology’s	more	
engineering	driven	quests,	such	as	standardising	and	characterising	biological	
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parts.	The	problem	was	that	not	many	people	knew	how	to	work	the	robot.75	
However	this	did	not	stop	Alan	buying	another	one,	so	that	by	the	end	of	my	
fieldwork	there	were	two	robots,	one	for	characterisation	work,	called	C3PO,	
and	one	for	assembly	work	called,	unsurprisingly,	R2D2.	It	was	widely	hoped	
that,	with	time	and	training,	these	two	would	become	a	central	element	of	the	
Centre’s	 experimental	 approach	 and	 data	 production.	 This	 hope	 was	 clear	
whenever	 groups	 from	 Industry,	 Engineering	 guilds,	 or	 other	 international	
Synthetic	Biology	 centres	would	 visit	 the	Centre.	 For	 at	 these	 times,	 despite	
being	seldom	used,	the	robots	became	a	highlighted,	and	much	admired,	tour	
stop.	
Data	
As	 with	 the	 research	 questions	 and	 experiments,	 taking	 an	 ‘engineering’	
approach	to	biology,	and	embracing	the	kind	of	collaboration	required	by	the	
field,	also	impacted	on	the	data	gathered	in	the	wet-lab.	At	almost	any	time	of	
the	 day	 you	 could	 find	 a	member	 of	 the	 Centre	 hovering	 over	 a	 timer	 and	
carefully	 documenting,	 among	 other	 things,	 protein	 expression	 levels	 or	
optical	 density	 readings.	 Documenting	 such	 information	 is	 common	 in	
biology,	but	due	to	the	desire	for	collaboration	with	the	dry-lab	work,	several	
of	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	 insisted	 that	 synthetic	 biology	
demands	 more	 systematic,	 rigorous	 measurements,	 more	 repeats	 of	
experiments,	 more	 standardisation,	 and	 more	 precision	 within	 the	 wet-lab	
work	than	biology.	As	Sara	said:	
If	you	want	to	take	[your	experimental	data]	into	the	dry	lab	and	do	
the	modelling	.	 .	 .	everything	has	to	be	super-accurate.	You	don’t	do	
that	necessarily	 if	 you	 just	want	 to	express	a	protein	 in	 the	 lab	 .	 .	 .	
you	don’t	do	all	the	timing	exactly.	[But]	you	will	have	to	do	that	 if	
you’re	going	to	use	the	results	in	your	model.		
(Sara,	doctoral	student,	engineering)	
																																								 								
75	At	least,	they	didn’t	at	the	time	that	I	started	my	fieldwork.	
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Thus	 from	my	 observations	 of	 their	 day-to-day	work	 it	 definitely	 seemed	
that,	 for	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 working	 in	 the	 Centre,	 applying	 an	
engineering	 approach	 was	 not	 just	 rhetoric	 and	 discourse	 but	 rather	 was	
tangibly	 shaping	 their	 practices.	 Crafting	 the	 procedural	 norms	 of	 the	
discipline’s	 repertoire,	 and	 thus	 strengthening	 its	 emergence.	 Indeed,	 even	
those	who	were	uncertain	of	the	applicability	of	the	engineering	approach,	as	
Endy	 describes	 it,	 were	 working	 towards	modifying	 the	 approach	 so	 that	 it	
would	work.	However	 I	 also	 came	 to	 see	 that,	 for	 the	 synthetic	biologists	 at	
the	Centre,	‘taking	an	engineering	approach	to	biology’	equated	to	more	than	
just	altering	their	practices.	Indeed,	underpinning	their	shifts	in	practice	was,	I	
discovered,	a	shift	in	their	way	of	thinking	about	the	whole	process	of	‘doing’	
and	 interacting	with	biology.	A	conceptual	 shift	 towards	 rationality	 that	was	
likewise	being	shaped	by	the	so-called	engineering	approach.	
Rational	design	
The	 equation	 “Synthetic	 Biology	 =	 Engineering	 Biology”	 was	 written	 in	
marker	pen	at	the	top	of	the	whiteboard	in	Grant’s	office.	Contained,	as	it	was,	
within	a	boxed	outline	it	was	clearly	considered	both	important	and	not	to	be	
erased.	 Grant,	 an	 engineer	 by	 training	 with	 little	 previous	 knowledge	 of	
biology,	was	the	Centre’s	resident	modelling	expert	who	embraced	the	notion	
of	engineering	biology	as	a	practical	strategy	central	 to	the	synthetic	biology	
endeavour.	 This	 perspective,	 I	 came	 to	 learn,	 was	 widely	 shared	 by	 his	
colleagues	in	the	Centre,	as	well	as	others	within	the	broader	synthetic	biology	
community.	 Indeed,	 during	my	 fieldwork	 I	 encountered	 the	 ‘engineering	 of	
biology’	 being	 described	 as	 both	 a	 “revolution	 for	 biotechnology”	 (Malcolm,	
senior	 researcher,	 biology),	 and	 as	 having	 “moved	 past	 simple	 metaphor	 to	
become	a	reality”	(de	Lorenzo	2010).	Central	to	this	perceived	“revolution”	and	
new	“reality”	were	the	tactics	synthetic	biology	was	drawing	from	engineering	
with	 the	 hope	 of	 “controlling	 biology”	 (George,	 postdoctoral	 researcher,	
engineering)	 and	 thus	 increasing	 the	 efficiency,	 efficacy,	 and	 rigour	 of	
synthetic	 biology’s	 attempts	 to	 build	 complex	 biological	 systems.	 As	 Grant	
described	it:	
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It’s	bringing	this	level	of	rigour	.	.	.	into	biology.	So	it’s	trying	to	build	
systems	 of	 increasing	 complexity	 using	 a	 classical	 engineering	
approach,	 and	 actually	 seeing	 the	 fruit	 of	 it.	 Synthetic	 biologists	
really	do	get	 the	point	 that	 if	 you	 take	a	 rigorous	approach	 for	 the	
building	 of	 this	 complex	 system	 you	 can	 indeed	 increase	 the	
complexity	in	a	much	more	efficient	way	than	it	would	be	by	just	trial	
and	error.	
(Grant,	senior	researcher,	engineering)	
Taking	 such	 a	 rigorous	 engineering-inspired,	 research	 approach,	 it	 was	
hoped,	would	simplify	 ‘construction’	within	synthetic	biology,	making	 it	 “the	
biological	 equivalent	 of	 assembling	 Ikea	 furniture”	 (Martin,	 senior	 researcher,	
biology),	while	also	supporting	the	design	and	realisation	of	biologically	novel	
functions	within	synthetic	biology’s	‘products.’	As	Michael	put	it:	
It’s	like,	let’s	build	new	functions,	let’s	make	nature	do	what	it	doesn’t	
do	.	.	.	what	we	haven’t	observed	it	to	do	yet	.	.	.	let’s	try	to	rewire	or	
re-purpose	the	way	that	biology	works,	to	do	new	things,	interesting	
things,	useful	things.		
(Michael,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
The	idea	of	producing	“new,”	“interesting,”	and	“useful”	things	was,	from	what	I	
could	tell,	behind	much	of	the	enthusiasm	for	synthetic	biology’s	catch-phrase	
‘engineering	 approach.’	 And	 the	 driving	 concept	 within	 this	 approach	 was	
‘rationality.’	 Whenever	 conversation,	 during	 both	 interviews	 and	 informal	
discussions,	turned	to	what	it	meant	to	engineer	biology,	‘rationality’	and	the	
taking	of	a	‘rational	approach’	was	almost	always	uttered.	Lewis,	for	example,	
described	synthetic	biology’s	engineering	approach	as	follows.	
It’s	the	ethos	of	engineering,	.	.	.	the	idea	that	you	build	something	up	
and	 the	 incorporation	 of	modelling	 and	 sort	 of	 rational	 design	 .	 .	 .	
rational	design	is	really	key.	
(Lewis,	doctoral	student,	engineering)		
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For	many,	‘rationality’	appeared	to	have	become	shorthand	for	describing	the	
Centre’s	 ‘engineering	 approach’	 to	 biology,	 an	 approach	 described	 as	
embracing	rigor,	reason,	and	logic.		
The	design	cycle	
Central	to	many	of	the	Centre’s	inhabitants’	views	of	how	one	incorporates	
a	rational	approach	into	synthetic	biology	is	what	they	term,	the	design	cycle,	
the	engineering	cycle,	or	the	engineering	design	cycle.	Christian,	for	example,	
described	the	rational	approach	like	this:	
So	the	cycle’s	the	best	way	to	define	it	.	.	.	you	go	from	design	into	the	
modelling	 and	 into	 the	 construction	 and	 into	 characterisation	 of	
each	of	the	individual	parts,	and	then	.	.	.	iterations	of	that	process.	I	
guess	that’s	what’s	new,	right?	Normally	they	do	things	in	biology	by	
brute	force.		
(Christian,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
Here	 Christian	 describes	 this	 engineering-derived	 iterative	 process	 to	
developing,	testing,	and	evaluating	‘products,’	as	what	makes	synthetic	biology	
“new,”	 setting	 it	 apart	 from	 biology’s,	 apparently	 inferior,	 “brute	 force”	
approach.	As	depicted	 in	 figure	6,	 this	 design	 cycle,	 frequently	 rolled	out	 in	
the	Centre’s	external	presentations	to	describe	their	approach,	begins	with	the	
identification	 of	 the	 specifications	 a	 ‘product’	 must	 include.	 These	
specifications	 are	 then	 incorporated	 into	 a	design	 for	 the	 ‘product,’	which	 is	
subsequently	 modelled	 before	 being	 ‘assembled.’	 The	 physical	 ‘product’	 is	
then,	 at	 least	 in	 theory,	 tested	 and	 the	 results	 are	 used	 to	 adjust	 the	
specifications	for	the	next	round	of	‘tweaking’	which	in	turn	alters	the	design,	
and	so	on	and	so	forth	until	they	are	satisfied	with	the	outcome.	The	premise	
is	 that	 adherence	 to	 this	 cycle	 of	 activities	 is	 the	most	 efficient	 and	 rational	
way	to	design	and	produce	an	effective	synthetic	biology	‘product.’	
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However	from	my	observations	of	the	day-to-day	work	within	the	Centre,	it	
was	apparent	that	the	practice	of	synthetic	biology	was	much	messier	than	it	
was	 presented	 to	 be.	 For	 despite	 using	 the	 design	 cycle	 as	 a	 way	 of	
distinguishing	themselves	from	other	areas	of	biology,	during	my	fieldwork	I	
observed	 no	 examples	 of	 it	 being	 systematically	 applied.	 The	 challenging	
aspect	 for	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 attempting	 to	 diligently	 follow	 the	design	
cycle’s	 steps	 was	 the	 modelling.	 As	 several	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	
acknowledged,	 undertaking	 the	 modelling	 before	 the	 ‘wet-lab’	 work,	 and	
actually	 using	 it	 to	 inform	 which	 experiments	 should	 be	 undertaken,	 was	
currently	an	ambitious	goal	rather	than	an	accurate	depiction	of	their	process.		
That’s	like	the	ultimate	goal	isn’t	it,	to	be	able	to	have	a	system,	but	
to	model	 it	 first	 .	 .	 .	but	at	 the	moment	obviously	you	need	data	 to	
model	and	it’s	that	kind	of	a	‘chicken	egg’	thing.		
(Anna,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
You	can’t	apply	the	engineering	cycle.	You	can	write	that	you	apply	
it.	 And	 you	 can,	 but	 you	 skip	 the	 modelling	 bit	 basically.	 The	
specifications,	'this	with	this'	kind	of	thing,	that’s	all	fine,	but	you	are	
missing	out	.	.	.	the	modelling,	which	isn’t	in	there,	yet.		
(Martin,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
Figure	6:	The	engineering	design	cycle	as	theoretically	applied	
to	synthetic	biology	within	the	Centre	
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Here	Anna	contends	that	the	goal	of	modelling	a	system	before	you	‘build’	it	is	
currently	thwarted	by	the	‘chicken	or	egg’	dilemma	that	such	models	need	to	
be	 based	 on	 the	 data	 produced	 by	 the	 systems	 they	 are	 intended	 to	 be	
designing.	While	Martin	argues	that	this	situation	currently	undermines	their	
ability	to	apply,	if	not	their	ability	to	claim	to	have	applied,	the	design	cycle.		
During	my	time	in	the	Centre	I	observed	two	such	occasions	where,	during	
public	presentations,	 it	was	claimed	that	the	design	cycle	had	been	faithfully	
applied	in	a	project,	but	where	in	reality,	the	modelling	was	undertaken	after	
the	 experimentation	and	was	 then	 slotted	 in	 as	 if	 it	had	preceded	 it.	This	 is	
arguably	 an	 attempt	 to	 portray	 synthetic	 biology	 as	 more	 systematic,	 and	
‘rational’	than	it	currently	is,	and	thus	to	align	it	with	the	vision	of	engineering	
that	 these	 synthetic	 biologists	 are	 embracing.	 It	 is	 therefore	 tempting	 to	
proclaim	that,	given	this	gap	between	the	practice	of	synthetic	biology	and	its	
presentation	 as	 a	 rational,	 engineering	 discipline,	 the	 practice	 of	 synthetic	
biology	 and	 engineering	 have	 little	 in	 common.	 However	 several	
ethnographers	 have	 highlighted	 similar	 disparities	 between	 practice	 and	
presentation	within	engineering.		
Bucciarelli	(1994)	for	example	contends	that	the	vision	of	engineering	as	a	
rational,	efficient,	and	systematic	endeavour	does	not	necessarily	capture	how	
engineering	 is	 really	 practiced,	 but	 rather	 how	 it	 presents	 itself.	 Bucciarelli	
argues	that	engineering	is,	in	practice,	much	messier	and	more	reliant	on	trial	
and	error	than	engineers	usually	acknowledge,	an	argument	that	is	supported	
by	the	works	of	Ravaille	and	Vinck	(2003),	and	Blanco	(2003),	who	show	the	
design	 process	 in	 industrial	 engineering	 to	 be	 far	 from	 a	 linear,	 sequential	
process.	Furthermore,	Bucciarelli	highlights	the	prevalence	of,	what	he	terms,	
“the	 incestuous	 character	 of	 this	 model-making	 process”	 (1994:	 57)	 within	
engineering	 (“the	 model	 designed	 to	 verify	 field	 data;	 the	 data,	 in	 turn,	
providing	 a	 reference	 for	 the	model”	 (1994:	 57)),	 an	 observation	 that	 echoes	
Anna’s	 ‘chicken	 or	 egg’	 comment	 above.	 Thus	 it	 could	 be	 said	 that	 the	 gap	
between	the	reality	and	the	projected	image	of	the	discipline	aligns	synthetic	
biology	 with,	 rather	 than	 distinguish	 it	 from,	 engineering.	 Indeed,	 as	 the	
following	 section	 highlights,	 although	 modelling	 is	 a	 central	 element	 of	
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synthetic	 biology’s	 engineering	 approach,	 like	 the	 design	 cycle,	 synthetic	
biology’s	 relationship	 with	 modelling	 is	 far	 from	 straightforward	 and	
uncomplicated.		
Modelling	biology	
The	 word	 ‘modelling’	 comes	 from	 the	 Latin	modellus	 and	 has	 long	 been	
used	to	describe	a	typically	human	way	of	coping	with	reality	by	reducing	real	
world	problems	 to	 simplified,	artificial,	 representations	 (Schichl	2004).	From	
at	least	the	eighteenth	century	there	have,	however,	been	two	main	categories	
of	models,	physical	models	and	mathematical	models.	Physical	models	were,	
at	 this	 time,	 used	 to	 represent	 the	 likes	 of	 humans	 and	 the	 heavens,	 while	
mathematical	models	were	used	for	the	likes	of	commerce	and	surveying	(de	
Chadarevian	 and	 Hopwood	 2004;	 Schichl	 2004).	 Nevertheless,	 despite	 their	
differences,	 both	 types	 of	 models	 imitate	 some	 existing	 feature	 of	 art	 or	
nature,	and	both	were	predominantly	used	as	teaching	aids76	(de	Chadarevian	
and	 Hopwood	 2004).	 With	 time,	 their	 use	 extended	 to	 include	 research,	
however	until	the	twentieth	century	this	was	still	in	the	capacity	of	description	
and	 characterisation	 (Schichl	 2004).	 With	 the	 advent	 of	 computers	 there	
began	a	move	 from	using	physical	models	 to	using	 computer	 simulations	 to	
explore	phenomena,	and	as	 the	 twentieth	century	progressed,	and	computer	
power	 increased,	 the	 distinction	 between	 physical	 and	 mathematical	
modelling	 continued	 to	 blur	 (de	 Chadarevian	 and	 Hopwood	 2004).	 By	 the	
mid-twentieth	 century	 computer	 simulations	 had	 increasingly	 become	 the	
norm	in	the	physical	sciences	and	engineering,	and	the	role	of	modelling	had	
shifted	 from	 “one	 of	 problem	 description	 towards	 problem	 solving”	 (Schichl	
2004:	 31).	 However	 within	 developmental	 biology	 things	 were,	 and	 for	 that	
matter	still	are,	markedly	different.	
Unlike	 the	 physical	 sciences,	 within	 developmental	 biology	 the	 term	
‘model’	does	not	refer	to	a	mechanical	model,	a	chemical	model,	or	to	a	set	of	
																																								 								
76	For	example,	anatomy	models	were	used	to	teach	medical	students,	midwives,	and	artists,	
model	 machines	 were	 used	 to	 teach	 engineering,	 and	model	 buildings	 were	 used	 to	 teach	
architecture	(de	Chadarevian	and	Hopwood	2004).	
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equations,	 but	 rather	 to	 an	 organism.	 Model	 organisms,	 such	 as	 mice,	
Drosophila,	 and	 E.	 coli,	 are	 not	 artificial	 constructs	 and,	 unlike	 within	 the	
physical	sciences	and	engineering,	the	primary	criterion	for	their	selection	as	
models	 is	 rarely	 simplicity.	 Furthermore,	 where	 models	 in	 the	 physical	
sciences	 and	 engineering	 are	 used	 to	 represent	 a	 class	 of	 phenomena,	 in	
biology,	model	organisms	are	used	as	models	for	a	class	of	organisms	(Keller	
2002).	 Thus,	 Keller	 writes,	 biological	 modelling	 is	 sometimes	 described	 as	
“proceeding	 ‘by	 homogeny’	 rather	 than	 ‘by	 analogy’”	 (2002:	 52).	 Yet	 within	
synthetic	biology,	this	is	beginning	to	change.		
As	historian	of	biology	Michel	Morange	writes,	one	of	the	significant	ways	
in	which	synthetic	biology	is	novel	in	practice	is	that	within	synthetic	biology,	
“models	hold	the	position	that	they	traditionally	held	in	physics,	ecology	and	
evolutionary	 biology:	 they	 assist,	 support	 and	 guide	 the	 work	 of	 the	
experimenters”	 (2009:	 S52).	 It	 is	 the	 word	 ‘guide’	 here	 that	 is	 particularly	
significant	 as	 synthetic	 biology	 is,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 striving	 to	 use	
modelling,	as	engineering	does,	for	design	rather	than	for	representation.	This	
is	 evident	 in	 the	 place	 modelling	 holds	 within	 the	 design	 cycle,	 and	 the	
centrality	 of	 modelling	 within	 the	 discipline’s	 vision	 for	 its	 future.	 It	 is,	 as	
Lewis	 noted	 above,	 the	 combination	 of	 modelling	 and	 rational	 design	 that	
make	up	the	Centre’s	engineering	approach	to	biology.		
Thus	I	spoke	to	Grant,	the	resident	modelling	expert,	many	times	about	the	
process	 and	 challenges	 of	 modelling	 within	 synthetic	 biology.	 As	 Grant	
explained	 it,	 synthetic	 biology	 needs	 models	 in	 order	 to	 “efficiently	 design	
complex	 systems	 from	 the	 interconnection	 of	 well-characterised	 parts,”	 to	
“easily	predict	 the	behaviour”	of	these	complex	systems,	and	to	“propose	ways	
to	 improve	 their	 behaviour”	(Grant,	senior	researcher,	engineering).	Yet	there	
are	 “no	 set	 rules”	 for	 how	 to	 achieve	 this	 end.	 Grant,	 a	 control	 engineer,	
nevertheless	has	an	approach,	which	he	generally	follows	in	order	to	provide	
what	he	calls	“rigorous	results”	and	“performance	guarantees.”	Grant	described	
this	approach	to	me	using	 the	example	of	a	modelling	problem	he	had	been	
working	 through	 with	 his	 students,	 and	 with	 the	 advice	 of	Michael	 (senior	
researcher,	biology).	He	had	first	met	with	Michael	to	discuss	the	problem	to	
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be	modelled,	and	then	he	and	his	doctoral	students	and	postdocs	had	defined	
the	 problem	 before	 returning	 to	 the	 biologists	 to	 check	 it	 made	 biological	
sense.		
Grant	told	me	that	the	process	of	modelling	starts	with	an	outline	of	what	
you	want	to	do,	this	 is	the	design	phase	in	the	design	cycle.	In	this	case,	the	
project	was	seeking	to	maximise	the	flux	of	a	metabolic	pathway,	so	the	first	
thing	they	did	was	draw	up	a	mathematically	simplified,	and	linear,	model	of	
the	metabolic	pathway.	What	 they	wanted	 to	do	was	 to	branch	the	pathway	
off	 to	 create	 a	 new	 substrate,	 so	 they	 needed	 to	 figure	 out	 how	much	 they	
could	direct	the	flow	of	the	pathway	down	the	branch	without	killing	the	cell.	
Ultimately,	 what	 the	 modellers	 were	 trying	 to	 determine	 was	 how	 far	 you	
could	 push	 the	 system.	 Once	 they	 had	 defined	 the	metabolic	 pathway	 in	 a	
model	 they	 looked	 at	 how	 they	 could	 optimise	 its	 output	 by	 running	
simulations	 with	 altered	 variables,	 this	 is	 the	 modelling	 phase.	 It	 was	 only	
after	 this	 point	 that	 they	 sought	 to	 render	 their	 mathematical	 models	 as	
physical	entities	by	“building”	the	pathway	in	the	lab	in	a	step	Grant	referred	
to	as	the	“realisation	process,”	but	which	is	referred	to	as	the	assembly	phase	
in	the	design	cycle.	
At	this	point,	Grant	explained,	they	go	through	an	iterative	process	to	refine	
the	model,	 moving	 back	 and	 forth	 between	 the	 lab	 and	 the	modelling,	 the	
testing	and	specification	phases.	The	modellers	work	out	which	variables	they	
need	to	alter	to	gain	the	desired	effects	and	then	they	go	to	the	biologists	to	
find	 overlap	 between	 what	 they,	 as	 modellers,	 want	 to	 adjust,	 and	 the	
variables	 the	 biologists	 actually	 can	 adjust	 in	 the	 system.	 Then	 they	 run	
experiments	 to	 test	 whether	 the	 adjustment	 in	 the	 model	 garnered	 the	
predicted	 output	 in	 the	 physical	 system.	 If	 it	 did	 not,	 there	 are	 several	
potential	 explanations.	 They	 could	 have	 missed	 out	 a	 single	 variable,	 or	
multiple	variables,	 from	their	model,	or	the	biologist	doing	the	wet	 lab	work	
could	have	made	a	mistake.	Once	they	figure	it	out	they	adjust	the	model	as	
necessary	and	do	it	again	until	it	behaves	as	predicted.		
As	Grant	explained	it,	if	you	do	it	right	80-90%	of	the	effort	of	modelling	is	
in	 defining	 the	 problem,	 and	 the	 other	 10-20%	 is	 finding	 the	 solution.	 This	
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should	then	render	a	“good”	model,	one	that	is	accurate,	predictive	(meaning	
the	 outcome	 of	 the	model,	 obtained	 through	 analysis	 or	 simulation,	 is	 very	
close	 to	 the	 real	 system	 outcome),	 reusable	 in	 other	 similar	 cases,	 and	
parsimonious	 (meaning	 it	 should	 be	 as	 simple	 as	 possible).	 “This,”	 Grant	
claimed,	 “allows	 us	 to	 develop	 synthetic	 biology	 in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 other	
engineering	disciplines.”	Yet,	despite	his	confidence	Grant	admitted	that	there	
are	 challenges	 to	 the	 successful	 incorporation	 of	 modelling	 into	 synthetic	
biology.	 The	 challenges	 Grant	 highlighted	 originate	 from	 the	 changeable	
nature	 of	 the	 material	 being	 modelled.	 How,	 for	 example,	 do	 you	
mathematically	capture	evolution,	or	model	self-replication	and	stochasticity?	
These	are	 indeed	significant	challenges	 for	modelling	biology,	however	there	
are	other	 challenges	 that	Grant	did	not	mention.	Challenges	 that	 stem	 from	
the	trade	off	between	accuracy	and	simplicity,	and	the	need	for	standardised	
and	characterised	parts.		
On	 the	 first	 page	 of	 his	 lecture	 notes	 for	 a	 course	 on	modelling	 biology,	
Grant	 has	 printed	 the	 following	George	 Box77	quote,	 “All	models	 are	wrong,	
but	some	of	them	are	useful.”	Grant	explained	to	me	that,	the	key	to	designing	
useful	models	was	“to	be	able	to	judge	the	right	degree	of	abstraction	to	apply	so	
that	you	simplify	the	model	as	much	as	possible,	but	no	more	than	is	necessary.	
You	must,”	he	continued,	“capture	the	most	important	phenomena,	but	only	the	
most	 important	 phenomena	 as	 you	 can’t	 model	 every	 single	 element	 of	 a	
biological	system.”	This	need	to	simplify	a	system	in	order	to	model	it	was,	at	
times,	a	cause	of	frustration	within	synthetic	biology,	especially	when	those	in	
the	wet	 lab	were	 told	 that	 the	data	 they	had	meticulously	 collected	was	not	
required.	As	Martin	put	it,	“it	 is	depressing	to	gather	huge	amounts	of	data	to	
give	to	a	modeller	who	then	says	‘this	doesn’t	matter,	and	this	doesn’t	matter’,	as	
they	 are	 only	 looking	 for	 bottlenecks	 and	 important	 parameters	 in	 order	 to	
simplify	 the	 system.”	 Yet,	 while	 this	 is	 potentially	 a	 challenge	 to	 the	
development	of	cohesive,	collaborative	relationships	within	synthetic	biology,	
																																								 								
77	George	Box	was	a	famous	British	statistician.	
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a	greater	 challenge	 for	 the	 role	of	modelling	 in	 the	discipline	 is	 arguably	 its	
reliance	on	well-characterised	parts.	
	One	afternoon	Simon	and	Christian	 (both	doctoral	 students	hailing	 from	
biology)	 were	 sitting	 at	 their	 computers	 talking	 over	 their	 own	 experiences	
with	 modelling.	 They	 stressed	 that	 what	 you	 want,	 in	 synthetic	 biology,	 is	
predictive	 models,	 those	 that	 determine	 and	 predict	 the	 experimental	
processes	and	outcomes.	This,	after	all,	is	what	the	design	cycle	calls	for,	and	
what	 Alan	 (one	 of	 the	 Centre	 directors)	 advocates.	 However	 in	 reality,	 as	
addressed	 above,	 such	 models	 are	 hard	 to	 develop.	 Simon	 and	 Christian	
explained	 to	 me	 that	 the	 difficulty	 was	 in	 large	 part	 due	 to	 the	 dearth	 of	
available	standardised	characterisation	data.	Collaborations	such	as	BIOFAB,78	
and	members	 of	 the	 Centre	 such	 as	 David,	 were	 working	 towards	 this,	 but	
there	 was	 still	 a	 lot	 of	 work	 required	 before	 all	 of	 the	 desired	 parts	 were	
characterised	using	 the	same	units,	and	providing	 the	same	detail	under	 the	
same	conditions.		
The	 dream,	 they	 explained,	 was	 to	 have	 sufficient	 underlying	
characterisation	 to	 allow	 drag	 and	 drop	 CAD79 	modelling	 tools,	 such	 as	
Tinkercell,80	to	be	workable.	But,	 in	reality	 there	was	not	yet	enough	data	to	
realise	this	dream.81	Christian	and	Simon	thus	confessed	that,	while	modelling	
for	 design	 and	 control	 was	 undeniably	 the	 aim	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 and	 is	
frequently	claimed	to	be	the	reality	by	those	within	the	Centre	and	the	wider	
discipline,	 models	 have	 yet	 to	 achieve	 this	 centrality	 and	 status	 in	 reality.	
Nevertheless	better,	and	more	plentiful,	characterisation	would,	they	asserted,	
make	 modelling	 more	 accurate	 and	 would	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 that	
modelling	 could	 usefully	 and	 feasibly	 be	 done	 before,	 rather	 than	 after,	 the	
																																								 								
78 	The	 BIOFAB:	 International	 Open	 Facility	 Advancing	 Biotechnology	is	 a	 collaborative	
endeavour	 to	 produce	 standardised,	 biological	 parts	 for	 academic	 and	 commercial	 users	
(SynBERC).	
79	Computer	Aided	Design.	
80	Interestingly,	 TinkerCell	 is	 no	 longer	 being	 actively	 developed.	 However	 it	 is	 uncertain	
whether	this	is	because	of	the	challenges	mentioned	above	(Chandran).	
81	In	 the	meantime	 those	within	 the	Centre	predominantly	used	a	modelling	program	called	
SimBiology,	which	relies	on	the	programming	language	MatLAB.	
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experimental	 work.	 Thus	 allowing	 modelling	 to	 slot	 into	 its	 ‘proper’	 place	
within	 the	 design	 cycle,	 a	 place	 from	which	 it	 could	 precede	 and	 guide	 the	
experimentation	rather	than	follow	and	support	it.	As	such,	it	was	this	desire	
that	was	guiding	and	shaping	the	conceptual	and	practical	norms	of	those,	like	
David,	 who	 were	 working	 to	 develop	 such	 standardisation	 and	
characterisation	of	bioparts	within	the	Centre.	
Thus	 like	 the	 abstraction	 hierarchy,	 and	 the	 design	 cycle,	 modelling	 is	
another	key	element	of	synthetic	biology’s	engineering	approach	that	 is	a	 lot	
more	 complicated	 in	 reality	 than	 the	 prevailing	 rhetoric	 suggests.	However,	
and	 as	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 three,	 it	 is	 not	 only	 these	 engineering	 elements	
that	are	proving	a	challenge	for	the	realisation	of	the	discipline	and	its	hybrid	
epistemic	 culture.	 Rather,	 due	 to	 the	 epistemic	 cultural	 differences	 of	 those	
who	 have	 entered	 the	 field,	 those	within	 the	Centre	were	 also	 struggling	 to	
overcome	the	challenges	of	collaboration.	
Collaborative	compromise	and	constraint	
As	 highlighted	 in	 chapter	 three,	 collaboration	 is,	 currently,	 a	 basic	
requirement	 in	 fulfilling	 the	 demands	 of	 taking	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	
biology,	and	thus	establishing	synthetic	biology	as	a	discipline.	Indeed,	at	this	
point	in	the	discipline’s	emergence,	a	point	where	the	necessary	skill	set	and	
knowledge	 base	 for	 the	 discipline	 is	 not	 ubiquitous,	 but	 rather	 is	 largely	
spread	across	two	separate	internal	groups,	collaboration	is	key.	Thus,	just	as	
shaping	their	work	around	the	abstraction	hierarchy,	the	design	cycle,	and	the	
ambitions	of	the	modellers	is,	ultimately,	establishing	practical	and	conceptual	
norms	 for	 the	 synthetic	 biologists,	 so	 too	 are	 their	 norms	 being	 shaped	 by	
their	 collaborative	 working	 relationships.	 For	 it	 is	 frequently	 within	 these	
relationships	that	those	at	the	Centre	strive	to	enact	the	engineering	approach	
in	 practice,	 dividing	 the	 wet-lab	 and	 dry-lab	 aspects	 of	 the	 work	 amongst	
themselves.	 Yet,	while	 these	 relationships	 help	 to	 determine	 the	 norms	 and	
shape	of	practice	 for	 the	synthetic	biologists	at	 the	Centre,	allowing	them	to	
implement	 the	 engineering	 approach,	 I	 came	 to	 learn	 that	 the	 consequent	
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demands	 and	 frustrations	 of	 the	 collaboration,	 constrained	 their	 work	 and	
potentially	restricted	the	promise	of	synthetic	biology.		
One	day	while	 talking	 to	Lewis	about	his	experiences	of	 collaboration,	he	
told	 me,	 as	 Anna	 had	 before,	 that	 in	 each	 project	 the	 two	 ‘sides’	 have	 to	
compromise	and	adapt	to	fit	each	other.	Yet,	Lewis	stressed,	while	the	hope	of	
synthetic	biology	is	that	this	will	lead	to	added	value,	the	very	real	risk	is	you	
end	up	with	“a	second	rate	model,	and	a	second	rate	lab	study”	(Lewis,	doctoral	
student,	 engineering).	 With	 Lewis’	 words	 in	 the	 back	 of	 my	 head,	 I	 began	
asking	others	 about	 their	own	experiences.	 In	 responding	 to	my	question	of	
whether	there	were	any	downsides	to	collaborating	with	biologists	in	order	to	
implement	the	engineering	approach	to	biology,	Stephanie	(senior	researcher,	
engineering)	 responded	 without	 hesitation	 that,	 “just	 working	 with	 biology	
constrains	our	work.”	This,	she	explained,	was	due	to	a	lack	of	understanding	
of	how	biology	‘works’	and	a	dearth	of	attainable	data.		
Where	Stephanie	voiced	the	opinion	that	attempting	to	take	an	engineering	
approach	 to	 biology	 constrains	 the	 work	 of	 engineers,	 Peter	 made	 the	
opposing	 assertion	 that	 working	 towards	 this	 goal	 also	 constrains	 the	
biological	work.	
Some	people	work	on	systems	that	are	simplified	biologically	 .	 .	 .	so	
that	 it’s	 a	 tractable	 modelling	 problem,	 which	 is	 good,	 I	 mean	 in	
order	 to	 learn	 you	have	 to	 start	with	 the	 simplest	 system	and	 then	
build	up	to	the	complex	system	that	you	want	to	be	working	on.	.	.	.	
Probably	that’s	the	reason	why	synthetic	biology	has	focused	a	lot	on	
the	 mono-systems	 that	 it	 has	 .	 .	 .	 and	 they’ve	 stayed	 away	 from	
systems	 that	are	maybe	more	 industrially	 relevant	 .	 .	 .	 because	 .	 .	 .	
nobody	knows	what’s	going	on	inside	those,	and	so	then	you’d	have	
to	 start	 at	 square	 one	 and	 find	 all	 that	 information	 out	 before	 you	
could	use	it.		
(Peter,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
Here	Peter	is	highlighting	the	challenge	that,	due	to	the	hybrid	nature	of	the	
emerging	 discipline,	 a	 successful	 synthetic	 biology	 project	 must	 be	 both	
feasible	in	the	laboratory	and	a	“tractable	modelling	problem.”	Thus,	given	that	
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a	 biological	 system	must	 be	 understood,	 in	 order	 to	 be	modelled,	 synthetic	
biology	has,	so	far,	 largely	been	limited	to	simple,	well-understood	biological	
systems	rather	than	the	more	industrially	relevant	ones.	This	was	a	point	that	
Michael	also	struck	upon	when	he	said:	
I	 mean	 honestly	 I	 think	 that	 [taking	 an	 engineering	 approach]	
probably	restricted	[the	field],	it’s	probably	slowed	it	down,	so	you’ve	
got	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 field	 looking	 at	 E.	 coli	 .	 .	 .	 because	 it’s	 well	
understood	and	we	know	how	to	work	with	it.		
(Michael,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
As	 highlighted	 by	 these	 quotations,	 I	 came	 to	 learn	 that	 the	 limited	
understanding	and	data	available	from	biological	experiments	was	believed	by	
some	to	have	restricted	the	work	of	engineers	attempting	to	produce	models	
for	 synthetic	 biology.	Whereas	 the	 discipline’s	 emphasis	 on	 standardisation	
and	 the	 use	 of	 simple,	 well	 characterised,	 biological	 ‘chassis,’	 has	 benefited	
both	the	modelling	and	the	work	to	improve	the	reliability,	predictability,	and	
reusability	of	 the	 entities	 they	 ‘construct.’	However,	 it	has	 theoretically,	 also	
simultaneously	 constrained	 the	 field’s	 potential	 to	 produce	 the	 industrially	
relevant	systems	it	strives	for.			
Deskilling	
Another	potential	way	 in	which	synthetic	biology’s	drive	 to	 implement	an	
engineering	approach	to	biology	may	prove	to	be	constraining	is	the	deskilling	
of	 those	 from	 biology.	 A	 professional,	 rather	 than	 a	 practical	 or	 epistemic	
consequence	of	such	a	merger,	this	concern	was	raised,	several	times,	during	
my	 fieldwork	 both	 by	 those	within	 the	Centre	 and	 those	within	 the	 greater	
synthetic	biology	community.	At	 an	Open	Source	Biology	workshop	 in	2010,	
for	 example,	 historian	 and	 philosopher	 of	 science	 Bernadette	 Bensaude-
Vincent	 commented,	 during	 her	 presentation,	 that,	 “Endy’s	 focus	 on	
simplifying	 biology	 for	 engineering	 results	 in	 a	 deskilling.”	Sociologist	Nikolas	
Rose	 echoed	 this	 observation	 at	 the	 same	meeting,	when	 he	 noted	 that	 the	
deskilling	of	craftspeople	was	central	to	the	Industrial	Revolution.	Thus,	if,	as	
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Alan	contends,	synthetic	biology	is	to	be	the	next	industrial	revolution	it	will	
involve	the	deskilling	of	biology	and,	therefore,	its	downgrading	of	authority.		
It	 would	 be	 tempting	 to	 assume	 that	 these	 were	 solely	 the	 concerns	 of	
social	scientists	were	it	not	for	the	fact	that	they	were	also	expressed	by	several	
members	 of	 the	 Centre.	 Christian	 (doctoral	 student,	 biology)	 for	 example,	
expressed	 his	 unease	 that	 the	 discipline	 he	 was	 aligning	 himself	 with,	 was	
striving	to	do	away	with	the	need	for	his	skills.	While	Janet	(senior	researcher,	
biology)	 similarly	 stressed	 that	 if	 synthetic	 biology	 succeeds	 in	 its	 goals	 of	
abstraction	and	decoupling,	so	that	people	only	need	to	understand	the	small	
piece	of	the	process	they	work	on,	“the	resultant	deskilling	of	biology	could	be	
severe.”	Apparently	Syngenta82	attempted	to	turn	its	lab	work	into	just	such	a	
production	 line	a	 few	years	ago.	However	Karen	wasn’t	certain	whether	 they	
had	managed	to	recruit	people	to	do,	what	she	termed,	the	“mind-numbingly	
repetitive	 tasks.”	 If	 synthetic	biology	went	 the	same	way,	Karen	stressed,	 she	
feared	no	one	would	want	to	do	it	anymore.		
Building	a	collaborative	discipline	
The	acknowledged	limitations	and	challenges	of	the	engineering	approach,	
the	 constraints	 of	 collaboration,	 and	 the	 risks	 of	 deskilling	 half	 of	 the	
discipline’s	 adherents,	 all	 arguably	pose	 risks	 to	 the	 successful	 emergence	of	
synthetic	 biology	 as	 a	 viable	 discipline.	 On	 paper,	 these	 factors	 appear	 to	
undermine	 both	 the	 attempts	 to	 draw	 the	 two	 sides	 of	 synthetic	 biology	
together	 in	 order	 to	 form	 a	 coherent	 repertoire,	 and	 the	 efforts	 to	 establish	
synthetic	 biology’s	 defining	 problem,	 the	 application	 of	 an	 engineering	
approach	 to	biology,	as	doable.	Yet,	 I	observed	 that	 the	determination	 to	do	
just	this	remained.	Indeed,	in	spite	of	these	challenges,	the	pervasive	desire	to	
develop	 and	 use	 standard	 chassis,	 standard	 methods	 and	 develop	 standard	
parts	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 was	 seen	 by	 some	 within	 the	 Centre	 as	 a	 way	 of	
drawing	 the	 disciplinary	 community	 together,	 a	 topic	 explored	 by	 Calvert	
																																								 								
82	Syngenta	is	an	international	biotechnical	agriculture	company.	
 163 
(2010a).	 Hayden,	 for	 example,	 addressed	 this	 relationship	 between	
standardisation	and	disciplinary	community	building,	when	he	said:	
It’s	 like	 the	way	 you	 design	 experiments	 and	 the	way	 you	 set	 your	
goals.	 For	 example	when	 I’m	 trying	 to	 develop	 an	 assembly	 system	
for	genes,	 instead	of	 just	 .	 .	 .	developing	something	that	only	works	
for	us,	[I	think]	 ‘could	this	system	work	for	anybody	else,	could	this	
be	used	by	anybody	else,	could	this	become	a	standard	 in	the	field?’	
And	 this	 guides	 the	 way	 I	 think.	 .	 .	 .	 	 If	 you’re	 just	 in	 a	 lab	 doing	
research	for	yourself	you	don’t	really	think	of	that,	you	just	get	your	
data,	get	your	paper	out	–	you	still	do	good	research	but	it’s	not	.	.	.	
aimed	 at	 building	 something	 that	 can	 be	 used	 by	 other	 labs	 to	 all	
work	in	concert	towards	one	goal,	one	application.		
(Hayden,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
Further	 signs	 of	 the	 commitment	 I	 encountered	 to	 making	 synthetic	
biology	 ‘work’	 as	 a	 discipline	 can	 be	 seen,	 as	 detailed	 above	 and	 in	 the	
previous	chapter,	in	the	way	members	of	the	Centre	increased	their	workload,	
adapted	 their	 research	questions,	 experiments,	 data	 collection	methods,	 and	
models	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 their	 colleagues	 and	 their	 collaborative	 projects.	
Here	 Hayden	 is	 simply	 referring	 to	 this	 same	 work	 being	 done	 on	 a	
disciplinary	 level.	 He	 highlights	 a	 desire	 to	 standardise	 synthetic	 biologists’	
work	so	that	together,	as	a	discipline,	they	can	achieve	their	common	goal	of	
producing	 industrialisable	 applications.	 A	 goal	 that	 would	 not	 only	 support	
the	development	of	synthetic	biology’s	repertoire,	but	would	also	see	synthetic	
biology	further	aligned	with	engineering	and	distanced	from	biology.	
Idealised	engineering		
The	drive	 to	 align	 synthetic	 biology	with	 engineering	 rather	 than	 biology	
was	 almost	palpable	within	 the	Centre,	 and	came	 through	 loud	and	clear	 in	
my	 fieldwork	 and	 interviews.	 Above	 we	 heard	 that	 unlike	 biologists,	 whose	
work	 is	 described	 as	 “just	 observational”	 given	 that	 they	 “never	 build	 new	
things,”	synthetic	biologists’	work	is	considered	“applied,”	“using	biological	bits	
and	 bobs	 to	 build	 stuff	 and	 do	 stuff.”	 Previously	 we	 saw	 synthetic	 biology	
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described	 as	 “rigorous,”	 “industrially	 useful,”	 “efficient,”	 and	 “rational,”	 while	
biology	 was	 said	 to	 use	 “trial	 and	 error”	 and	 “brute	 force.”	 The	 adjectives	
applied	 here	 to	 synthetic	 biology	 are	 drawn	 from	 an	 idealised	 notion	 of	
engineering	 appropriated	 by	many	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	
and	used	as	a	counter	position	to	a	derogative	notion	of	biology.	Grant	(senior	
researcher,	 engineering)	 painted	 this	 comparison	 most	 starkly	 when	 he	
described	 the	 biologist’s	 approach	 to	 problems	 as	 being	 “haphazard	 and	
almost	 violent,”	while	 that	 of	 the	 engineer	 as	 “systematic	 and	 logical.”	Many	
biologists,	 and	 I	 dare	 say	 some	 within	 the	 Centre	 with	 a	 background	 in	
biology,	 would	 challenge	 Grant’s	 description	 of	 biology,	 but	 less	 would	
perhaps	 challenge	his	 description	 of	 engineering.	 Yet,	 as	we	 saw	 above,	 this	
notion	of	engineering	is	also	out	of	step	with	the	messy	reality	of	engineering.	
Furthermore,	as	we	also	saw	above,	synthetic	biology	is,	at	least	at	present,	
not	as	rational,	 rigorous	or	efficient	as	 it	 is	 frequently	described	to	be.	Thus,	
like	the	use	of	the	novel,	engineering-derived,	descriptive	language	discussed	
above,	 these	 proposed	 disciplinary	 distinctions,	 and	 the	 inherent	 alignment	
with	 engineering,	 are	 arguably	 more	 of	 an	 endeavour	 to	 demarcate	 the	
emerging	discipline	of	synthetic	biology	as	something	new	and	distinct	 from	
biology,	 than	 an	 accurate	 description	 of	 their	 differences.	 As	 Mackenzie	
suggests,	 such	 a	 desire	 to	 embrace	 ‘rational	 design’	 and	 the	 engineering-
inspired	techniques	considered	to	enable	such	an	approach	to	their	work,	may	
highlight	the	synthetic	biologists’	“underlying	apprehension	of	the	inefficiency	
or	‘irrationality’	of	trial-and-error	approaches	to	creating	biotechnologies	and	
drugs”	 (2010:	 192).	 Thus	 adopting	 this	 engineering	 approach	 and	 invoking	
rational	 design	 principles,	 “demarcates	 synthetic	 biology	 from	 genomic	
science	and	biotechnology	more	generally	by	borrowing	a	form	of	legitimation	
derived	from	the	manifest	success	of	engineering	design	in	many	domains.	It	
promises	products	rather	than	experiments”	(Mackenzie	2010:	194).	
Therefore,	despite	concerns	that	biology	is	resisting	being	engineered,	and	
thus	acknowledgements	 that	 applying	an	engineering	approach	 to	biology	 is	
challenging,	 the	 synthetic	biologists	 at	 the	Centre	 largely	embrace	 the	belief	
that	the	engineering	of	biology	will	ultimately	prove	to	be	doable.	For	many	of	
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them,	 appropriating	 engineering’s	 supposedly	 efficient,	 rigorous	 and	 logical	
approach	presented	a	 revolutionary	way	of	 interacting	with,	and	controlling,	
biology.	Thus	 in	 striving	 to	 achieve	 this	 ends,	 the	 synthetic	biologists	 at	 the	
Centre	 variously	 employed	 strategies	 such	 as	 prioritising	 synthesis	 over	
analysis;	embracing	notions	of	 rationality	and	standardisation;	attempting	 to	
faithfully	adhere	to	an	engineering-derived	design	cycle;	and	endeavouring	to	
align	 themselves,	 and	 their	 venture,	 with	 engineers	 and	 engineering	 and	
distance	 themselves	 from	biologists	 and	biology.	Yet	 the	key	words	here	 are	
‘attempting’	 and	 ‘endeavouring,’	 for	 despite	 their	 commitment	 and	 efforts	
those	 at	 the	 Centre	 were	 unable	 to	 fully	 apply	 their	 idealised	 version	 of	
engineering	to	biology.	
A	kludged	engineering	approach	
Indeed	 despite	 the	 prevailing	 rhetoric,	 which	 maintains	 that	 synthetic	
biology	employs	a	robust,	efficient,	rational	engineering	approach,	the	reality	I	
encountered	within	the	Centre	was	a	lot	messier,	and	arguably	a	lot	closer	to	
kludging.	Kludging,	a	concept	drawn	from	engineering,	purportedly	originated	
as	an	acronym	 for	 “a	workaround	solution	 that	 is	klumsy,	 lame,	ugly,	dumb,	
but	 good	 enough”	 (O’Malley	 2009:	 382).	 Thus	 given	 the	 reality	 of	 synthetic	
biology,	 with	 its	 iterative	 rounds	 of	 trial,	 error,	 and	 pragmatic	 solutions,	
O’Malley	 argues	 that	 the	 engineering	 approach	 that	 is	 currently	 employed	
within	 the	 emerging	 discipline	 ultimately	 aligns	more	 closely	with	 kludging	
than	it	does	with	rational,	elegant,	efficient	design.		
This	 tension	 between	 the	 rhetoric	 and	 reality	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	
engineering	 approach	 brought	 to	 mind	 Rheinberger’s	 (1997)	 assertion	 that	
scientists	are	bricoleurs,	or	 tinkerers,	 rather	 than	engineers.	That	 is,	 they	do	
not	create	the	efficient,	rational	designs	and	solutions	preferred	by	engineers.	
However,	 this	 assertion	 assumes	 that	 engineers	 do	 produce	 such	 idealised	
designs	 and	 solutions.	 An	 assumption	 called	 into	 question	 by	 Bucciarelli’s	
(1994)	work,	discussed	above,	which	suggests	that	engineers	actually	do	a	lot	
of	what	could	be	called	kludging	themselves,	even	though	they	seldom	admit	
to	it	or	openly	frame	their	work	in	this	way.	O’Malley	addresses	this	unspoken	
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commonality	between	biologists	and	engineers	asserting	that	“[e]xperimental	
kludging	 and	 model	 ‘fudging’	 do	 not	 make	 biologists	 inferior	 to	 engineers,	
however,	 because	 .	 .	 .	many	 sorts	 of	 engineers	 kludge	 to	make	 things	work”	
(O’Malley	2009:	383).		
Furthermore,	 O’Malley	 is	 adamant	 that	 to	 say	 synthetic	 biology’s	
engineering	approach	amounts	to	kludging,	rather	than	to	rational	design,	 is	
not	 to	 say	 that	 such	 kludging	 equates	 to	 failure.	 Rather	 such	 kludging	 is	 “a	
highly	creative	and	effective	process”	 (O’Malley	2009:	382),	and	one	that	not	
only	makes	things	work	but	does	so	“often	in	the	context	of	non-standardized	
parts	 and	 insufficient	 knowledge”	 (2009:	 383).	 Thus	 the	 key	 aspect	 of	 the	
‘kludge’	 acronym	may	 indeed	be	 ‘good	 enough.’	 In	 that,	 their	 solutions	may	
not	 be	 elegant	 but	 they	 seem	 to	 be	 working.	However,	O’Malley	 also	 notes	
that	 despite	 the	 creativity,	 and	 efficacy,	 of	 the	 kludging	 process,	 “synthetic	
biology	is	in	many	respects	antikludge:	it	wants	nature	and	engineering	to	be	
elegant	and	efficient”	(O’Malley	2009:	383).	As	such	synthetic	biology	clings	to	
its	 idealised	 notion	 of	 engineering,	 even	 though	 this	 fits	 with	 neither	
engineering	itself,	nor	with	synthetic	biology’s	application	of	engineering.		
Similarly,	 despite	 the	 ‘antikludging’	 rhetoric	 they	 espoused,	 which	
suggested	 that	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 defined	 by	 its	 application	 of	 a	 rational,	
efficient,	and	elegant	engineering	approach	to	biology,	the	reality	I	discovered	
within	 the	 Centre	 was	 a	 lot	 messier.	 No	 single	 element	 of	 the	 engineering	
approach	 was	 applied	 without	 modification	 in	 order	 to	 find	 some	 way	 of	
making	 it	work.	Not	 the	abstraction	hierarchy,	nor	 the	design	cycle,	nor	 the	
modelling.	 Nothing	 was	 straightforward,	 nothing	 was	 elegant,	 and	 nothing	
was	 ‘rational’	 as	 such.	 Though,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 ‘cleaned	 up’	
presentations	of	the	design	cycle,	which	hid	from	view	the	kludging	which	had	
taken	 place	 in	 its	 application,	 those	 at	 the	 Centre	 were	 not	 keen	 to	 openly	
jettison	their	 idealised	version	of	engineering	 in	 favour	of	a	kludged	version.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 kludged	 version	 of	 an	 engineering	 approach	 they	 were	
applying	 in	 reality	 was	 still	 seemingly	 shaping	 the	work	 and	 outputs	 of	 the	
Centre.	 Indeed,	although	the	engineering	approach	wasn’t	as	easy	to	achieve	
as	the	prevailing	rhetoric	maintains,	those	at	the	Centre	were,	giving	primacy	
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to	 the	 role	 of	modelling,	 forming	new	 collaborations,	 asking	 new	questions,	
using	 different	 experimental	 designs,	 and	 collecting	 new	 levels	 and	 types	 of	
data.	All	of	 these	conceptual	and	practical	norms	were	underpinned	by	their	
kludged	 version	 of	 engineering,	 and	 all	 were	 furnishing	 the	 emerging	
discipline’s	 repertoire,	 increasing	 the	 doability	 of	 their	 problem	 (the	
application	 of	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	 biology)	 and	 thus	 helping	 to	
establish	its	epistemic	culture.		
While	 this	 hybrid	 epistemic	 culture	 is	 yet	 to	 fully	 emerge,	 I	 would	 argue	
that	the	key	elements	for	its	formation	are	assembling.	There	is	the	academic	
identity	 of	 being	 a	 synthetic	 biologist,	 and	 undergraduate	 courses	 and	
graduate	 degrees	 to	 furnish	 the	 discipline’s	 ranks.	 There	 is	 the	 hybrid	
discourse,	 drawing	 terms	 from	 engineering	 and	 applying	 them	 to	 biology.	
There	 are	 the	 practical	 and	 conceptual	 norms,	 underpinned	 by	 a	 kludged	
version	 of	 engineering,	 which	 are	 shaping	 the	 projects,	 outputs,	
collaborations,	and	general	day-to-day	work	of	synthetic	biologists.	And	there	
are	 research	 units,	 like	 the	 Centre,	 which	 are	 equipped	 with	 the	 funding,	
infrastructure,	 and	 profile	 to	 promote	 the	 existence	 and	 coherence	 of	 the	
emerging	 discipline.	 However,	 while	 this	 momentum	 appears	 to	 be	 leading	
towards	the	full	emergence	of	synthetic	biology	as	a	notable	discipline,	with	a	
robust	repertoire,	a	doable	problem,	and	a	distinctive	epistemic	culture,	this	is	
not	to	say	that	biology	will	prove	to	be	engineerable	in	the	way	the	prevailing	
rhetoric	maintains.	That	is,	for	all	their	application	of	engineering,	it	remains	
to	 be	 seen	 whether	 synthetic	 biology	 can	 successfully	 design	 and	 build	
reliable,	 predictable	 organisms	 using	 solely	 standardised,	 well-characterised	
parts.	 Furthermore,	 as	 addressed	 above,	 while	 their	 attempt	 to	 apply	
standardisation	and	rationality,	albeit	in	a	kludged	form,	may	aid	community	
building	and	the	transformation	of	synthetic	biology	into	a	coherent	discipline	
aligned	 with	 engineering,	 it	 may	 also	 have	 the	 unintended	 outcome	 of	
restricting	the	discipline’s	scope.		
Conclusion	
Within	the	academic	synthetic	biology	research	centre	where	 I	conducted	
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my	study,	the	adoption	of	an	engineering	approach	to	their	work	was	strongly	
promoted	 by	 the	 directors	 and	 embraced	 by	 most.	 Taking	 an	 engineering	
approach	to	biology,	for	many	within	the	Centre,	meant	attempting	to	adopt	
an	efficient,	rigorous	and	logical	approach	to	their	work	appropriated	from	an	
idealised	version	of	 engineering.	The	adoption	of	 this	 approach	was	perhaps	
most	 clearly	 manifest	 in	 the	 engineering-derived	 language	 the	 synthetic	
biologists	used	to	describe	their	own,	and	the	discipline’s	endeavours.		
This	 common	 language,	 which	 draws	 heavily	 on	 metaphors	 and	
terminology	 from	engineering,	 contributes	 to	 the	 formation	of	 the	 synthetic	
biology’s	repertoire	and	thus	its	emergence,	by	aiding	cohesiveness	within	the	
discipline,	 while	 also	 delineating	 synthetic	 biology	 from	 other	 disciplines.	
Furthermore,	 it	 arguably	 helps	 to	 shape	 synthetic	 biology’s	 scope	 and	 the	
synthetic	 biologists’	 understandings	 of	 the	 natural	 world.	 However,	 as	
discussed	above,	adhering	to	 the	engineering	approach	to	biology,	and	to	 its	
accompanying	language,	is	easier	said	than	done.	Biology,	the	members	of	the	
Centre	 agreed,	 is	much	more	difficult	 to	 engineer	 than	 inanimate	materials,	
and	applying	engineering-derived	terminology,	concepts,	and	modes	of	work,	
to	biology	is	a	significant	challenge.		
This	 gap	 between	 rhetoric	 and	 practice,	 which	 is	 arguably	 a	 significant	
obstacle	to	the	application	of	the	idealised	engineering	approach,	was	perhaps	
clearest	in	the	enactment	of	the	design	cycle.	This	engineering-inspired	cycle	
of	production	dictated	that	dry-lab	modelling	work	should	proceed	and	guide	
wet-lab	 ‘assembly’	 work.	 However,	 given	 the	 ‘chicken	 or	 egg’	 relationship	
between	biological	data	and	modelling	within	synthetic	biology,	whereby	the	
models	 are	 currently	 based	 on	 the	 data	 produced	 by	 the	 systems	 they	 are	
intended	to	be	designing,	the	cycle	 is	not,	currently,	being	faithfully	applied.	
Applying	the	design	cycle	 in	practice	was	therefore	a	significant	challenge	to	
the	synthetic	biologists’	aim	of	applying	an	idealised	engineering	approach	to	
biology.	However,	the	synthetic	biologists	at	the	Centre	remained	determined	
to	find	ways	around	such	challenges.		
Thus,	despite	 the	obstacles	 they	 faced	 in	regards	 to	 the	application	of	 the	
abstraction	hierarchy,	the	design	cycle,	and	modelling	for	design	and	control,	
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the	 synthetic	 biologists	 continued	 to	 embrace	 the	 notion	 of	 applying	 an	
engineering	 approach	 to	 their	 work.	 Moulding	 their	 day-to-day	 practices	
around	 the	aims	of	 the	discipline,	 they	 let	 their	 engineering	approach	 shape	
the	 questions	 they	 asked,	 the	 experiments	 they	 conducted,	 the	models	 they	
produced,	 and	 the	 data	 they	 collected.	 They	 also	 let	 it	 shape	 their	 working	
relationships,	 such	 that	 collaboration	has	 come	 to	play	 a	 central	 role	within	
the	 discipline.	 However,	 given	 the	 modifications	 and	 approximations	 they	
have	needed	to	apply	to	their	idealised	engineering	approach	in	order	to	‘make	
it	 work’	 as	 best	 they	 can,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 engineering	 approach	 which	 is	
shaping	 their	 work,	 and	 thus	 the	 discipline	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 it’s	
emerging	epistemic	culture,	is	a	kludged	version	of	an	engineering	approach.	
An	 engineering	 approach	 which	 is	 klumsy,	 rather	 than	 elegant,	 which	 is	
defined	by	 trial	 and	 error	 rather	 than	 rational	 design,	 but	 one	 that,	while	 it	
may	not	be	efficient,	 is	 still	proving	efficacious	 in	shaping	the	discipline	and	
its	products.	
Yet	 despite	 the	 current	 success	 of	 their	 kludged	 engineering	 approach,	
O’Malley	(2009)	asserts	that	synthetic	biology	remains	staunchly	anti-kludge.	I	
indeed	 found	 that	many	at	 the	Centre	believe,	or	at	 least	hope,	 that	biology	
will	ultimately	prove	to	be	engineerable	in	the	idealised	fashion.	To	this	ends,	
they	 prioritise	 synthesis	 over	 analysis,	 and	 adopt	 terminology	 and	 concepts	
drawn	from	engineering	as	they	strive	to	use	an	efficient,	rigorous,	and	logical	
approach	 to	 controlling	 biology	 and	 producing,	 novel,	 industrialisable	
‘products.’	The	desire	to	produce	such	‘products’	goes	some	way	to	explaining	
attempts	to	cast	synthetic	biology	as	an	engineering	discipline,	thus	aligning	it	
with	engineering	while	simultaneously	distancing	it	from	biology.	Indeed	the	
Centre’s	drive	to	align	themselves,	and	synthetic	biology,	with	engineering	was	
so	strong	and	universal	that	 it	trumped	the	power	dynamics	at	play	between	
the	 two	 ‘sides’	 of	 the	 Centre.83	So	much	 so	 that	 I	 would	 contend	 that	 their	
																																								 								
83	As	 evident	 in	 the	 beliefs	 of	 some	 individuals’	 that	 the	 contributions	 of	 their	 ‘side’	 of	
synthetic	biology	were	more	important	than	those	of	the	other	 ‘side,’	and	in	the	disparaging	
stereotypes	employed	by	each	‘side’	in	regards	to	the	other	(both	of	which	were	discussed	in	
chapter	three).	
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primary	motivation	 in	 striving	 to	 turn	 synthetic	 biology	 into	 an	 engineering	
discipline	was	one	of	discipline	building.	An	attempt,	as	I	see	it,	to	distinguish	
synthetic	 biology	 from	 biology,	 and	 molecular	 biology	 in	 particular,	 which	
draws	 on	 the	 legitimation	 derived	 from	 engineering’s	 success	 as	 synthetic	
biology	strives	for	its	own.	Even	though	such	a	goal	brought	with	it	the	risk	of	
deskilling	the	biologists.	
Thus,	it	could	be	said	that	such	determined	attempts	to	apply	an	idealised	
version	of	engineering	to	biology,	to	hide	from	view	the	instances	of	kludging,	
to	 stifle	 their	 doubts	 for	 fear	 of	 others	 concluding	 that	 ‘the	 emperor	 has	 no	
clothes,’	 and	 to	 aligning	 synthetic	 biology	 with	 engineering,	 are	 helping	 to	
establish	 the	 discipline	 of	 synthetic	 biology.	 This	 is	 achieved	 by	 delineating	
synthetic	 biology	 from	 other	 disciplines	 while	 also	 building	 its	 repertoire	
through	 the	 establishment	 of	 practical	 and	 conceptual	 norms.	 Albeit	 norms	
which	are	based	on	kludging.	Thus	I	would	ultimately	contend	that	synthetic	
biology	 is	 an	emerging	 interdiscipline	whose	developing	epistemic	 culture	 is	
founded	 on	 hybrid	 language,	 research	 centres,	 personnel,	 and	 funding,	 and	
conceptual	and	practical	norms	which	are	underpinned	by	a	kludged,	 rather	
than	a	rational,	engineering	approach	to	biology.	
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Chapter	 Five:	 “Machiney-
something-elseys:”	 Examining	 the	
‘products’	of	synthetic	biology	
Each	and	every	one	of	the	Centre’s	laboratories	is	teeming	with	life.	Not	just	
the	senior	 investigators,	post-graduate	researchers,	and	doctoral	and	masters	
students	 who,	 white	 coated	 and	 concentrating,	move	 from	 bench	 to	 bench,	
but	also	the	countless	colonies	of	microorganisms	that	occupy	petri	dishes	and	
test-tubes	 in	 the	 Centre’s	 many	 fridges,	 freezers,	 and	 incubators.	 These	
organisms,	 fed	 and	 nurtured	 to	 assist	 their	 reproduction	 and	 survival,	 are	
being	designed	and	bred	to	perform	certain,	pre-defined	tasks.	It	is	hoped	that	
some	will	glow	green	when	encountering	pathogenic	biofilms,	while	others	are	
having	 their	 constituent	 genetic	 material	 whittled	 away	 with	 the	 aim	 of	
producing	minimal	cells,	a	new	kind	of	cellular	‘chassis’	if	you	will.	There	are	
organisms	 that	 are	 being	 designed	 to	 overproduce	 carbohydrate	 material	
polymers,	and	organisms	that	are	being	devised	to	act	as	in	vivo	biosensors	to	
monitor	and	control	cellular	behaviour.	All	of	 these	organisms	are	alive	and,	
despite	all	attempts	to	control	them,	they	are	undoubtedly,	like	all	biological	
organisms,	mutating	and	evolving.	Yet,	 all	 of	 these	organisms	are	 also	being	
designed	 and	modelled	 using	 engineering	 practices	with	 the	 hope	 that	 they	
will	perform	predictably	and	controllably,	much	like	machines.	It	is	here	then	
that	 the	 epistemic	 clashes	 and	 conceptual	 differences	 between	 synthetic	
biology’s	 two	 sides,	 biology	 and	 engineering,	 become	 embedded	 within	 the	
discipline’s	 ‘products,’	 the	organisms	 themselves.	And	 it	 is	 here	 too	 that	 the	
tensions	between	 synthetic	biology’s	 reductionistic	 approach	 to	biology,	 and	
the	 conceptual	 and	 practical	 challenges	 caused	 by	 the	 deficit	 in	 our	
understanding	of	life	come	to	a	head.	
As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 four,	 synthetic	 biology	 explicitly	 aims	 to	 take	 an	
engineering	 approach	 to	 biology,	 and	 thus	 make	 biology	 engineerable,	 but	
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where	does	 this	 leave	the	resultant	 ‘engineered’	organisms?	Do	the	synthetic	
biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	 see	 the	 ‘products’	 of	 their	 work	 as	 machines?	 This	
would	arguably	be	the	logical	end	point	of	believing	you	can	engineer	biology	
like	 any	 other	 inanimate	 material	 after	 all.	 Do	 they	 instead	 see	 them	 as	
organisms,	admittedly	nudged	in	certain	biological	directions,	but	essentially	
no	 different	 from	 naturally	 occurring	 ‘wild’	 microorganisms?	 Or	 indeed,	 do	
they	 see	 them	 as	 some	 kind	 of	 hybrids	 that	 ultimately	 blur	 the	 age-old	
machine/organism	 divide?	 As	 shall	 be	 discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 chapter	 six,	
synthetic	biology	appears	to	be	part	of	a	more	general	epistemic	shift	towards	
a	 view	 of	 life	 as	 engineerable	 material,	 a	 shift	 that	 is	 accompanied	 by	 a	
commitment	to	applying	engineering	discourse	and	methods	to	biology.	The	
notion	of	life	as	engineerable	material,	central	to	this	potential	epistemic	shift,	
implies	 that	 the	 ‘material,’	 in	 this	 case	 biological	 ‘parts’	 and	 biological	
organisms,	 is	 essentially	no	different	 to	other	engineerable	materials.	Such	a	
shift	 towards	 an	 engineering	 epistemology,	 therefore,	 suggests	 a	 step,	 and	
potentially	 a	 large	 step,	 towards	 blurring	 or	 even	 removing	 the	 conceptual	
boundary	 between	 machines	 and	 organisms.	 What,	 I	 therefore	 wondered,	
does	such	a	shift	mean	for	the	synthetic	biologists	at	the	Centre’s	conception	
of	‘life?’	How,	that	is,	do	they	think	about,	and	categorise,	the	living	‘products’	
they	are	designing,	producing,	and	sharing	their	 lab	space	with,	and	how	do	
their	 views	 fit	 within	 the	 messy,	 uncertain,	 contentious	 history	 of	 the	
machine/organism	divide?		
On	May	20th	2010	all	of	these	questions,	which	had	spent	months	running	
around	my	 head,	 came	 crashing	 to	 the	 fore.	 It	 was	 only	 my	 second	 day	 of	
intensive	 fieldwork,	 and	 I	 was	 still	 figuring	 out	 the	 lay	 of	 the	 land	 as	 the	
newest	 inhabitant	 of	 the	 Centre.	 Unusually	 the	 normally	 quiet	 laboratories	
and	offices	were	abuzz.	There	were	film	crews	interviewing	Alan	and	Malcolm	
(the	 Centre	 directors),	 and	 journalists	 seeking	 comment	 from	 the	 Centre’s	
senior	 members.	 Craig	 Venter,	 of	 the	 J.	 Craig	 Venter	 Institute,	 had	 just	
announced	that	his	team	had	successfully	‘booted	up’	a	synthesised	version	of	
the	Mycoplasma	mycoides	genome	within	another	cell	(reported	in	Gibson	et	
al.	2010).	At	a	press	conference	that	day	Craig	Venter	described	the	resulting	
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organism	as	 “the	 first	 self-replicating	 species	we’ve	had	on	 the	planet	whose	
parent	 is	 a	 computer”	 (quoted	 in	 Wade	 2010)	 and	 this	 notion	 of	 a	
machine/organism	 hybrid	was	 doing	 the	 rounds.	 Eager	 to	 find	 out	 how	 the	
story	was	being	depicted	in	the	media,	David	(doctoral	student,	biology)	and	I	
set	off	across	campus	the	next	morning	to	buy	a	copy	of	every	newspaper	we	
could	 find	 with	 a	 reference	 to	 the	 announcement.	 There	 were	 claims	 that	
Venter	 and	 his	 team	 had	 variously	 made	 artificial	 life	 (e.g.	 Sample	 2010),	
synthetic	 life	 (e.g.	 Connor	 2010;	 Henderson	 2010)	 or	 man-made	 life	 (e.g.	
Alleyne	 2010),	 and	many	 questions	 about	 whether	 Venter	 was	 ‘playing	 god’	
(e.g.	 Alleyne	 2010;	 Connor	 2010;	 Morton	 2010)	 or	 indeed	 playing	
“Frankenstein”	 (Dawar	 2010;	 Morton	 2010).	 The	 front	 page	 headline	 of	 The	
Guardian	 referred	 to	 Venter	 as	 “God	 2.0”	 (Sample	 2010)	 while	 that	 of	 the	
Metro	called	him	“Dr	God”	(Attewill	2010).	The	front	cover	of	The	Economist,	
issued	two	days	after	the	announcement,	even	depicted	David,	with	a	 laptop	
on	his	knee,	creating	cells	under	the	headline,	“And	man	made	life”	(2010)	(see	
figure	7).	
Figure	7:	Front	cover	of	The	Economist	May	22nd-
28th	2010	
 174 
The	 ‘synthetic’	 organism	 Venter	 and	 his	 team	 ‘created,’	 which	 quickly	
gained	 the	 name	 ‘Synthia,’84	prompted	 a	 worldwide	 debate	 and	 discussion	
over	what	exactly	the	 ‘products’	of	synthetic	biology	are,	how	we	can	classify	
them,	and	how	we	should	 feel	about	 their	creation.	As	 the	headlines	quoted	
above	suggest,	 this	breakthrough	 from	the	 J.	Craig	Venter	 Institute	 raised	as	
many	conceptual	questions	as	scientific	questions.		
In	 literature,	 and	 in	 history,	 creatures	 that	 have	 appeared	 to	 breach	 the	
boundaries	 between	 the	 ‘normal’	 and	 the	 ‘abnormal’	 (Canguilhem,	 2009)	 or	
between	‘natural’	biological	organisms	and	‘designed’	technological	machines	
have	 been	 seen,	 at	 least	 since	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 as	monstrosities;	 the	
most	 famous	 of	 which	 is	 arguably	 Frankenstein’s	 monster.	 Therefore,	 given	
that	 a	 key	 goal	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 to	 synthesise	 “complex,	 biologically	
based	 (or	 inspired)	 systems,	 which	 display	 functions	 that	 do	 not	 exist	 in	
nature”	 (NEST,	 2005)	 and	 thus	 to	 “engineer	 cells	 into	 tiny	 living	 devices”	
(Ferber,	2004:	158),	synthetic	biologists	are	finding	themselves,	as	Craig	Venter	
did,	 accused	 of	 playing	God	 (ETC,	 2007)	 and	 of	 treading	 in	 the	 footsteps	 of	
Frankenstein	 (van	 den	 Belt,	 2009).	 Accusations	 of	 ‘playing	 God’	 and	
comparisons	to	Frankenstein	are	clearly	critical	in	intent,	but	where	does	the	
objection	to	creating	life,	that	underlies	these	allegations,	come	from?	
Creating	life	
Throughout	human	history,	 the	 likes	of	Copernicus,	Newton,	Darwin,	and	
Einstein	have	challenged	and	changed	our	conceptions	of	the	world	we	live	in	
and	 our	 place	 within	 it	 (Goodfield,	 1977).	 Such	 fundamental	 challenges	
continue	 to	 confront	 us	 as	 science	 advances	 and,	 with	 the	 continual	
development	of	new	 techniques	 to	 ‘create’	 life,	many	of	 these	challenges	are	
now	coming	from	within	the	life	sciences.	The	potential	for	humans	to	act	as	
‘creators’	 has	 raised	 concerns	 about	 ‘playing	 God,’	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
creation	of	human	life	through	the	likes	of	artificial	insemination	(Kline,	1963),	
																																								 								
84	Synthia	 is	 the	 name,	 first	 applied	 by	 the	 ETC	 group	 (2010)	 to	 the	 synthetic	M.	 mycoides	
constructed	by	the	J.	Craig	Venter	Institute	(Gibson	et	al.	2010).	
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and	the	creation	of	novel	forms	of	life	through	genetic	engineering	(Goodfield,	
1977).	It	is	arguably	into	this	latter	category	of	creation	that	synthetic	biology	
falls.		
Perhaps	 surprisingly	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘creating’	 life	 has	 not,	 however,	 always	
prompted	the	kind	of	controversy	which	now	regularly	accompanies	advances	
in	 biotechnology	 (Schummer	 2009).	 Rather,	 up	 until	 the	 early	 nineteenth	
century,	 the	 spontaneous	 generation	 of	 life	 out	 of	 inorganic	 or	 organic	
matter 85 	was	 taken	 for	 granted,	 free	 of	 the	 contentions	 that	 accompany	
contemporary	attempts	 to	 ‘create’	 life.	 It	was	widely	believed	 that	under	 the	
right	conditions	life	could	be	generated	out	of	such	substances	as	faeces,	meat,	
hay,	 and	 rotting	 logs	 (Lennox	 2001;	 Schummer	 2009),	 or	 indeed	 out	 of	 the	
earth	 itself.	As	 the	 first-century	BCE	Roman	poet	 and	philosopher	Lucretius	
reportedly	wrote	in	his	didactic	poem,	De	rerum	natura,	“with	good	reason	the	
earth	has	gotten	the	name	of	mother,	since	all	things	are	produced	out	of	the	
earth.	 And	many	 living	 creatures,	 even	 now,	 spring	 out	 of	 the	 earth,	 taking	
form	by	the	rains	and	the	heat	of	the	sun”86	(Lucretius	quoted	in	Amicus	2011).		
	Such	beliefs,	 supported	by	 both	 scholars87	and	 religious	 doctrine,88	led	 to	
the	 development	 of	 a	 set	 of	 guidelines	 for	 undertaking	 the	 production	 of	
certain	 living	 beings.	 For	 example,	 the	 carcasses	 of	 cows	 were	 believed	 to	
create	 bees,	 the	 carcasses	 of	 horses	were	 understood	 to	 produce	wasps,	 and	
																																								 								
85	The	notion	of	life	arising	from	inorganic	matter	is	called	abiogenesis,	while	the	notion	of	life	
arising	from	organic	matter	is	referred	to	as	hetergenesis.	
86	This	poem	was	written	to	explain	Epicurean	philosophy	to	a	Roman	audience.		
87	Scholars	 such	 as	Aristotle,	Virgil,	Ovid,	Pliny,	 and	 Isidor	of	 Sevilla	 for	 example	 supported	
the	notion	of	the	spontaneous	generation	of	life.	Aristotle,	for	example,	wrote	that	“[a]nimals	
and	plants	come	into	being	in	earth	and	in	liquid	because	there	is	water	 in	earth,	and	air	 in	
water,	and	in	all	air	there	is	vital	heat;	so	that	in	a	sense	all	things	are	full	of	soul.	Therefore	
living	 things	 form	quickly	whenever	 this	 air	 and	 vital	 heat	 are	 enclosed	 in	 anything.	When	
they	are	so	enclosed,	the	corporeal	liquid’s	being	heated,	there	arises	as	it	were	a	frothy	bubble.	
The	differentiae	which	determine	whether	the	kind	is	more	or	less	honorable	are	determined	
by	 the	 organization	 of	 the	 vital	 principle	 in	 the	 enclosure.	 And	 both	 the	 places	 and	 the	
enclosed	material	are	causes	of	this	organisation”	(Aristotle,	Generation	of	Animals	III,	quoted	
in	Lennox	2001:	232-33).		
88	The	 Bible,	 the	 Talmud,	 the	 Upanishads,	 and	 other	 ancient	 texts	 and	 scriptures,	 contain	
stories	of	living	organisms	emerging	out	of	inanimate	matter.	For	example,	in	Exodus	8	of	the	
Bible,	two	of	the	plagues,	those	of	lice	and	frogs,	are	made	out	of	dust	and	water	respectively.	
 176 
those	 of	 donkeys,	 beetles	 (Schummer	 2009).	 Francis	 Bacon,	 in	 his	
posthumously	 published	 work	 New	 Atlantis	 (1627), 89 	outlined	 an	 entire	
research	program	for	the	creation	of	novel	plants	and	animals.	Thus,	given	the	
widespread	belief	in,	and	acceptance	of,	such	views,	Schummer	surmises	that,	
“there	were	no	basic	philosophical,	scientific,	ethical,	or	theological	objections	
to	spontaneous	generation	or	artificial	creation	of	life.	Indeed,”	he	continues,	
“these	 were	 perfectly	 reconcilable	 with	 the	 biblical	 creation	 myth”	 (2009:	
127).90	Schummer	 extends	 his	 argument	 that	manmade	 life	 is	 not	 inherently	
contentious	by	highlighting	three	unrelated,	and	relatively	uncontroversial	(at	
least	 in	 their	 own	 time),	 historical	 antecedents	 to	 the	 artificial	 creation	 of	
humanoids	 -	 ancient	Greek	 and	Egyptian	 automata,	Kabbalistic	 golems,	 and	
alchemical	homunculi.91	Schummer	(2009)	maintains	that	none	of	these	three	
traditions	raised	contemporaneous	ethical	or	religious	concerns	as	long	as	the	
work	to	produce	them	was	not	motivated	by	a	desire	to	perfect	divine	creation	
by	 generating	 beings	 that	were	 superior	 to	 natural	 humans.92	For	where	 the	
creation	 of	 plants	 and	 animals	 had	 not,	 and	 still	 did	 not,	 raise	 ethical	 or	
theological	objections	(given	the	wide	acceptance	of	spontaneous	generation),	
the	creation	of	a	creature	with	a	‘rational	soul,’	a	fully	functional	human,	was	
open	 to	 a	 slew	 of	 theological	 objections	 including	 Satanism,	 tempting	 God,	
and	hubris.		
The	 scope	 for	 theological	 objection	 expanded	 however	 in	 the	 nineteenth	
century	with	 the	 beginnings	 of	 Christian	 creationism,	 a	 belief	 system	which	
																																								 								
89	Edited	and	republished	by	G.	C.	Moore-Smith	(1900).	
90	In	Genesis	1,	the	plants	and	animals	are	not	created	like	Adam	and	Eve,	but	rather,	upon	the	
creator’s	fiat,	they	emerge	out	of	earth,	water,	and	air.	Thus	spontaneous	generation	and	the	
artificial	 creation	 of	 life	 were	 viewed	 as	 being	 completely	 reconcilable	 with	 the	 bible	
(Schummer	2009).	
91	For	 a	 description	 and	discussion	 of	 these	humanoids	 see	 Lachman	 (2006),	 Lennox	 (2001),	
Schummer	(2009),	and	de	Solla	Price	(1964).		
92	However	 in	 the	 thirteenth	 century	 just	 such	 a	 shift	 in	 motivation	 began	 to	 drive	 the	
production	 of	 golems,	 a	 shift	 that	 was	 echoed	 in	 the	 sixteenth	 century	 production	 of	
alchemical	 homunculi.	 Indeed	 the	 homunculi	 texts	 (the	 recipes	 if	 you	will)	 became	 famous	
because	 their	 authors	 all	 “considered	 the	 creation	 of	 homunculi	 the	 crowning	 power	 of	
alchemy	 in	 surpassing	 the	power	of	nature	 and	even	 that	of	 the	divine	 creator”	 (Schummer	
2009:	130).	Such	claims,	Schummer	asserts,	were	the	cause	of	some	controversy.	
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arose	 out	 of	 a	 series	 of	 scientific	 developments	 starting	 in	 the	 seventeenth	
century	(Schummer	2009).	These	developments	 included	the	emergence	and	
prominence	of	the	mechanical	philosophy	of	natural	theology93	(which	revived	
the	 notion	 of	 causal	 determinism 94 ),	 the	 increasing	 use	 and	 rigor	 of	
experiments	 in	 scientific	 studies, 95 ,	 96 	and	 perhaps	 most	 surprisingly,	 the	
																																								 								
93	Mechanical	philosophy,	which	was	ultimately	rooted	 in	ancient	Greek	atomism,	arose	and	
gained	 popularity	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 century.	 It	 held	 that	 all	 natural	 phenomena	 could	 be	
explained	in	terms	of	matter,	motion,	and	collisions	between	‘atoms,’	the	small	imperceptible	
particles	of	matter	which	were	thought	to	make	up	everything	in	the	material	world	(de	Solla	
Price	 1964;	 Osler	 2004).	 One	 of	 the	 first	 systematic,	 and	 most	 influential,	 accounts	 of	
mechanical	 philosophy	 was	 published	 by	 French	 natural	 philosopher	 Pierre	 Gassendi.	
Gassendi,	 a	 Catholic	 priest,	 detailed	 his	 view	 of	 mechanical	 philosophy	 in	 Syntagma	
philosophicum	(1658).	He	believed	 that	God	had	 created	 a	 finite	number	of	 ‘atoms’	 and	had	
imbued	 them	 all	 with	 motion,	 and	 that	 these	 ‘atoms’	 made	 up	 everything	 in	 the	 material	
world.	 He	 also	 asserted	 that	 all	 beings	 possessed	 a	 material,	 sensible	 soul	 (alongside	 an	
immaterial,	immortal	soul),	which	was	composed	of	such	‘atoms,’	and	that	this	material	soul	
was	transmitted	from	generation	to	generation	through	biological	reproduction	(Osler	2004).	
Gassendi,	and	those	that	followed	his	line	of	thinking,	therefore	believed	that	all	‘atoms,’	and	
thus	 all	 living	 beings,	 were	 ultimately	 connected	 back	 to	 primordial	 creation.	 As	 all	
phenomena	 could,	 purportedly,	 be	 explained	 through	 the	 motion	 of	 these	 ‘atoms’	 under	
physical	laws,	all	phenomena,	past,	present	and	future,	could	not	be	self-caused	but	must	then	
be	absolutely	determined	and	linked	to	divine	creation	thus	providing	one	of	the	pillars	upon	
which	creationism	was	erected	(Schummer	2009).	
94	Causal	determinism	is	a	 theological	 idea,	which	holds	 that	any	given	phenomenon	can	be	
linked	back	to	the	primordial	creation	through	a	deterministic	chain	of	events.		
95 	Like	 mechanical	 philosophy,	 the	 increase	 in	 scientific	 rigor,	 played	 a	 role	 in	 the	
development	 of	 Christian	 creationism,	 but	 it	 also	 played	 a	 significant	 part	 in	 debunking	
spontaneous	generation.	Indeed,	as	experimentation	became	more	rigorous,	the	standard	list	
of	 organisms	 believed	 to	 arise	 from	 spontaneous	 generation	 shrank	 substantially,	 and	
continued	 to	 shrink	as	 small	mammals,	 insects,	bacteria,	 viruses,	prions,	 and	 self-sustaining	
molecular	systems	were	systematically	eliminated.	Each	organism	that	was	removed	from	this	
list,	following	the	determination	of	its	reproductive	mechanism,	became,	in	turn,	a	candidate	
for	 primordial	 creation,	 bolstering	 the	 case	 for	 creationism.	 For	 many	 of	 the	 scientists	
involved	in	whittling	down	this	standard	list,	including	Louis	Pasteur,	the	motivation	behind	
debunking	the	 idea	of	spontaneous	generation	was	religious,	as	spontaneous	generation	had	
shifted	from	a	banal	reality,	to	a	perceived	threat	to	the	fundamentals	of	Christianity.	As	such	
it	was	seen	as	essential	that	spontaneous	generation	be	refuted	in	order	to	‘prove’	that	all	life	
therefore	must	have	been	‘created’	by	God.	Nevertheless,	the	question	of	whether	spontaneous	
generation	 can,	 or	 does,	 ever	 occur	 has	 never	 been	 definitively	 answered.	 Rather,	 as	
candidates	 for	 such	 generation	 have	 become	 simpler,	 the	 line	 between	 life	 and	 nonlife	 has	
become	increasingly	blurred.		
96	See	Huxley’s	 1870	Presidential	Address	 to	 the	British	Association	 for	 the	Advancement	 of	
Science	for	an	interesting	account	of	the	inquiries,	experiments,	and	scientific	advances	which	
led	to	the	debunking	of	abiogenesis	(Huxley	1893).	
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advancement	 of	 Darwin’s	 theory	 of	 biological	 evolution97	(Schummer	 2009).	
All	three	of	these	scientific	developments	ultimately	expanded	the	scope	and	
importance	 of	 natural	 theology,	 especially	 within	 the	 Christian	 church,	
resulting	 in	 significant	 changes	 to	 the	 Christian	 value	 system.	 Where	 the	
creation	of	living	beings	had	not	previously	been	of	religious	concern,	unless	a	
‘rational	soul’	was	involved,	now	the	making	of	life	at	any	level,	including	the	
chemical	 synthesis	 of	 organic	 compounds, 98 	was	 open	 to	 scrutiny	 and	
accusations	of	‘playing	God.’	
Playing	God	
‘Playing	God’	 is	 subsequently	 a	particularly	 laden	accusation,	having	been	
employed	over	the	years	to	critique	a	wide	range	of	professions	and	situations.	
Teachers	passing	down	grades	to	their	students	(Skinner	1939),	medical	teams	
who	make	decisions	regarding	transplant	recipients	(Harken	1968),	the	State’s	
application	 of	 capital	 punishment	 (Gerstein	 1960),	 and	 even	 Jane	 Austen’s	
meddling	character	Emma	(Shannon	1956)	have	all	been	charged	with,	or	have	
faced	 their	 own	 personal	 concern	with,	 ‘playing	God.’	However	 perhaps	 the	
most	common	target	in	recent	years	has	been	biotechnology	(Goodfield	1977;	
Howard	and	Rifkin	1977;	Pollan	1998;	Sale	1999).	 It	should	therefore	come	as	
no	 surprise	 that	 synthetic	 biology,	 as	 a	 branch	 of	 biotechnology	 with	 an	
explicit	desire	 to	 create	new	 forms	of	 life,	has,	 as	 the	headlines	 that	 greeted	
the	 J.	 Craig	 Venter	 Institute’s	 announcement	 show,	 also	 been	 subjected	 to	
accusations	 of	 playing	God	 (Douglas	 and	 Savulescu	 2010;	 ETC	Group	 2007).	
However,	 perhaps	 surprisingly,	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 as	 in	 all	 of	 these	 other	
																																								 								
97 	While	 Darwin	 avoided	 addressing	 spontaneous	 generation	 in	 public,	 many	 of	 his	
contemporaries,	 including	 Pasteur,	 saw	 in	 his	 work	 a	 clear	 path	 through	 evolution	 from	
spontaneous	 generation	 to	 the	 evolution	 of	 humans	 (Geison	 2014).	 Thus,	 while	 today’s	
creationists	 view	 Darwin’s	 work	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 creationism,	 Darwin’s	 theory	 prompted	 the	
development	of	creationism	by	linking	spontaneous	generation	to	the	generation	of	humans.	
This	link	was	taken	as	evidence	that	all	living	beings,	and	not	just	those	with	a	rational	soul,	
owed	their	existence	to	the	primordial	divine	creation	(Schummer	2009).	
98	As	 such,	 nineteenth	 century	 chemists	 also	 came	 under	 fire	 and	 suspicion	 as	 they	 strove	 to	refute	vitalism	by	systematically	synthesising	organic	compounds.	
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situations,	 there	 is	 an	 argument	 that	 the	 charge	 of	 ‘playing	 God’	 is	 not	
necessarily	indicative	of	a	religious	opposition.		
Grey	 (1998),	 Drees	 (2002),	 and	 Peters	 (2006)	 have	 each	 highlighted	 that	
both	 religious	 and	 secular	 groups	 raise	 the	 charge	 of	 ‘playing	 God.’	 Grey	
claims,	 therefore,	 that	 rather	 than	 always	 being	 a	 religious	 argument,	 in	 a	
secular	 context	 the	 term	 is	 used	 metaphorically	 “to	 indicate	 that	 the	
consequences	 of	 an	 act	 are	 exceedingly	 serious	 or	 far-reaching	 and	 must	
therefore	be	considered	with	very	great	care,”	continuing	that	“the	phrase	may	
also	 be	 used	 to	 describe	 paternalistic	 or	 authoritarian	 decisions,	 often	
resented,	made	by	individuals	in	positions	of	power”	(Grey	1998:	335).	Indeed,	
even	 some	 theologists,	 such	 as	 Peters	 (2003)	 and	 Dabrock	 (2009),	 contend	
that,	despite	the	history	outlined	above,	there	are	no	principled	objections	of	a	
religious	 nature	 against	 the	 making	 of	 new	 life	 forms,	 as	 synthetic	 biology	
aims	to	do.		
Thus,	rather	than	being	an	explicit	religious	argument,	Davies	et	al.	(2009)	
argue	that	the	term	‘playing	God’	acts	as	a	symbolic	expression	of	inexpressible	
concerns.	 Consequently	 it	 is	 potentially	 more	 interesting	 to	 shift	 the	 focus	
away	 from	 the	 religious	 wording	 of	 the	 term,	 which	 is	 easily	 dismissed	 by	
those	 without	 religious	 inclination,	 to	 look	 instead	 at	 the	 concerns	 it	
represents.	 ‘Playing	 God’	 may	 be	 better	 understood,	 as	 Grey	 suggests,	 as	 a	
concern	with	the	use	of	power,	the	making	of	decisions	that	affect	others,	and	
with	 “humans	 letting	 their	 power	 and	 knowledge	 exceed	 their	 caution”	
(Kirkham	 2006:	 176).	Hence,	 despite	Venter	 dismissing	 questions	 of	 ‘playing	
God’	 as	 simply	 a	 result	 of	 scientific	 progress,99	the	 concerns	 underlying	 this	
symbolic	expression,	as	Kirkham	(2006)	and	Grey	(1998)	stress,	should	not	be	
ignored	or	dismissed.	
Kirkham	(2006)	claims	that	the	secular	version	of	the	term	‘playing	God’	is	
‘vexing	 nature’	 and	 that	 the	 concerns	 that	 underlie	 both	 are	 essentially	 the	
																																								 								
99	He	 is	 quoted	 as	 saying,	 “Every	 time	we	understand	 a	 little	more	 and	 get	 some	 command	
over	 nature,	 these	 terms	 come	 up.	 It’s	 one	 of	 the	 consequences	 of	 making	 breakthroughs”	
(Sample	2010:	3).	
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same.	For,	as	Ball	(2010)	and	Grey	(1998)	indicate,	nature	and	the	natural	are	
often	 held	 in	 high	 esteem	 by	 both	 religious	 and	 secular	 groups.	 Thus,	 it	 is	
often	 perceived	 transgressions	 against	 the	 natural	 order	 of	 things	 that	
encounter	 these	 objections.	 As	 bioethicist	 Arthur	 Caplan	 notes	 there	 is	
concern	 that	 synthetic	 biologists	 may	 be	 “manipulating	 nature	 without	
knowing	where	 they	are	going”	 (Caplan	quoted	 in	 J.	Carey	2007:	40).	Caplan	
also	 notes	 that,	 “while	 creating	 new	 life	 may	 not	 be	 playing	 God,	 it	 has	
revolutionary	implications	for	how	we	see	ourselves.	When	we	can	synthesize	
life,	 it	makes	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 living	 being	 less	 special”	 (Caplan	 quoted	 in	 J.	
Carey	 2007:	 40).	 This	 statement	 from	 Caplan	 in	 turn	 raises	 a	 question;	 is	 a	
living	 being	 indeed	 special?	 And	 if	 the	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 is	 yes,	 what	
exactly	makes	it	so?	
Organisms	and	machines			
Venter	is	quoted	in	the	Guardian	as	saying,	in	regards	to	his	team’s	success,	
“[i]t	has	definitely	changed	my	views	of	definitions	of	life	and	how	life	works”	
(Sample	 2010:	 1).	 The	 questions	 ‘what	 is	 life?’	 and	 ‘what	 are	 the	 essential	
differences,	if	any,	between	the	living	and	the	non-living,	the	animate	and	the	
inanimate,100	and	 organisms	 and	machines?,’101	that	 Venter’s	 work	 raised	 not	
only	 for	 himself	 but	 for	 many	 others,	 have	 been	 around	 since	 at	 least	 the	
fourth	century	BCE.	At	this	time,	as	shall	be	discussed	in	chapter	six,	Aristotle	
became	 the	 first	 person	 to	 attempt	 a	 general	 definition	 of	 life,	 by	
distinguishing	 it	 from	non-life.	He	wrote,	 “[o]f	 natural	 bodies	 [that	 is,	 those	
not	 fabricated	 by	 man],	 some	 possess	 vitality,	 others	 do	 not.	 We	 mean	 by	
‘possessing	 vitality’	 that	 a	 thing	 can	 nourish	 itself	 and	 grow	 and	 decay”	
																																								 								
100	Interestingly,	 the	words	 ‘animal’	and	 ‘animate’	come	 from	the	Latin	anima	and	the	Greek	
anemos	which	mean	breath	(Canguilhem	2000).	
101	While	 similar,	 there	 are	 significant	 differences	 between	 these	 categories.	 The	distinctions	
between	 living	 and	 non-living	 entities	 map	 onto	 those	 between	 the	 animate	 and	 the	
inanimate,	 but	 the	 same	 is	 not	 true	 for	 the	 distinctions	 between	machines	 and	 organisms.	
Indeed,	while	all	non-living	entities	 are	 inanimate,	not	all	 inanimate	entities	 are	 considered	
machines;	 think	 of	 a	 rock	 for	 instance.	 Furthermore,	 and	 arguably	 less	 obviously,	 not	 all	
entities	 that	have	historically	been,	 and	contemporarily	 are,	 considered	 to	be,	or	 treated	as,	
machines	are	inanimate.	
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(quoted	 in	 Canguilhem	 2000:	 67).	 Since	 this	 time,	 attempts	 to	 address	 the	
above	 questions	 have	 often	 assumed	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 boundary	 between	
organisms	and	machines.	Thus,	 rather	 than	question	 the	existence	of	 such	a	
division,	much	of	the	media	coverage	of	Venter’s	‘synthetic’	organism	debated	
whether	this	assumed	boundary	had	been	transgressed.		
Interestingly,	this	focus	was	in	line	with	much	of	the	early	historical	debate	
around	 the	 machine/organism	 divide,	 a	 debate	 that	 concerned	 what,	 and	
sometimes	who,	fell	on	either	side	of	the	division.	In	the	fourth	century	BCE,	
for	 example,	 Aristotle	 argued	 that	 slaves,	 who	 he	 referred	 to	 as	 “animate	
machines,”	fell	on	the	machine	side	of	the	machine/organism	boundary.	While	
in	 the	seventeenth	century	Descartes	more	 famously,	 though	potentially	 less	
controversially,	argued	that	all	animals	were	machines	(Canguilhem	2009).	As	
shall	 be	 addressed	 in	 chapter	 six,	 Descartes	 held	 that	 the	 body,	 with	 its	
material	parts,	works	like	a	machine	while	the	nonmaterial	soul,	or	mind,	does	
not	follow	the	laws	of	nature,	but	interacts	with	the	body	through	the	pineal	
gland.	Thus	his	argument	that	animals	were	essentially	reflex-driven	‘animal-
machines’	was	based	on	his	notion	 that	animals	have	no	 soul,	 and	 therefore	
cannot	 judge,	 understand,	 or	 feel	 pain	 and	 consequently	 do	 not	 qualify	 as	
rational	beings	under	his	famous	dictum	Cogito	ergo	sum	(I	think	therefore	I	
am)	 (Allen	 and	 Trestman	 2014;	 Canguilhem	 2009;	 Dawkins	 2011).	 While	
Aristotle	 and	 Descartes’	 arguments	 no	 longer	 hold	 sway,	 having	 been	
motivated,	 according	 to	 Canguilhem	 (2009),	 by	 a	 desire	 to	 justify	 the	
exploitation	 of,	 in	 turn,	 slaves	 and	 animals,	 the	 notion	 that	 a	
machine/organism	divide	exists	remained	strong.	
Indeed,	 in	 1790	 Immanuel	 Kant	 followed	 in	 the	 footsteps	 of	 Aristotle	 by	
dividing	 all	 things	 in	 nature	 into	 two	 categories,	 the	 inorganic	 and	 the	
organic102	introducing	 the	 term	 self-organisation103	as	 a	way	 of	 characterising	
what	it	was	that	singled	out	organisms	from	other	subjects	(Keller	2008).	Kant	
																																								 								
102	It	 is	worth	 noting	 that	 this	 predates	 the	 formation	 of	 ‘biology’	 as	 a	 distinct	 and	 separate	
field	of	science	by	a	decade.	
103	In	Kant	(1987).	
 182 
reportedly	 contended	 that	 an	 organism	 is	 “not	 merely	 self-steering,	 self-
governing,	 and	 self-maintaining;	 it	 is	 also	 self-organizing.	 More,	 it	 is	 self-
generating,”	 thus	 it	 is	both	“cause	 and	 effect	 of	 itself”	 (Kant	quoted	 in	Keller	
2008:	 49).	 The	 emphasis	 here	 was	 very	much	 upon	 the	 ‘self’	 for	 it	 was	 the	
autonomy	of	the	organism	to	perform	these	functions	on	or	within	itself,	that	
Kant	argued,	in	a	similar	vein	to	Canguilhem	(2009)	and	Nicholson	(2013)	after	
him,	set	it	apart	from	a	machine,	no	matter	how	organised.	Drawing	on	Kant	
then,	Keller	defines	an	organism	as	“a	body	which,	by	virtue	of	its	peculiar	and	
particular	organization,	 is	 constituted	as	a	 ‘self’	 -	 an	entity	 that	 .	 .	 .	 achieves	
both	autonomy	and	 the	 capacity	 for	 self-generation”	 (2008:	 49).	Thus,	while	
machines	and	organisms	continued	to	be	used	as	analogies	for	each	other,104	it	
was	this	concept	of	 their	different	 forms	of	organisation,	self-perpetuated	vs.	
externally	determined,	which	prevented	organisms	from	being	confused	with	
machines	(Keller	2008).	
The	emergence	of	thermodynamics	in	the	mid-nineteenth	century	however,	
saw	 the	 boundary	 between	 organisms	 and	 inanimate,	 physical	 systems	
become	 less	 clear	 as	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 boundary	 itself	 increasingly	 came	
into	question.	Thermodynamic	experiments,	such	as	that	by	von	Helmholtz,105	
were	 used	 to	 argue	 that	 there	 was	 no	 longer	 any	 basis	 for	 arguing	 that	
organisms	were	governed	by	distinct	processes	(Keller	2008).	Further	efforts	to	
disprove	the	existence	of	 the	boundary	 followed,	such	as	moves	to	apply	 the	
concepts	 of	 “stability,	 equilibrium,	 and	 fixity	 (and	 later,	 of	 steady	 states)	 in	
describing	 features	 of	 biological	 regulation”	 (Keller	 2008:	 52)	 in	 order	 to	
assimilate	 organic	 systems	with	 inorganic	 systems.	However,	 the	 speculative	
and	ambiguous	usage	of	such	concepts	simultaneously	left	open	the	possibility	
that	 biology	was,	 as	 Caplan’s	 quote	 above	 suggests,	 something	 distinct,	 and	
the	 notion	 of	 a	 boundary	 between	 biological	 systems	 and	 physico-chemical	
																																								 								
104	See	Nicholson	(2013)	for	a	discussion	of	such	analogies.	
105	Von	Helmholtz,	one	of	the	early	proponents	of	the	principle	of	energy	conservation	(Kuhn	
1959),	demonstrated	the	equivalence	of	animal	heat	and	energy	by	showing	that	muscle	tissue,	
in	isolation,	produces	heat.	An	explanation	of	such	heat	that	did	not	require	the	presence	of	a	
‘vital	force’	(Blaxter	1989).	
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systems	 survived.	 Indeed,	 the	 1920s	 saw	 a	 drive	 to	 oppose	 thermodynamics’	
reductionism.	For	example,	physiologist	Walter	Cannon	attempted	to	bolster	
the	 argument	 for	 a	 clear	 divide	 through	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 term	
‘homeostasis.’	Homeostasis,	Cannon	hoped,	could	be	used	to	differentiate	“the	
kind	 of	 stability	 maintained	 by	 biological	 systems	 from	 simple	 physico-
chemical	equilibria”	(Keller	2008:	61).	Homeostasis	then,	like	self-organisation	
before	it,	was	used	to	signal	the	distinctiveness	of	organisms,	and	was	largely	
successful	 in	 this	endeavour	until	 the	 rise	of	cybernetics	 in	 the	 1940s	 (Keller	
2008).	
Keller	writes	that	while	there	was	a	lot	of	focus	on	the	relationship	between	
organisms	and	physico-chemical	systems	during	the	nineteenth	century,	there	
was	not	much	 focus	 on	 the	divide	between	organisms	 and	machines.	 It	was	
widely	accepted	 that	machines	could	be	designed	 to	 self-regulate	but,	Keller	
argues,	 no	 links	 were	 made	 between	 biological	 self-regulation	 and	 its	
mechanical	counterpart	(2008).	However	with	the	end	of	World	War	II,	and	in	
the	wake	of	the	technological	leaps	that	had	been	achieved	as	part	of	the	war	
effort,	 cybernetics	 was	 born.	 According	 to	 Keller,	 the	 basic	 argument	 of	
cybernetics	was	 that	 the	 “relation	between	organisms	and	machines	was	not	
merely	 analogous,	 but	 homologous:	 organisms	were	machines,	 and	 at	 least	
some	 machines	 could	 be	 organisms”	 (2008:	 47).	 Accordingly,	 those	 within	
cybernetics	held	that,	“it	ought	to	be	possible	to	build	machines	with	the	same	
self-organizing	 capacities	 as	 organisms”	 (2008:	 47).	 Rather	 ironically	
cybernetics	 co-opted	Kant’s	 term	 ‘self-organisation’	 to	describe	 this	program	
of	 work.	 Cybernetics	 then,	 like	 thermodynamics	 before	 it,	 held	 that	 no	
division	 between	 machines	 and	 organisms	 exists.	 Yet,	 rather	 than	 simply	
evidencing	this	through	experiments,	cybernetics	aimed	to	create	entities	that	
breached	the	divide,	thus	proving	that	the	notion	of	the	divide’s	existence	was	
untenable.	
For	 twenty	years	efforts	 to	create	self-organising,	communicative	machine	
systems,	which	would,	 it	was	hoped,	 qualify	 as	 organisms,	 continued	within	
cybernetics.	However,	due	to	its	lack	of	progress,	cybernetics	fell	out	of	favour	
within	 computer	 science	 and,	 in	 the	 1960s,	molecular	 biology	 took	 over	 the	
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conversation	on	self-organisation	(Keller	2008).	With	this	shift,	the	efforts	to	
breach	 the	 machine/organism	 divide	 continued,	 however	 such	 efforts	 were	
now	 predominantly	 driven	 from	 the	 organism	 side	 of	 the	 divide.	
Consequently,	 the	 conversation	 around	 self-organisation	 shifted	 at	 this	 time	
to	focus	on	its	role	in	the	formation	and	emergence	of	stable	patterns	within	
low-entropy,	 non-equilibrium	 systems	 governed	 by	 nonlinear	 dynamics,	 the	
prime	example	being	organisms	(Eigen	1971;	Nicolis	and	Prigogine	1977).		
This	 focus	 on	 nonlinearity	 in	 far-from-equilibrium	 systems,	 continued	 to	
influence	 the	 work	 on	 self-organisation,	 as	 well	 as	 understandings	 of	 the	
origins	 of	 life,	 and	 thus	 the	 ‘nature’	 of	 biological	 organisms	 throughout	 the	
1970s	and	80s.	Charles	Bennett,	for	example,	wrote	“dissipation	has	taken	over	
one	of	 the	 functions	 formerly	performed	by	God:	 It	makes	matter	 transcend	
the	clod-like	nature	 it	would	manifest	 at	 equilibrium,	and	behave	 instead	 in	
dramatic	and	unforeseen	ways,	molding	itself	for	example	into	thunderstorms,	
people	 and	 umbrellas”	 (1986:	 586).	 The	 result	 of	 this	 conceptual	 shift	 was,	
therefore,	 a	 further	 assault	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 a	machine/organism	 divide	 as,	
“life	 itself	 was	 reconceptualized	 as	 a	 self-organizing	 system,	 with	 the	 same	
kinds	 of	 properties	 that	 had	 previously	 been	 encountered	 in	 fluid	 dynamics	
and	 statistical	mechanics”	 (Keller	 2009a:	 17).	 This	 reconceptualisation	 of	 the	
relationship	between	organisms	and	machines	led	in	turn	to	the	development	
of	the	science	of	complexity.		
Complexity	
The	science	of	complexity	arose	in	the	late	1980s	and	90s	as	an	attempt	to	
find	 a	 unified	 theory	 of	 complex	 systems,	 including	 both	 animate	 and	
inanimate	 systems.	 Much	 effort	 has,	 since	 this	 time,	 been	 expended	 in	 the	
search	for	such	a	theory,	however	the	desired	universality	has	 largely	proved	
elusive	(Keller	2009a).	Thus,	while	Kant’s	term,	self-organisation,	has	come	to	
refer	 to	 any	 complex	 phenomena	 arising	 out	 of	 random	 ensembles,	 such	
emergent	patterns,	though	complex,	continue	to	lack	meaning.	“Stripes,	rolls,	
whirls,	 eddies	are	all	phenomena	 indicative	of	complex,	nonlinear	dynamics;	
they	 are	 phenomena	 that	 can	 only	 be	 found	 in	 systems	 that	 share	 with	
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organisms	 the	 property	 of	 being	 open,	 far	 from	 equilibrium,	 dissipative.”	
However,	Keller	continues,	“they	still	lack	the	properties	that	make	organisms	
so	 insistently	 different	 from	 physical	 systems.	 Most	 notably,	 they	 lack	
function,	agency,	and	purpose”	(2009a:	27).	Keller	argues	that	such	properties	
may	 therefore	 require	a	greater	 level	of	complexity	 than	 that	which	emerges	
spontaneously	 out	 of	 complex	 interactions	 between	 simple	 components.	 A	
level	 of	 complexity	 which	 some	 have	 termed	 organised	 complexity	 (Keller	
2009a),	and	one	that	Nobel	Prize	winner	Hebert	Simon	argued	is	complexity	
with	hierarchical	architecture	(1962).		
Yet	despite	such	hypotheses,	and	despite	decades	of	attempts,	no	satisfying	
account	 of	 the	 origins	 of	 life,	 or	 of	 life’s	 organisation,	 yet	 exists.	 That	 is,	
despite	decades	of	work,	organisms	cannot	yet	be	 fully	explained	using	what	
we	know	of	physico-chemical	systems,	thus	they	cannot	yet	be	accounted	for	
using	the	reductionistic	approach	synthetic	biology	adheres	to.	There	is	plenty	
of	 evidence	 supporting	 the	notion	 that	organisms	can	be	explained	 in	 solely	
physico-chemical	 terms,	 but	 the	 explanation	 itself	 is	 incomplete.	 Perhaps	
then,	Keller	concedes,	Kant	was	right,	 “perhaps	the	task	 is	 just	too	difficult	-	
too	large	-	for	the	mind	to	encompass”	(2009a:	30).	This	position	would	leave	
open	 the	 chance	 that	 we	 may	 not	 ever	 be	 able	 to	 fully	 comprehend	 what	
makes	 life,	 life.	 Which	 subsequently	 raises	 questions	 regarding	 synthetic	
biology’s	practical	and	conceptual	doability.	Can	we	truly	engineer	life,	in	the	
manner	 synthetic	 biology	 aims	 to,	 if	 we	 do	 not	 full	 understand	 it?	
Furthermore	this	position,	like	all	the	attempts	before	it,	fails	to	unequivocally	
put	to	rest	the	issue	of	whether	or	not	a	machine/organism	divide	exists.	
Blurring	the	boundary	
The	 history	 recounted	 above	 is	 replete	 with	 examples	 of	 organisms,	 and	
their	 characteristics,	 being	 reduced	 to	 and	 reclassified	 as	 physico-chemical	
processes	or	machine-like	qualities,	and	of	machines	and	their	characteristics	
being	reclassified	as	organic	or	life-like.	Yet	the	results	of	such	categorisations	
and	 analogies,	 like	 the	 results	 of	 experimental	 imitations	 of	 life,	 have	 never	
truly	 spanned	 the	 divide	 between	 the	 animate	 and	 inanimate.	 Loeb’s	 (1912)	
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famous	 sea	 urchins,	 produced	 through	 artificial	 parthenogenesis	 were,	 like	
babies	 born	 following	 In	 Vitro	 Fertilisation,	 undeniably	 animate.	 While	
Leduc’s	(1911)	artificial	cells,	made	using	inorganic	fluids	and	crystals	were,	like	
the	products	of	modern	Artificial	Intelligence,	undoubtedly	inanimate.		
However,	 Deplazes	 and	 Huppenbauer	 (2009)	 contend	 that,	 unlike	 such	
historical	attempts,	synthetic	biology	is	actually	spanning	this	divide.	Through	
the	 use	 of	 both	 basic	 natural	 mechanisms	 and	 computers	 in	 the	 design	 of	
systems,	 Deplazes	 and	 Huppenbauer	 maintain	 that	 “synthetic	 biology	 as	 a	
whole	 approaches	 the	borderline	between	 living	 and	non-living	matter	 from	
both	 sides,	 the	 living	 and	 the	 inanimate”	 (2009:	 56).	 Thus	 creating	 entities,	
like	 ‘Synthia’	 and	 syn3.0,	 that	 “seem	 not	 to	 stretch	 but	 to	 transgress	 the	
borderline	 between	 organisms	 and	machines”	 (2009:	 62).	 As	 such,	 Deplazes	
and	Huppenbauer	argue	that	synthetic	biology	may	well	be	the	first	endeavour	
to	 successfully	 blur	 this	 boundary,	 as	 “the	 aim	 of	 producing	 novel	 types	 of	
living	organisms	in	synthetic	biology	not	only	implies	the	production	of	living	
from	non-living	matter,	but	also	the	idea	of	using	living	matter	and	turning	it	
into	machines,	which	are	traditionally	considered	non-living”	(2009:	56).	This	
then	 helps	 to	 explain	why	 Craig	 Venter’s	 announcement	made	 the	waves	 it	
did.		
Before	‘Synthia’	the	discussion	had	been	hypothetical,	anticipating	how	we	
would	classify	 such	 future	entities,	but	with	 ‘Synthia’s’	 arrival,	hailed	as	 ‘she’	
was	 as	 the	 “first	 artificial	 organism”	 (The	 Economist	 2010),	 the	 ‘future’	 had	
arrived	and	the	machine/organism	divide	was	under	attack.	 It	was	therefore,	
in	the	wake	of	this	shake-up	that	I	was	undertaking	my	fieldwork.	Many	of	the	
synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	 were	 not	 convinced	 that	 ‘Synthia’	 was	 as	
much	 of	 a	 game-changer	 as	 Craig	 Venter,	 or	 the	 media,	 would	 have	 you	
believe.	 However	 the	 hype	 that	 had	 accompanied	 ‘her’	 unveiling	 did	 raise	
questions	 for	 these	 same	 synthetic	 biologists	 about	 how	 they	 themselves	
viewed	and	classified	the	‘products’	of	their	discipline	and	their	work.	It	is	to	
the	 answers	 and	 internal	 debates	 that	 these	 questions	 generated	 that	 I	 now	
turn	my	attention.	
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Exploring	the	boundaries		
How	synthetic	biologists	refer	to	the	 ‘products’	of	their	work	may	seem	to	
be	 a	 simple	 case	 of	 nomenclature,	 however,	 Deplazes	 and	 Huppenbauer	
suggest,	 such	 decisions	 have	 profound	 conceptual	 and	 philosophical	
underpinnings.	They	write,	“[b]y	calling	their	product	an	artificial	or	synthetic	
cell	scientists	are	announcing	that	life	no	longer	is	only	a	natural	process	and	
feature.	They	point	out	that	the	phenomenon	‘life’	will	be	fully	understood	by	
scientists,	and	this	understanding	should	enable	the	production	of	life”	(2009:	
61).	 Venter’s	 claims	 around	 ‘Synthia’	 are	 a	 perfect	 example	 of	 this	 with	 the	
artificiality	of	‘her’	origins	and	‘parenthood’	being	arguably	overstated	in	order	
to	 make	 this	 point.	 Referring	 to	 synthetic	 biology’s	 products	 as	
synthetic/artificial/man-made	 organisms	 therefore	 suggests,	 according	 to	
Deplazes	 and	 Huppenbauer,	 that	 you	 see	 the	 creation	 of	 life	 as	 a	 purely	
replicable,	mechanical	process.	Furthermore,	they	claim,	“calling	a	genetically	
engineered	 bacterium	 a	machine	 conveys	 a	 completely	 different	message.	 It	
points	out	 that	 these	 entities	 are	 controlled	 and	produced	by	human	beings	
who	can	dispose	of	them	freely	and	that	these	entities	are	no	longer	part	of	the	
realm	 of	 nature”	 (2009:	 62).	 Thus,	 they	 argue,	 classifying	 the	 products	 of	
synthetic	biology	as	machines	suggests	that	you	view	life,	not	just	it’s	creation	
but	all	its	processes,	as	designable,	mechanical,	and	disposable.		
And	yet,	as	is	evident	in	the	announcement	of	syn3.0	(Clyde	A.	Hutchison	
et	 al.	 2016),	 with	 its	 149	mystery	 genes,	 even	Venter	 admits	 to	 not	 yet	 fully	
understanding	‘life.’	Which,	as	discussed	in	chapter	one,	raises	the	question	of	
whether	life	can	truly	be	considered	engineerable	if	the	function	of	the	parts	is	
not	 fully	 understood.	 This	 gap	 in	 understanding,	 it	 should	 be	 stressed,	 is	
arguably	 a	 fundamental	 problem	 for	 the	 application	 of	 the	 engineering	
approach	 as	 it	 was	 laid	 out	 in	 chapter	 four.	 Genes	 whose	 functions	 are	
completely	unknown	(where	it	 is	not	simply	a	case	of	 ‘we	know	what	it	does	
but	not	how	it	does	it,’	but	rather	 ‘we	don’t	even	know	what	it	does’)	cannot	
be	subjected	to	standardisation,	characterisation,	or	abstraction.	Thus	despite	
a	 strong	 commitment	 to	 taking	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	 biology,	 as	
 188 
discussed	in	chapter	four	the	prevailing	rhetoric	of	synthetic	biology	seems	to	
be	out	of	step	with	the	reality	of	synthetic	biology.		
This	 rhetoric	 suggests	 that	 biological	 organisms	 are	 fundamentally	 no	
different	 to	 other	 inanimate,	 engineerable	 materials,	 and	 hence	 that	 the	
products	of	engineering	endeavours	 in	biology	can	themselves	be	thought	of	
as	engineered	entities.	However	the	question	I	shall	be	exploring	below	is,	do	
synthetic	 biologists	 themselves	 see	 the	 products	 of	 their	 work	 in	 this	 way?	
Given	 their	 commitment	 to	 synthetic	 biology,	 the	 epitome	 of	 the	
reductionistic	 approach	 to	 biology,	 I	 initially	 assumed	 that	 the	 synthetic	
biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	 would	 uniformly	 reject	 the	 notion	 of	 a	
machine/organism	divide.	However,	 as	 this	 chapter	 outlines,	 the	boundaries	
of	life	are	problematic	to	say	the	least.		
In	 The	 Politics	 of	 Life	 Itself:	 Biomedicine,	 power,	 and	 subjectivity	 in	 the	
twenty-first	century,	Nikolas	Rose	addresses	this	issue	writing	that	“[o]ur	very	
sense	of	what	is	or	is	not	life,	living,	or	alive	is	often	exactly	what	is	at	stake	in	
the	politics	of	the	present.	A	host	of	entities	inhabit	a	transitional	zone	where	
their	 life-liness	 is	 precisely	 in	 question”	 (2007:	 48).	 Rose	 is	 referring	here	 to	
two	 specific	 kinds	 of	 liminal	 entities,	 those	 involved	 in	 reproductive	
technologies,	such	as	sperm,	ova,	blastocysts,	and	embryos,	and	those	that	did	
not	 previously	 exist	 but	 rather	 are	 generated	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	
reproductive	and	stem-cell	technologies	such	as	stem	cells	and	stem	cell	lines.	
Although	 he	 does	 not	 mention	 them,	 the	 products	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	
designed	 on	 computers	 and	 ‘built’	 in	 the	 laboratory,	 would,	 it	 seems,	 fall	
within	 Rose’s	 transitional	 zone.	 As	 Rose	 asserts,	 such	 entities	 highlight	 the	
philosophy	of	life	embodied	in	individuals’	ways	of	thinking	and	acting,	and	in	
the	 ways	 they	 differentiate	 between	 life	 and	 nonlife	 (N.	 Rose	 2007).	 Thus,	
exploring	the	ways	in	which	the	synthetic	biologists	at	the	Centre	classify	the	
‘products’	 of	 their	 work,	 as	 I	 shall	 below,	 provides	 an	 insight	 into	 their	
philosophy	 of	 life,	 and	 thus	 into	 their	 take	 on	 whether	 biology	 is	 indeed	
engineerable.	
Deplazes	 and	Huppenbauer	 (2009),	 Latour	 (1987),	Haraway	 (1997),	 Keller	
(2002),	and	Arthur	(2009),	all	independently	suggest	that	drawing	a	boundary	
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between	 organisms	 and	 machines	 is	 an	 increasingly	 difficult	 and/or	
meaningless	endeavour.	Not	surprisingly	then,	given	the	discipline’s	adoption	
of	 such	 a	mechanistic	 approach	 to,	 and	 conception	of,	 biology,	many	of	 the	
synthetic	 biologists	 within	 the	 Centre	 also	 expressed	 this	 viewpoint,	 as	 I	
expected.	They	told	me,	in	a	variety	of	ways,	that	they	see	no	clear	boundary	
between	organisms	and	machines,	but	rather	envision	a	grey	area	between	the	
two.		
I	think	there’s	no	clear	boundary.	Because	I’ve	thought	about	this	for	
a	while,	like	where	do	you	draw	the	line,	right?	.	.	.	you	can	just	keep	
decomposing	 the	 matter	 where	 you	 are,	 right?	 Like	 keep	
decomposing	 to	 the	 next	 level	 and	 then	 it’s	 really	 tough	 to	 define	
what	life	is.		
(Christian,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
I	 think	 that	 there’s	 a	 big	 grey	area	as	 to	 .	 .	 .	where	a	 living	 system	
begins	and	a	non-living	system	ends.		
(Ryan,	postdoctoral	researcher,	biology)	
This	 distinction	 [between	 machines	 and	 organisms]	 will	 become	
much	more	.	.	.	blurry	than	it	is	now.	
(Grant,	senior	researcher,	engineering)	
Like	 many	 others	 within	 the	 Centre,	 Christian,	 Ryan,	 and	 Grant	 all	
expressed,	 in	 their	 own	 ways,	 doubts	 regarding	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 clear	
boundary	 between	 organisms	 and	 machines.	 For	 Christian,	 his	 qualms	 are	
underpinned	by	a	belief	 in	the	mechanistic	conception	of	 the	organism,	that	
you	can	“just	keep	decomposing	the	matter	.	.	.	to	the	next	level”	until	life	is	fully	
explained	 in	 physico-chemical	 terms.	 Whereas,	 in	 their	 descriptions	 of	 a	
blurry,	 grey	 mid-zone	 between	 machines	 and	 organisms	 Ryan	 and	 Grant	
appear	to	be	implying	that	there	is	a	difference	between	these	two	categories	
but	that	defining	this	difference	and	locating	a	clear	division	between	them	is	
difficult,	and	possibly	increasingly	so	as	synthetic	biology	advances.		
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For	 some	of	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	Centre,	 such	 as	 Simon,	 Lewis,	
and	Trevor,	 it	was	within	 this	grey	area	 that	 they	 saw	 the	 ‘products’	of	 their	
discipline	falling.	
We’re	 doing	 something	 that’s	 in	 the	middle	 between	machines	 and	
life	forms.		
(Simon,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
I	think	[a	product	of	synthetic	biology]	would	be	both	[an	organism	
and	a	machine]	actually	.	.	.	it	probably	would	just	be	a	hybrid	of	the	
two.		
(Lewis,	doctoral	student,	engineering)		
This	machine	will	 contain	 this	biological	 system	 that	you	designed,	
and	you	also	can	have	an	interface	between	.	.	.	this	machine	field	and	
this	 living	 field,	 like	 .	 .	 .	 we	 have	 overcome	 the	 barrier	 between	
electrical	 side,	 the	 electrical	 field	 and	 the	 living	 organism	 field,	 the	
biology	side.		
(Trevor,	postdoctoral	researcher,	engineering)	
Yet,	while	these	three	synthetic	biologists	contend	that	it	is	difficult	to	assign	
their	discipline’s	‘products’	to	either	the	machines	or	organisms	category,	the	
classifications	they	do	assign	to	them	subtly	differ.	While	Simon	asserted	that	
synthetic	 biology’s	 ‘products’	 belong	 in	 the	 grey	 area	 located	 “in	 the	 middle	
between	machines	 and	 life	 forms”	being	neither	 fully	one	nor	the	other,	both	
Lewis	 and	 Trevor	 conversely	 saw	 them	 as	 “both,”	 being,	 much	 like	 the	
discipline	itself,	boundary	spanning	“hybrid[s]	of	the	two.”		
Others	 within	 the	 Centre	 similarly	 saw	 no	 clear	 boundary	 between	
machines	and	organisms	but,	rather	than	conceiving	of	a	grey	area,	believed	in	
an	 essential	 inanimate	 homogeneity	 between	 the	 ‘categories.’	 For	 Peter,	 his	
belief	 in	 an	 essential	 homogeneity	 between	 machines	 and	 organisms	 was	
prompted	by	the	observation	that	the	enzymes	in	the	cells	he	works	with	are	
“the	 ultimate	 nano-machines”	 rendering	 the	 cells	 themselves	 as	 simply	 the	
housing	 or	 ‘factory’	 that	 contains	 a	 collection	 of	 such	 enzymatic	 “mini-
machines,”	and	the	notion	of	a	machine/organism	divide,	nonsensical.	
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Enzymes	are	the	ultimate	nano-machines.	I	mean	.	 .	 .	when	you	see	
how	some	of	these	enzymes	operate	in	cells	they	are	mini-machines,	
so	therefore	I	don’t	see	a	divide,	no.	No.		
(Peter,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
Like	 Peter,	 Grant	 also	 expressed	 a	 mechanistic	 conception	 of	 organisms,	
arguing	that	the	“simple	organisms	and	bacteria”	they	work	with	are	not	only	
looked	at	and	treated	as	machines,	but	that	they	essentially	are	machines.	
The	way	we	are	currently	looking	at	simple	organisms	and	bacteria	is	
as	machines.	We	try	to	get	down	to	the	mechanistic	[basis]	of	those	
things	 and	 to	 get	 a	 level	 of	 understanding	 that	 allows	 us	 to	 treat	
them	 as	 machines,	 as	 things	 that	 we	 can	 on	 demand	 force	 to	 do	
things	that	they	are	not	intended	.	.	.	to	do	in	the	first	place.	So	yeah,	
that’s	what	you	do	with	a	machine,	right?	You	create	something	that	
can	perform	tasks	for	you,	in	a	way	that	is	reliable	.	.	.	A	ribosome	is	
what?	 It’s	 a	 protein-producing	 factory	 that	 takes	 a	 blueprint	 at	 its	
entry	 and	 produces	 fantastic	 3D	 fundamental	 units	 for	 the	
functioning	 of	 the	 cell.	 It’s	 a	 machine,	 isn’t	 it?	 Isn’t	 that	 what	 a	
machine	does?		
(Grant,	senior	researcher,	engineering)	
For	 Michael	 however,	 the	 notion	 of	 an	 essential	 homogeneity	 between	
machines	 and	 organisms	 arose	 not	 from	 a	 recognition	 of	 machine-like	
qualities	in	organisms,	but	rather	from	a	belief	that	all	matter	is	inanimate.		
There’s	no	vital	 element	of	biological	material	 .	 .	 .	 So	 this	might	be	
the	final	sort	of	death	knell	 for	vitalism	.	 .	 .	 that	everything	is	dead,	
that	 there	 is	 no	 life,	 that	 nothing	 is	 alive,	 that	 everything	 is	 dead.	
Everything’s	 inanimate	 .	 .	 .	 there’s	 no	 inherent	 difference	 in	 the	
matter	that	makes	up	me	than	makes	up	this	computer.		
(Michael,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
Michael’s	 assertions	 that	 “there	 is	 no	 life”	 and	 “everything’s	 inanimate”	
illustrate	 a	 consequence	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	 engineering	 approach	
previously	discussed	by	Pablo	Schyfter	(2012).	Drawing	on	Heidegger,	and	his	
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notion	 of	 Ge-stell,	 Schyfter	 writes	 that	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 the	 focus	 on	
reducing	living	organisms	to	a	combination	of	biological	functions	leads	to	the	
position	that	“[t]here	do	not	exist	 living	things;	rather,	 there	exist	 functions”	
(2012:	217).	This	mechanistic	view	of	organisms,	which	is	clearly	evident	in	the	
quotes	 from	 Peter,	 Grant,	 and	Michael,	 is	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 synthetic	
biology.	 Synthetic	 biologists	 are,	 after	 all,	 taking	 this	 mechanistic	 approach	
extremely	 literally.	 They	 are	 attempting	 to	 render	 the	 organisms	 they	 work	
with	as	collections	of	functions,	or	‘parts,’	that	can	be	linked	together	in	order	
to	produce	an	entity,	which	will	behave	in	a	predetermined	and	desired	way,	
as	Grant	outlines	above.		
Michael	is	obviously	demonstrating	this	same	conviction,	however	I	found	
Michael’s	 emphatic	 rejection	 of	 vitalism	 and	 unequivocal	 acceptance	 of	
mechanism	particularly	 striking.	Not	only	did	his	 answer	display	a	 complete	
lack	of	the	uncertainty	expressed	by	most	of	his	colleagues,	but	also	it	was	the	
only	unambiguous	response	I	received.	Even	Peter	and	Grant	waivered	in	their	
mechanistic	 conviction	as	 they	 tried	 to	make	 sense	of	 the	 ‘products’	of	 their	
work,	but	Michael	did	not.	Given	my	expectations,	it	was	not	Michael’s	lack	of	
uncertainty	 that	 surprised	me,	 but	 rather,	 it	 was	 the	 doubt	 expressed	 by	 so	
many	others	that	intrigued	me.	
Indeed,	despite	synthetic	biology’s	adherence	 to	an	engineering	approach,	
and	 the	 widespread,	 ostensible	 rejection	 of	 vitalism	 by	 those	 within	 the	
Centre,	 I	 repeatedly	 encountered	 the	 viewpoint	 that	 living	 entities	 possess	
something	that	sets	them	apart	from	machines.	For	some,	such	as	Jessica	and	
Martin,	 this	 led	 to	 internal	 conflict.	 They	were	 uncertain	whether	 or	 not	 to	
believe	 that	 the	 boundary	 between	 machines	 and	 organisms	 was	 indeed	
blurring,	 as	 they	 maintained,	 at	 times	 in	 spite	 of	 themselves,	 that	 in	 their	
minds	such	entities	bear	distinct	differences.	
I’d	like	to	say	it	depends	but	then	I	guess	it	shouldn’t,	you	know	.	.	.	If	
I	say	it	depends	that	implies	that	you	could	have	.	.	.	this	bacterium	is	
a	 machine	 but	 this	 other	 one	 is	 not,	 you	 know,	 so	 what’s	 the	
difference	between	 them? Somewhere	 there’s	 .	 .	 .	 is	 it	a	 sort	of	grey	
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area,	 is	there	a	 line?	 .	 .	 .	 	 I	personally	would	not	think	of	a	cell	as	a	
machine	.	.	.	Like	we	can	make	it	do	things,	we	can	use	it	in	the	same	
way	 as	 a	 machine	 but	 I	 wouldn’t	 think	 of	 it	 as	 a	 machine,	 even	
though	at	the	end	of	the	day	it’s	all	like,	you	know,	the	same	kind	of	
chemical	reactions	going	on	and	stuff,	but	I	just	.	.	.	I	wouldn’t	think	
of	it	like	that	.	.	.	because	it	is	derived	from	living	material.		
(Jessica,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
In	 my	 head	 I’m	 always	 like,	 yeah,	 that’s	 a	 machine,	 that’s	 an	
organism.	I	mean	when	you	really	think	about	 it,	 it’s	pretty	hard	to	
define	 a	 boundary.	 But	 yeah,	 notionally,	 there’s	 a	 machine,	 and	
there’s	a	cell,	or	there’s	life.	
	(Martin,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
Here	both	Jessica	and	Martin	demonstrate	a	conflict	between	what	they	know	
of	 biology,	 that	 it	 has	 “the	 same	 kind	 of	 chemical	 reactions	 going	 on”	 as	
machines,	and	thus	“when	you	really	think	about	it,	it’s	pretty	hard	to	define	a	
boundary”	 and	 a	 deep-seated	 belief	 that	 life	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 purely	
mechanistic	 explanations.	 For	 Jessica	 this	 conflict	 led	her	 to	want	 to	 answer	
the	question	‘do	you	think	of	the	products	of	synthetic	biology	as	machines,	as	
organisms,	 as	 something	 in-between,	 or	 as	 something	 else	 entirely?’	 with	 “it	
depends.”	She	wanted	to	say	that	some	organisms	are	machines	but	others	are	
not,	yet	she	acknowledges	that	 it	would	be	hard	to	clearly	state	 the	defining	
difference.		
Max,	 another	 doctoral	 student	 at	 the	 Centre,	 likewise	 struggled	 with	
whether	or	not	he	believed	the	boundary	between	organisms	and	machines	to	
be	blurred.		
I	don’t	even	know	if	it’s	a	blurring	of	the	boundary,	I	think	it’s	just	.	.	.	
the	way	our	attitude	towards	it	changes.	But	if	you	look	at	it	kind	of	
empirically,	 I	 guess,	 you	 either	 say,	 everything	 is	 a	 machine,	 or	
organisms	are	organisms.	[Laughs]	I	don’t	know	if	I	would	ever	say	a	
machine	 is	an	organism,	so	 .	 .	 .	Yeah.	 I	 think	we	want	 it	 to	be	 that	
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blurred	 because	 it	 helps	 us	 one,	 engineer	 it,	 and	 two,	 get	 useful	
applications	out	of	it.	Whether	or	not	it	actually	is,	I’m	not	sure.		
(Max,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
Max	 claims	here	 that	 he	 isn’t	 sure	whether	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 blurring	 the	
machine/organism	boundary,	or	whether	people’s	 attitudes	 to	machines	 and	
organisms	 are	 simply	 changing.	 In	 his	 claim	 that	 you	 either	 believe	 that	 a	
boundary	exists	and	 that	 therefore	 “organisms	 are	 organisms”	or	you	believe	
there	is	no	boundary,	and	thus	“everything	 is	a	machine,”	Max	has	essentially	
outlined	the	fundamental	difference	between	vitalism	and	mechanism,	yet	at	
this	 point	Max	 claims	 that	 he	 isn’t	 sure	 how	he	 feels	 about	 these	 positions.	
However,	 after	 giving	 me	 this	 answer	 Max	 sat	 for	 a	 moment	 in	 silence	
contemplating	what	 he	 had	 just	 said.	He	 then	 gave	me	 this	 long,	 but	 I	 feel	
enlightening,	 account	 of	 the	 internal	 conflict	 that	 underlay	 his	 uncertainty	
regarding	the	essential	homogeneity	of	machines	and	organisms.	He	said:	
Even	if	it	functions	as	a	machine	.	.	.	you	could	never	erase	the	basic	
characteristics	of	a	 living	organism.	So	the	machine	part	of	 it	could	
never	mask	.	.	.	the	basic	living	function	.	.	.	I	do	believe	that	because	
we’re	 applying	 engineering	 by	 definition	 we	 must	 be	 creating	 a	
machine	 .	 .	 .	 it’s	got	defined	 inputs,	defined	outputs,	but	as	soon	as	
that	 becomes	 somewhat	 variable	 you’ve	 lost	 the	 machine	 part.	 It	
becomes	cyborg-like	bacteria?	I	don’t	know!	I	don’t	know	a	good	way	
of	defining	what	it	is	I	think	about	them.	I	just	think	that	we	need	to	
treat	them	like	machines	in	order	to	be	effective	synthetic	biologists,	
but	biology	being	biology,106	given	a	certain	amount	of	time	they	are	
not	machines	any	more	 .	 .	 .	 and	 they	probably	never	will	be	but	we	
have	to	treat	them	like	they	are	in	order	to	get	what	we	want	out	of	
them	.	.	.	[So]	they’re	a	machiney-somethingy-elsey	thing	at	the	very	
beginning,	 but	 soon	 enough	 they	 just	 become	 organisms	 again	 .	 .	 .	
maybe	 if	 we	 knew	 everything	 about	 the	 cell	 and	 could	 tune	 it	
																																								 								
106	Here	Max	is	referring	to	biology’s	propensity	to	evolve	and	adapt.	
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perfectly	it	would	stop	being	an	organism	and	be	a	machine.	Maybe	
for	me	being	an	organism	has	got	to	be	the	unknown	as	well,	because	
as	 soon	 as	 something’s	 knowable	 it’s	 not	 necessarily	 life,	 in	 my	
opinion.	In	a	weird	way!	It	 just	becomes	a	sum	of	its	parts,	whereas	
everything	at	the	moment	to	us	seems	like	greater	than	the	sum	of	its	
parts	.	.	.	whereas	a	computer	never	seems	greater	than	the	sum	of	its	
parts.		
(Max,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
Like	 Jessica	then,	Max	contends	that	 it	 is	 the	biological	nature	of	organisms,	
which	 sets	 them	 apart	 from	 inanimate	 entities,	 even	 though	 such	 a	 view	
contravenes	the	accepted	notion	within	synthetic	biology,	as	expressed	above	
by	Michael,	 that	no	 such	division	exists.	Yet	Max’s	 account	also	highlights	 a	
conflict	over	how	to	classify	the	‘products’	of	synthetic	biology’s	endeavours.	A	
conflict	others	within	the	Centre	also	acknowledged.		
The	complexity	of	classifications	
Above,	Max	 clearly	 struggles	 to	 clarify	 his	 thoughts	 about	 classifying	 the	
products	of	synthetic	biology	both	to	me,	and	to	himself.	For,	while	he	states	
that,	“because	we’re	 applying	 engineering	by	definition	we	must	 be	 creating	a	
machine,”	 he	 sees	 this	 state	 as	 unstable.	 By	 his	 reckoning	 synthetic	 biology	
‘products’	 start	 as	 “machiney-somethingy-elsey	 thing[s],”	 but	 as	 their	
biological	 nature	 is	 expressed	 they	 become	 “cyborg-like	 bacteria”	 and	 then	
“soon	 enough	 they	 just	 become	 organisms	 again.”	 This	 instability	 of	
classification	is	also	addressed	by	Deplazes	and	Huppenbauer	who	write	that	
the	evolutionary	capability	of	synthetic	biology	products	“raises	the	question	
whether	 in	 subsequent	 generations,	 at	 a	 point	 when	 new	 structures	 and	
features	 have	 evolved,	 their	 origin	 should	 still	 be	 considered	 artificial	 or	
whether	the	‘processing	by	evolution’	would	render	them	natural”	(2009:	60).	
This	 uncertainty	highlights	 the	 complexity	 that	 lies	 in	 classifications	 of	 this	
sort.	 When	 you	 are	 designing	 ‘products’	 using	 a	 computer,	 which	 will	 be	
‘built’	 using	 standardised,	 albeit,	 biological	 ‘parts,’	 to	 fulfil	 determined,	
desired	outcomes,	which	are	ultimately	reliant	on	your	‘product’s’	biological,	
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and	at	least	partially	unknown	capabilities,	how	do	you	classify	the	resultant	
‘product’?	
What	is	life	and	what	is	a	machine?	
In	 chapter	 four,	 I	 discussed	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 I	
studied	were	embracing	an	engineering	approach	to	biology,	with	its	drive	to	
design	and	build	controllable,	predictable	organisms	which	will	perform	pre-
determined,	 predictable	 tasks.	 Given	 this	 approach	 to	 biology	 and	 the	
commitment	of	those	within	the	Centre	to	applying	engineering	discourse	and	
methods	to	biology,	what,	I	wondered,	does	this	mean	for	‘life’?		
Evelyn	 Fox	 Keller	 writes,	 as	 I	 quoted	 in	 chapter	 one,	 that	 “the	 question	
‘what	 is	 life?’	 is	 a	 historical	 question,	 answerable	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 the	
categories	by	which	we	as	human	actors	choose	to	abide,	the	differences	that	
we	as	human	actors	 choose	 to	honor,	 and	not	 in	either	 logical,	 scientific,	or	
technical	terms.	It	 is	 in	this	sense	that	the	category	of	 life	 is	a	human	rather	
than	 a	natural	 kind”	 (2002:	 294).	 I	would	 argue	 that	 a	 similar	 case	 could	be	
made	 regarding	 the	 question	 ‘what	 is	 a	 machine?’	 As	 such,	 rather	 than	
debating	which	 category	 the	 ‘products’	 of	 synthetic	biology	 ‘really’	 fit	 into,	 I	
am	 more	 interested	 in	 examining	 the	 conceptual	 categories	 the	 synthetic	
biologists	at	the	Centre	are	creating,	and	the	differences	they	are	choosing	to	
honour	when	considering	their	discipline’s	‘products.’		
As	outlined	 in	 the	quotes	 above,	while	most	of	 the	 synthetic	biologists	 at	
the	 Centre	 saw	 no	 clear	 boundary	 between	 machines	 and	 organisms,	 and	
some	 of	 them	 saw	 their	 products	 as	 hybrids	 or	 boundary-transgressing	
entities,	 others	 resisted	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 entities	 they	 are	 producing	 are	
machines.	 This	 could	 be	 due,	 in	 part,	 to	 ‘machine’	 being,	 as	 Janet	 (senior	
researcher,	 biology)	 claimed,	 a	 “rather	 loaded	 term.”	 However,	 the	 quotes	
above	and	below	from	members	of	the	Centre	suggest	that	this	resistance	may	
also	 be	 linked	 to	 an	 assumption	 that	 there	 are	 certain	 characteristics	 of	
machines	 that	 synthetic	 biology’s	 ‘products’	 do	 not	 yet	 possess,	 and	 certain	
characteristics	of	organisms	that	they	have	not	yet	shed.	
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Honoured	differences	
In	 the	 lengthy	 quote	 above	 from	Max,	 and	 in	 the	 question	 that	 followed	
from	 Deplazes	 and	 Huppenbauer	 (2009),	 the	 distinction	 that	 is	 being	
honoured	is	that	between	the	artificial	and	the	natural.	In	discussing	whether	
evolution	 can,	 or	 inevitably	 will,	 turn	 an	 artificial	 lab-made	 entity	 into,	 or	
back	into,	a	natural	entity	Max,	and	Deplazes	and	Huppenbauer,	are	placing	
these	characteristics	on	either	side	of	the	machine/organism	divide.	Machines	
are,	 according	 to	 this	 form	 of	 classification	 artificial,	 while	 organisms	 are	
natural.	 Yet	 as	 Max	 addresses,	 such	 a	 classification	 in	 synthetic	 biology	 is	
unstable.	Despite	efforts	 to	design	and	engineer	 the	cells	as	machines,	 their	
biological	 ability	 to	 evolve	 and	 mutate	 can	 override	 and	 disrupt	 their	
engineered	 qualities.	 The	 instability	 of	 the	 artificial	 verses	 natural	
classification,	and	the	difficulty	of	applying	it	to	synthetic	biology’s	products,	
was	also	addressed	by	Hayden,	who	said:	
It’s	 really	 hard	 to	 say	 if	 now	 an	 organism	 that	 has	 been	 heavily	
modified	 is	 still	 life,	 it’s	 not	 life	 anymore,	 it’s	 like	 artificial	 life,	
organic	machine.	I	don’t	know	.	.	.	I	mean	.	.	.	it’s	life	modified	.	.	.	to	
work	for	us.		
(Hayden,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
While	 Hayden,	 like	 Max,	 is	 uncertain	 how	 to	 ultimately	 classify	 the	
‘products’	 synthetic	 biology	 produces	 using	 the	 categories	 of	 machine	 and	
organism,	 he	 seems	 to	 find	 more	 clarity	 in	 defining	 their	 purpose.	 Such	
products	are,	he	says,	“life	modified	to	work	for	us.”	Jessica	also	made	such	an	
appeal	to	the	‘product’s’	purpose	as	a	form	of	classification	while	also	drawing	
a	 distinction	 between	 the	 artificial	 and	 the	 natural.	 Yet	 unlike	 Max	 and	
Hayden,	 she	 is	 not	 only	 referring	 to	 the	 engineered	 cells	 as	 potentially	
artificial,	 but	 also	 the	 environment	 within	 which	 they	 are	 produced	 and	
interact.	
I	think	of	these	as	cells	that	are	only	ever	going	to	be	used	in	the	lab	or	
in	industry,	I	don’t	think	of	these	as	cells	that	are	ever	going	to	interact	
with	anything	in	the	real	world.	So	in	that	sense	I	guess	I	would	think	
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of	them	as	machines.	I	think	of	them	as	I	guess	somewhat	different	to,	
you	know,	like	something	I	see	out	there.		
(Jessica,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
As	 Jessica	 stresses,	 for	 her,	 the	 ‘artificial’	 environment	 of	 the	 laboratory	 or	
industry,	and	her	belief	that	the	cells	she	makes	and	works	with	will	only	ever	
interact	with	other	artificial	things,	renders	them	machines.	This	is	in	contrast	
to	 cells	 that	 are	 “out	 there”	 interacting	 in	 “the	 real	 world.”	 Here	 the	 “real,”	
‘natural’	world	 is	 seen	 by	 Jessica	 as	 separate	 from	 the	 artificial	world	 of	 the	
laboratory	and	industry.	Yet	it	is	not	so	much	the	perceived	boundary	between	
science	and	nature	that	Jessica	is	honouring	in	her	model	of	classification	but	
the	purpose	to	which	the	cells	are	being	put.	That	is,	for	Jessica	the	distinction	
between	the	cells	produced	by	synthetic	biology	and	those	“out	 there”	is	that	
the	synthetic	biology	cells	have	an	artificial,	human-determined	purpose,	and	
artificial,	 human-determined	 interactions,	while	 those	 in	 the	 “real	 world”	 do	
not.		
This	foreshadows	the	division	between	mechanism	and	vitalism	which	shall	
be	discussed	in	detail	in	chapter	six,	whereby	mechanism	holds	that	causation	
is	externally	determined,	while	vitalism	maintains	the	notion	of	self-causation	
(Lash	 2006).	 It	 would	 also	 seem	 that	 Jessica	 is	 adhering	 to	 a	 mechanistic	
conception	 of	 the	 organisms	 she,	 and	 others,	 work	 with	 and	 ‘create’	 within	
synthetic	biology,	but	is	reluctant	to	apply	this	conception	to	‘wild’	organisms	
out	 in	 the	 ‘real’	 world.	 Such	 a	 position	 provides	 evidence	 for	 Deplazes	 and	
Huppenbauer’s	 claim,	 quoted	 above,	 that	 classifying	 a	 synthetic	 biology	
‘product’	as	a	machine	indicates	that	they	are	“no	longer	part	of	the	realm	of	
nature”	(2009:	62).	
A	further	difference	honoured	in	the	attempt	to	draw	a	distinction	between	
machines	and	organisms	and	classify	synthetic	biology’s	products	as	one,	the	
other,	 or	 both	 is	 the	 distinction	 between	 understood,	 predictable,	 and	
controllable	 entities	 and	 entities	 that	 lack	 these	 qualities.	 Janet,	 like	 Max,	
Hayden,	 and	 Jessica,	 also	 struggled	 with	 how	 to	 classify	 the	 ‘products’	 of	
synthetic	biology,	but	unlike	these	others	 it	wasn’t	a	distinction	between	the	
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natural	and	the	artificial	that	Janet	called	upon.	Rather,	Janet	determined	that	
the	 ‘products’	of	 synthetic	biology	are	not	well	 enough	understood,	nor	well	
enough	 controlled,	 to	 fulfil	 the	 requirements	 to	 be	 considered	 engineered	
machines.		
I	 feel	 like	 [referring	 to	 a	 ‘product’	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 as	 an]	
engineered	 machine	 sort	 of	 feels	 like	 you	 understand	 .	 .	 .	 enough	
about	 it	 that	 you	 can	 predict	what	 it	will	 do,	 and	 you	 don’t	 in	 any	
way	feel	like	it’s	not	controllable.		
(Janet,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
This	echoes	a	sentiment	Max	expressed	above	when	he	suggested	that	if	a	cell	
could	be	tuned	perfectly,	if	it	was	completely	knowable	and	known,	and	thus	if	
it	was	simply	the	sum	of	its	parts,	then	it	would	no	longer	be	‘life.’	Life	being	
inherently,	 by	Max’s	 estimation,	 “greater	 than	 the	 sum	 of	 its	 parts.”	 Should	
these	 conditions	 be	 met,	 then,	 in	 Max’s	 mind,	 a	 cell	 “would	 stop	 being	 an	
organism	and	be	a	machine.”	So,	by	this	rationale,	syn3.0,	which	still	defies	full	
understanding,	is	alive.	Should	Venter	and	his	team	succeed	in	connecting	the	
149	mystery	genes	to	defined	functions	however,	this	would	render	it	‘known,’	
and	 its	 ‘lifelihood’	 may	 be	 called	 into	 question.	 Nevertheless,	 by	 Max’s	
reasoning,	 as	 long	 as	 syn3.0	 still	 mutates	 and	 evolves	 (the	 “biology	 being	
biology”	 he	 mentioned),	 it	 would	 resist	 control	 and	 would	 remain	 “greater	
than	the	sum	of	 its	parts”	and	thus	it	would	not	yet	qualify	as	a	machine.	For	
Max,	 then,	 it	 is	 the	biological	nature	and	the	unknown	qualities	of	synthetic	
biology’s	‘products’	that	set	them	apart	from	machines.	Whereas	for	Janet	it	is	
their	 lack	 of	 predictability	 and	 controllability,	 and	 for	 Christian	 and	 Jessica,	
quoted	below,	it	is	the	dearth	of	design	in	their	construction.		
I	 guess	 that’s	 about	 designing	 DNA,	 right,	 .	 .	 .	 that’s	 where	 my	
definition	 looks	 like	 it’s	 lying.	 I	 don’t	 think	 ‘Synthia’	 is	 that	
revolutionary	 because	 they	 didn’t	 really	 design	 anything,	 they	 just	
reconstructed.	 So	 for	 me	 .	 .	 .	 that’s	 not	 really	 that	 revolutionary,	
whereas	if	they	actually	did	design	it	from	scratch,	.	.	.	treating	it	like	
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chemistry,	 I	want	this	membrane,	that	structure,	 that	type	of	ER,107	
proteins,	and	polysaccharides	.	.	.	when	we	get	to	that	point	maybe	it	
really	is	like	a	machine.	
(Christian,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
By	Christian’s	reckoning	synthetic	biologists	would	need	to	be	able	to	design	
and	build	an	organism	piecemeal	from	‘the	ground	up’	before	it	could	truly	be	
considered	a	machine.	Jessica	also	honoured	this	difference	in	her	conceptual	
categories	 of	 machines	 and	 organisms,	 but	 unlike	 Christian,	 Jessica	 saw	
Venter’s	 work	 as	 a	 significant	 step	 towards	 achieving	 designed,	 engineered,	
biological	machines.		
So	 a	 natural	 organism	 is	 clearly	 different	 from	 an	 engineered	
machine,	just	in	the	sense,	you	know	.	.	.	we	didn’t	design	it	.	.	.	[but]	
it’s	a	difference	 in	degree	not	 in	kind	 .	 .	 .	 If	you	think	of	the	kind	of	
stuff	 that	Craig	Venter’s	doing,	you	know,	 if	you	can	actually	make	
like	an	artificial	cell	then	that	is	clearly	a	lot	closer	to	something	like	
an	engineered	machine	than	what	we’ve	previously	seen.		
(Jessica,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
The	quotes	within	this	chapter	from	Jessica	also	point	towards	an	internal	
struggle	 over	 how	 to	 classify	 synthetic	 biology’s	 ‘products.’	 Jessica	 struggled	
with	the	idea	of	organisms	being	machines,	and	contended	that	she	definitely	
sees	the	cell	as	being	essentially	different	from	inanimate	machines,	but,	when	
she	started	to	think	about	building	them,	she	found	herself	seeing	these	cells	
as	potentially	machine-like.	Others	such	as	Sara,	were	also	conflicted,	feeling	
comfortable	 with	 the	 idea	 that	 simple	 organisms	 are	 no	 different	 from	
machines,	 but	 more	 hesitant	 to	 extrapolate	 that	 view	 to	 more	 complex	
organisms.	 When	 I	 asked	 Sara	 whether	 or	 not	 she	 perceives	 a	 difference	
between	 something	 that	 is	 a	 biological	 organism	 and	 something	 that	 is	 a	
designed	machine,	she	responded:	
																																								 								
107	Endoplasmic	reticulum.	
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It	kind	of	depends	on	the	organism!	[Laughs]	Because	if	it’s	just	like	
E.	coli	that	you	can	.	.	.	program	to	make	something	for	you	and	you	
have	a	machine	making	something	for	you	.	.	.	there	is	no	difference.	
But	 it	 kind	 of	 depends,	 as	 I	 was	 saying,	 on	 the	 organism	 because,	
where	do	you	stop	then?		
(Sara,	doctoral	student,	engineering)	
Sara’s	question,	“where	do	you	stop	then?”	highlights	her	belief	that	you	would	
need	 to	 stop	 somewhere,	 that	 not	 all	 organisms	 can	 be	 thought	 of	 as	
machines.	 This	 is	 perhaps	 because	 simple	 organisms,	 such	 as	 E.	 coli,	 more	
readily	 fit	 within	 Sara’s	 conceptual	 category	 of	 machines	 than	 do	 more	
complex	 organisms.	 Yet	 as	 the	 following	 quotes	 show,	 for	 others	within	 the	
Centre,	even	these	same	simple	organisms	display	enough	characteristics	and	
differences	 that	are	honoured	 in	 their	definitions	of	 life	 to	make	 thinking	of	
them	as	machines	untenable.	
You	could	argue	that	if	a	bacteria	has	been	engineered	so	that	it	only	
exists	 for	 our	 own	 purpose	 then	 it’s	 a	machine	 instead,	 but	 I	 don’t	
think	so	because	to	get	[the	bacteria]	to	do	that	.	.	.	you	still	have	to	
get	 it	 so	 it	 wants	 to	 live	 and	 replicate.	 .	 .	 .	 	 So	maybe	 they	 should	
change	 iGEM	 to	 iGES,	 so	 Internationally	 Genetically	 Engineered	
Slaves.	That’s	more	applicable	really	than	Internationally	Genetically	
Engineered	Machines.		
(Martin,	senior	researcher,	biology)	
Even	 though	we	may	create	 the	most	well-defined	synthetic	biology	
application	 bacteria,	whatever,	within	 three	 rounds	 of	 division	 that	
might	not	be	 the	same	organism,	and	I	 think	the	 fact	 that	we	can’t	
control	 it	 to	 that	 extent	makes	 it	 not	 a	machine.	 .	 .	 .	 I	 also	believe	
that	 machines	 theoretically	 can	 become	 not	 machines,	 in	 the	 fact	
that	 in	 a	 purely	 hypothetical	 universe	 they	 may	 develop	 artificial	
intelligence,	at	which	point	that’s	no	longer	a	machine	to	me	because	
it’s	got	free	will.		
(Max,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
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Unlike	 the	 previous	 quotes	 which	 have	 addressed	 the	 characteristics	
honoured	in	the	classification	of	‘machine,’	both	of	the	above	quotes,	and	the	
one	below,	address	characteristics	honoured	in	definitions	of	 life	and	thus	of	
organisms.	Such	characteristics	include	self-replication,	free	will,	a	will	to	live,	
and	 the	 ability	 to	 evolve.	 The	 persistence	 of	 these	 characteristics	within	 the	
‘products’	of	 synthetic	biology	are	as	 instrumental	 in	 leading	 these	 synthetic	
biologists	 to	 define	 them	 as	 organisms,	 and	 to	 differentiate	 them	 from	
machines,	 as	 their	 lack	 of	 machine	 characteristics	 such	 as	 controllability.	
Interestingly	 though,	 and	 in	 contrast	 to	most	 of	 the	members	 of	 the	Centre	
who	spoke	of	which	characteristics	their	products	would	need	to	shed	or	gain	
to	 transgress	 the	machine/organism	 boundary	 by	 becoming	more	machine-
like,	Max	speaks	here	of	what	characteristics	machines	would	need	to	gain	in	
order	 to	do	 the	 same	 from	 the	opposite	direction.	Also	of	note	within	 these	
quotes	is	Martin’s	comment	that	it	might	be	more	appropriate	to	classify	the	
products	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 as	 slaves	 rather	 than	 as	 machines.	 As	 the	
following	 quote	 from	 Hayden,	 regarding	 the	 ‘products’	 of	 synthetic	 biology	
shows,	Martin	was	not	alone	in	making	such	a	statement.	
I	would	put	them	more	on	the	life	[side]	.	.	.	but	that	doesn’t	mean	it	
can’t	be	used	as	a	machine	 .	 .	 .	 you	know,	 I	don’t	 think	 there’s	any	
problem	 exploiting	 some	 kind	 of	 life	 forms	 to	 do	 our	 bidding.	 It	
sounds	bad	but	.	.	.	[laughs]	I	mean	I’m	not	saying	we	should	enslave	
other	 humans	 but,	 you	 know	 .	 .	 .	 we	 could	 enslave	 bacteria,	 I’m	
totally	OK	with	that!		
(Hayden,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
Without	getting	distracted	by	a	discussion	of	the	ethics	of	enslaving	another	
living	entity,	I	do	wish	to	highlight	the	resonance	between	these	two	synthetic	
biologists	 arguing	 that,	 what	 some	 see	 as	 biological	 machines,	 should	 be	
thought	 of	 as	 slaves,	 and	 Aristotle’s	 argument	 that	 human	 slaves	 should	 be	
thought	of	as	machines.	
Like	Max,	both	Martin	 and	Sam	determine	 that	 the	products	of	 synthetic	
biology	 retain	 too	many	of	 the	 characteristics	 they	 assign	 to	 the	 category	of	
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‘life’	 to	be	 considered	machines	and	 thus	 they	 resist	 consigning	 them	 to	 the	
category	 of	 ‘machines.’	 However	 where	 Martin	 jokes	 that	 iGEM	 should	 be	
renamed	iGES,	Sam	considers	the	potential	for	a	novel	classificatory	category	
for	 the	products.	Could	they	be	considered	artificial	or	manmade	organisms,	
as	 the	 headlines	 around	 ‘Synthia’	 suggest,	 rather	 than	 just	 being	 lumped	 in	
with	other	‘natural’	organisms?		
They	are	all	organisms.	Yeah,	I	mean	I	wouldn’t	necessarily	see	it	as	a	
machine,	you	may	have	engineered	 it	 to	perform	a	specific	 task	but	
this	is	where	you	sort	of	get	into	biology	having	its	complexities	that	
you	don’t	have	in	a	lot	of	other	machines,	because	.	.	.	presumably	it	
would	 need	 to	 self-replicate,	 it	 would	 need	 to	 take	 in	 some	 sort	 of	
energy	 source.	 Well,	 you	 can	 say	 that	 about	 a	 machine.	 But	 .	 .	 .	
presumably	it	will	evolve	as	well.	So	.	 .	 .	I	personally	would	consider	
that	 to	be	an	organism,	whether	 it’s	what	you’d	call	an	artificial	or	
manmade	organism	or	not	is	a	completely	different	matter,	because	
again	you’re	getting	into	different	stages	of	grey.		
(Sam,	postdoctoral	researcher,	biology)	
Restrictive	categories	
Olma	 and	 Koukouzelis	 write,	 “if	 our	 existing	 categories	 increasingly	 turn	
out	 to	 be	 insufficient	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	 way	 the	 world	 becomes,	 is	 it	
legitimate	to	try	to	look	for	different	ones?”	(2007:	1-2).	This	question	strikes	at	
the	 heart	 of	 the	 internal	 classificatory	 conflicts	 experienced	 by	 some	 of	 the	
synthetic	biologists	at	the	Centre.	Those	who	claimed	that	their	‘products’	fell	
into	 a	 ‘grey’	 area	 between	 machines	 and	 organisms,	 or	 who	 claimed	 their	
‘products’	as	hybrids,	were	searching	around	for	a	new	category	having	found	
the	 existing	 ones	 insufficient.	 The	 quote	 from	 Sam	 above	 shows	 a	 tentative	
suggestion	that	a	new	category	might	be	required	to	account	for	the	grey	area	
synthetic	biology	 finds	 itself	 in,	but	 it	 is	a	potential	 that	he	shied	away	 from	
exploring.	 Others	 at	 the	 Centre,	 such	 as	 Christian,	 were	 more	 forthright.	
Referring	to	the	future	products	of	synthetic	biology	Christian	said:	
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It	will	be	like	a	tree	of	life,	but	like	massive,	you	know?		So	I	think	just	
from	 that,	 having	 that	 bit	 of	 technology	 I	 think	 it’s	 going	 to	 .	 .	 .	
explode	 .	 .	 .	 the	 amount	 of	 diversities	 you’re	 going	 to	 get.	 .	 .	 .	 But	
yeah,	I	think	it	would	be	kind	of	like	a	new	form	of	life,	which	is	kind	
of	weird.	But	whether	people	would	.	 .	 .	class	it	as	life,	it’s	a	difficult	
one	to	say.		
(Christian,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
For	 Christian,	 the	 categories	 of	 machines	 and	 organisms,	 and	 even	 the	
category	 of	 life,	 are	 insufficient	 to	 hold	 synthetic	 biology’s	 future	 ‘products,’	
which,	he	maintains,	will	be	a	new	form	of	life,	necessitating	an	expansion	of	
the	 classic	 tree	 of	 life.	 This	 brings	 to	mind	 the	 work	 of	 designer	 Alexandra	
Daisy	Ginsberg,	whose	piece	The	Synthetic	Kingdom	(figure	8)	depicts	the	tree	
of	life	with	a	new	branch,	“Synthetica,”	attached	to	contain	synthetic	biology’s	
products.		
	
	
Figure	8:	The	Synthetic	Kingdom	by	Alexandra	Daisy	Ginsberg	(2010)	
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Ginsberg	 produced	 this	work	 to	 provoke	 discussion	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	
drive	to	bring	engineering	and	design	into	nature	and	to	raise	questions	about	
how	we	can	make	sense	of	engineered	life	(2010).	A	large	canvas	bearing	The	
Synthetic	Kingdom	hangs	on	the	wall	of	the	Centre’s	upstairs	open	plan	office	
where,	 despite	 Ginsberg’s	 intent,	 I	 encountered	 individuals	 debating	 the	
placement	 of	 Ginsberg’s	 hypothetical	 “Synthetica”	 branch	 but	 never	 its	
inclusion	in	the	tree	which,	 it	seemed,	was	taken	for	granted.	Lewis	however	
could	be	said	to	have	taken	it	a	step	further	than	even	Ginsberg,	questioning	
not	the	 inclusion	of	 ‘Synthetica’	 in	the	tree	of	 life,	but	the	sheer	existence	of	
the	tree	of	life.	
Like	Christian,	Lewis	also	saw	the	existing	conceptual	categories	as	limiting.	
However	 his	 objections	 lay	 not	 only	 with	 the	 categories	 of	 ‘machine’	 and	
‘organism.’	Lewis	viewed	the	concept	of	the	tree,	itself	a	conceptual	creation,	
as	prohibitively	rigid.	Especially	when	it	is	used	as	an	arbiter	of	what	entities	
can	 and	 should	 be	 produced.	 While	 complaining	 about	 critics	 of	 synthetic	
biology	who	invoke	the	tree	of	life	in	order	to	protest	potential	entities	which	
might	span	the	machine/organism	divide,	Lewis	said:	
It’s	 like,	 ‘oh	we	can’t	do	 this,	 you	know,	 it	will	 really	mess	with	 the	
tree.’	It’s	like,	the	tree	doesn’t	fucking	exist!		
(Lewis,	doctoral	student,	engineering)	
Underlying	Lewis’	forceful	opposition	to	the	tree	of	life	is	the	recognition	that,	
as	Keller	wrote	regarding	life,	such	categories	are	human	rather	than	natural	
in	kind.	Yet	the	critics	Lewis	is	objecting	to	are	those	who	perceive	the	tree	as	
natural	and	thus	as	an	entity	to	be	defended	rather	than	a	conceptual	tool	to	
aid	understanding.	
	Hayden	likewise	noted	that,	despite	the	human	drive	to	categorise	things,	
classifications	do	not	work	well	in	biology,	as	“nature	doesn’t	really	need	them.”	
I	 know	 that	 people	 need	 those	 classifications	 .	 .	 .	 It	 happens	 for	
everything	but	for	biology	in	particular	definitions	really	don’t	work,	
because	you	know,	nature	doesn’t	really	need	them.	.	.	.	So	I	mean	it	
doesn’t	 surprise	 me	 that	 now	 we	 don’t	 know	 if	 what	 we	 do	 is	 a	
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machine	or	a	life	form	.	.	.	I	think	it’s	really	important	that	everybody	
knows	 that	 we’re	 doing	 something	 that’s	 in	 the	 middle	 between	
machines	and	life	forms,	but	that	doesn’t	mean	that	then	you	have	to	
decide	which	one	it	is,	you	can	just	say,	OK,	we’re	doing	something	in	
the	middle,	it’s	interesting,	let’s	do	it.		
(Hayden,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
However,	 while	 rallying	 against	 the	 drive	 to	 categorise	 everything,	 Hayden	
simultaneously	 asserts	 that,	 “it’s	 really	 important	 that	 everyone	 knows	 that	
we’re	 doing	 something	 in	 the	middle	 between	machines	 and	 life	 forms.”	Thus	
suggesting	 that	 the	 ‘products’	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 fall	 into	 the	 grey	 area	
between	machines	and	organisms	discussed	above,	and	 that	 the	existence	of	
this	grey	area	needs	to	be	noted	and	recognised.	This	itself	suggests	a	form	of	
classification,	 albeit	 classification	 outside	 of	 the	 existing	 categories	 of	
machines	 and	 organisms.	 Furthermore,	 by	 claiming	 that	 the	 products	 of	
synthetic	 biology	 are	 neither	 machines	 nor	 organisms	 but	 rather	 fall	
somewhere	 in	 the	 middle	 between	 these	 poles,	 Hayden	 is	 asserting	 that	
synthetic	 biology	 is	 already	 breaching	 the	 machine/organism	 divide	 by	
producing	boundary	spanning	entities.	This	brings	us	back	to	the	hybrid,	grey	
zone	 that	 many	 of	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Centre	 assigned	 synthetic	 biology’s	
‘products’	 to.	 Yet	 in	 light	 of	 the	 above	 discussion	 regarding	 classification,	 I	
wish	to	suggest	the	possible	need	for	a	hybrid	conceptual	category	to	inhabit	
this	grey	zone.		
A	hybrid	category?	
As	 discussed	 previously,	 although	 synthetic	 biologists	 are	 taking	 their	
mechanistic	approach	to	biology	literally,	by	treating	organisms	as	collections	
of	functions,	‘parts’	which	can	be	linked	together	in	order	to	produce	entities	
that	will	behave	in	predetermined	and	desired	ways,	there	is	a	lot	about	these	
organisms	 that	 is	not	 controlled.	After	 all,	 the	 ‘products’	 synthetic	biologists	
are	attempting	to	‘design’	and	‘build’	are,	despite	the	engineering	rhetoric	and	
approach,	 reliant	 on	 the	 biological	 capabilities	 of	 the	 organisms	 themselves.	
Capabilities	 that	 is,	 which	 neither	 are,	 nor	 indeed	 could	 currently	 be,	
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designed,	built	or	controlled.	This	is	the	biological	ignorance,	and	the	limits	of	
mechanism	 and	 reductionism	 which	 Bergson	 (1983),	 Greco	 (2005),	 and	
Canguilhem	 (2009)	 were	 referring	 to,	 and	 which	 many	 of	 the	 synthetic	
biologists	at	the	Centre	were	aware	of.	
Thus,	synthetic	biologists	ultimately	only	design	and	‘engineer’	a	very	small	
part	of	any	‘product,’	and	yet	they	are	reliant	on	the	whole	of	it,	the	whole	cell	
or	organism,	to	perform	its	desired	task.	In	synthetic	biology	the	‘parts’	of	the	
construct	 that	 are	 not	 designed,	 which	 are	 not	 standardised,	 categorised,	
bioparts,	 are	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 chassis.	This	mechanistic	 term	hides	 the	 fact	
that	 the	 chassis	 itself	 is	 not	 just	 a	 structural	 scaffold	 for	 the	 ‘product’	 to	 be	
built	 upon,	 but	 rather	 contains	 all	 of	 the	 cellular	 components	 necessary	 to	
keep	the	cell	alive	and	functioning,	and	thus	performing	whatever	task	it	has	
been	‘designed’	to	perform.	Yet,	as	syn3.0	so	clearly	demonstrated,	we	do	not	
currently	 understand	 all	 of	 this	 componentry.	 Furthermore,	 as	 discussed	
above,	despite	decades	of	work,	organisms	cannot	yet	be	fully	explained	using	
what	we	know	of	physico-chemical	systems	(Keller	2009a).	Thus	they	cannot,	
at	 least	 as	 yet,	 be	 built	 completely	 from	 the	 ‘ground	 up’	 using	 physico-
chemical	parts.		
Accordingly,	despite	the	Centre	Director	Alan’s	beliefs	that	“we	don’t	 need	
to	know	how	it	works,	we	 just	need	to	know	the	 inputs	and	outputs,”	and	that	
synthetic	biology	only	needs	to	find,	as	he	puts	it,	the	“islands	of	stability	in	an	
ocean	 of	 chaos,”	 synthetic	biology	 is	 reliant	on	 such	unknown	workings	 and	
oceans	 of	 chaos.	Without	 these,	 the	 synthetic	 biological	 ‘products’	 will	 not	
‘work.’	Nevertheless,	 these	 ‘products’	 are	not	 indistinguishable	 from	 ‘natural’	
organisms	 either.	 Their	 stripped	 down	 chassis,	 standardised	 parts,	 and	
industrial	purposes	set	them	apart	from	the	organisms	from	which	they	were	
derived,	even	though	they	rely	on,	and	maintain,	their	biological	functions.		
This	brings	to	mind	the	wave-particle	duality.	The	principle	that	addresses	
the	inability	of	the	classical	concepts	‘particle’	and	‘wave’	to	fully	describe	the	
behaviour	 of	 quantum-scale	 objects,	 the	 most	 commonly	 considered	 being	
light.	 Light	 is	 well	 known	 to	 be	 both	 a	 particle	 and	 a	 wave,	 exhibiting	
properties	of	both,	a	situation	which	led	Einstein	and	Infeld	to	write:		
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"But	what	 is	 light	really?	 Is	 it	a	wave	or	a	shower	of	photons?	 .	 .	 .	
There	 seems	 no	 likelihood	 of	 forming	 a	 consistent	 description	 of	
the	phenomena	of	light	by	a	choice	of	only	one	of	the	two	possible	
languages.	 It	 seems	 as	 though	 we	 must	 use	 sometimes	 the	 one	
theory	and	sometimes	the	other,	while	at	times	we	may	use	either.	
We	 are	 faced	 with	 a	 new	 kind	 of	 difficulty.	 We	 have	 two	
contradictory	 pictures	 of	 reality;	 separately	 neither	 of	 them	 fully	
explains	the	phenomena	of	light,	but	together	they	do!"	(1967:	262-
63).			
While	there	are	some	quite	obvious	differences	between	the	phenomenon	of	
light,	and	the	‘products’	of	synthetic	biology,	I	would	argue	that,	as	discussed	
above,	such	‘products’	also	fall	between	two	classical	categories,	machines	and	
organisms.	 Not	 sitting	 solely	 in	 one	 nor	 the	 other	 but	 rather	 requiring	 the	
explanatory	 power	 of	 both.	 This,	 as	 Einstein	 and	 Infeld	 put	 it	 in	 regards	 to	
light,	is	a	difficulty.	However,	while	they	concede	that,	at	first	sight,	the	wave	
and	particle	 theories	are	 irreconcilable,	 they	also	argue	 that	 “[s]cience	 forces	
us	 to	create	new	 ideas,	new	theories.	Their	aim	 is	 to	break	down	the	wall	of	
contradictions	which	 frequently	blocks	the	way	of	scientific	progress.	All	 the	
essential	ideas	in	science	were	born	in	a	dramatic	conflict	between	reality	and	
our	attempts	at	understanding”	(Einstein	and	Infeld	1967:	264).	
Thus	 perhaps,	 as	 Deplazes	 and	 Huppenbauer	 (2009)	 contend,	 synthetic	
biology	 really	 is	 creating	 boundary	 spanning	 entities,	 and	 such	 entities	 will	
ultimately	 force	 us	 to	 create	 new	 ideas	 and	 new	 theories	 to	 categorise	 and	
understand	 them.	 Just	 as	 light	 is	 understood	 to	 be	 simultaneously	 both	 a	
particle	and	a	wave,108	so	too	may	the	products	of	synthetic	biology	come	to	be	
understood	 as	 being	 simultaneously	 both	 a	 machine	 and	 an	 organism.	 A	
situation	 that	 may,	 ultimately,	 necessitate	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 hybrid	
conceptual	 category	 to	 contain	 such	 entities.	A	 boundary	 spanning	 category	
																																								 								
108	Something	that	was	captured,	for	the	first	time	recently	(Piazza	et	al.	2015).	
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that	 is,	 to	 account	 for	 the	 boundary	 spanning	 products	 of	 a	 boundary	
spanning	discipline.		
However,	for	some	within	the	Centre	such	hybridity	is	only	an	intermediate	
step.	The	ultimate	goal	being	the	creation	of	synthetic	biology	‘products’	that	
completely	breach	the	machine/organism	divide,	becoming	 indistinguishable	
from	machines.	While	the	achievement	of	this	goal,	these	individuals	argue,	is	
simply	a	matter	of	time.	
Not	if,	but	when	
As	 indicated	 above,	 several	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	
expressed	 views	 on	 the	 characteristics	 a	 synthetic	 biology	 ‘product’	 would	
need	to	possess	in	order	to	stop	being	an	organism,	at	least	in	their	minds,	and	
thus	fully	transgress	the	machine/organism	boundary.	The	aggregate	working	
definition	 of	 the	 ‘category	 of	 life,’	 of	 those	 at	 the	 Centre,	 thus	 appears	 to	
encompass	 entities	 that	 reproduce,	 self-repair,	 evolve,	 and	 exercise	 free	will,	
among	 other	 potentialities.	 Whereas	 the	 ‘category	 of	 machine’	 implies,	 for	
these	 scientists,	 the	 possession	 of	 features	 including	 being	well	 understood,	
controllable,	 stable,	 reliable,	 and	 designed	 and	 built	 from	 ‘scratch.’	 Several	
synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	 echoed	Max’s	 comments	 that,	 due	 to	 the	
biological	 nature	 (the	 “biology	 being	 biology”)	 of	 the	 organisms	 they	 work	
with,	these	organisms	resist	efforts	to	endow	them	with	these	characteristics.	
Nevertheless	 some,	 such	 as	 Christian	 and	 Jessica,	 see	 it	 as	 only	 a	matter	 of	
time	before	they	will	be	able	to	achieve	this	goal,	thinking	in	terms	of	“when”	
rather	than	‘if’	“we	get	to	that	point.”		
David,	who	 shared	 the	 perspective	 that	 it	 is	 only	 a	matter	 of	 time	before	
synthetic	biology’s	products	can	truly	be	thought	of	as	machines,	was	perhaps	
the	most	excited	about	this	prospect,	telling	me:	
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I’m	 really	 looking	 forward	 to	 ten,	 fifteen	 years	 down	 the	 line	when	
we’re	 starting	 to	 make	 these	 really	 complex	 machines,	 putting	
together	 several	 devices	 to	 make	 systems	 and	 then	 seeing	 what	
fireworks	 come	 out	 as	 a	 result,	 that’s	 going	 to	 be	 a	 fantastic	 few	
years	to	be	around.	But	it’s	a	fun	little	stepping-stone	for	now.		
(David,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
Grant,	 the	most	 experienced	 engineer	 in	 the	Centre,	was	 likewise	 optimistic	
about	 the	 potential	 for	 synthetic	 biology	 to	 endow	 their	 ‘products’	 with	
engineering	 characteristics.	 For	 him	 it	 was	 all	 about	 following	 a	 rational,	
engineering	 approach,	 an	 approach	 that,	 he	 argues,	 has	 seen	 technology	
progress	in	leaps	and	bounds	since	the	industrial	revolution.	
We’re	dealing	with	things	that	during	billions	of	years	have	been	.	.	.	
mixed	and	matched,	 tinkered	around,	 changed,	 evolved,	 to	 be	more	
and	more	and	more	efficient,	and	.	.	.	when	did	we	start	to	engineer	.	.	
.	what	we	call	complex	systems?	When	was	the	industrial	revolution?	
Put	that	in	perspective	with	the	millions	of	years	we	have	behind	us	
and	you	still	see	that	using	rational	approaches	and	.	.	.	I	would	like	
to	say	engineering	approach,	we	are	not	that	bad	at	engineering	stuff.	
We	 are	 very	 far	 from	what	 biology	 has	 come	 up	with	 during	 those	
billions	 of	 years	 but	 .	 .	 .	 if	 you	 look	 at	 the	 way	 things	 evolve	 and	
technology	efficiency	increases	every	year,	well	I	bet	you	that	in	a	few	
decades	we	will	be	quite	far.	.	.	.	We’re	not	as	good	as	biology	but	we	
are	trying	to	get	there.		
(Grant,	senior	researcher,	engineering)	
Grant	suggests	here	that	the	ultimate	goal	of	engineering	is	to	be	“as	good	as	
biology,”	and	surely	being	able	to	design,	build,	and	control	biological	entities	
using	 rational	approaches,	would	be	a	 fair	 indication	 that	 this	goal	has	been	
reached.	 However,	 as	 discussed	 both	 here	 and	 in	 chapter	 four,	 and	 as	 is	
indirectly	acknowledged	by	Grant,	this	is	not	yet	where	synthetic	biology	is.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 notion	 that	 it	 is	 simply	 a	 matter	 of	 time	 before	 the	
‘products’	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 possess	 the	 characteristics	 that	 would	 define	
 211 
them	as	machines,	or	as	being	indistinguishable	from	machines,	also	arguably	
owes	 a	 lot	 to	 the	 commitment	 to	 the	 engineering	 approach	 discussed	 in	
chapter	four.	As,	through	their	attempts	to	apply	both	the	engineering	design	
cycle	 and	 the	 concepts	 of	 standardisation,	 abstraction,	 and	 decoupling,	 the	
synthetic	biologists	 at	 the	Centre	 are	 striving	 to	 endow	 their	 ‘products’	with	
these	characteristics.	Thus	it	is	no	surprise	that	members	of	the	Centre,	such	
as	 David	 and	 Grant,	 believe	 this	 goal	 is	 achievable.	 Yet,	 as	 clearly	 outlined	
above,	 there	were	 others	who	were	not	 so	 sure,	 adhering	 as	 they	did	 to	 the	
notion	of	a	machine/organism	divide.	Was	this	adherence	due	to	humility,	a	
desire	to	avoid	the	sort	of	limelight	Craig	Venter	had	been	thrust	into	when	he	
claimed	 to	 have	 breached	 the	 boundary?	 Or	 were	 they	 displaying	 an	
underlying,	and	unacknowledged,	adherence	to	vitalism?	
Vitality,	complexity,	reductionism	
Michel	 Foucault	 wrote	 in	 his	 introduction	 to	 Canguilhem’s	 (1989)	 The	
Normal	and	the	Pathological:	
“the	 living	 being	 involves	 self-regulation	 and	 self-preservation	
processes;	 with	 increasing	 subtlety	 we	 can	 know	 the	 physico-
chemical	mechanisms	which	assure	them;	they	nonetheless	mark	a	
specificity	which	the	 life	sciences	must	take	 into	account,	save	for	
themselves	 omitting	 what	 properly	 constitutes	 their	 object	 and	
their	own	domain”	(1989:	18).	
While	 this	 assertion	 that,	 in	 order	 to	 protect	 their	 academic	 domain	 from	
being	subsumed	within	physics	and	chemistry,	life	scientists	need	to	maintain	
the	existence	of	a	specificity	of	life,	makes	perfect	sense	for	biology,	it	makes	
less	 sense	 for	 synthetic	 biology.	 Synthetic	 biology	 has,	 after	 all,	 embraced	
mechanism	 to	 such	 a	 degree	 that,	 as	 a	 discipline,	 it	 is	 striving	 to	 apply	 an	
engineering	 approach	 to	 biology	 in	 order	 to	 design	 and	 build	 biology	 in	 a	
modular	 fashion,	much	 as	 any	 other	 engineered	product	would	 be	 designed	
and	 built.	 Thus	 synthetic	 biology’s	 academic	 domain	 is	 not	 threatened	 by	
seeing	 organisms	 as	 machines;	 rather	 their	 entire	 approach	 is	 reliant	 on	
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biology	 being	 machine-like.	 Thus,	 given	 their	 general	 commitment	 to	 this	
approach,	why	do	so	many	of	the	members	of	the	Centre	assert	that	organisms	
cannot	be	thought	of,	treated	as,	nor	equated	with,	machines?	
Canguilhem	writes	 that	 “the	 term	 vitalism	 is	 appropriate	 for	 any	 biology	
careful	to	maintain	its	independence	from	the	annexationist	ambitions	of	the	
sciences	of	matter”	 (2009:	60).	Given	 the	assertions	of	 some	of	 the	synthetic	
biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	 that	 organisms	 are	 distinct	 from	 inanimate	matter,	
one	possible	explanation	is	that	these	synthetic	biologists	are	vitalists.	I	doubt	
anyone	at	the	Centre	would	welcome	the	label	of	‘vitalist,’	though	there	are,	in	
some	of	their	responses,	grounds	for	exploring	whether	Canguilhem’s	form	of	
vitalism	 is	 appropriate.	Unlike	 traditional	 vitalists,	who	 strove	 to	 prove	 that	
organisms	 possess	 a	 ‘vital	 force’	 lacking	 in	 inanimate	 entities	 (Bechtel	 and	
Richardson	 1998;	 Mayr	 2002),	 Canguilhem	 conceded	 that	 such	 a	 take	 on	
vitalism	 may	 well	 appear	 to	 today’s	 biologists	 to	 be	 merely	 an	 illusion	 of	
thought.	 However	 he	 also	 notes	 that,	 unlike	 other	 debunked	 scientific	
theories109	vitalism	continues	to	require	refutation	and	debate.		
Canguilhem	 refers	 to	 this	 as	 the	 vitality	 of	 vitalism	 and	 argues	 that,	 “the	
rebirths	 of	 vitalism	 translate,	 perhaps	 in	 discontinuous	 fashion,	 life’s	
permanent	distrust	of	the	mechanization	of	 life.	In	them	we	find	life	seeking	
to	 put	 mechanism	 back	 into	 its	 place	 within	 life”	 (2009:	 73).	 Drawing	 on	
Canguilhem’s	 work,	 Monica	 Greco	 (2005)	 consequently	 argues	 that	 it	 is	
vitalism’s	position	as	a	form	of	resistance	to	reductionism	that	accounts	for	its	
vitality.	 For	 despite	 its	 questionable	 approach	 to	 biology,	 it	 has	 served	 an	
important	 role	 in	 the	 history	 of	 biology	 as	 a	 counterpoint	 to	 excessive	
reductionism	and	mechanism.	Bergson	made	a	 similar	point	 in	 1911	when	he	
wrote	 that,	 “the	 ‘vital	 principle’	might	 indeed	not	 explain	much,	 but	 it	 is	 at	
least	 a	 sort	 of	 label	 affixed	 to	 our	 ignorance,	 so	 as	 to	 remind	 us	 of	 this	
occasionally,	while	mechanism	invites	us	to	ignore	that	ignorance”	(1983:	42).		
																																								 								
109	For	 example	 geocentricism,	 the	 idea	 that	 the	Earth	 is	 the	 centre	of	 the	Universe	 and	 the	
planets	revolve	around	it.	
 213 
As	 discussed	 previously,	 within	 the	 Centre	 I	 encountered	 a	 lot	 of	
uncertainty	 regarding	 the	 classification	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	 ‘products,’	 and	
much	 of	 this	 uncertainty	was	 fraught	with	 the	 kinds	 of	 doubts	 Canguilhem	
would	ascribe	to	vitalism.	For	example,	 there	were	doubts	over	the	extent	to	
which	 organisms	 could	 be	 reduced	 to	 physico-chemical	 components	 and	
mechanistic	 explanations,	 and	 an	 awareness	 of	 how	 much	 we	 do	 not	 yet	
understand	 about	 the	 origins	 and	 organisation	 of	 life.	 Indeed,	 as	 I	 have	
outlined	 above,	 only	 one	 synthetic	 biologist	 at	 the	 Centre	 claimed	 to	 see	
absolutely	 no	 difference	 between	 organisms	 and	 machines.	 Whereas	 most	
struggled	 with	 defining	 the	 products	 of	 their	 work.	 Many	 believed	 that	 by	
applying	an	engineering	approach	and	engineering	methods,	and	by	creating	
organisms	 that	 would	 serve	 designed	 and	 desired	 functions,	 they	 were	
essentially	 creating	 machines.	 However	 for	 some,	 such	 as	 Max,	 this	 line	 of	
reasoning,	which	they	outlined	themselves,	did	not	dissuade	them	from	their	
belief	in	the	essential	differentiation	between	machines	and	organisms.	
I’d	like	to	believe	that	everything	is	a	machine	that,	you	know,	it’s	a	
tool	.	.	.	I’d	like	to	believe	that.	But	I	don’t	believe	it.		
(Max,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
Why	then	did	Max	not	believe	 it?	Canguilhem	might	argue	that	Max,	and	
those	 like	 him,	 are	 essentially	 vitalists.	 And	 yet,	 they	 were	 more	 likely	 to	
attribute	biology’s	uniqueness	 to,	what	Greco	(2005)	sees	as	 the	modern	day	
equivalent	of	Canguilhem’s	‘vitalism,’	complexity.	As	Greco	writes,	“complexity	
can	be	read	as	constituting	an	intellectual	demand,	an	ethical	imperative,	that	
is	 not	 dissimilar	 to	 what	 Canguilhem	 addressed	 through	 the	 theme	 of	 the	
‘vitality	of	vitalism.’	Complexity	expresses	 the	demand	 that	we	acknowledge,	
and	learn	to	value	as	the	source	of	qualitatively	new	questions,	the	possibility	
of	 a	 form	of	 ignorance	 that	 cannot	 simply	be	deferred	 to	 future	knowledge”	
(Greco	 2005:	 24).	 Not	 one	 member	 of	 the	 Centre	 invoked	 ‘vitalism’	 as	 an	
explanation	 for	 why	 they	 perceived	 a	 difference	 between	 organisms	 and	
machines,	but	several,	such	as	Jessica,	raised	the	issue	of	complexity.	
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It’s	 hard	 to	 say	 whether	 there’s	 something	 fundamentally	 different	
about	a	living	organism	compared	to	a	machine	because	it’s	just	.	.	.	
so	 complex	 at	 the	 moment	 we	 don’t	 quite	 understand	 yet	 how	 it	
works,	you	know,	with	a	machine	we	understand	how	it	works,	with	
an	organism	we	don’t	and	we	don’t	quite	know	yet	whether	.	.	.	when	
you	look	at	the	fundamental	processes	it’s	just	kind	of	like	a	machine	
or	 whether	 it’s	 actually	 so	 complex	 that	 not	 in	 a	 thousand	 years	
would	we	ever	be	able	to	create	something	like	that	from	scratch.		
(Jessica,	doctoral	student,	biology)	
Greco	 argues	 that	 as	 vitalism	 has	 fallen	 out	 of	 favour	 new	 theories	 and	
concepts,	 such	 as	 complexity,	 have	 taken	 its	 place	 as	 signifiers	 of	 our	
ignorance	regarding,	and	attempts	to	explain,	the	origins	and	organisation	of	
life	without	resorting	to	simple	reductionism.	Such	concepts	have	abandoned	
the	metaphysical	aspects	of	vitalism	but	retain	its	ambiguity.	As	such,	perhaps	
the	persistence	of	doubt	over	the	applicability	of	the	mechanistic	conception	
and	treatment	of	the	organism	is	due	to	an	acknowledgement	of	the	inherent	
complexity	 in	 life.	 These	 doubts	 seemed	 stronger	 in	 those	 with	 a	 biology	
background	than	those	with	an	engineering	background,	which	may	be	due	to	
their	differing	knowledge	of,	and	experience	of	working	with,	biology.			
As	discussed	 in	 chapter	 three,	 there	 is	 a	 vast	difference	 in	 the	knowledge	
base	 of	 synthetic	 biologists	who	 hail	 from	 biology	 and	 those	who	 hail	 from	
engineering.	 Many	 of	 those	 from	 engineering	 have	 little	 or	 no	 training	 in	
biology	 and	 thus	 are	 surprised	 to	discover	how	difficult	 it	 is	 to	 engineer.	As	
engineer	Jack	Schonbrun	is	quoted	as	saying,	 in	regards	to	synthetic	biology,	
“[t]he	synthetic	part	is	easy,	it’s	the	biology	part	that’s	confounding”	(Gardner	
2013).	Thus,	perhaps	those	hailing	from	engineering	are	less	aware	of	the	gaps	
in	the	physico-chemical	explanation	of	life.	Furthermore,	as	also	discussed	in	
chapter	three,	there	are	significant	differences	in	the	interactions	of	those	on	
the	biology	side	of	synthetic	biology,	and	those	on	the	engineering	side,	with	
the	discipline’s	‘products.’		
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The	biologists,	as	outlined	in	chapter	three,	predominantly	encounter	their	
‘products’	within	 the	messy	 reality	of	 the	 laboratory,	where	 cultures	die	 and	
thrive,	 need	 to	 be	 tended,	 fed,	 and	 kept	 alive.	 An	 environment	 where	 the	
organisms	are	as	likely	to	throw	up	aberrant	results	requiring	experiments	to	
be	 tweaked	 or	 overhauled	 completely,	 as	 they	 are	 to	 produce	 the	 desired	
outcomes.	These	 synthetic	biologists	 also	encounter	 their	 ‘products’	 through	
inscriptions	of	various	sorts,	smeared	lines	on	a	black	and	white	gel	photo	for	
example,	 or	 a	 series	 of	 OD 110 	readings.	 But	 ultimately	 these,	 like	 the	
mathematical	 equations	 produced	 by	 modellers,	 do	 not	 supplant	 their	
impressions	of	the	organisms	themselves.		
Many	 of	 the	 engineers,	 by	 contrast,	 only	 ever	 encounter	 these	 same	
‘products’	 in	 the	 form	 of	 numbers.	 First	 the	 cleaned,	 repeated,	 accurately	
timed	 results	 of	 experiments	 fed	 to	 them	by	 the	 biologists,	 and	 then	 in	 the	
form	 of	 the	 mathematical	 equations	 that	 they	 turn	 these	 results	 into.	 As	
Callon’s	 (1986)	 fascinating	 paper	 about	 scallop	 domestication	 showed,	
organisms	are	capable	of	different	things	when	they	are	organisms	than	when	
they	are	reduced	to	being	numbers.	The	numbers	may	be	easier	to	work	with,	
but	 they	 can	mask	 the	underlying	 complexity.111	Thus	 it	 is	 perhaps	 easier	 for	
the	engineers	to	adhere	to	a	reductionist	view	of	life	and	biology	than	it	is	for	
the	biologists.	Such	a	reductionist	view	is,	after	all,	in	line	with	the	way	other	
branches	 of	 engineering	 view	 their	 material	 and	 subjects.	 This	 does	 not	
however	 mean	 that	 it	 is	 necessarily	 an	 appropriate	 way	 of	 viewing	 and	
interacting	with	biology.	
As	shall	be	discussed	in	chapter	six,	famous	microbiologist	and	biophysicist	
Carl	 Woese	 railed	 against	 the	 application	 of	 engineering’s	 reductionism	 to	
biology.	Although	his	comments	predate	the	emergence	of	synthetic	biology,	
he	opposed	both	the	idea	of	turning	biology	into	an	engineering	discipline	and	
the	 ‘organism	 as	 machine’	 perspective,	 which	 underpin	 the	 discipline.	 He	
																																								 								
110	Optical	Density.	
111	In	Callon’s	 study	 the	numbers,	which	were	meant	 to	 represent	 the	 scallops,	displaced	 the	
scallops	 themselves	but	ultimately	proved	 to	be	unrepresentative,	 leading	 to	 the	drawing	of	
inaccurate	conclusions	regarding	the	scallops’	behaviour	(1986).	
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wrote,	“[l]et’s	stop	looking	at	the	organism	purely	as	a	molecular	machine.	The	
machine	metaphor	certainly	provides	insights,	but	these	come	at	the	price	of	
overlooking	much	of	what	biology	is”	(2004:	176).	Thus	much	like	Canguilhem	
(2009)	and	Greco	(2005),	Woese	argues	that,	“to	understand	living	systems	in	
any	deep	sense,	we	must	come	to	see	them	not	materialistically,	as	machines,	
but	as	(stable)	complex,	dynamic	organization”	(2004:	176).		
Consequently,	 both	 Canguilhem	 and	 Woese	 might	 now	 have	 looked	
approvingly	at	the	uncertainty	and	internal	conflict	of	the	synthetic	biologists	
at	the	Centre.	Seeing	their	ambiguous	responses	regarding	the	classification	of	
their	 ‘products’	 as	 a	 positive	 sign	 of	 resistance	 to	 the	 reductionism	 that	 is	
prevalent	 in	modern	biology.	They	might	 therefore,	 encourage	 the	 synthetic	
biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	 to	 embrace	 their	 doubts	 regarding	 the	mechanistic	
conception	 of	 the	 organism,	 hold	 tight	 to	 their	 questions,	 and	 acknowledge	
their	ignorance,	rather	than	urge	them	to	shed	these	in	favour	of	the	kind	of	
certainty	displayed	by	Michael.	Arguing	that	such	an	approach	is	more	likely	
to	 increase	 their	 understanding	 of	 the	 entities	 they	 work	 with	 than	 an	
unquestioning	acceptance	of	the	reductionism	and	mechanism	that	synthetic	
biology	promotes.	
Conclusion	
The	questions:	 ‘what	 is	 life’	 and	 ‘what	are	 the	essential	differences,	 if	 any,	
between	 the	 living	 and	 the	 non-living/the	 animate	 and	 the	 inanimate/	
organisms	and	machines?’	have,	as	I	address	above,	been	with	us	since	at	least	
the	 fourth	 century	 BCE.	 Since	 this	 time,	many	 attempts	 have	 been	made	 to	
answer	them.	Yet,	despite	centuries	of	effort	bringing	us	closer	to	an	answer	of	
what	makes	life,	life,	and	to	either	firmly	establishing	or	fully	discrediting	the	
existence	 of	 such	 boundaries,	 uncertainty	 remains.	 Enough	 uncertainty	 for	
vitalism	to,	as	Canguilhem	would	have	it,	retain	its	vitality.	Thus,	despite	the	
increasing	 certainty	 that	 life	 contains	 no	 metaphysical	 element,	 vitalism’s	
persistent	 longevity	 suggests	 that	 Greco	 (2005),	 Bergson	 (1983),	 and	
Canguilhem	(2009)	are	correct	that	the	term	highlights	something	important.	
As	Greco	(2005)	argues,	 it	appears	 to	signpost	a	discomfort	with	mechanism	
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and	reductionism	while	affixing	a	label	to	our	areas	of	ignorance	regarding	life,	
much	as	the	more	contemporary,	and	less	contentious,	‘complexity’	now	does.	
That	is,	while	biological	systems	may	well	be	explainable	in	terms	of	physico-
chemical	processes,	there	are	too	many	unaccounted	for	differences	between	
organisms	 and	 machines,	 and,	 as	 shown	most	 recently	 by	 syn3.0	 (Clyde	 A.	
Hutchison	et	al.	2016),	too	much	that	is	unknown	about	life,	to	do	away	with	
the	machine/organism	divide	completely;	at	least	for	now.		
Given	 this	 degree	 of	 complexity,	 it	 is	 no	 great	 surprise	 that	 synthetic	
biology	 has	 struggled	 to	 implement	 its	 mechanistic	 approach.	 Nor	 is	 it	
alarming	that	those	working	with	the	messy	reality	of	biology	have	struggled	
to	 conceive	 of	 these	 complex	 entities	 being	 completely	 reduced	 to	 simple	
physico-chemical	 components	 and	 processes.	 Where	 Venter	 displayed	
complete	 confidence	 that	 ‘Synthia’	 required	 a	 new	 classificatory	 label,	 being	
not	 just	 life	 but	 synthetic	 life,	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	 were	
largely	more	conflicted.		
While	 most	 of	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Centre	 contended	 that	 no	 clear	
boundary	exists	between	machines	and	organisms,	most	were	more	inclined	to	
place	the	‘products’	of	their	discipline	in	a	blurry,	grey,	liminal	zone	between	
these	 categories,	 than	 to	 do	 away	 with	 the	 categories	 completely.	 Indeed,	
while	several	members	of	the	Centre	made	claims	regarding	the	homogeneity	
of	all	matter,	animate	and	inanimate,	only	Michael	stuck,	unwavering,	to	this	
viewpoint.	Most	found	themselves	back-pedalling,	or	contradicting	themselves	
as	 they	 tried	 to	 articulate	 what	 category	 the	 ‘products’	 of	 synthetic	 biology	
belong	within.	This	uncertainty	 and	difficulty	with	attributing	 the	 ‘products’	
to	one	category	or	the	other	may,	I	suggest,	indicate	the	need	for	a	new	hybrid	
category.	 A	 boundary	 spanning	 conceptual	 category	 that	 is,	 which	 can	
encompass	 entities	 that	 possess	 characteristics	 of	 both	 machines	 and	
organisms	 simultaneously.	 Such	 a	 category	would	 not	 only	 potentially	 solve	
synthetic	biology’s	classification	woes	but	more	fundamentally,	would	disrupt	
the	long	held	machine/organism	divide.	
The	 key	word	 here	 however	 is	 conceptual	 given	 that,	 as	 I	 have	 discussed	
above,	 the	 process	 of	 classifying	 entities	 uncovers	 underlying	 philosophical	
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conceptions	about	what	counts	as	life,	and	what	counts	as	a	machine.	Drawing	
on	Keller	 I	 argue	 that	both	 life	 and	machine	 are	human	 rather	 than	natural	
categories,	and	the	act	of	drawing	a	boundary,	and	assigning	an	entity	to	one	
or	 the	 other	 side,	 tells	 us	 something	 about	 the	 differences	 that	 are	 being	
honoured.	 The	 same	 would,	 of	 course,	 be	 true	 of	 such	 a	 hybrid	 boundary	
spanning	category,	should	it	arise.	However,	as	it	stands,	those	at	the	Centre	
honour	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 differences	 from	 which	 they	 have	 formed	 their	
concepts	of	what	life	and	machines	are.	These	honoured	differences	are	then	
used	as	both	justification	of	the	classification	given	to	their	‘products’	and	as	a	
guideline	of	what	characteristics	an	entity	would	need	to	shed	and/or	gain	in	
order	to	be	deemed	to	have	transgressed	the	machine/organism	boundary;	an	
achievement	that	for	many	is	just	a	matter	of	time.	
Yet,	 despite	 such	 goals,	 and	 despite	 claims	 that	 synthetic	 biology’s	
‘products’	 fall	 within	 a	 grey	 zone,	 for	 which	 our	 existing	 categories	 are	
insufficient,	the	synthetic	biologists	at	the	Centre	were	hesitant	to	claim	that	
synthetic	biology	 is,	as	yet,	producing	anything	revolutionary.	For	some,	 this	
was	because	life	will	always	be	life	no	matter	what	they	do	to	it,	but	for	others	
there	seemed	to	be	humility;	a	reluctance	to	court	the	media	attention	that	a	
Venter-like	announcement	would	garner,	and	the	almost	inevitable	charges	of	
playing	God	 that	 come	with	 ‘creating’	 life.	Yet,	 given	 the	 advances	 synthetic	
biology	is	making,	and	the	work	that	the	synthetic	biologists	at	the	Centre	are	
engaged	 with,	 the	 reality	 is,	 as	 Deplazes	 and	 Huppenbauer	 argue,	 that	 the	
‘products’	of	their	work	“will	affect	the	concept	and	evaluation	of	life	and	the	
idea	of	what	constitutes	a	machine	 in	society	and	 in	our	culture”	 (2009:	63).	
Thus,	while	they	may	struggle	with	classifying	their	 ‘products,’	and	they	may	
waiver	 back	 and	 forth	 between	 embracing	 mechanism	 and	
vitalism/complexity,	given	the	nature	of	their	work,	they	are	likely	to	still	face	
the	same	questions	and	concerns	as	Craig	Venter	did	over	‘Synthia.’		
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Chapter	 Six:	 Doing	 Biology	
Differently	
As	discussed	 in	 the	previous	 chapter,	 synthetic	biology	 is	 challenging	our	
concepts	 and	 evaluations	 of	 organisms	 and	 machines.	With	 its	 engineering	
approach	 to	 understanding	 and	 engaging	 with	 biology,	 this	 emerging	
discipline	 is	promoting	an	extreme	 form	of	 reductionism	and	mechanism.	A	
mechanistic	 reductionism,	 that	 is,	which	 ascribes	 to	 the	 notion	 that	 biology	
can	be	thought	of	and	treated	like	any	other	engineerable	material.	Life,	 it	 is	
maintained,	can	be,	or	at	least	will	be,	designed,	built,	and	controlled	from	the	
bottom	 up	 in	 the	 manner	 of	 machines.	 Performing	 predetermined,	 desired	
tasks,	 and	 producing	 industrialisable	 products.	 As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 five,	
this	 approach	 is	 challenging	 the	 machine/organism	 boundary	 by	 arguably	
producing	 boundary	 spanning	 entities	 which,	 conceptually	 at	 least,	 bear	
characteristics	 from	 both	 sides.	 Thus,	 despite	 the	 practical	 and	 conceptual	
challenges	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 facing	 as	 it	 strives	 to	 establish	 itself	 as	 a	
discipline,	I	would	maintain	that	this	emerging	discipline	is,	nevertheless,	part	
of	 a	 larger,	 and	more	 significant,	 shift	within	 the	 life	 sciences.	A	movement,	
that	 is,	 towards	 convergence	 and	 collaboration	 between	 biology	 and	
engineering,	which	is	reshaping	our	conception	of	life.		
Scientific	convergence	
In	 1939,	 Massachusetts	 Institute	 of	 Technology	 President,	 and	 physicist,	
Karl	 Compton	 and	 Professor	 of	 Biology	 John	 Bunker	 wrote	 a	 paper	 on	 the	
formation	of	biological	engineering.112	In	it,	they	argued	for	open-mindedness,	
																																								 								
112	They	describe	 their	proposal	of	 a	 five-year	 course	of	undergraduate	and	graduate	work	at	
MIT	 in	 biological	 engineering	 that	 they	 argue	 would	 be	 required	 to	 give	 students	 the	
necessary	minimum	training	in	the	essential	elements	of	biology,	chemistry,	and	physics.	This	
five-year	course	started	in	1936	with	students	pursuing	a	BSc	in	Biophysics	and	subsequently	
an	MSc	in	Biological	Engineering.	They	write	that	much	thought	and	consultation	went	into	
the	 choice	 of	 the	 name	 ‘biological	 engineering’	 for	 the	 course.	 Apparently	 they	 temporarily	
abandoned	 it	 as	 a	name	while	 searching	 for	 an	appropriate	 title	 for	 their	objective	however	
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and	 the	 importance	 of	 convergence	 between	 sciences,	 claiming	 that	 the	
history	of	science	is	like	a	pendulum	swinging	back	and	forth	between	periods	
of	 specialisation	 and	 periods	 of	 convergence.	 “Convergence	 of	 specialized	
fields,”	they	argued,	“comes	about	when	some	fundamental	discovery	discloses	
the	 underlying	 unity,	 the	 basic	 processes,	 of	 two	 branches	 of	 science	which	
have	 developed	 apparently	 divergently	 on	 less	 fundamental	 and	 apparently	
unrelated	bases”	(1939:	7).		
Compton	and	Bunker	attribute	many	great	intellectual	and	social	advances	
to	 such	 convergences	 between	 disciplines.	 Arguing,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 their	
proposed	‘biological	engineers,’	that	they	would	be	explorers	of	an	“ill-mapped	
territory”	 (1939:	 14)	who	may,	 like	Christopher	Columbus,	 come	upon	a	new	
world	 serendipitously.	Yet	despite	 the	name,	Compton	and	Bunker	 included	
no	 engineers,	 nor	 engineering,	 in	 their	 endeavour.	 Rather,	 they	 envisioned	
their	new	 field	emerging	at	 a	 time	of	 convergence	between	biology,	physics,	
and	 chemistry.	 However	 now,	 more	 than	 seventy	 years	 after	 their	 article	
proposing	the	field	of	biological	engineering,	engineering	is	itself	entering	the	
realm	of	biology.	 For	 just	 as	biological	 engineering	was	 framed	by	Compton	
and	Bunker	 as	 the	product	of	 an	underlying	unity	between	biology,	physics,	
and	chemistry,	the	nascent	field	of	synthetic	biology	is	founded	on	a	belief	in	
an	underlying	unity	between	biology	and	engineering.		
However,	contrary	to	Compton	and	Bunker’s	assertions,	I	would	argue	that	
the	current	convergence	between	biology	and	engineering	is	more	a	result	of	
assimilation	that	of	an	uncovered,	fundamental	unity	between	the	disciplines.	
																																								 																																								 																																								 													
returned	to	 it	after	 rejecting	 ‘biophysics’	 for	being	 insufficiently	definitive,	 ‘biochemistry’	 for	
being	 insufficiently	 inclusive,	 and	 ‘biurgy,’	 ‘biodynamics,’	 and	 ‘biotechnology’	 for	 being	
unsuitable.	Dr	Vannevar	Bush,	then	the	vice-president	and	dean	of	engineering	at	MIT	(who,	
interestingly,	 later	 became	 one	 of	 the	 primary	 organisers	 of	 the	 Manhattan	 Project),	
encouraged	 the	use	of	 the	name	 ‘biological	engineering,’	 even	 though	 those	who	decided	 to	
use	it,	didn’t,	at	the	time,	like	it.	Bush	argued	that	their	objective	conformed	to	the	definition	
of	 engineering	 as	 “the	 art	 of	 organizing	 and	 directing	 men	 and	 of	 controlling	 forces	 and	
materials	of	nature	for	the	benefit	of	the	human	race”	(2009b:	294)	Within	this	conception	of	
engineering	 the	 authors	 argue	 there	 was	 scope	 for	 “every	 activity	 from	 instrumentation	 to	
theory,	 including	 biophysics	 and	 biochemistry	 .	 .	 .	 so	 long	 as	 the	 major	 objective	 is	 the	
marshalling	 of	 all	 available	 resources	 to	 aid	 biology	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 humanity”	 (Compton	
and	Bunker	1939:	12).	
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A	 general	 movement,	 that	 is,	 of	 both	 disciplines	 towards	 a	 point	 of	
convergence.	 As	 biology	 slowly	 but	 surely	 is	 reformulated	 in	 the	 image	 of	
engineering,	 and	 engineering	 encroaches	 further	 and	 further	 into	 the	 life	
sciences.	Where	this	expansion	of	engineering	was	discussed	in	chapter	three,	
it	is	the	shifts	in	biology	that	I	believe	are	more	significant	to	the	development	
of	synthetic	biology.	As	such	it	is	biology	that	I	shall	focus	on	in	this	chapter.		
In	 A	 Vital	 Rationalist,	 Georges	 Canguilhem	 (2000)	 writes	 of	 four	 major	
shifts	 in	 the	 conception	 of	 life;	 life	 as	 animation,	 life	 as	mechanism,	 life	 as	
organisation,	 and	 life	 as	 information.	 These	 shifts	 take	 us	 from	Aristotle,	 in	
350BCE,	 right	 up	 until	 the	 end	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 As	 I	 shall	 address,	
they	 have	 come	 about	 as	 the	 result	 of	 scientific	 and	 technological	 advances	
and	 societal	 and	 philosophical	 shifts	 as	 we	 have	 continued	 our	 attempts	 to	
grapple	with	the	stuff	of	life.	All	have	been	focused	on	understanding	life	and	
its	 processes,	 but	 all,	 as	 I	 shall	 address,	 have	 also	 introduced	 concepts	 and	
practices	 that	 have	 incrementally	 moved	 biology	 closer	 to	 this	 intersection	
with	 engineering.	 Indeed,	 as	mechanism	has	 encroached	 further	 and	 further	
into	 our	 understandings	 of	 life	 we	 have	 moved	 closer	 and	 closer	 to	 a	
convergence	 between	 biology	 and	 engineering.	 To	 the	 so-called	 crossroads	
between	 biology	 and	 engineering	 where	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 said	 to	 reside	
(Rusk	2007).	
Echoing	 a	 British	 Medical	 Journal	 (BMJ)	 article	 from	 1910	 (BMJ	 1910),	
Compton	 and	 Bunker	 (1939)	 wrote	 that,	 the	 introduction	 of	 experimental	
techniques	from	physics	and	chemistry	into	biology	changed	the	character	of	
biology	 from	descriptive	 to	analytical.	Yet	where	Compton	and	Bunker	 leave	
their	 analysis	 at	 this	 point,	 the	 BMJ	 paper	 asserts	 that	 “[a]ll	 natural	 science	
follow	the	same	process	of	evolution”	(1910:	1080)	beginning	with	a	descriptive	
phase,	 followed	 by	 an	 analytical	 phase,	 and	 advancing	 to	 a	 synthetic	 phase.	
“Biology,”	 the	 author	 lamented	 over	 a	 hundred	 years	 ago,	 had	 “not	 yet	
advanced	beyond	the	first	two	stages”	(BMJ	1910:	1080).	Yet,	it	seems	that	it	is	
just	such	an	‘advance’	that	synthetic	biology	is	now	attempting	to	enact,	both	
in	name	and	in	practice,	as	they	shift	the	focus	of	their	biology	from	analysis	
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to	 synthesis.	 A	 shift	 which	 is	 clearly	 articulated	 by	 Venter’s	 team	 when,	
regarding	the	creation	of	syn3.0’s	minimal	genome,	they	write:	
“Genomics	 is	moving	 from	a	descriptive	phase,	 in	which	genomes	
are	sequenced	and	analysed,	 to	a	 synthetic	phase,	 in	which	whole	
genomes	can	be	built	by	chemical	synthesis.	As	the	detailed	genetic	
requirements	 for	 life	 are	 discovered,	 it	 will	 become	 possible	 to	
design	whole	genomes	from	first	principles,	build	them	by	chemical	
synthesis,	 and	 then	 bring	 them	 to	 life	 by	 installation	 into	 a	
receptive	cellular	environment”	(Clyde	A.	Hutchison	et	al.	2016:	8).		
In	this	chapter	then,	I	shall	take	a	step	back	from	the	Centre	and	the	day-
to-day	work	which	takes	place	within	it,	in	order	to	investigate	both	the	shifts	
in	the	character	of	biology,	and	in	the	conception	of	life,	which	are	captured	in	
the	above	quote.	This	is	not	intended	as	a	 ‘glossing	over’	of	the	challenges	of	
enacting	 synthetic	 biology’s	 engineering	 approach,	 but	 rather	 as	 an	
acknowledgement	that,	 in	spite	of	 these	challenges,	 the	 landscape	of	biology	
appears	to	be	shifting.	Thus	drawing	from	scientific,	philosophical,	historical,	
and	 social	 science	 literature,	 I	 shall	 explore	 the	 wider	 social	 and	 scientific	
trends	that	have	ultimately	 led	to	this	point	of	convergence	between	biology	
and	engineering.	A	junction	where,	the	momentum	towards	engineering,	the	
growing	technologisation	of	life,	and	an	increasingly	interventionist	approach	
to	biology,	are	culminating	in	an	emerging	shift	in	the	conception	of	life.		
The	beginnings	of	biology	
The	origins	of	the	word	‘biology,’	as	the	name	for	a	distinct	science	of	life,	
are	often	traced	back	to	a	varying	number	of	 independent	scientists	working	
at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century.113	Yet	 the	 roots	 of	 the	 word,	 like	 the	
																																								 								
113	Most	 commonly	 the	 coinage	 is	 attributed	 to	 German	 naturalist	 and	 botanist	 Gottfried	
Reinhold	 Treviranus	 and	 French	 botanist	 and	 natural	 historian	 Jean-Baptiste	 Lamarck	
(Canguilhem	 2000;	 Keller	 2002;	 Sapp	 2003).	 However	 it	 is	 sometimes	 also	 attributed	 to	
German	 physiologist	 and	 medical	 historian	 Theodor	 Georg	 August	 Roose	 (Mateos	 2010),	
French	 anatomist	 and	 physiologist	Marie	 François	 Xavier	Bichat	 (Gayon	 2010),	 and	German	
physiologist	Karl	Friedrich	Burdach,	 (Mayr	 1982).	These	 independent	coinages	all	 took	place	
between	1797-1802	(Compton	and	Bunker	1939).	
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roots	 of	 the	 discipline,	 go	 back	 much	 further.	 Biology,	 in	 its	 Latin	 form	
‘biologia,’	 is	 the	 contraction	 of	 the	 Greek	 word	 bios,	 meaning	 ‘life,’	 and	 the	
suffix	–logia,	meaning	‘study	of.’	Gayon	writes	that,	in	this	form,	the	word	has	
been	 used	 since	 at	 least	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 in	 German	 speaking	
universities.	However,	it’s	purpose	was	solely	descriptive,	being	used	primarily	
in	obituaries	 to	denote	 the	narrative	of	an	 individual’s	entire	 life	 (2010).114	As	
such,	Richards	claims	that	it	wasn’t	until	1802	that	Treviranus	established	the	
modern	concept	of	biology,115	describing	the	science	as	follows:	
	“The	 objects	 of	 our	 research	 will	 be	 the	 different	 forms	 and	
manifestations	 of	 life,	 the	 conditions	 and	 laws	under	which	 these	
phenomena	 occur,	 and	 the	 causes	 through	which	 they	 have	 been	
effected.	The	science	that	concerns	itself	with	these	objects	we	will	
indicate	 by	 the	 name	 biology	 [Biologie]	 or	 the	 doctrine	 of	 life	
[Lebenslehre]”	(Treviranus	quoted	in:	Richards	2002).116	
While	 modern	 biology	 remains	 closely	 linked	 to	 this	 conception	 of	 the	
science,	 Sarah	 Franklin	 (1995)	 argues	 that	 our	 understanding	 of	 life	 has	
transformed	many	 times	 in	 the	 intervening	 years.	While	 I	would	 agree	with	
Franklin,	 I	would,	 following	Canguilhem	 (2000),	 extend	her	 assertion	 to	 the	
																																								 								
114 	According	 to	 McLaughlin	 (2002),	 the	 word	 reappeared	 in	 1736	 when	 Swedish	 natural	
scientist	Carl	Linnaeus,	used	the	term	biologi	in	his	Bibliotheca	botanica.	However	its	usage,	at	
this	time,	was	similarly	descriptive	and	denoted	what	we	might	now	call	biography.	
115	McLaughlin	 attributes	 to	 German	 professor	 and	 librarian	 Michael	 Christoph	 Hanov,	 the	
word’s	 usage	 as	 a	 referent	 to	 a	 general	 science	 of	 life,	 one	 that	 embraces	 both	 plants	 and	
animals.	This	was	 in	 the	 third	of	his	 four-volume	Latin	 compendium,	 a	 volume	bearing	 the	
wonderfully	 loquacious	 subtitle:	Geology,	 Biology,	 General	 Phytology	 and	Dendrology,	 or	 the	
Science	of	 the	Earth,	of	Living	Things	and	of	Vegetating	Things	 in	General,	as	well	as	of	Trees	
(Philosophiae	 naturalis	 sive	 physicae	 dogmaticae	 tomus	 III,	 continens	 geologiam,	 biologiam,	
phytologiam	generalem	et	dendrologiam	vel	 terrae,	 rerum	viventium	et	vegetantium	in	genere,	
atque	 arborum	 scientiam).	 The	 compendium	 itself	 was	 entitled	 Natural	 Philosophy	 or	
Dogmatic	Physics	(Philosophia	naturalis	sive	physica	dogmatica)	and	was	originally	published	
between	1762-1768.	However,	rather	than	envisioning	it	as	a	broad	discipline	encompassing	all	
of	botany	 and	zoology,	Hanov	 reportedly	used	 ‘biology’	 to	 refer	 solely	 to	 the	 study	of	 ‘laws’	
common	to	both	plants	and	animals	(Gayon	2010;	Mateos	2010;	McLaughlin	2002).	Moreover,	
with	the	exception	of	headings,	Hanov	does	not	use	‘biology’	in	his	work	at	all	and	thus	his	use	
of	the	term,	according	to	McLaughlin	(2002),	probably	did	not	influence	later	coinages.	
116	It	was,	however,	only	in	the	years	following	1840,	once	French	philosopher	Auguste	Comte	
popularised	the	word,	that	‘biology’	came	into	common	use	(Gayon	2010).	
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period	 of	 time	 before	 ‘biology’	 was	 coined.	 For	 as	 Canguilhem	 writes,	 our	
understandings	of	‘life’	have	varied	widely	since	it	was	first	defined	2366	years	
ago.	Nevertheless,	one	must	be	careful	when	looking	at	earlier	understandings	
of	what	we	now	consider	 ‘life,’	that	these	are	not	attributed	to	the	science	of	
biology	per	se.	Foucault	was	quick	to	warn	historians	against	such	‘histories’	of	
pre-nineteenth	century	biology,	writing:		
“they	 do	 not	 realize	 that	 biology	 did	 not	 exist	 then,	 and	 that	 the	
pattern	of	knowledge	that	has	been	familiar	to	us	for	a	hundred	and	
fifty	years	is	not	valid	for	a	previous	period.	And	that,	if	biology	was	
unknown,	 there	was	a	very	simple	reason	 for	 it:	 that	 life	 itself	did	
not	 exist.	 All	 that	 existed	 was	 living	 beings,	 which	 were	 viewed	
through	a	grid	of	knowledge	constituted	by	natural	history”	(1970:	
127-28).		
Natural	history,	which	predated	biology,	was	indeed	concerned	with	living	
beings	 rather	 than	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 ‘life.’	However	 there	were,	 as	 I	 shall	
discuss	 below,	 attempts	 to	 define	 what	 it	 was	 that	 distinguished	 animate	
entities.	While	such	attempts	may	not	have	employed	the	term	‘life,’	I	would	
argue	that	we	would	now,	in	hindsight,	consider	these	attempts	to	be	attempts	
to	define	 life.	As	 such,	 and	 for	 the	benefit	of	 continuity,	 I	 shall	 speak	of	 life	
before	 Foucault	 would	 perhaps	 consider	 it	 appropriate.	 As	 mentioned	
previously,	 Canguilhem	 (2000)	 divides	 the	 history	 of	 the	 conception	 of	 life	
into	 four	main	 periods,	 namely,	 life	 as	 animation,	 life	 as	mechanism,	 life	 as	
organisation,	and	life	as	information.	Below	I	shall	briefly	explore	each	of	these	
ways	of	 conceptualising	 life	 in	order	 to	argue	 that	 the	 study	of	 life	has	been	
incrementally	shifting	towards	the	notion	of	life	as	engineerable	material	since	
its	inception.	
Life	as	animation		
Canguilhem	quotes	Aristotle	 as	writing,	 in	his	 350BCE	 treatise	De	Anima,	
“[o]f	 natural	 bodies	 [that	 is,	 those	 not	 fabricated	 by	 man],	 some	 possess	
vitality,	 others	 do	 not.	 We	 mean	 by	 ‘possessing	 vitality’	 that	 a	 thing	 can	
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nourish	itself	and	grow	and	decay”	(Aristotle	quoted	in	Canguilhem	2000:	67).	
This,	Hanov	 (1997)	claims,	was	 the	 first	known	attempt	 to	provide	a	general	
definition	 of	 life.117	For	 two	 centuries	 before	 Aristotle,	 his	 predecessors	 had	
written	 down	 their	 reflections	 on	 nature,	 seeking	 to	 discover	 the	 simplest	
entities	 in	 the	 universe	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 bottom-up	 understanding	 of	
nature	(Lennox	2001).	But	until	Aristotle,	no	one	had	singled	out	living	natural	
entities	as	a	group	worthy	of	a	distinct	branch	of	natural	philosophy.	Indeed,	
in	contrast	to	his	predecessors,	Aristotle	reportedly	preferred	to	focus	on	the	
perceived	unity	of	form	and	matter	within	all	animate	entities,	arguing	that	it	
was	 life	 that	 distinguished	 the	 animate	 from	 the	 inanimate	 (Canguilhem	
2000).	 Aristotle’s	 notion	 of	 life	 as	 animation	 thus	 became	 the	 first	 known	
conception	 of	 life	 (Canguilhem	 2000).	 Under	 this	 conception,	 Gayon	 notes,	
life	was	intimately	associated	with	the	concept	of	the	soul.	Wherein	the	soul	is	
understood	as	being	“for	the	entire	body	what	sight	is	for	the	eye	.	.	.	both	the	
ensemble	of	functions,	and	their	coordination”	(Gayon	2010:	236).118		
Yet	despite	his	adherence	 to	what	 some	claim	 is	a	vitalistic	conception	of	
the	 organism	 (R.	 E.	 Hughes	 1965),	 Aristotle	 also	 introduced	 mechanical	
evaluations	 and	 comparisons	 into	 his	 assessment	 of	 animate	 entities.	 As	
Canguilhem	 notes,	 Aristotle	 held	 that	 a	 slave	 was,	 essentially,	 “an	 animate	
machine”	 (2009:	 80).	Canguilhem	 (2009)	 also	notes	 that	Aristotle,	 like	Plato	
before	him,	likened	the	movement	of	limbs	to	mechanisms.	Thus,	despite	the	
long	held	conceptual	division	between	machines	and	organisms,	discussed	in	
chapter	five,	Aristotle’s	work	not	only	served	as	the	beginning	of	the	study	of	
life	 but	 also	 the	beginning	of	 the	 encroachment	 of	mechanism	 into	biology.	
While	 also	 serving	 as	 the	 first	 “assimilation	 of	 the	 organism	 to	 a	 machine”	
																																								 								
117	Given	 that,	 “except	 for	 some	 medical	 lore,	 we	 have	 next	 to	 no	 information	 about	 the	
biological	 knowledge	 of	 the	 Sumerians,	 Babylonians,	 Egyptians,	 and	 other	 civilizations	
preceding	that	of	the	Greeks”	(Hanov	1997).	
118	Aristotle	is	also	widely	quoted	as	arguing	that,	in	animate	entities,	“the	whole	is	something	
over	and	above	its	parts	and	not	just	the	sum	of	them	all”	(Corning	2002:	19).	Thus,	Ruse	(2013)	
contends	that	Aristotle’s	focus	was	on	questions	of	purpose	and	ends,	arguing	that	in	order	to	
gain	 full	 understanding	 of	 an	 animate	 entity	 one	needed	 to	 ask	 about	 final	 causes,	 to	 trace	
how	their	potentiality	translated	into	their	actuality.		
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(Canguilhem	 2009:	 79).119	These,	 it	 would	 seem	 in	 hindsight,	 were	 the	 first	
steps	along	the	road	towards	biology’s	current	convergence	with	engineering.	
However,	due	to	both	the	increasing	role	of	Christianity	in	the	West,	and	the	
domination	 of	 essentialism	 in	 Western	 thinking,	 it	 was	 several	 centuries	
before	any	further	steps	were	taken	along	this	path.120	
The	Renaissance	and	the	scientific	revolution	
After	 many	 centuries	 of	 little	 progress	 in	 the	 natural	 sciences,	 the	
Renaissance	saw	a	renewed	interest	in	natural	history	and	anatomy.	Explorers	
and	traders	had	started	travelling	further	around	the	globe	bringing	back	tales,	
and	indeed	evidence,	of	the	sheer	diversity	of	the	planet’s	plant	and	animal	life	
(Mayr	 1982).	 Faced	with	 this	 abundance	 of	 life,	 Foucault	 (1970)	 reports	 that	
																																								 								
119	In	Knowledge	 of	 Life,	Canguilhem	explores	 the	history	of	 the	assimilation	of	organisms	as	
machines,	which	underlies	the	assumptions	of	Descartes,	and	his	followers,	regarding	animals.	
Long	 before	 Descartes,	 Aristotle	 argued	 that	 animals	 were	 machines,	 comparing	 their	
movements	with	those	of	war	machines	(for	example	he	likened	the	movement	of	the	arm	to	
that	 of	 the	 catapult).	 In	 this	 way,	 Canguilhem	 asserts,	 Aristotle	 was	 faithful	 to	 Plato	 who	
similarly	 defined	 the	movements	 of	 vertebrates	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 pivots.	 This	 assimilation	 of	
organisms	 as	 machines	 thus	 predated	 Descartes	 and	 fed	 through	 Descartes’	 ideas,	 and	
ultimately	 into	 his	 mechanical	 philosophy	 and	 mechanistic	 approach	 to	 biology	 (P.	 R.	 L.	
Brown	1971).	
120	Mayr	(1982)	contends	that	for	more	than	two	thousand	years	following	the	work	of	Aristotle	
and	Plato,	Western	thinking	was	dominated	by	essentialism.	A	concept	maintaining	that	any	
specific	entity	has	a	set	of	 innate,	and	thus	unchanging,	characteristics	and	attributes	which	
make	them	what	they	are	and	which	can	therefore	be	used	to	identify	them.	This	perspective	
was,	 reportedly,	 adopted	 by	 Christian	 theology.	 However	 the	 Greek	 notion	 of	 an	 eternal,	
essentially	 static	world	was	not.	 Instead	Christian	 theology,	Mayr	writes,	was	dominated	by	
the	concept	of	creation	which	held	that	the	world	is	not	eternal,	but	rather	recently	created,	
and	all	knowledge	of	the	world	is	contained	within	the	Bible’s	“revealed	word”	(Mayr	1982:	91).	
This	 perspective	 both	 precluded	 the	 need	 to	 ask	 ‘why’	 questions	 and,	 by	 asserting	 that	 all	
nature	(plants	and	animals)	was	subservient	to	humans,	disrupted	the	Greek	idea	of	a	unity	in	
nature.	 Furthermore,	 Mayr	 notes,	 this	 so-called	 natural	 theology	 adhered	 strictly	 to	
rationalism,	maintaining	that	truth	could	be	deduced	through	logic	and	reasoning	rather	than	
observation	or	experiment.	Indeed	empiricism,	promoted	by	Aristotle	and	now	the	backbone	
of	modern	science,	was	despised.	The	dominance	of	natural	theology,	which	looked	to	nature	
solely	to	provide	arguments	for	the	existence	of	God,	was	thus	thoroughly	unfavourable	to	the	
development	 of	 the	 natural	 sciences	 (Mayr	 1982).	 Indeed	 throughout	 the	 Middle	 Ages,	
(considered	to	have	lasted	in	Europe	from	the	5th	to	15th	century)	“[t]he	only	aspects	of	living	
nature	that	received	attention	were	problems	of	medicine	and	human	biology”	(Mayr	1982:	93)	
and	even	here	empirical	investigation	played	only	a	minor	part.	For	example,	while	anatomy	
was	taught	 in	Medieval	medical	schools,	dissection	played	only	a	small	part	 in	the	teaching.	
Thus	it	wasn’t	until	the	Renaissance	(considered	to	have	lasted	from	the	fourteenth	until	the	
seventeenth	centuries)	that	the	study	of	life	began	to	progress	beyond	the	work	of	Aristotle.		
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many	 natural	 historians	 turned	 to	 Aristotle’s	 approach	 to	 studying	 life,	
classifying	 everything	 into	 taxonomies	 based	 on	 their	 observable,	 and	 only	
their	 observable,	 characteristics.121	Thus,	 just	 as	 it	 had	 been	 under	 Aristotle,	
the	study	of	life	at	this	time	was	very	descriptive	in	character.	Yet	despite	its	
descriptive	nature,	such	taxonomic	work	played	a	significant	role	in	reigniting	
the	scientific	study	of	life.122	
Following	this	reintroduction	of	scientific	practice,	further	steps	were	taken	
to	move	 away	 from	 the	 constraints	 of	 natural	 theology.	 For	 example,	 Smith	
(2011)	writes	that	in	the	early	seventeenth	century	‘psychology,’	understood	at	
the	time	to	be	the	analysis	of	 the	soul,	was	eliminated	from	the	study	of	the	
natural	world.	As	a	result	of	this	elimination,	some	saw	a	need	to	replace	the	
soul,	previously	considered	to	be	responsible	for	the	animation	of	nature,	with	
something	 else.	 Smith	 argues	 that	 this	 replacement	 “took	 the	 form	 of	 the	
concept	of	‘life,’	but	the	challenge	for	many	seventeenth-century	thinkers	was	
to	find	a	way	to	study	life,	or	to	‘do	biology,’	without	allowing	this	to	be	simply	
a	continuation	of	psychology	under	a	new	name”	(2011:	3).	At	this	same	time,	
the	 scientific	 revolution	 was	 growing,	 and	 with	 it,	 Ruse	 notes,	 came	 “a	
fundamental	change	in	the	root	metaphor	that	informs	everything”	(2013:	412).	
The	 new	 “root	 metaphor,”	 ushered	 in	 by	 the	 Scientific	 Revolution,	 was	
mechanism.	The	focus	thus	shifted	from	life	as	animation’s	organic	view	of	the	
world,	 where	 everything	 was	 looked	 at	 in	 terms	 of	 living	 beings,	 to	 a	
mechanistic	worldview	where	everything	was	looked	at	in	terms	of	machines.	
																																								 								
121	Mayr	writes,	“[t]he	era	of	overseas	travel	and	explorations	resulted	in	a	veritable	obsession	
with	 exotic	 organisms	 and	 led	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 vast	 collections”	 (1982:	 101)	 The	
exponential	 growth	of	 such	collections	produced	a	drive	 towards	 classification	 starting	with	
Cesalpino	(1583)	and	reaching	a	climax	with	Carl	Linnaeus	(1707-1778).	Thus,	even	eighteenth	
century	 naturalists,	 such	 as	 Comte	 Buffon	 and	 Linneaus,	 drew	 heavily	 on	 Aristotle	 in	 their	
work,	describing	and	classifying	life	forms	without	ever	defining	what	they	meant	by	‘alive.’		
122	Another	significant	 factor	 in	this	reintroduction	of	scientific	practice	 into	biology	was	the	
role	 played	by	dissection	 in	 the	 teaching	 of	 anatomy.	Dutch	professor	 of	medicine	Andreas	
Vesalius	made	dissection	a	central,	rather	than	a	supplementary,	element	of	his	practice	and	
teaching	thus	helping	to	bring	observation	and	empiricism	back	into	the	study	of	life	(Vesalius	
et	al.	1973).	
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Thus,	Ruse	(2013)	writes,	the	focus	shifted	from	animism	and	final	causes,	to	
laws	of	motion	and	‘blind’	physical	forces.	
In	 introducing	 this	 new	 mechanistic	 worldview	 the	 study	 of	 life	 moved	
closer	 to	 a	 point	 of	 convergence	 with	 engineering,	 laying	 the	 initial	
mechanistic	groundwork	for	the	conceptual	shift	towards	engineering	that	we	
are	currently	seeing	in	the	life	sciences.	People	at	this	time	began	to	think	of	
nature	as	“a	law-bound	system	of	matter	in	motion”	(Mayr	1982:	95)	believing	
that	 all	 motion,	 whether	 organic	 or	 mechanical,	 had	 to	 have	 a	 mechanical	
cause.	 Thus	 it	 was	 that	 by	 1600,	 950	 years	 after	 it	 was	 first	 advanced,	 “the	
concept	of	life	as	an	animation	of	matter	lost	ground	to	materialist	or	merely	
mechanistic	conceptions	of	the	intrinsic	life	functions”	(Canguilhem	2000:	75).	
Life	as	mechanism		
As	Osler	 (2004)	writes,	 the	development	of	mechanistic	philosophy	was	a	
collective	endeavour	undertaken	by	a	community	of	European	thinkers	during	
the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 century.123	Yet,	 no	 other	 member	 of	 this	
community,	Nicholson	 (2012)	 argues,	 contributed	more	 to	 the	 spread	 of	 the	
mechanistic	 worldview	 into	 the	 natural	 sciences	 than	 French	 philosopher	
René	Descartes.	 Adamant	 that	 animals	were	 essentially	machines,	Descartes	
famously	 proposed	 a	 vision	 of	 life	 that	 reduced	 all	 organisms	 to	 a	 class	 of	
automata.	Writing	 in	 regards	 to	 animals,	 “I	 should	 like	 you	 to	 consider	 that	
these	 functions	 follow	 from	 the	mere	 arrangement	 of	 the	machine’s	 organs	
every	bit	as	naturally	as	the	movements	of	a	clock	or	other	automaton	follow	
from	 the	 arrangement	 of	 its	 counter-weights	 and	 wheels”	 (1988:	 108).	 Thus	
Canguilhem	writes	that,	in	perceiving	animals	as	machines,	“Descartes	does	to	
the	animal	what	Aristotle	did	to	the	slave:	he	devalorizes	it	in	order	to	justify	
its	use	by	man	as	an	instrument”	(2009:	84).124		
																																								 								
123	Osler	(2004)	writes	that	the	core	members	of	this	community	were	Isaac	Beeckman,	Marin	
Mersenne,	Thomas	Hobbes,	Pierre	Gassendi,	René	Descartes,	Sir	Kenelm	Digby,	and	Walter	
Charleton.	
124	Despite	his	focus	on	animals,	human	beings	were	not	exempt	from	Descartes’	mechanism,	
they	were	however	considered	to	be	significantly	different	 to	all	other	organisms.	For,	while	
animals	 were	 deemed	 to	 be	 merely	 machines,	 humans,	 Descartes	 contended,	 possessed	
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By	envisioning	life	as	mechanism,	and	thus	all	living	entities	as	instruments	
and	machines,	Descartes	took	a	position	in	direct	opposition	to	that	of	life	as	
animation.	Where	life	as	animation	suggested	that	living	beings	were	distinct	
from	non-living	entities,	and	therefore	required	a	special	type	of	explanation,	
life	as	mechanism	held	that	there	were	no	such	distinctions	and	thus	no	need	
for	 a	 special	 theoretical	 principle	 to	 explain	 their	 functioning.	 Indeed,	
Descartes	 reportedly	 challenged	 the	 machine/organism	 divide,	 much	 as	
modern	 synthetic	 biology	does	 (as	discussed	 in	 chapter	 five),	 by	 contending	
that	 organisms	 are	not	merely	 analogous	 to	machines	but	 that	 ontologically	
they	can	be	identified	as	machines	(Nicholson	2013).		
Thus,	 despite	 external	 similarities	 with	 the	 mechanistic	 theory	 of	
movement	 advanced	 by	 Aristotle,	 Canguilhem	 (2009)	 contends	 that	 the	
theories	 of	movement	 of	Aristotle	 and	Descartes	were	 in	 fact	 very	 different.	
Where	Aristotle	held	that,	despite	the	mechanistic	nature	of	movement,	“the	
principle	of	all	movement	is	the	soul,”	and	that	all	movement	requires	a	“first	
motor”	(Canguilhem	2009:	79),	Descartes’	theory	of	movement	was	not	reliant	
on	 the	 soul	 at	 all.	 Rather,	Descartes	 attributed	 all	 organic	movement	 to	 the	
same	 mechanistic	 origins	 as	 he	 determined	 were	 responsible	 for	 machine	
movement.125	The	whole	 for	 the	organism,	 as	 for	 the	machine,	being	 seen	as	
“strictly	the	sum	of	the	parts”	(Canguilhem	2009:	88).	Thus	under	Descartes’	
life	 as	 mechanism,	 the	 explanations	 for	 the	 movements	 and	 functions	 of	
mechanical	machines	were,	Gayon	(2010)	notes,	applied	without	alteration	to	
																																								 																																								 																																								 													
rational,	 nonmaterial	 souls,	 or	 minds,	 which	 interacted	 with	 the	 material	 and	 mechanical	
body	through	the	pineal	gland.	It	was	this	distinction	of	mind	and	body	that	became	the	basis	
of	Cartesian	dualism	(Descartes	1988).	
125	Canguilhem	 argues	 that	 in	 both	 cases	 the	 source	 of	 the	 energy	 fuelling	 the	movement	 is	
either	human	or	animal,	however	this	is	often	ignored	under	Descartes’	theory	of	movement	
due	to	the	time	between	the	storing	and	releasing	of	the	‘organic’	energy.	Canguilhem	writes:	
“[d]espite	this	difference	in	the	explanation	of	motion,	the	fact	remains	that	 for	Aristotle,	as	
later	 for	 Descartes,	 the	 comparison	 of	 the	 organism	 to	 a	 machine	 presupposes	 man-made	
devices	in	which	an	automatic	mechanism	is	linked	to	a	source	of	energy	whose	motor	effects	
continue	 well	 after	 the	 human	 or	 animal	 effort	 they	 release	 has	 ceased.	 It	 is	 this	 interval	
between	the	storing	up	and	the	release	of	energy	by	the	mechanism	that	allows	one	to	forget	
the	 relationship	 of	 dependence	 between	 the	mechanism’s	 effects	 and	 the	 action	 of	 a	 living	
being”	(2009:	79-80).	
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organisms.	 In	 this	 way,	 Descartes	 moved	 the	 study	 of	 life	 closer	 to	
engineering,	 while	 also	 expanding	 mechanistic	 understandings	 of	 life	 to	
encompass	the	parts,	the	whole,	and	the	function	of	all	organisms.	
Such	a	belief	in	the	homogeneity	of	machines	and	organisms	is,	according	
to	Nicholson	(2013),	based	on	a	number	of	readily	perceptible	commonalities.	
For	example,	both	are	bounded	physical	systems	whose	actions	are	governed	
by	 natural	 laws.	 Both	 use	 energy	 and	 are	 hierarchically	 structured	 and	
differentiated	 internally,	 and	 both	 can	 be	 described	 in	 terms	 of	 causal	
relationships	between	interacting	parts.	Ultimately	then,	both	are	organised	so	
that,	 as	 a	 whole,	 they	 are	 purposive,	 working	 towards	 the	 attainment	 of	
particular	ends	(Nicholson	2013).126	Yet	despite	such	commonalities,	there	was	
another	motivation	for	reframing	biology	using	the	concept	of	mechanism.	As	
Mayr	 writes,	 “[o]ne	 of	 the	 objectives	 of	 attempts	 to	 provide	 a	 mechanistic	
explanation	of	all	phenomena	was	to	further	the	unity	of	science”	(1982:	99).127		Central	 to	 this	 drive	 for	 unity	 was,	 reportedly,	 the	 work	 of	 Newton.	 For	example	 Clayton	 writes,	 “nothing	 seemed	 more	 to	 support	 a	 mechanistic	worldview	 than	 Isaac	 Newton’s	 three	 laws”	 (2013:	 435).	 Published	 in	 1687,	Clayton	argues	that	“[t]he	brilliance	of	Newton’s	laws	was	that	they	proposed	a	
single	 quantitative	dynamical	 system	 that	 could	 in	principle	 account	 for	 the	
motion	 of	 all	 physical	 bodies	 whatsoever.	 It	 was	 this	 assumption,	 among	
others,	 that	made	 possible	 the	 birth	 of	 the	 scientific	method”	 (2013:	 435).	 It	was	 also	 an	 assumption	which,	Mayr	 (1982)	 contends,	 greatly	 reinforced	 the	mechanistic	approach	to	physiology.		In	attempting	to	align	the	natural	sciences	with	the	physical	sciences,	as	the	scientific	method	came	into	being,	Compton	and	Bunker	(1939)	assert	that	the	
																																								 								
126 	However,	 as	 both	 Nicholson	 (2013)	 and	 Canguilhem	 (2009)	 note,	 the	 nature	 of	 their	
purposiveness	is	completely	different.		
127 	During	 the	 Renaissance	 all	 areas	 of	 science	 saw	 great	 advancements,	 and	 with	 these	
advances	came	a	desire	to	bring	the	natural	sciences	in	line	with	the	physical	sciences.	Indeed	
Mayr	(1982)	writes	that,	during	the	seventeenth	century,	natural	scientists	looked	increasingly	
to	 the	notion	of	 life	 as	mechanism	 to	describe	 and	understand	 the	world.	 This	 drive	 under	
mechanism	 to	 cast	 biology	 in	 the	 image	 of	 physics	 is,	 Clayton	 (2013)	 notes,	 an	 interesting	
reversal	of	the	desire,	under	life	as	animation,	to	cast	physics	in	the	image	of	biology	(Shapin	
1996).	
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study	 of	 life	 began	 to	 shift	 in	 character	 from	 being	 descriptive	 to	 being	analytical.	 This	 shift	 is	 evident	 in	 Mayr’s	 (1982)	 descriptions	 of	 seventeenth	
and	 eighteenth	 century	 iatromechanics.128	A	 movement	 which	 attempted	 to	
explain	 the	 workings	 of	 organs	 or	 organ	 systems	 by	 building	 ‘mechanical	
models’	and	drawing	on	the	 laws	of	Galilean	and	Cartesian	mechanics	(Mayr	1982).	Thus	 leading	Mayr	 to	write,	 regarding	 this	 time,	 “[m]ore	 than	ever,	 it	
now	became	fashionable	to	explain	everything	in	physical	terms	of	forces	and	
motion,	 as	 inappropriate	 as	 such	 an	 explanation	 was	 for	 most	 biological	
phenomena”	 (1982:	 96).129	Consequently	 Mayr	 (1982)	 notes	 that,	 despite	 its	success,	Descartes’	notion	of	life	as	mechanism	encountered	vigorous	resistance	from	 some	 biologists,	 mainly	 in	 the	 form	 of	 anti-reductionistic,	 anti-mechanistic,	vitalistic	arguments.	
Vitalistic	objections	
While	 in	 today’s	world,	 contending	 that	organisms	are	not	 essentially	 the	
same	as	machines,	but	rather	are	fundamentally	and	essentially	different,	is	to	
court	 the	 pejorative	 charge	 of	 vitalism,	 vitalism	 did	 not	 always	 garner	 such	
scientific	 scorn.	 Indeed	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 and	 eighteenth	 centuries,	
Descartes’	mechanistic	approach	to	biology	was	unpopular	among	naturalists,	
who	 contended	 that	 there	 was	 much	 about	 animate	 entities	 that	 defied	
mechanistic	explanation.130	Questions	such	as,	“how	can	a	machine	regenerate	
																																								 								
128	Iatromechanism	was	an	intellectual	movement	that	advocated	the	study	of	the	mechanics	
of	living	beings	(Canguilhem	2009).	
129	Canguilhem	likewise	contends	that	such	explanations	of	life	are	inappropriate.	Arguing	that,	
“mechanism	 is	a	 theory	 that	 tells	us	how	machines	 (living	or	not)	work	once	 they	are	built,	
but	it	tells	us	nothing	about	how	to	build	them”	(2000:	78).	
130	More	 recently	 Nicholson	 and	 Canguilhem	 have	 written	 extensively	 on	 the	 differences	
between	machines	and	organisms.	Organisms,	they	contend,	act	on	their	own	behalf,	working	
towards	their	own	ends,	while	machines	do	not	serve	their	own	interests,	only	those	of	their	
maker	 or	 operator.	 Indeed,	 both	 authors	 assert	 that	 machines,	 unlike	 organisms,	 are	 not	
autonomous.	 Where	 organisms	 demonstrate	 “self-construction,	 self-conservation,	 self-
regulation,	 and	 self-repair,”	 in	 order	 for	 machines	 to	 display	 these	 processes,	 Canguilhem	
notes,	 they	require	the	“periodic	 intervention	of	human	action”	 (2009:	88).	Canguilhem	also	
argues	 that	 in	 machines,	 “the	 whole	 is	 strictly	 the	 sum	 of	 the	 parts,”	 while	 machines	
themselves	display	a	clear	 functional	rigidity	“made	 increasingly	pronounced	by	the	practice	
of	 standardization”	 (2009:	 88).	 An	 organism,	 by	 contrast,	 is	 described	 as	 having	 “greater	
latitude	 of	 action	 than	 a	 machine.	 It	 has,”	 Canguilhem	 asserts,	 “less	 purpose	 and	 more	
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lost	 parts,	 as	many	 kinds	 of	 organisms	 are	 able	 to	 do?	How	 can	 a	machine	
replicate	itself?	How	can	two	machines	fuse	into	a	single	one	like	the	fusion	of	
two	gametes	when	producing	a	zygote?”	(Mayr	2002)	went	unanswered	under	
Descartes’	 mechanism. 131 	Thus,	 as	 a	 result,	 vitalists	 argued	 that	 animate	
entities	 must	 “contain	 some	 non-physical	 element	 or	 [be]	 governed	 by	
different	principles	than	are	inanimate	things”	(Bechtel	and	Richardson	1998)	
and	thus	they	cannot	simply	be	reduced	to	physico-chemical	components	and	
equated	 with	 machines.	 Vitalists	 concluded	 that,	 “just	 as	 the	 motion	 of	
planets,	 suns,	 and	 stars,	 is	 controlled	 by	 an	 occult,	 invisible	 force	 called	 by	
Newton	gravitation,	analogously	 the	movements	and	other	manifestations	of	
life	in	organisms	is	controlled	by	an	invisible	force,	Lebenskraft	or	vis	 vitalis”	
(Mayr	2002).		
Other	scientists	were,	however,	so	convinced	by	the	essential	truth	of	life	as	
mechanism	 that	 they	 took	 to	 their	 laboratories	 to	 attempt	 to	 prove	 the	
fundamental	 homogeneity	 of	 organisms	 and	 machines.	 Endeavours	 to	 this	
ends	have	 included	 various	 attempts	 to	 reduce	 life	phenomena	 to	 replicable	
physical-chemical	processes,	as	French	scientists	Lavoisier	and	Laplace	did	in	
1780	in	regards	to	the	formation	of	animal	heat	(Loeb	1912)132	and	Wöhler	did	
in	1828	with	the	synthesis	of	urea.133	The	success	of	such	experiments	helped	to	
																																								 																																								 																																								 													
potentialities”	(2009:	90).	A	further	significant	difference	between	organisms	and	machines	is	
said	 to	 be	 death.	Death,	 Canguilhem	writes,	 “is	what	 distinguishes	 living	 individuals	 in	 the	
world,	 and	 the	 inevitability	 of	 death	 points	 up	 the	 apparent	 exception	 to	 the	 laws	 of	
thermodynamics	 which	 living	 things	 constitute.	 Thus	 the	 search	 for	 signs	 of	 death	 is	
fundamentally	a	search	for	an	irrefutable	sign	of	life”	(2000:	88).	Consequently,	Canguilhem	is	
arguing	 that	 in	 deteriorating	 and	 dying	 in	 the	 manner	 that	 they	 do,	 organisms	 further	
highlight	their	differences	from	machines,	which,	while	they	also	cease	to	function,	do	not	die.	
131 	However	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 modern	 biology,	 through	 advances	 in	 genetics	 and	
molecular	biology,	has	solved	these	questions	without	the	need	for	a	vital	force.	
132	Their	 experiment	demonstrated	 that	 the	quantity	of	heat	 formed	 in	 the	body	of	 a	warm-
blooded	 animal	 was	 equal	 to	 that	 formed	 in	 a	 candle,	 provided	 that	 the	 same	 quantity	 of	
carbon	dioxide	was	formed	in	both	cases.	
133	This	 experiment	 is	 often	 credited,	 somewhat	 inaccurately,	 with	 single-handedly	 refuting	
vitalism.	The	argument	goes	that	by	synthesising	this	organic	compound	out	of	two	inorganic	
molecules,	 Wöhler	 challenged	 the	 vitalistic	 belief	 that,	 organic	 compounds	 could	 only	 be	
formed	 from	 other	 organic	 compounds	 and	 therefore	 a	 fundamental	 difference	 existed	
between	them	and	their	inorganic	counterparts	(Bruce	Fye	1996).	
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cement	the	notion	of	life	as	mechanism,	and	the	belief	in	the	homogeneity	of	
machines	 and	 organisms,	 while	 simultaneously	 eroding	 the	 credibility	 of	
vitalism.	 Consequently,	 despite	 the	 continued	 resistance	 of	 vitalists,	134	the	
notion	of	life	as	mechanism,	as	evident	in	the	advent	of	synthetic	biology,	has	
not	 disappeared.	 What	 has	 changed	 across	 the	 centuries	 however	 are	 the	
analogies	drawn	upon,	as	organisms	have	come	to	be	understood	in	terms	of	
the	paradigmatic	machine	of	 the	age	(Nicholson	2013).	Nicholson	writes	that	
in	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 it	 was	 the	 clock,	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 the	
steam	 engine,	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 the	 chemical	 factory,	 and	 in	 the	
twentieth	century,	 the	 computer	 (Nicholson	2013).	Yet,	despite	 the	enduring	
perseverance	 of	 mechanistic	 analogies,	 and	 mechanistic	 conceptions	 within	
biology,	Canguilhem	 (2000)	 argues	 that,	 like	 the	notion	 of	 life	 as	 animation	
before	it,	Descartes’	conception	of	life	as	mechanism	did	eventually	fall	out	of	
favour.	Spurred	along,	in	part,	by	the	rise	of	microscopy.	
																																								 								
134	For	 example,	 in	 both	Knowledge	 of	 Life	 (2009)	 and	A	 Vital	 Rationalist:	 Selected	Writings	
from	Georges	Canguilhem	(2000),	Canguilhem	questions	both	the	conflation	of	organisms	and	
machines,	 and	 the	use	of	machines	as	 a	model	 to	understand	organisms.	He	contends	 that,	
with	the	exception	of	vertebrates,	organisms	rarely	behave	in	ways	that	would	evoke	the	idea	
of	a	mechanism.	Furthermore,	he	argues	that	both	Descartes’	and	Aristotle’s	comparisons	of	
organisms	and	machines	“presupposes	man-made	devices	in	which	an	automatic	mechanism	
is	linked	to	a	source	of	energy	whose	motor	effects	continue	well	after	the	human	or	animal	
effort	 they	 release	 has	 ceased”	 (2009:	 79-80).	However,	 he	 continues,	 “this	 explanation	 can	
only	 be	 conceived	 once	 human	 ingenuity	 has	 constructed	 apparatuses	 that	 imitate	 organic	
movements”	(2009:	80).		What	Canguilhem	is	therefore	arguing	is	that	machines	can	only	be	
used	 to	 explain	organisms	once	organisms	have	designed	and	built	 them	 to	 imitate	organic	
movement.	As	he	puts	it,	“the	construction	of	a	mechanical	model	presupposes	a	vital	original”	
(2009:	 85).	 This	 is	 significant	 because,	 as	 Nicholson	 (2013)	 notes,	 the	 tendency	 to	
metaphorically	 describe	 organisms	 as	 a	 class	 of	 machine,	 as	 was	 undertaken	 under	 the	
conception	of	life	as	mechanism,	is	based	on	the	assumption	that,	in	doing	so	we	are	able	to	
come	 to	 terms	 with	many	 of	 the	 organism’s	 properties	 and	 features.	 However	 Canguilhem	
contends	 that	 since	 organisms	 precede	 machines,	 to	 explain	 any	 similarities	 found	 within	
organs	or	organisms	through	mechanical	models	is	“to	explain	the	organ	using	the	organ.	It	is	
a	tautology”	(2009:	87).		
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The	rise	of	microscopy	
First	invented	in	the	1590s	(Van	Helden	et	al.	2010),	microscopes	came	into	
common	 usage	 for	 research	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 seventeenth	 century	
(Wootton	 2006).	 Mechanism,	 Canguilhem	 (2000)	 writes,	 had	 by	 this	 time	
become	 the	 dominant	 explanatory	model	 for	 the	 structure	 and	 workings	 of	
organs	such	as	the	heart,	muscles,	and	lungs.	However,	 it	was	of	 little	use	in	
explaining	 the	hidden	 inner	 structures	of	plants	 and	animals	 revealed	under	
the	 microscope	 (Canguilhem	 2000).	 Seventeenth	 century	 mechanism	 was,	
after	 all,	 a	 theory	 based	 on	 data	 accessible	 to	 sight	 and	 touch.	 While	
“microscopic	 anatomy	was	 concerned	with	 objects	 beyond	 the	manifest	 and	
tangible”	 (Canguilhem	 2000:	 79)	 and	 thus	 hinted	 at	 unimagined	 levels	 of	
structural	 complexity.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 limitation,	 Canguilhem	 (2000)	
notes	 that	 French	 mathematician,	 physicist,	 and	 philosopher	 Blaise	 Pascal,	
and	German	philosopher	Gottfried	Wilhelm	Leibniz,	found	Descarte’s	notion	
of	 life	 as	 mechanism	 wanting.	 Leibniz’s	 critique	 was,	 Canguilhem	 asserts,	
particularly	significant	as	it	lay	the	foundations	for	a	new	conception	of	living	
things,	life	as	organisation	(Canguilhem	2000;	Leibniz	1930).		
Life	as	organisation	
Despite	 the	 continued	 popularity	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 as	 mechanism,	
Gayon	 (2010)	 argues	 that	 life	 as	 organisation	 began	 to	 gain	 ground	 in	 the	
eighteenth	 century.135		While	 still	 relying	 on	mechanistic	 conceptions	 of	 the	
body,	it	also	drew	on	Aristotle’s	notion	of	the	‘organised	body.’	A	notion	which	
Canguilhem	 (2000)	 argues	 denotes	 the	 idea	 that	 animals	 (and	 to	 a	 lesser	
extent	plants)	are	made	up	of	instruments	or	organs,	which	are	indispensible	
to	 the	exercise	of	 the	organiser’s,	 that	 is	 the	soul’s,	powers.	Yet,	Canguilhem	
maintains	 that	 the	 naturalists,	 physicians,	 and	 philosophers	 who	 saw	 the	
benefit	 in	 such	 a	 combination	 of	 conceptions	 nevertheless	 sought	 semantic	
substitutes	for	the	word	‘soul.’	In	order	“to	explain	how	systems	composed	of	
																																								 								
135	Descartes	also	adhered	to	the	notion	of	the	organised	body,	however	he	saw	no	need	for	an	
‘organiser,’	 whereas	 Leibniz	 argued	 that	 without	 an	 organiser,	 nothing	 is	 organised	
(Canguilhem	2000).	
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distinct	 components	 nevertheless	 work	 in	 a	 unified	 manner	 to	 perform	 a	
function”	 (2000:	81).	 In	 the	eighteenth	century	 the	concept	of	 the	 ‘organism’	
was,	 Gayon	 (2010)	 maintains,	 eventually	 settled	 upon	 as	 an	 alternative	 to	
‘soul.’	 Indicating,	 by	 definition,	 that	 an	 ‘organism’	was	 able	 to	 perform	 such	
feats	of	organisation.	
Gayon	 (2010)	writes	 that	 the	 term	 ‘organism,’	 so	 familiar	 to	 us	 now,	 only	
entered	common	usage	in	the	nineteenth	century.	This	was	largely	as	a	result	
of	 Immanuel	 Kant’s	 1790	 publication	 Critique	 of	 Judgment	 (Kant	 1987).	
According	 to	 Canguilhem	 (2000)	 and	 Gayon	 (2010),	 Kant’s	 work	 provided	 a	
clear,	 philosophical	 elaboration	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 as	 organisation.136	He	
argued	that	an	organised	body	was	a	machine	in	one	sense,	but	a	machine	that	
required	 a	 formative	 energy	 that	 was	 capable	 of	 organising	 otherwise	 inert	
matter,	 a	 feat	 beyond	 the	 powers	 of	 manufactured	 machines.	 Thus,	
Canguilhem	 writes,	 Kant	 conceived	 of	 the	 organic	 body	 as	 “not	 only	
organized,	 it	 is	 self-organizing”137	(2000:	 82)	 each	 part	 being	 an	 organ	 that	
produced	the	other	parts.	It	was	this	notion	that	the	whole	is	greater	than	the	
sum	of	 its	parts,	 and	 the	 focus	on	 the	 intricate	organisation	of	an	organism,	
which	 Canguilhem	 (2000)	 claims	 set	 life	 as	 organisation	 apart	 from	 life	 as	
mechanism.138	Kay	quotes	François	Jacob’s	explanation	of	the	notion	of	life	as	
organisation	as	follows.		
“It	was	the	interaction	of	the	parts	that	gave	meaning	to	the	whole	.	
.	 .	The	 surface	properties	of	 a	 living	being	were	 controlled	by	 the	
inside,	 what	 is	 visible	 by	 what	 is	 hidden.	 Form,	 attributes	 and	
behaviour	 all	 became	 expressions	 of	 organization.	 By	 its	
																																								 								
136	However	he	did	so	without	using	the	words	‘life’	or	‘living	thing.’	
137	Able	to	self-maintain,	self-repair,	and	self-reproduce	(Gayon	2010).	
138	At	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 as	 organisation	 gained	
further	theoretical	support	from	French	philosopher	Auguste	Comte,	who	wrote	that	“the	idea	
of	life	is	really	inseparable	from	that	of	organization”	(Comte	quoted	in	Canguilhem	2000:	83).	
Interestingly,	 and	as	noted	previously,	Comte	was	 also	 responsible	 for	 the	popularisation	of	
the	term	‘biology.’	
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organization	the	living	could	be	distinguished	from	the	non-living”	
(Jacob	quoted	in	Kay	2000:	40)	
This	shift	in	focus,	Kay	(2000)	writes,	was	not	only	instrumental	in	the	shift	
away	 from	Descartes’	 notion	 of	 life	 as	mechanism,	 and	 a	 reassertion	 of	 the	
machine/organism	 divide,	 but	 also	 facilitated	 the	 birth	 of	 ‘biology’	 as	 a	
science.	 However,	 despite	 this	 shift,	 technological	 imagery	 and	mechanistic	
conceptions	persisted,	as	Canguilhem	(2000)	contends	they	had	since	the	time	
of	 Aristotle.	 However,	 this	 mechanism	 now	 took	 a	 different	 form.	 The	
organism	 came	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 “sort	 of	 workshop	 or	 factory”	 (Canguilhem	
2000:	84),	an	“organic	machine”	equipped	with	a	“flexible,	elastic	mechanism”	
which	nevertheless	does	not	violate	the	“general	laws	of	mechanics,	physics	or	
chemistry”	(Claude	Bernard	quoted	in	Canguilhem	2000:	86).139	Thus,	this	new	
science	 moved	 away	 from	 classifying	 organisms	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 visible	
structures,	and	instead	focused	on	studying	organisation	and	the	processes	of	
life.		
However,	given	its	retention	of	mechanistic	language	and	imagery	this	shift	
merely	 changed	 the	mechanistic	 analogy	 for	 life.	Organisms,	 that	 is,	 shifted	
from	being	viewed	as	machines	to	being	viewed	as	factories.	As	such,	despite	
bearing	a	different	understanding	of	life	than	that	of	life	as	mechanism,	life	as	
organisation	 retained,	 and	 indeed	 expanded,	 the	mechanistic	 conception	 of	
biology.	 A	 major	 component	 in	 this	 movement	 being	 the	 perspective	 that	
																																								 								
139	This	 notion	 of	 a	 flexible,	 elastic	 mechanism	 was	 also	 central	 to	 French	 naturalist	 Jean-
Baptiste	Lamarck’s	version	of	evolutionism,	which	he	articulated	in	Discours	 (1800).	 In	stark	
contrast	to	Descartes’	mechanism,	which	held	that	species	were	fixed,	Lamarck’s	research	led	
him	to	believe	that	organisms	were	adapted	to	their	environment.	Mayr	quotes	him	as	writing,	
“they	must	change	 in	order	 to	maintain	 their	adaptation	 to	 the	ever	changing	world”	(Mayr	
1982:	 108).	 While	 his	 explanatory	 endeavours	 encountered	 strong	 resistance	 within	 the	
naturalist	 community,	 and	 were	 largely	 unsuccessful	 due	 in	 large	 part	 to	 their	 reliance	 on	
conventional	 beliefs	 such	 as	 the	 notion	 that	 acquired	 characteristics	 were	 inheritable,	
Lamarck’s	 work	 undoubtedly	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 Charles	 Darwin,	 whose	On	 the	 Origin	 of	
Species	 (published	 in	 1859)	 posited	 several	 revolutionary	 ideas	 (Mayr	 1982).	 Firstly,	 he	
suggested	 that	 all	 life	 forms,	 humans	 included,	 shared	 a	 common	 ancestor,	 thus	 demoting	
them	from	the	 lofty	position	given	to	them	by	Christian	dogma	and	Descartes.	Secondly,	he	
posited	the	theory	of	evolutionary	causation,	and	the	mechanism	of	natural	selection	which,	
Henning	 and	 Scarfe	 (2013)	 contend	 was	 responsible	 for	 mechanism	 conquering	 in	 the	
biological	sciences,	no	less	than	it	conquered	in	the	physical	sciences.		
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organisms	are	factories,	a	notion	clearly	still	evident	in	modern	day	synthetic	
biology.	This	perspective	thus	spurred	on	the	development	of	the	increasingly	
interventionist	approach	to	biology	apparent	today.	For,	in	viewing	organisms	
as	 sites	 of	 production,	 the	 focus	 of	 biology	 moved	 closer	 to	 that	 of	
engineering.	A	move,	that	is,	which	ultimately	saw	the	beginnings	of	attempts	
to	shift	biology	into	a	synthetic	phase.		
An	interventionist	approach	to	biology	
The	 advent	 of	 leavened	 bread	making	 and	 brewing,	 some	 8000	 and	 4500	
years	 ago	 respectively,	 arguably	 first	 demonstrated	 an	 interventionist	
approach	 to	 living	 organisms	 (Ladisch	 2004).140	However	 Bud	 contends	 that	
tracing	modern	interventionist	biology	back	this	far	 is	misleading,	given	that	
“Egyptian	craftsmen	 thought	of	 their	work	 in	a	way	quite	different	 from	 the	
modern	 technologist”	 (1993:	 2).	 As	 such,	 I	 will	 begin	my	 exploration	 of	 the	
interventionist	 approach	 to	 biology	 in	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 with	 the	
work	of	Moritz	Traube.		
Moritz	Traube	 is	credited,	by	 the	BMJ	(1910),	with	the	construction	of	 the	
first	artificial	cell,	in	1864.141	Yet	the	BMJ	article	claims	that	Traube’s	work,	and	
that	of	several	of	his	contemporaries	who	also	strove	to	create	‘life,’	was	largely	
ignored.	Nevertheless,	the	article’s	author	was	certain	that,	as	of	the	beginning	
of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 things	were	 about	 to	 change.	 To	 this	 ends,	 s/he142	
wrote:	
	“The	 idea	 of	 biological	 synthesis	 is	 a	 bold	 one,	 and	 yet	 it	 is	 no	
novelty.	It	has	cropped	up	in	the	imaginative	literature	of	all	ages,	
but,	 considered	as	a	 scientific	possibility,	 its	 conception	 is	of	 very	
recent	date	(BMJ	1910:	1080).		
																																								 								
140	Both	being	processes	which	manipulate	microorganisms	in	order	to	produce	a	product.	
141	Traube’s	artificial	cell	was	formed	using	osmosis.	
142	The	identity	of	the	author	is	not	supplied	with	the	BMJ	article.	
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To	 evidence	 the	 scientific	 possibility	 of	 biological	 synthesis,	 the	 article	
references	 the	 work	 of	 French	 biologist	 Stephane	 Leduc. 143 	Being	 a	 firm	
believer	in	the	virtues	of	synthesis,	and	not	just	analysis,	in	the	advancement	
of	 biology,	 Leduc	 was,	 Campos	 writes,	 one	 of	 the	 first	 people	 to	
“experimentally	attempt	to	use	synthesis	as	a	means	to	understand	the	basic	
biology	 of	 organic	 growth	 and	 morphology”	 (2009:	 7).	 His	 experiments	
involved	the	use	of	osmosis	and	diffusion	through	which	he	created	artificial	
‘cellular’	 systems	 that	mimicked	biological	processes,	and	which	Leduc	 (1911)	
claimed	showed	the	physico-chemical	foundations	of	life.	It	was	this	approach	
that	he	termed	‘synthetic	biology,’	being	the	first,	as	far	as	I	am	aware,	to	coin	
this	term.144		
While	Leduc’s	osmotic	growths	were	 inorganic,	 like	 living	organisms	 they	
exhibited	 reproduction,	 assimilation,	 elimination,	 and	 morphogenesis. 145 	It	
would	 therefore	 appear	 that	 such	 work	 was	 underpinned	 by	 a	 mechanistic	
conception	 of	 life	 that	 extended	 to	 the	 cellular	 level.	 A	 mechanistic	
conception,	 that	 is,	 which	 went	 deeper	 into	 our	 understanding	 of	 life	 and	
biology.	One,	 that	 is,	which	held	that	replicating	the	physical	structures	of	a	
‘natural’	cell	in	a	mechanistic	fashion,	could	produce	life.	As	the	author	of	the	
BMJ	 article	 attests,	 it	 was	 believed	 that	 the	 form	 and	 function	 of	 cells,	 and	
therefore	 life,	 was	 achieved	 through	 osmosis.	 Thus	 by	 utilising	 osmosis	 to	
mimic	 the	 structures	 and	 transformations	 of	 the	 cell,	 one	 was	 essentially	
creating	life.		
“[a]n	animal	or	plant	 can	 live	 and	grow	by	virtue	of	osmosis.	Not	
only	is	osmosis	responsible	for	the	maintenance	and	continuance	of	
life,	however,	but	it	is	also	capable	of	creating	living	matter	from	its	
																																								 								
143	As	well	 as	Quincke	 of	Heidelberg,	 Benedikt	 of	Vienna,	Dubois	 of	 Lyon,	 and	 Lehmann	 of	
Karlsruhe	(BMJ	1910).	
144	This	work	and	approach	are	described	by	Leduc	(1911,	1912).	
145	Leduc	was	not	alone	in	using	inorganic	compounds	to	explore	the	origins	and	structure	of	
life.	 Irish	 physicist	 John	 Butler	 Burke,	 for	 example,	 grew	 ‘life-like’	 cellular	 forms	 after	
introducing	radium	into	sterilised	test	tubes	of	bouillon.	While	Burke	did	not	claim	that	his	
structures	 were	 living,	 he	 believed	 that	 they	 weren’t	 wholly	 inorganic	 either,	 seeing	 them	
instead	as	half-living	(Burke	1906).	
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elementary	constituents;	 it	 is,	 in	 fact,	practically	equivalent	 to	 the	
vital	force	we	term	life”	(BMJ	1910:	1080-81).	
Nonetheless,	 despite	 the	 enthusiasm	 of	 this	 author,	 and	 the	 resemblance	 of	
these	osmotic	structures	to	biological	organisms,	Keller	notes	that	they	raised	
questions	 in	Leduc’s	contemporaries.	Questions	such	as,	“whether	or	not	the	
resemblance	was	meaningful,”	and	whether	it	provided	answers	“to	questions	
about	the	nature	and	origin	of	real	life”	(2002:	47).	
Although	the	idea	underlying	the	work	of	Leduc,	that	living	entities	could	
be	produced	from	inorganic	matter,	was	far	from	a	new	one	at	the	beginning	
of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 Campos	 argues	 that	 this	 was	 a	 time	 when	 “a	
distinctively	 synthetic	 engineering-oriented	 standpoint	 to	 life	 gained	
dominance”	(2009:	6).	To	illustrate	this	point,	Campos	describes	the	founding	
of	 the	Carnegie	 Institution’s	Station	 for	Experimental	Evolution	 in	 1904.	The	
station’s	explicitly	interventionist	aim	was	to	experiment	with	evolution	so	as	
to	understand	it,	control	it	and	direct	it	to	the	use	of	humanity.		
This	 standpoint	 is	 clear	 in	 the	 following	 statements	 from	 Charles	
Davenport,	 the	 station’s	 first	 director.	 Campos	 quotes	 him	 as	 saying:	 “the	
principles	 of	 evolution	will	 show	 the	way	 to	 an	 improvement	 of	 the	 human	
race,”	while	also	highlighting	 “how	organisms	may	be	best	modified	 to	meet	
our	requirements	of	beauty,	food,	materials	and	power”	(Davenport	quoted	in	
Campos	 2009:	 7).	 Such	 a	 drive	 to	 control	 and	 modify	 organisms	 to	 serve	
human	ends,	a	drive	that	now	underlies	synthetic	biology,	has	therefore	long	
played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 biology.	 With	 many	 already	 believing,	 over	 a	
hundred	years	ago,	 that	 the	answers	 to	 the	question	 ‘what	 is	 life?’	was	 to	be	
discovered	through	synthesis	not	analysis	(Keller	2002).		
Keller’s	book	Making	Sense	of	Life:	Explaining	Biological	Development	with	
Models,	Metaphors,	and	Machines,	for	example,	provides	a	fascinating	account	
of	 some	 of	 the	 most	 significant	 attempts	 that	 have	 been	 made	 since	 the	
beginnings	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century	 to	 synthesise	 life.	 For	 some,	 such	 as	
Leduc,	this	took	the	form	of	producing	artificial	 life,	while	others	focused	on	
the	 similar	 sounding,	 but	 significantly	 different,	 artificial	 production	 of	 life.	
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One	of	the	most	noteworthy	early	examples	of	this	second	approach	was	the	
work	 of	 Jacques	 Loeb,	 the	 first	 person	 to	 induce	 parthenogenesis146	(Loeb	
1913).		
Loeb	 was,	 according	 to	 his	 biographer	 Pauly	 (1987),	 the	 foremost	 public	
advocate	 of	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	 biology	 between	 1890	 and	 1915.	
Expressing	 his	 adherence	 to	 such	 an	 approach	 in	 a	 letter	 to	 physicist	 Ernst	
Mach	in	1890,	Pauly	quotes	Loeb	as	writing,	“[t]he	idea	is	now	hovering	before	
me	 that	 man	 himself	 can	 act	 as	 a	 creator	 even	 in	 living	 nature,	 forming	 it	
eventually	according	to	his	will.	Man	can	at	 least	succeed	 in	a	 technology	of	
living	substance”	(Loeb	quoted	 in	Pauly	 1987:	51).	 	Moreover,	 it	was	not	only	
the	 creation	 of	 living	 nature	 that	 Loeb	 saw	 as	 the	 future	 of	 biology,	 but	 its	
control.	To	this	ends	he	wrote,	in	the	preface	to	Studies	in	General	Physiology,	
“it	 is	 possible	 to	 get	 the	 life-phenomena	under	 our	 control,	 and	 that	 such	 a	
control	 and	 nothing	 else	 is	 the	 aim	 of	 biology”	 (1905:	 ix).	 Yet,	 despite	 such	
claims,	 claims	 which	 would	 not	 seem	 out	 of	 place	 in	 present	 day	 synthetic	
biology,	 these	 earlier	 incarnations	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 met	 with	 significant	
resistance	from	many	biologists.		
Benjamin	Gruenberg	wrote	 in	 1911,	 “[v]ery	 few	of	 the	attempts	 to	produce	
‘artificial	 life’	 have	 been	 made	 by	 biologists,	 who	 realize	 too	 well	 the	
complexity	of	the	problems	involved”	(1911:	231).	Indeed	at	the	time	Gruenberg	
wrote	 this,	 and	 for	many	 years	 afterwards,	many	of	 those	who	attempted	 to	
create	artificial	life,	artificially	create	life,	or	indeed	explain	life,	using	concepts	
from	physics,	engineering,	and	mathematics,	hailed	from	the	physical	sciences	
or	mathematics.	Much	like	the	engineers	who	first	fomented	the	modern	idea	
of	 synthetic	 biology,	 but	 without	 the	 collaboration	 of	 biologists.	 As	 such,	
Keller	 (2002)	 reports,	 their	 efforts	 encountered	 significant	 resistance	 from	
biologists.	 Take	 for	 example	 D’Arcy	 Wentworth	 Thompson,	 Nicolas	
Rashevsky,	 and	 Alan	 Turing,	 all	 of	 whom	 proposed	 the	 application	 of	
																																								 								
146 	Parthenogenesis	 is	 a	 type	 of	 asexual	 reproduction	 in	 which	 offspring	 develop	 from	
unfertilised	eggs.	In	1899	Loeb	artificially	induced	such	reproduction	in	sea	urchins	by	altering	
the	chemical	content	of	the	water	in	which	the	eggs	were	kept.		
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mathematics	to	biology	in	order	to	explain	biological	processes	and	structures.	
While	 Thompson	 was	 himself	 a	 biologist,	 his	 attempts,	 like	 those	 of	
mathematicians	Rashevsky	and	Turing,	were	roundly	discounted	by	biologists	
as	 being	 oversimplified	 (Keller	 2002).	Many	 biologists,	 Keller	 explains,	 were	
resistant	to	the	idea,	represented	by	such	attempts,	that	science	needed	to	be	
mathematical.	 Viewing	 mathematical	 modellers	 as	 arrogant,	 ill-informed	
intruders	into	biology	(Keller	2002).		
This	 general	 resistance	 from	 biologists	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 collaboration	 with	
engineering	 was	 arguably	 significant.	 For,	 despite	 the	 steady	 influx	 of	
mechanistic	 ideas	 and	 concepts	 into	 biology,	 and	 the	 incremental	 shifts	 in	
biology	 towards	 the	 concepts	 and	 approaches	 of	 engineering,	 there	was	 not	
enough	 perceived	 underlying	 unity	 between	 the	 two	 fields,	 at	 this	 time,	 to	
allow	for	their	convergence.	This	then	raises	the	question,	what	has	changing	
in	 the	 intervening	 years	 to	 make	 such	 a	 convergence	 now	 possible?	 The	
answer,	 I	suggest,	can	be	found	in	the	continued,	though	gradual,	social	and	
technological	shifts	outlined	below.	
Nevertheless,	 despite	 the	 claims	 from	 the	 BMJ	 (1910)	 regarding	 biology	
being	 poised	 to	 enter	 its	 synthetic	 phase,	 what	 is	 interesting	 about	 the	
attempts	at	applying	ideas	from	mathematics	and	engineering	to	biology,	that	
Keller	 (2002)	 addresses,	 is	 that	 their	 primary	 aim	was	 analytical.	 They	were,	
that	 is,	 largely	geared	 towards	understand	more	about	biology	and	 life	 itself	
rather	 than	 towards	 controlling	 it.	 Indeed,	 even	 Loeb	 recanted	 his	 claims	
about	controlling	life.	Determining,	in	his	later	years,	that	scientists	“could	do	
only	 one,	 rather	 passive,	 thing:	 to	 look	 at	 nature	 and	 try	 to	 see	 the	 hidden	
mechanisms	 underlying	 biological	 processes”	 (Pauly	 1987:	 130).	 However,	 as	
Campos	 (2009)	 addresses,	others	 from	within	biology	were	more	 inclined	 to	
embrace	 the	 stance	 expressed	 in	 Loeb’s	 earlier	 conviction.	 Clinging	 to	 the	
belief	 that	biology	could	be,	 and	 should	be,	manipulated	and	controlled.	An	
approach	that	has,	I	would	contend,	ultimately	led	to	synthetic	biology.	
Campos	(2009)	writes	that	this	trend	began	in	the	early	twentieth	century	
amongst	 agriculturalists,	 breeders,	 and	 geneticists.	 Biologists,	 that	 is,	 who	
embraced	 the	 idea	 of	 experimenting	 with	 evolution	 in	 order	 to	 improve	
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species	and	varieties.	Campos	(2009)	draws	out	several	particular	examples	to	
illustrate	 this	 trend,	 including	 Thomas	 Hunt	 Morgan,	 and	 Albert	 F.	
Blakeslee.147	Morgan	started	the	Drosophila	school	of	genetics	at	Columbia	in	
the	 1910s-20s	 to	 study	mutations	 (Campos	 2009),	while	 Blakeslee	 reportedly	
established	 the	 production	 of	 “synthetic	 new	 species”	 (2009:	 13)	 using	
chromosomal	mutations,	in	the	1920s	and	thirties.	Campos	quotes	Blakeslee	as	
describing	 these	 “synthetic”	 species	 as	 being	 “made	 up	 to	 order,	 as	 it	 were,	
with	 definite	 plan	 and	 purpose”	 (Blakeslee	 quoted	 in	 Campos	 2009:	 13).	
Microscopes	 were	 central	 to	 this	 interventionist	 work,	 allowing	 as	 they	 do,	
greater	 understanding	 of	 cell	 structure	 and	 function.	 Thus,	 the	 drive	 to	
manipulate	 organisms	 was	 accelerated	 in	 the	 1930s	 by	 the	 development	 of	
electron	 microscopes,	 which	 were	 capable	 of	 far	 greater	 resolution	 and	
magnification	 than	 their	 predecessors,	 the	 light	microscopes	 (Marton	 1968).	
Furthermore,	in	permitting	the	visualisation	of	the	macromolecular	structure	
of	 biological	 cells,	 these	 microscopes	 not	 only	 advanced	 the	 interventionist	
approach	 to	 biology,	 moving	 biology	 closer	 to	 the	 current	 point	 of	
convergence	 with	 engineering,	 but	 they	 also	 paved	 the	 way	 for	 the	
development	of	molecular	biology.148	
Molecular	biology	
Kay	 (1993)	 writes	 that	 in	 1938	 the	 then	 director	 of	 the	 Rockefeller	
Foundation’s	 natural	 science	 division,	 Warren	 Weaver,	 coined	 the	 term	
‘molecular	 biology.’	 He	 reportedly	 did	 so	 in	 order	 to	 capture	 the	 centre’s	
increasing	 focus	on	 the	 “ultimate	minuteness	of	biological	entities”	 (1993:	3).	
Yet,	 despite	 the	 continuity	 of	 the	 name,	 Kay	 (2000)	 stresses	 that	 what	 is	
thought	 of	 as	molecular	 biology	 today,	 is	 not	what	was	 encompassed	 under	
the	 term	 in	 the	 1930s	 and	 forties.	 Rather,	 at	 this	 time	 the	 discipline	 was	
narrowly	 focused	 on	macromolecules.	 It	 was	 also	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 two	
																																								 								
147	Blakeslee	was	the	second	director	of	the	Station	for	Experimental	Evolution.	
148	Molecular	biology,	at	 the	time,	 focused	 its	study	at	the	sub-microscopic	 level	(10-6	and	10-
7cm)	which	 is	 the	 region	between	molecules	and	cells	 (hence	 the	 focus	on	macromolecules)	
(Kay	1993).	
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key	elements	of	 the	notion	of	 life	as	organisation,	namely	specificity	and	the	
protein	paradigm	(Kay	2000).149		
With	similarities	to	Compton	and	Bunker’s	(1939)	contemporaneous	vision	
for	 biological	 engineering,	 Kay	 writes	 that	 Weaver150	envisioned	 molecular	
biology	 as	 a	 “new	 interdisciplinary	 biology	 .	 .	 .	 grounded	 in	 theories	 and	
technologies	of	the	physical	sciences”	(2000:	45).	Following	such	an	approach,	
the	aim	of	molecular	biology	was	 to	discover	 the	underlying	physiochemical	
laws	governing	vital	phenomena.	This	goal	was	 to	be	achieved	by	 looking	at	
life	processes	and	organisation,	rather	than	the	host	organisms	themselves.	A	
change	 in	 focus	 that	 ultimately	 expanded	 the	mechanistic	 understanding	 of	
life,	 as	 not	 only	 organisms,	 tissues,	 movements,	 and	 cells	 came	 to	 be	
understood	 in	mechanistic	 terms,	but	also	 life’s	processes.	Furthermore,	 this	
shift	in	focus	from	the	‘whole’	to	the	‘parts,’	spelt	the	beginnings	of	the	move	
away	from	the	notion	of	life	as	organisation,	and	a	step	closer	to	the	advent	of	
‘parts’-focused	approaches	like	that	of	synthetic	biology.		
Molecular	 biologists	 removed	 all	 considerations	 of	 biological	 and	
environmental	 context151	from	 their	 study	 of	 life	 and	 became	 much	 more	
interested	in	the	common	phenomena	of	life,	such	as	reproduction,	than	they	
were	 in	 diversity.	 As	 it	 was	 easier	 to	 study	 these	 common	 phenomena	 in	
simple	 biological	 systems,	 bacteria	 and	 viruses	 were	 employed	 to	 act	 as	
models	 for	 more	 complex	 systems	 and	 organisms	 (Kay	 1993).	 A	 situation	
which	Kay	argues	 led	 to	 Jacque	Monod’s	 infamous	dictum	that	 “what	 is	 true	
for	 the	bacterium	 is	 true	 for	 the	elephant”	 (Kay	 1993:	 5).	Furthermore,	given	
																																								 								
149	The	 protein	 paradigm	 held	 that	 the	 processes	 of	 life	 could	 be	 explained	 through	 the	
structure	and	function	of	proteins.	While	specificity,	the	primary	biological	concept	within	the	
notion	 of	 life	 as	 organisation,	 denoted	 “the	 complementarity	 of	 highly	 ordered	 biological	
structures”	(Kay	2000:	41)	and	the	remarkable	functional	specificities	within	biological	entities,	
whilst	drawing	heavily	on	the	lock	and	key	metaphor.	
150	Who	was	himself	a	mathematical	physicist.	
151 	For	 example	 the	 emergent	 properties	 of	 the	 organisms,	 and	 the	 interactive	 processes	
occurring	 within	 organisms,	 between	 organisms	 and	 between	 organisms	 and	 their	
environment.	
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their	 focus	 on	 model	 organisms	 and	 the	 specificity	 of	 macromolecules,	
molecular	biologists	came	to	require	complex	and	sophisticated	apparatus.		
Kay	 (1993)	 subsequently	 argues	 that	 the	 introduction	 of	 massive	 and	
sophisticated	 apparatus	 into	 biology	 not	 only	 turned	 biological	 laboratories	
into	the	technological	landscapes	they	are	today,	but	was	significant	in	several	
other	 key	 ways.	 She	 writes	 that	 such	 scientific	 instruments	 “are	 not	 mere	
devices	for	discovering	objective	reality	but	complex	processes	of	intervention	
for	 representing	 nature,	 processes	 that	 alter	 nearly	 all	 aspects	 of	 scientific	
practice”	 (Kay	 1993:	 7).	 Thus	molecular	 biology	 came	 to	 reify	 the	molecular	
level	as	the	essential	locus	of	life.	Making	“the	representation	of	life	contingent	
upon	technological	intervention”	(Kay	1993:	8).	This	growing	technologisation	
of	 biology,	 and	 of	 our	 understandings	 of	 life,	 has	 been,	 I	 would	 argue,	
significant	 in	 the	 movement	 towards	 the	 current	 crossroads	 of	 biology	 and	
engineering.	 Indeed,	 I	would	argue	 that,	 the	 increasing	encroachment	of	 the	
technologisation	and	mechanism	that	underlie	engineering,	into	the	study	of	
life	 and	 biology,	 has	 been	 instrumental	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 engineering-
inspired	fields	such	as	synthetic	biology.	
Nevertheless,	whilst	this	interventionist	approach	to	biology	remained,	and	
continued	 to	 gain	 dominance,	 the	 1940s	 and	 fifties	 saw	 a	 significant	
reshuffling	 of	 ideas	 and	 techniques.	 The	 concept	 of	 a	 genetic	 code	 was	
introduced,	the	structure	of	DNA	was	discovered	and,	as	a	result,	the	protein	
paradigm	was	ousted	and	specificity	dethroned.	When	the	dust	cleared	from	
all	of	 this	upheaval,	biology	had	taken	further	steps	towards	the	 intersection	
with	 engineering,	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 as	 organisation	 had	 been	 replaced	
with	that	of	life	as	information.	
Life	as	information	
Kay	(2000)	argues	that	in	the	post	war	years,	the	narratives	of	heredity	and	
life	 within	 molecular	 biology,	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 organisation,	 were	 recast	 as	
programmed	communication	systems.	Thus,	 just	as	 the	widespread	adoption	
of	 the	 theory	 of	 mechanism	 had	 aligned	 the	 natural	 and	 physical	 sciences	
during	 the	 Scientific	Revolution,	 the	 adoption	of	 information	 theory	 aligned	
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molecular	biology	with	other	contemporary	scientific	disciplines	within,	what	
Kay	(2000)	terms,	the	cold-war	technoculture.152	Central	to	this	‘technoculture’	
was	 the	 burgeoning	 relationships	 between	 science	 and	 technology,	 thus	
biology’s	 adoption	 of	 language	 and	 concepts	 drawn	 from	 technology,	
particularly	computing,	again	moved	the	field	closer	to	engineering.	
The	shift	towards	the	concept	of	life	as	information	was	famously	solidified	
following	Watson	and	Crick’s	ground	breaking	1953	discovery	of	the	structure	
of	DNA.153	After	which	Crick,	who	went	on	to	become	a	theoretical	molecular	
biologist,154	played	a	central	role	in	formalising	the	discourse	of	linguistics	and	
information	 theory	 within	 biology.155	Words	 such	 as	 code,	 information,	 and	
message,	 all	 drawn	 from	 information	 theory	 and	 prevalent	 in	 computing,156	
began	 to	 appear	 with	 increasing	 regularity	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 biology	 (Kay	
2000:	 53).	 As	 Kay	 writes,	 “biological	 specificity	 became	 informational,	 and	
information,	 message,	 and	 code	 eventually	 became	 biological	 concepts”	
																																								 								
152	Another	significant	shift	towards	the	notion	of	life	as	information	came	at	the	expensive	of	
specificity.	In	light	of	the	information	theory	filtering	into	biology,	specificity	came	to	be	seen	
as	 limited	 in	 its	 ability	 to	 explain	 life.	 It	 was,	 according	 to	 Kay,	 considered	 “immobile	 and	
grounded	 in	 matter”	 whereas	 its	 replacement	 ‘information,’	 “came	 to	 serve	 as	 its	 carrier	
beyond	material	 bounds	 .	 .	 .	 possessing	motion,	 information	 could	 transcend	 the	 limits	 of	
structure.	Specificity	was	mute;	information	communicated	specificity’s	messages”	(Kay	2000:	
41).	
153	Jacob	(1973)	writes	that	in	the	1940s	Austrian	radiation	biologist	Henry	Quastler	became	the	
first	 person	 to	 attempt	 to	 develop	 information	 theory	 within	 biology.	 Quastler	 was	
determined	to	turn	molecular	biology	into	an	information	science,	and	thus	reportedly	strove	
to	 rework	 biochemical	 specificity	 (the	 central	 concept	 of	 life	 as	 organisation),	 in	 favour	 of	
information	 theory;	 to	 shift	 the	 discipline’s	 focus	 from	 biology’s	 material	 and	 structural	
properties	 to	 its	 nonmaterial	 attributes.	 Yet,	 Jacob	 (1973)	 notes,	 despite	 his	 enthusiasm	
Quastler	 encountered	 enormous	 difficulties	 in	 actually	 applying	 information	 theory	
quantitatively	 to	 biology,	 and	 thus	 he	 ultimately	 abandoned	 his	 attempts.	 After	 the	 end	 of	
WWII,	however,	 things	began	to	change	as	 ‘information’	came	to	be	seen	as	both	a	physical	
parameter	and	a	precisely	defined	concept	that	could	be	studied	(Kay	2000).	
154	Francis	Crick	was	a	doctoral	student	when	he	and	James	Watson	discovered	the	structure	of	
DNA,	 completing	 his	 PhD	 in	 1954.	 After	 completing	 his	 PhD	 his	 work	 focused	 on	 the	
‘information	flow’	from	DNA	to	proteins	(Crick	et	al.	1961;	Crick	1970;	Olby	1970).	
155	Francis	 Crick	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 notions	 of	 the	 Central	
Dogma	and	of	the	genetic	code.	
156	Which,	as	mentioned	previously,	was	the	predominant	mechanistic	analogy	 for	 life	 in	the	
twentieth	century	(Nicholson	2013).	
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(Canguilhem	2000).157	Kay	(2000)	notes	that	in	the	1950s,	molecular	biologists	
sometimes	 used	 quotation	 marks	 when	 they	 employed	 terms	 such	 as	
‘information’	 and	 ‘code,’	 as	 a	 way	 of	 acknowledging	 their	metaphorical	 and	
heuristic	 dimensions.	 However,	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 decade	 these	 quotation	
marks	 disappeared	 as	 the	 linguistic	 tropes	 of	 the	 new	 biosemiotics	 became	
naturalised.	 Indeed,	 Kay	 maintains,	 that	 it	 became	 “virtually	 impossible	 to	
think	of	genetic	mechanisms	and	organisms	outside	the	discursive	framework	
of	information”	(2000:	39).	
This	 naturalisation	 of	 both	 the	 ‘life	 as	 information’	 discourse,	 and	 the	
casting	of	molecular	biology	as	an	information	system,	occurred	despite	many,	
including	 information	 theorists,	 cryptologists,	 linguists,	 and	 life	 scientists,	
questioning	 its	 appropriateness	 (Kay	2000).	This,	Kay	contends,	was	 in	 large	
part	due	to	two	key	factors.	The	first	of	which	was	the	cultural	resonances	of	
the	informational	and	scriptural	representations	in	the	post-war	period.	“The	
notion	 of	 ‘code,’”	 Kay	 writes,	 “carried	 multiple	 historical	 allusions	 and	
contemporary	referents,	eliciting	imagery	of	transcendent	knowledge,	Mosaic	
tablets,	positivists’	ideals	of	nature’s	laws,	secret	writings,	period	intrigues	and	
espionage	 and	 cryptology,	 ideas	 from	 linguistics,	 information	 theory,	 and	
cybernetics”	 (2000:	 14).	 The	 second	 of	 these	 factors	 was	 the	 efficacy	 of	 the	
models	 and	 analogies	 for	 biological	 meaning	 that	 these	 representations	
provided.	 ‘Information,’	 ‘language,’	 ‘code,’	 and	 ‘message’	 are,	 Kay	 (2000)	
concedes,	 compelling	 and	 productive	 as	 analogies	 for	 biological	 meaning	
making.	 However,	 she	maintains,	 that	 they	 have	 erroneously	 been	 taken	 as	
ontologies.158	
																																								 								
157	Yet,	as	Canguilhem	addresses,	the	concept	of	life	as	information	did	not	account	for	where	
such	biological	 information	 originated.	 Thus	Canguilhem	 raises	 the	 question,	 “How	did	 the	
first	 self-organization	 come	 about	 if	 communication	 depends	 on	 a	 prior	 source	 of	
information?”	(2000:	88).	
158	Kay	(2000)	writes	that	Austrian	physicist	Erwin	Schrödinger’s	1944	book	What	 is	Life?	was	
very	 influential	 in	 the	 eventual	 shift	 towards	 the	 concept	 of	 life	 as	 information.	 In	 it,	
Schrödinger	draws	on	the	analogy	of	Morse	code	to	propose	the	idea	that	a	code-script	could	
account	 for	biological	 complexity	 and	 specificity.	Yet,	while	Kay	writes	 that	he	 is	 attributed	
with	 being	 the	 “progenitor	 of	 the	 genetic	 code”	 (2000:	 59),	 Schrödinger’s	 concept	 did	 not	
involve	the	transfer	of	information.	As	such	his	code	was	not	 ‘the	code,’	but	it	did	help	pave	
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Yet,	over	the	subsequent	fifty	years	or	so,	this	change	in	discourse	not	only	
signified	a	new	way	of	speaking	about	biology,	but	also	came	to	signify	a	new	
way	of	thinking	about,	and	interacting	with,	biology.	Life	came	to	be	seen	as	
mechanistic	at	the	most	fundamental	level	yet,	that	of	the	DNA,	the	machine	
code	 for	 the	organismic	 ‘computer’	 if	 you	will.	As	 such,	 the	human	genome,	
viewed	as	an	 information	system,	became	the	software,	or	 the	 ‘Book	of	Life,’	
which	was	to	be	read	and,	some	thought,	could	be	edited	(Kay	2000;	Pollack	
1995).	As	Canguilhem	wrote	in	1966,	regarding	the	shifts	in	biology	following	
1953,	 “[t]he	 science	 of	 life	 no	 longer	 resembles	 a	 portrait	 of	 life,	 as	 it	 could	
when	 it	 consisted	 in	 the	 description	 and	 classification	 of	 species;	 and	 it	 no	
longer	 resembles	 architecture	 or	mechanics,	 as	 it	 could	when	 it	 was	 simply	
anatomy	 and	 macroscopic	 physiology.	 But	 it	 does	 resemble	 grammar,	
semantics	and	 the	 theory	of	 syntax.	 If	we	are	 to	understand	 life,	 its	message	
must	be	decoded	before	it	can	be	read”	(Canguilhem	2000:	317).		However	 the	 aim	was	 not	 simply	 to	 understand	 life,	 but	 also	 to	 control	 it.	Derrida	(2013),	for	example,	wrote	of	the	way	representing	nature	had	become	intertwined	with	 the	 drive	 to	 intervene	 in	 nature,	 as	 the	 idea	 of	 reading	 the	‘book	 of	 life’	 became	 inseparable	 from	 the	 act	 of	 writing	 it.	 This	 shift,	 Kay	contends	 signified	 “an	 emergent	 form	of	 biopower,	 as	 the	material	control	of	
life	would	be	now	 supplemented	by	 the	promise	 of	 controlling	 its	 form	and	
logos,	 its	 information	(the	DNA	sequence,	or	the	 ‘word’)”	(2000:	3).	This	 is	a	
clear	embrace	of	the	same	goal	that	initially	consumed	Loeb.	However	in	the	
intervening	 years	 many	 technological	 advances	 have	 been	 made	 to	 render	
																																								 																																								 																																								 													
the	 way	 for	 the	 subsequent	 elucidation	 of	 the	 genetic	 code.	 Between	 the	 publishing	 of	
Schrödinger’s	 book	 and	 1953	 at	 least	 three	 scientists,	 Stern,	Hinshelwood,	 and	Dounce,	 also	
tried	 to	 explain	 the	 combinatorial	 properties	 of	 biological	 codes	 (Kay	 2000).	 The	 first	 step	
towards	this	goal	was	the	discovery	of	the	structure	of	DNA,	a	feat	that	was	quickly	followed	
by	 the	explication	of	 the	structure	of	codons	and	of	 the	genetic	code	 itself.	Physicist	George	
Gamov	was	the	first	to	propose	a	code	involving	nucleotide	triplets,	and	while	his	formulation	
was	 incorrect,	 it	 did	 influence	 the	 successful	 1961	 formulation	 of	 Francis	 Crick	 and	 his	
colleagues	(Crick	et	al.	1961;	Hayes	1998).	The	rest	of	the	genetic	code	was	elucidated	by	Har	
Gobind	Khorana	(1968)	and	his	team.	
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biology	 more	 susceptible,	 though	 as	 chapter	 five	 outlined,	 not	 completely	
susceptible,	to	such	control.	
Kay	 (2000)	 thus	 notes	 that,	 the	 increasingly	 interventionist	 and	
technological	approach	to	studying	and	representing	life	was	believed,	in	the	
latter	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 to	 finally,	 and	 truly	 mark	 the	 end	 of	
biology	as	an	analytic	form	of	inquiry	and	its	beginning	as	a	synthetic	science.	
Furthermore,	 unlike	 the	 ‘synthetic	 biology’	 of	 Loeb,	 Leduc,	 and	 their	
contemporaries,	 with	 the	 advent	 of	 modern	 biotechnology,	 the	 role	 of	
‘synthesising’	biology	shifted	from	being	primarily	a	way	to	understand	life,	to	
being	a	method	for	producing	desirable	bio-products.	
Modern	biotechnology	
The	interwar	years	thus	not	only	saw	the	beginnings	of	molecular	biology,	
but	also	a	major	advance	in	biotechnology,	as	it	came	to	be	associated	with	the	
application	of	biology	 to	humanity.159	An	early	major	 success	of	 this	modern	
biotechnology	 was	 Penicillin.	 Discovered	 in	 1928	 by	 biologist,	 Alexander	
Fleming,	 it	 was	 not	 until	 the	 1940s	 that	 its	 ability	 to	 treat	 infection	 was	
thoroughly	 appreciated.	Yet	Ford	 (2014)	notes	 that	producing	 it	 in	 sufficient	
quantities	 was	 a	 major	 problem,	 especially	 given	 the	 escalating	 number	 of	
																																								 								
159	The	origins	of	biotechnology	go	back,	if	not	to	the	ancient	Egyptians,	then	at	least	as	far	as	
1828.	 At	 this	 time	 Jean-Jacques	 Virey,	 developed	 the	 influential	 idea	 that	 “man	 has	 had	 to	
develop	technology	to	make	up	for	the	loss	of	natural	instincts”	(Bud	1993:	54).	He	termed	this	
innate	human	trait	‘biotechnie’	and	argued	that	tool	making	was	a	biological	phenomenon.	As	
such	he	used	 ‘biotechnie’	 to	argue	 that	all	of	engineering	 is	co-opted	as	a	 subset	of	biology.	
This	 usage	 differs	 markedly	 from	 later	 coinages	 of	 similar	 words,	 and	 from	 our	 current	
understandings	 of	 it,	 however	 it	 influenced	 Bergson	 to	 develop	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘homo	 faber,’	
(‘man’	the	maker).	Another	early	coinage	of	‘biotechnology’	came	from	Gustav	Tornier	at	the	
World	 Zoological	 Congress	 in	 Berlin	 in	 1901.	 Tornier,	 noting	 that	 many	 papers	 addressed	
analogies	 between	 biological	 and	 mechanical	 systems,	 proposed	 that	 the	 category	 of	
“technology”	could	be	applied	to	living	organisms	in	general,	he	termed	this	‘bionten.’	He	also	
proposed	 that	 the	process	of	modifying	or	using	 living	organisms	 technologically	be	 termed	
‘biontotechnik’	(Bud	1993).	However	Bud	writes	that	such	early	biotechnology	was	restricted	
to	the	production	or	processing	of	 food	products,	sewage,	and	beer.	Thus	 it	wasn’t	until	 the	
interwar	years	 that	biotechnology	acquired	a	new	association,	one	 that	 revolved	around	 the	
application	 of	 biology	 to	 humanity.	 The	 focus	 of	 this	 new	 branch	 of	 biotechnology	was	 on	
health,	 eugenics,	 nutrition,	 and	 non-polluting	 manufacturing	 technology	 that	 utilised	
renewable	 natural	 resources.	 In	 the	 1930s	 this	 ‘idealistic’	 branch	 of	 biotechnology	 came	
together	with	the	industrialised	zymotechnic	(the	study	of	yeast	fermentation)	branch	to	form	
a	‘new’	and	‘modern’	biotechnology	(Bud	1993).	
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cases	 of	 serious	 infection	 generated	 by	World	War	 Two.	 Chemical	 engineer	
Margaret	 Hutchinson	 Rousseau	 eventually	 derived	 a	 solution	 to	 this	
production	problem	by	drawing	on	the	processes	of	zymotechnology	to	design	
a	system	of	deep	tank	fermentation	for	Penicillin’s	first	production	plant.	This	
solution,	 Ford	 (2014)	 writes,	 ultimately	 allowed	 for	 sufficient	 quantities	 of	
Penicillin	 to	 be	 ready	 for	 the	 Allied	 troops	 before	 the	 1944	 invasion	 of	
Normandy.	Thus	 its	production	was	undoubtedly	 an	 important	 achievement	
for	 medical	 care,	 and	 a	 significant	milestone	 for	 biotechnology.	 However	 it	
was	also	a	 significant	milestone	 for	 the	 role	of	engineers	 in	 the	 life	 sciences.	
Given	 that,	 the	 episode	 highlighted	 the	 importance	 of	 both	 engineers	 and	
biologists	in	the	success	of	modern	biotechnology.	
Franklin	(2000)	writes	that,	with	the	advent	of	modern	biotechnology,	and	
its	 focus	 on	 ‘reprogramming’	 and	 ‘reorganising’	 biology	 in	 order	 to	 produce	
biotechnical	 objects,	 the	 interventionist	 approach	 to	 biology	 gained	
momentum.	 A	 central	 part	 of	 this	 strategy,	 discussed	 in-depth	 by	 Hannah	
Landecker	 (2007),	was	 the	 emphasis	placed	on	biological	plasticity.	Drawing	
on	 the	 work	 of	 Loeb	 and	H.G.	Wells160	Landecker	 writes,	 “[p]lasticity	 is	 the	
ability	 of	 living	 things	 to	 go	 on	 living,	 synthesizing	 proteins,	 moving,	
reproducing,	and	so	on	despite	catastrophic	interference	in	their	constitution,	
environment,	or	form”	(2007:	10).	This	capacity	to	alter	cells,	to	alter	biology	in	
such	 a	 purposeful	 way	 has,	 Landecker	 contends,	 allowed	 biotechnology	 to	
progress,	 as	 without	 it	 experimentally	 altered	 organisms	 would	 simply	 die	
(Landecker	2007).		
Biological	 plasticity	 is	 thus	 a	 scientific	 requirement	 for	 the	 production	 of	
biotechnological	entities.	However,	as	Ladisch	(2004)	points	out,	it	is	not	the	
only	requirement	for	the	success	of	biotechnology.	The	other	key	factor	in	the	
advancement	of	biotechnology	being	the	design	and	production	of	equipment	
																																								 								
160	H.G.	Wells	was	critical	of	the	fatalistic	nature	of	hereditary	thinking,	believing	instead	that	
living	matter	was	highly	malleable	and	thus	could	be	moulded	and	modified	by	humans.	This	
approach	to	biology	was	adopted	by	the	character	of	Dr	Moreau	in	Wells’	book	The	Island	of	
Dr.	Moreau,	in	which	Wells	questions	the	difference	between	partly	man-made	organisms	and	
naturally	occurring	ones	(Landecker	2007).
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and	processes	to	turn	these	entities	into	commercial	products.	This	part	of	the	
work	 is	 not	 done	 by	 biologists,	 but	 rather	 by	 engineers	 like	 Margaret	
Hutchinson	 Rousseau,	 and	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 bioprocess	 engineering.	 Where	
The	United	Nations	Convention	on	Biological	Diversity	defines	biotechnology	
as,	 "[a]ny	 technological	 application	 that	 uses	 biological	 systems,	 living	
organisms,	or	derivatives	thereof,	to	make	or	modify	products	or	processes	for	
specific	 use"	 (United	 Nations	 1992:	 Article	 2,	 Use	 of	 Terms),	 Ladisch	 writes	
that	 it	 is	 bioprocess	 engineering	 that	 puts	 biotechnology	 to	 work.	 It	 is,	 he	
claims,	the	bioprocess	engineers	who	design	and	develop	the	equipment	and	
processes	required	by	biotechnology	in	order	to	“generate	bioproducts	in	large	
volume,	at	low	cost,	and	with	acceptable	purity”	(Ladisch	2004:	29).		
In	 the	 1970s,	 this	 combination	 of	 biological	 plasticity	 and	 bioprocess	
engineering	allowed	modern	biotechnology	 to	come	 into	 its	own,	 spurred	 in	
large	 part	 by	 the	 invention	 of	 recombinant	DNA	 technology161	(S.	 S.	Hughes	
2011).	This,	now	universal,	 form	of	genetic	engineering162	extended	the	power	
and	 scope	 of	 molecular	 biology,	 becoming	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 what	 would	
become	the	biotechnology	industry.	Though	the	field	was	arguably	ready	and	
waiting	for	such	a	revolutionary	invention	to	move	it	forward.	In	1972,	a	year	
before	recombinant	DNA	technology	was	 invented,	Wright	 (1994)	notes	 that	
the	head	of	the	Center	for	Theoretical	Biology	at	the	State	University	of	New	
York,	 James	 Danielli,	 “anticipated	 an	 ‘age	 of	 synthesis’	 in	 which	 molecular	
biology	would	 be	 applied	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 organisms	 tailored	 to	 carry	 out	
specific	 tasks	 in	 industry	 and	 agriculture	 –	 for	 example,	 bacteria	 to	
manufacture	chemicals	or	digest	pollutants	and	plants	to	fix	nitrogen	from	the	
air”	 (Wright	 1994:	 69).	 Two	 years	 later,	Waclaw	 Szybalski	 echoed	 Danielli’s	
																																								 								
161	Recombinant	DNA	technology	allows	 for	 the	combination	of	strands	of	DNA	from	two	or	
more	species	and	for	the	replication	of	any	specific	DNA	sequence.	
162	Luis	Campos	(2009)	writes	 that	while	recombinant	DNA	technology	 is	now	considered	to	
be	genetic	engineering,	in	the	early	1970s	such	techniques	were	often	referred	to	as	‘synthetic	
biology’	 as	 the	 term	 ‘genetic	 engineering’	 was	 perceived	 by	 some	 to	 carry	 eugenic	
connotations.	However,	by	the	mid-1970s	the	name	 ‘synthetic	biology’	disappeared	 from	use	
again	and	‘genetic	engineering,’	shaking	off	any	remaining	resistance,	rose	to	prominence.		
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(and	indeed	the	much	early	BMJ’s)	anticipation	of	biology’s	“age	of	synthesis,”	
writing:	
	“Let	me	now	comment	on	the	question	‘what	next.’	Up	to	now	we	
are	working	on	the	descriptive	phase	of	molecular	biology.	.	.	.	But	
the	 real	 challenge	 will	 start	 when	 we	 enter	 the	 synthetic	 biology	
phase	 of	 research	 in	 our	 field.	 We	 will	 then	 devise	 new	 control	
elements	 and	 add	 these	 new	modules	 to	 the	 existing	 genomes	 or	
build	 up	 wholly	 new	 genomes.	 This	 would	 be	 a	 field	 with	 the	
unlimited	 expansion	 potential	 and	 hardly	 any	 limitations	 to	
building	‘new	better	control	circuits’	and	.	.	.	finally	other	‘synthetic’	
organisms,	 like	a	 ‘new	better	mouse’.	 .	 .	 .	 I	am	not	concerned	that	
we	 will	 run	 out	 of	 exciting	 and	 novel	 ideas,	 .	 .	 .	 in	 the	 synthetic	
biology,	in	general”	(Szybalski	1974:	405).	
The	 excitement	 and	 anticipation	 expressed	 by	 Danielli	 and	 Szybalski	 is	
unsurprising	given	the	successes	this	interventionist	approach	to	biology	was	
having	in	the	1970s,	as	biology	began	to	be	synthesised	and	manipulated	at	the	
genetic	level.	Both	the	first	complete	gene	(H.	G.	Khorana	et	al.	1972)	and	the	
first	recombinant	DNA	molecules	(D.	A.	Jackson	et	al.	1972),	were	synthesised	
in	 1972.	 A	 year	 later	 came	 the	 first	 transgenic	 organism	 (Cohen	 and	 Chang	
1973)	 and	 then	 a	 year	 after	 that,	 the	 first	 transgenic	 animal	 (Jaenisch	 and	
Mintz	1974).	By	1981	the	first	peptide-coding	gene	(Itakura	et	al.	1977),	and	the	
first	protein-coding	gene	(Edge	et	al.	1981),	had	also	been	synthesised.163	While	
these	 milestones	 were	 significant	 for	 the	 advancement	 of	 knowledge	 in	
molecular	 biology,	 and	 are	 arguably	 predecessors	 to	 synthetic	 biology’s	
																																								 								
163	It	 was	 not	 however	 until	 thirty	 years	 after	 Danielli’s	 prediction	 that	 the	 first	 virus	 was	
synthesised	(Cello	et	al.	2002).	Then,	more	recently,	the	first	genome	(Gibson	et	al.	2008),	and	
the	first	so-called	‘synthetic	organism’	(Gibson	et	al.	2010).	As	discussed	in	chapter	five,	there	
is	much	debate	over	whether	the	resulting	organism	of	this	experiment	was	indeed	‘synthetic.’	
However,	regardless,	the	experiment	is	widely	considered	to	be	an	important	step	forward	in	
the	 synthesis	 of	 biology.	While	 these	 three	more	 recent	milestones	 are	 frequently	 included	
under	the	banner	of	the	current	incarnation	of	synthetic	biology,	they	clearly	have	links	with	
their	predecessors,	and	all	of	them	can	be	thought	of	as	the	results	of	modern	biotechnology.	
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‘Synthia’	 and	 syn3.0,	 they	 were	 also	 significant	 for	 the	 commercial	
advancement	of	biotechnology.	
Indeed,	three	years	after	the	invention	of	recombinant	DNA	technology	one	
of	its	inventors,	Herbert	Boyer,164	formed	Genentech,165	the	first	biotechnology	
company.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 Genentech’s	 emergence,	 in	 the	mid	 1970s,	Hughes	
writes	 that	 molecular	 biology	 was	 becoming	 “practical,	 profitable,	 and	
controversial	 in	 a	 manner	 never	 before	 experienced”	 (2011:	 112).	 This	 was	 a	
significant	shift	for	biology	away	from	a	focus	on	the	production	of	knowledge	
and	 towards	a	 focus	on	 the	production	of	 industrialised	and	commercialised	
products.	 Such	 a	 focus	 is	more	 often	 associated	with	 engineering,	 and	 is,	 as	
discussed	previously,	clearly	evident	in	synthetic	biology.	In	keeping	with	this	
shift	 in	the	culture	of	biology,	Genentech’s	aim,	Hughes	(2011)	contends,	was	
to	 use	 recombinant	 DNA	 technology	 as	 an	 industrial	 process.	 In	 order	 to	
engineer	 bacteria	 to	 produce	 insulin,	 growth	hormone,	 and	other	 important	
pharmaceuticals,	which	could	be	used	as	commercial	products.		
Through	 much	 hard	 work	 they	 managed	 to	 show	 that	 chemically	
synthesised	 DNA	 could	 be	 introduced	 into	 bacteria,	 which	 could	 act	 as	 a	
biological	 ‘factory’	 to	 produce	 biologically	 functional	 proteins	 (S.	 S.	 Hughes	
2011).	 This,	 Hughes	 (2011)	 argues,	 was	 revolutionary	 both	 scientifically	 and	
commercially,	 with	 Genentech	 becoming	 the	 overnight	 darling	 of	 Wall	 St	
when	its	public	stock	offering,	 four	years	after	the	company	formed,	saw	the	
largest	 gain	 in	 stock	market	 history	 (S.	 S.	Hughes	 2011).166	Such	 successes	 as	
that	 of	 Genentech,	 thus	 led	 Andrew	Hacking	 (1987)	 to	write	 that	 biology	 is	
																																								 								
164	The	other	inventor	of	Recombinant	DNA	technology	was	Stan	Cohen.	For	an	account	of	its	
invention	and	the	formation	of	Genentech	see	Hughes	(2011).	
165	The	name	Genentech	was	a	contraction	of	genetic	engineering	technology.	
166	Share	 prices	 rocketed	 from	 $35	 to	 $89	 in	 the	 first	 few	 minutes	 of	 trading.	 Yet,	 while	
Genentech	 blazed	 a	 trail	 that	many	 other	 young	 companies	 followed,	 quickly	 bringing	 the	
biotechnology	 industry	 to	 life,	 by	 1985	 progress	 had	 already	 begun	 to	 slow.	 It	 was,	 as	 both	
Genentech	 and	 their	 competitors	 discovered,	 surprisingly	 difficult	 to	 realise	 the	 novel	 and	
complicated	pharmaceuticals	that	were	required	for	future	marketable	products	(S.	S.	Hughes	
2011).		
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now	 considered	 a	 manufacturing	 technology,	 a	 means	 to	 production	 for	
biotechnology.		
These	 advances	 within	 biotechnology	 are	 significant	 to	 the	 history	 of	
synthetic	biology,	as	they	not	only	paved	the	way	for	biology	to	be	used	as	a	
manufacturing	 technology,	 but	 they	 also	 saw	 biologists	 and	 bioprocess	
engineers	working	together	to	achieve	this	ends.	Ladisch	(2004),	for	example,	
writes	 in	 regards	 to	 Genentech’s	 production	 of	 human	 insulin,	 that	 it	 was	
engineers	 who	 designed	 the	 process	 to	 recover	 and	 purify	 the	 insulin	 once	
biologists	had	 figured	out	how	 to	produce	 it.	 Ladisch	 (2004)	 also	notes	 that	
bioprocess	engineers	were	involved	in	the	Human	Genome	Project,	designing	
the	 automated	 instruments	 and	 the	 software	 for	 analysing	 nucleic	 acid	
sequencing	as	the	biologists	worked	in	the	laboratories.	However,	while	these	
are	 undoubtedly	 important	 functions,	 and	 the	 engineers	who	 perform	 them	
are	undeniably	integral	to	the	process	and	progress	of	biotechnology,	the	role	
of	engineers	within	this	sort	of	biotechnology	was	arguably	a	supporting	one	
to	the	biologists.		
Nevertheless,	 I	would	argue	that	the	biotechnology	and	molecular	biology	
of	the	twentieth	century	did	finally	move	biology	out	of,	what	the	BMJ	(1910)	
termed	 its	 analytical	 phase,	 and	 into	 the	 beginnings	 of	 its	 long	 anticipated	
synthetic	phase.	I	would	also	contend	that	modern	biotechnology	has,	with	its	
reliance	 on	 both	 biologists	 and	 engineers	 with	 a	 common	 goal	 and	 an	
eagerness	 to	work	 together,	 helped	 to	 bring	 the	 two	 fields	 up	 to	 a	 point	 of	
disciplinary	convergence.	Furthermore,	 I	would	argue	 that	 the	results	of	 this	
convergence,	 and	 this	 emphasis	 on	 synthesis,	 are	 now	 playing	 out	 in	 a	 new	
way	of	‘doing’	and	thinking	about	biology	in	this	new	century.	A	shift	that	has,	
in	part,	filled	the	gap	left	by	the	decline	of	the	notion	of	life	as	information	in	
the	wake	of	the	Human	Genome	Project.	
The	limits	of	life	as	information	
Launched	 in	 1990,	 the	 Human	 Genome	 Project	 was	 the	 world’s	 largest	
collaborative	biological	project.	Following	the	elucidation	of	the	genetic	code	
in	 1953,	 the	 drive	within	molecular	 biology	 shifted	 towards	 determining	 the	
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codes	 and	 contents	 of	 entire	 genomes.	 This	work,	Keller	 notes,	 started	with	
simple	organisms,167	and	 cemented	 the	 idea	 that	 genes,	 and	 their	 sequences,	
were	responsible	for	all	biological	function.	Thus,	it	came	to	be	believed	that	
“sequence	 information	would,	by	 itself,	provide	all	 that	was	necessary	 for	an	
understanding	 of	 biological	 function”	 (Keller	 2000:	 6).	As	 such,	 determining	
the	 human	 genome	would,	 it	 was	 hoped,	 allow	 us	 to	 link	 all	 genes	 to	 their	
functions	 and	 establish	 which	 single,	 or	 small	 number	 of,	 mutations	 were	
responsible	for	which	diseases.		
After	 thirteen	 years	 of	 international	 work,	 the	 results	 of	 the	 Human	
Genome	Project	were	published	in	2003.	While	these	results	were	fascinating	
they	were	not	what	many	had	anticipated.	Given	 the	complexity	of	humans,	
and	 the	 size	 of	 the	 previously	 determined	 genomes	 of	 simpler	 organisms,	 it	
was	anticipated	 that	 the	human	genome	would	contain	between	 100000	and	
300000	genes.	However,	when	the	results	were	published	it	became	clear	that	
the	 genome	 contained	 only	 20000-25000	protein	 coding	 sequences	 (N.	Rose	
2007).	 Thus	 the	 ‘gene	 for’	 paradigm168 	fell	 by	 the	 wayside	 as	 it	 became	
apparent	 that	 “the	 human	 genome	 could	 not	 be	 the	 ‘digital	 parts	 list’	 for	
making	a	human	being”	(N.	Rose	2007:	46).	The	genome	was	not	the	blueprint	
of	 life	 people	 were	 expecting.	 Furthermore,	 the	 unpredicted	 results	 of	 the	
Human	Genome	Project	resulted	in	the	tacit	acknowledgement	of	“how	large	
the	gap	between	genetic	‘information’	and	biological	meaning	really	is”	(Keller	
2000:	8).	Life’s	secrets,	Keller	(2000)	stressed,	have	been	shown	to	be	far	more	
complex	than	previously	imagined,	and	this	complexity	cannot	be	captured	by	
the	informational	epistemology.169	
																																								 								
167	The	 first	 genomes	 to	be	determined	were	 those	of	 a	bacteriophage	with	an	RNA	genome	
(Jou	 et	 al.	 1972)	 and	 a	 bacteriophage	 with	 a	 DNA	 genome	 (Sanger	 et	 al.	 1978).	 These	
milestones	were	achieved	 in	the	 1970s,	but	 it	would	be	another	twenty	years	before	the	 first	
bacteria	genome	(Fleischmann	et	al.	1995),	archaeon	genome	(Bult	et	al.	1996),	and	eukaryotic	
genome	(Goffeau	et	al.	1996)	were	completed.	
168	The	‘gene	for’	paradigm	is	the	notion	that	there	is	a	single	gene,	or	a	small	group	of	genes,	
responsible	for	each	biological	feature	and	function.	
169	Following	 the	 findings	of	 the	Human	Genome	Project,	 the	central	dogma	 (that	 there	 is	 a	
one-way	path	 from	DNA	 to	RNA	 to	protein)	 can	no	 longer	be	 sustained,	 and	areas	of	DNA	
that	do	not	 code	 for	proteins	 (more	 than	98%	of	 the	genetic	material	 in	our	 cells)	previous	
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Thus,	while	information	theory	continues	to	provide	biology	with	much	of	
its	discourse	and	concepts,	since	the	beginning	of	the	21st	century	the	way	in	
which	biology	is	described,	understood,	and	undertaken	appears	to	be	shifting	
once	more.	Keller	quotes	François	 Jacob	as	writing	 in	 1973	 that,	 “[t]oday	 the	
world	is	message,	codes	and	information.	Tomorrow	what	analysis	will	break	
down	 our	 objects	 to	 reconstitute	 them	 in	 a	 new	 space?”	 (Jacob	 quoted	 in	
Keller	 2000:	 8).	 For	 some,	 this	 new	 analysis	 has	 taken	 the	 form	 of	 a	 post-
genomic	 emphasis	 on	 biological	 complexities,	 complexities	which	 cannot	 be	
captured	 by	 the	 informational	 epistemology	 (Keller	 2000).	 Integral	 to	 this	
focus	 is	 a	 shift	 in	 emphasis	 away	 from	 the	 gene.170	A	 shift	 that	Nikolas	Rose	
addresses	 when	 he	 writes,	 “the	 focus	 shifted	 from	 the	 gene	 to	 processes	 of	
regulation,	 expression,	 and	 transcription	 (transcriptomics),	 from	 the	gene	 to	
those	 small	 variations	 at	 the	 level	 of	 a	 single	 nucleotide	 termed	 Single	
Nucleotide	Polymorphisms	(SNPs),	and	indeed	from	the	gene	to	the	cell	and	
the	process	 for	the	creation	of	proteins	(proteomics)”	(2007:	46).	Part	of	 this	
shift	 in	 emphasis,	 and	 a	 prime	 example	 of	 a	 post-genomic	 field	 of	 study	 is	
epigenetics.171		
While	such	post-genomic	attempts	to	do	biology	differently	are	focused	on	
basic	 science,	 the	 other	major	 emergent	 trend	within	 biology,	 which	 I	 shall	
																																								 																																								 																																								 													
termed	‘junk	DNA’	has	been	found	to	actually	be	crucial	for	regulation.	As	such	a	lot	has	been	
discovered	that	makes	the	informational	model	of	DNA	as	the	 ‘book	of	 life,’	seem	untenable	
(Rose,	2007).	
170	Indeed	Keller	(2000)	writes	that	the	twentieth	century	was	the	century	of	the	gene,	and	that	
the	gene’s	dominance	ended	with	the	turn	of	the	century.	
171	Although	 it	was	 first	posited	as	a	way	of	 reuniting	developmental	biology	and	genetics	 in	
the	mid-twentieth	century,	epigenetics	only	really	emerged	as	a	discipline	in	the	first	decade	
of	 the	 twenty-first	 century	 once	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	Human	Genome	Project	were	widely	
known	 (Goldberg	 et	 al.	 2007).	 This	 relatively	 new	 field	 of	 study	 analyses	 the	 impacts	 of	
external	and	environmental	factors	on	the	gene	expression	and	phenotype	of	an	organism	(N.	
Carey	2012).	This	focus	on	how	our	environment,	and	indeed	the	environment	experienced	by	
our	parents,	and	even	grandparents,	influences	our	biology,	as	Bird	(2007)	discusses,	is	being	
seen	by	some	as	a	potential	antidote	to	the	genetic	determinism	so	dominant	in	the	twentieth	
century.	It	is	also	hoped	that	epigenetics,	and	the	epigenome,	once	it	is	eventually	elucidated,	
will	 fill	 in	many	of	 the	knowledge	gaps	 left	by	 the	Human	Genome	Project	 (Holliday	2006),	
and	thus	further	our	understandings	of	life.	See	Huang	(2000)	for	a	further	discussion	of	post-
genomic	biology.		
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discuss	 below,	 has	 instead	 taken	 the	 drive	 towards	 biological	 synthesis	 and	
convergence	between	biology	and	engineering	 to	a	new	 level.	That	 is,	where	
the	 post-genomic	 fields	 are	 focused	 on	 furthering	 our	 understanding	 of	
biology	 and	 life,	 the	 trend	 I	 explore	 here,	 which	 encompasses	 synthetic	
biology,	has	opted	to	side-line	the	desire	to	understand	life.	Focusing	instead	
on	manipulating	 and	 controlling	 it	 using	 concepts,	 language	 and	 tools	 from	
engineering.	 It	 is	 a	 trend	 that	 is	 emerging	 at	 the	 crossroads	 of	 biology	 and	
engineering	and	one	 that	appears	 to	be	reformulating	 the	conception	of	 life,	
replacing	life	as	information	with	life	as	engineerable	material.	
Life	as	engineerable	material?	
As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 notion	 that	 ideas	 and	methods	 from	 engineering	
could	be,	and	should	be,	applied	to	biology	 is	 far	 from	a	new	one.	However,	
building	on	the	advances	in	molecular	biology	and	biotechnology,	these	ideas	
seem	 to	 be	 gaining	more	 and	more	 traction	 in	 recent	 years.	 In	 2000	 Keller	
wrote	that	twentieth	century	geneticist	H.J.	Muller	“imagined	the	prospect	of	
controlling	genetic	change	in	ways	that	would	‘place	the	process	of	evolution	
in	 our	 hands’”	 (Muller	 cited	 in	 Keller	 2000:	 141).	 Looking	 forward	 into	 the	
twenty-first	century,	Keller	states	that	Muller’s	“fantasy	has	come	to	look	more	
and	more	 like	 a	 realizable	 prospect”	 (Keller	 2000:	 141),	 and	 that	 a	 key	 step	
towards	realising	such	a	fantasy	was	the	enlargement	of	genetics’	“conceptual	
toolkit”	using	concepts	and	terms	from	engineering.	She	wrote:	
	“Engineers	 have	 developed	 a	 conceptual	 toolkit	 for	 the	 design	 of	
systems	 –	 like	 airplanes,	 for	 example,	 or	 computers	 –	 in	 which	
reliability	 is	 the	 first	 and	 foremost	 criterion.	 As	 such,	 their	
approach	 might	 be	 said	 to	 be	 directly	 complementary	 to	 that	 of	
geneticists,	 and	 I	 suggest	 that	 the	 latter	 might	 profitably	 borrow	
some	of	the	concepts	and	terms	developed	in	the	study	of	dynamic	
stability	 to	 enlarge	 their	 own	 conceptual	 toolkits”	 (Keller	 2000:	
147).	
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While	 Keller	 is	 arguably	 correct,	 sixteen	 years	 on,	 geneticists	 are	 not	 the	
only	‘biologists’	now	‘profiting’	from	the	introduction	of	engineering	concepts	
and	 tools.	 Instead,	 much	 like	 Quastler’s	 attempts	 to	 turn	 biology	 into	 an	
information	science,	new	collaborative	groupings	of	biologists	and	engineers,	
like	 those	 within	 synthetic	 biology,	 are	 attempting	 to	 draw	 from	 the	
framework	of	engineering	in	order	to	reformulate	how	we	think	about	and	‘do’	
biology	in	different	areas.	Prime	examples	of	such	hybrid,	emerging	disciplines	
and	 research	 communities	 are,	 neuro-engineering	 (Eliasmith	 and	 Anderson	
2004;	He	2013),	nanobiotechnology	(Klefenz	2004;	Lowe	2000;	Niemeyer	and	
Mirkin	2004),	 tissue	engineering	 (Langer	and	Vacanti	 1993;	Lanza	et	al.	 2011;	
Viola	 et	 al.	 2003)	 particularly	 with	 the	 use	 of	 3D	 bioprinting	 (Doyle	 2014;	
Wang	et	 al.	 2015),	 genome	engineering	 (Carr	 and	Church	2009),	 particularly	
with	 the	 use	 of	 CRISPR	 (Hsu	 et	 al.	 2014),	 the	 proposed	 synthetic	 human	
biology	 consortium172	(Boeke	 et	 al.	 2016;	 Callaway	 2016),	 and	 of	 course	 the	
discipline	I	have	focus	on	here,	synthetic	biology.173			
While	 it	 is	 arguably	 clear	 how	 such	 hybrid	 fields	 have	 arisen	 out	 of	 the	
recent	advances	in	molecular	biology	and	modern	biotechnology,	it	has	been	
my	 aim	 in	 this	 chapter	 to	 outline	 how	 the	 trend	 towards	 seeing	 life	 in	
mechanistic,	reductionistic	terms	goes	back	much	further.	Indeed	the	strands	
of	thought	and	approach,	which	define	synthetic	biology	and	its	ilk,	have	their	
roots	in	the	various	preceding	conceptions	of,	and	approaches	to	studying,	life	
outlined	 above.	 The	 mechanistic	 conception	 of	 organisms,	 the	 notion	 that	
organisms	can	be	thought	of	and	treated	as	factories,	the	desire	to	control	and	
manipulate	biology,	the	shift	in	focus	from	analysis	to	synthesis,	the	disregard	
of	biological	and	environmental	context.	All	of	these	factors	are	central	to	the	
																																								 								
172 	The	 synthetic	 human	 biology	 consortium	 is	 a	 proposed	 public-private	 initiative	 to	
synthesise	 an	 entire	 human	 genome	 from	 scratch.	 The	 effort	 is	 being	 called	 the	 ‘Human	
Genome	 Project	 –	 write’	 to	 distinguish	 it	 from	 the	 previous	 human	 genome	 project	 which	
focused	 on	 ‘reading’	 the	 genome.	 It	 is	 anticipated	 that	 the	 effort	 could	 well	 take	 a	 decade	
given	 that,	 at	 present,	 only	 tiny	 bacterial	 genomes	 have	 successfully	 been	 synthesised	 from	
scratch.	 However	 it	 is	 facing	 resistance	 both	 within	 and	 outside	 of	 the	 synthetic	 biology	
community,	as	questions	are	being	asked	about	the	ethics	of	such	an	endeavour.	
173	While	it	is	synthetic	biology	that	I	am	focusing	on	in	this	thesis,	it	is	worth	remember	that	
it	is	far	from	the	only	example	of	the	shifts	I	describe	in	this	and	previous	chapters.	
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conception	of	 life	 as	 engineerable	material,	 and	 all	 arose,	 as	 outlined	 above,	
long	before	the	likes	of	modern	synthetic	biology.		
As	such	it	is	understandable	that	synthetic	biology,	and	most	of	these	other	
fields,	may	 appear	 at	 first	 glance	 to	 be	 nothing	more	 than	 new	 branches	 of	
biotechnology.	 They	 do,	 after	 all,	 rely	 on	 and	 exploit	 biological	 plasticity	 as	
they	 strive	 to	 make	 biotechnical	 products,	 and	 they	 do	 aim	 to	 scale	 these	
processes	 up	 in	 order	 to	 produce	 commercial	 products.	 Yet,	 while	 they	 fall	
under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 biotechnology,	 there	 are	 nonetheless	 significant	
differences	 between	 synthetic	 biology	 and	 its	 ilk	 and	 the	 biotechnology	 and	
molecular	biology	that	preceded	them.	Differences,	which	ultimately	set	these	
fields,	 and	 their	 conception	 of	 life,	 apart	 from	 the	 approaches	 to	 thinking	
about	and	‘doing’	biology	which	preceded	them.	In	terms	of	synthetic	biology,	
Heinemann	and	Panke	highlight	that	where	molecular	biology	has	“attempted	
to	unravel	the	molecular	mechanisms	that	are	important	in	cellular	function”	
and	“biotechnology	has	exploited	this	knowledge	and	adopted	some	of	 these	
mechanisms	 to	 produce	 chemicals,	 enzymes	 and	 biopharmaceuticals,”	 by	
contrast	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 “adopting	 a	 very	 ambitious	 agenda	 in	 building	
novel	biological	entities	on	an	ever	more	complex	level	for	novel	applications”	
(2006:	2797).		
What	 this	 equates	 to	 is,	 rather	 than	 simply	 drawing	 on	 the	 work	 of	
engineers	to	design	and	build	equipment	and	bioprocesses,174	these	emerging	
disciplines	 are	 drawing	 on	 ideas,	methods,	 and	 discourse	 from	 engineering.	
Incorporating	what	has	been	 called	 an	 engineering	 approach,	 into	 the	 study	
and	conception	of	biology.	As	discussed	in	chapter	four,	synthetic	biology	does	
not	 just	 view	 the	 processes	 and	 equipment	 used	 in	 biology	 as	 engineerable,	
but	also,	at	least	rhetorically,	the	organisms	and	biological	entities	themselves.	
Renowned	for	its	parts	based	approach	to	biology175,	176	(Endy	2008),	synthetic	
																																								 								
174	This	was	 the	 case	 in	 earlier	 incarnations	 of	 biotechnology,	 and	 indeed	 still	 is	 the	 case	 in	
many	branches	of	biotechnology.	
175 	The	 notion	 that	 a	 functioning	 biological	 entity	 could	 be	 designed	 and	 built	 using	
standardised,	 characterised,	 and	 engineered	 BioBrick	 parts	 and	 devices	 which	 have	 their	
sequences	effectively	black	boxed	(Endy	2008).	
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biology	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 “transformative	 innovation	 that	 will	 make	 it	
possible	 to	 build	 living	 machines	 from	 off-the-shelf	 chemical	 ingredients,	
employing	many	of	 the	same	strategies	 that	electrical	engineers	use	 to	make	
computer	chips”	 (Tucker	and	Zilinskas	2006:	25).	Where	genetic	engineering	
involves	the	transfer	of	individual	genes	from	one	species	to	another,	synthetic	
biology	 “envisions	 the	 assembly	 of	 novel	 microbial	 genomes	 from	 a	 set	 of	
standardized	genetic	parts”	(Tucker	and	Zilinskas	2006:	26).		
While	 syn3.0	 highlights	 that	 such	 genomes	 cannot,	 as	 yet,	 be	 completely	
assembled	using	only	standardised,	well-characterised	parts,177	the	confidence	
and	commitment	that	underlies	the	engineering	approach	persists.	Thus,	even	
without	 the	 realisation	 of	 this	 engineering	 ideal,	 organisms	 with	 semi-
engineered	 genomes	 are	 being	 utilised	 to	 produce	 products.	 Furthermore,	
such	semi-engineered	organisms	(organisms	which	would	arguably	fall	within	
the	boundary	spanning	category	proposed	in	chapter	five),	are	not	solely	being	
employed	 to	 produce	 ‘classic’	 biotechnical	 products	 such	 as	
pharmaceuticals, 178 	foodstuffs, 179 	cosmetic	 additives, 180 	‘plastics,’ 181 	textiles, 182	
																																								 																																								 																																								 													
176	Which	bears	conceptual	similarities	with	the	notion	of	interlocking	components	central	to	
the	conception	of	life	as	organisation.	
177	Requiring,	 as	 they	 do,	 a	 fair	 number	 of	 genes	 whose	 function	 is	 unknown	 in	 order	 to	
produce	organisms	that	can	survive	and	reproduce,	and	thus	perform	their	desired	functions.	
178	Such	as	Artemisinin,	an	antimalarial	drug,	which	in	2014	became	the	first	synthetic	biology	
pharmaceutical	agent	(Paddon	and	Keasling	2014).	
179	For	example	vannilin,	a	synthetic	vanilla	flavour,	which	was	the	first	synthetic	biology	food	
additive	to	reach	market	(E.	C.	Hayden	2014).	Evolva,	the	company	which	produces	vannilin,	is	
also	working	on	synthetic	biology	versions	of	saffron	and	Stevia	(Barras	2014).	
180	Valencene,	 which	 produces	 the	 aroma	 of	 oranges	 (Barras	 2014)	 and	 nootkatone,	 which	
produces	the	aroma	of	grapefruit	(E.	C.	Hayden	2014),	are	both	produced	by	engineered	yeast,	
and	both	are	used	in	perfumes	and	cosmetics	
181	Mirel,	for	example,	is	a	bioplastic	made	by	an	engineered	microbe	turning	corn	sugar	into	
plastic	polymer	(Church	and	Regis	2012)	
182 	For	 example	 Bio-PDO,	 a	 biologically-derived	 version	 of	 the	 chemical	 1,3-propanediol	
produced	by	engineered	E.	coli	.	Bio-PDO	is	the	main	ingredient	in	the	DuPont	fibre	Sorona,	
used	in	carpets,	upholstery	and	clothing	(Church	and	Regis	2012).	
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and	 biofuels. 183 	But	 rather,	 biological	 ‘machines’	 with	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	
traditionally	 mechanical,	 rather	 than	 biological,	 functions,	 are	 also	 being	
produced.	 Functions	 such	 as,	 the	 expression	 of	 Boolean	 logic,	 the	 ability	 to	
take	 ‘photographic’	 images,	 and	 the	 production	 of	 programmable	 platforms	
(Endy	2008).	
Moreover,	while	 Loeb	proposed	 similar	 ideas	 about	 the	 engineerability	 of	
biology	over	one	hundred	years	 ago,	 and	genetic	 engineering	 is	named	after	
the	 field,	 these	earlier	 incarnations	of	an	 interventionist	approach	to	biology	
involved	no	engineers	and	little	 in	the	way	of	engineering	(Baker	et	al.	2006;	
Chopra	and	Kamma	2006).	As	mentioned	above,	biologists,	mathematicians,	
and	 physical	 scientists	 were	 largely	 responsible	 for	 the	 earliest	 attempts	 to	
design	 and	 control	 biology,	 not	 engineers	 themselves,	 and	 many	 of	 these	
attempts	met	with	resistance	from	the	biology	community.	Even	in	molecular	
biology	 and	 biotechnology,	 where	 the	 work	 is	 primarily	 done	 by	 biologists,	
engineering	 is	 used	 as	 an	 analogy	 for	 the	 rational	 combination	 of	 genes	 (de	
Lorenzo	and	Danchin	2008).	While	the	bioprocess	engineering	that	is	done	is	
focused	on	the	equipment	and	processes,	not	the	organisms	themselves.		
By	 contrast,	 synthetic	 biology	 ostensibly	 views	 engineering	 as	 “a	 veritable	
methodology	with	which	 to	 construct	 complex	 biological	 systems	 from	 first	
principles”	(de	Lorenzo	and	Danchin	2008:	822)	and	it	is	engineers	themselves	
who	are	applying	this	methodology.	This	then	is	a	field	that	is	currently	poised	
at	 the	 crossroads	of	biology	 and	engineering,	not	dominated	by	one	 field	or	
the	other	(though	of	course	some	individual	laboratories	and	research	centres	
are),	 but	 drawing	 on	 what	 Compton	 and	 Bunker	 (1939)	 would	 call	 the	
convergence	of	the	disciplines	in	order	to	take	a	new	perspective	on	biology.	A	
perspective,	 that	 is,	 which	 views	 biological	 material	 as	 engineerable,	 and	
biological	organisms	as	ready	targets	for	synthesis.	
																																								 								
183	Such	as	Farnesene,	a	renewable	15-carbon,	long-chain,	branched,	unsaturated	hydrocarbon.	
Amyris	 intend	 to	use	 this	oil	 to	produce	 fuels,	 as	well	 as	 cosmetic	oil,	 lubricants,	 and	high-
performance	rubber	such	as	is	used	in	the	tyre	industry	(Gardner	and	Hawkins	2013).	
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The	 newly	 emerging	 disciplines	 at	 this	 crossroads	 are	 collaborative	 by	
nature,	drawing	participants	from	across	the	life	sciences	and	various	branches	
of	 engineering.	As	was	noted	 in	 chapter	 four,	within	 synthetic	biology	 these	
engineers	are	not	playing	a	 supportive	 role,	but	 rather	are	 full	 collaborators.	
They	are	not	only	designing	the	organisms	and	the	experiments,	but	at	times	
are	also	working	in	the	laboratories	to	‘build’	them.	Indeed,	while	the	centre	I	
studied	contained	more	biologists	than	engineers,	some	such	as	Endy	(2008),	
and	 Tucker	 and	 Zilinskas	 (2006),	 go	 so	 far	 as	 to	 contend	 that	 the	 future	 of	
synthetic	biology	will	ultimately	be	as	an	engineering	discipline.	A	discipline,	
they	 predict,	 which	 will	 be	 dominated	 by	 engineers.	 Engineers	 who	 will	
require	 no	 background	 in	 biology,	 nor	 experience	 with	 basic	 biological	
research	at	all	(Endy	2008).	It	is,	therefore,	these	shifts	within	biology	that	led	
me	to	question	whether	we	are	seeing	the	beginnings	of	a	new	conception	of	
life.	Is	life	as	information	being	replaced	by	the	notion	that	life	is	made	up	of	
engineerable	 material,	 despite	 the	 obstacles	 to	 enacting	 this	 vision?	 Indeed	
Endy,	 one	 of	 the	 guiding	 lights	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 glossed	 over	 these	
obstacles	when	 he	wrote	 that	 “the	 stuff	 of	 life”	was	 essentially	 “reproducing	
machines”	which	can	be	designed	and	built	(Endy	2008:	343).		
As	discussed	in	previous	chapters,	any	such	shift	towards	the	notion	of	life	
as	 engineerable	 material	 is	 occurring	 in	 spite	 of	 difficulties	 with	 actually	
engineering	life	as	the	prevailing	rhetoric	suggests.	This	is	in	part	attributable	
to	 the	 scientific	 and	 technological	 advances	 (such	 as	 those	 exhibited	 in	 the	
creation	of	syn3.0)	which	are	fuelling	the	belief	that	the	engineering	approach	
will	 prove	 to	 be	 revolutionary	 for	 biology.	 However	 scientific	 and	
technological	 shifts	 are	 arguably	not	 enough	 in	 themselves	 to	 bring	 about	 a	
new	conceptual	model	for	life.		
Ortony	 (1993),	 for	 example,	 argues	 that	 it	 would	 be	 a	 mistake	 to	
underestimate	 the	 capacity	 of	 discourse	 to	 shape	 the	 future	 of	 science.	
Metaphors,	 he	 stresses,	 are	 not	 merely	 linguistic	 tools,	 but	 rather	 they	 are	
necessary	for	our	thinking,	our	acting,	and	our	speaking.	Keller	also	addresses	
the	influence	of	language	on	people’s	thoughts	and	actions	when	she	notes,	in	
regards	to	scientists,	“[b]y	their	words,	their	very	landscapes	of	possibility	are	
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shaped”	 (2000:	 139).	 Thus,	 just	 as	 the	 post-war	 drive	 towards	 information	
theory,	and	the	introduction	of	a	new	language	for	biology,	helped	to	usher	in	
the	 notion	 of	 life	 as	 information;	 while	 new	mechanical	 analogies,	 and	 the	
wider	influence	of	a	mechanistic	worldview,	boosted	Descartes’	case	for	life	as	
mechanism;	 so	 too	 does	 the	 notion	 of	 life	 as	 engineerable	 material	 rely	 on	
discursive	and	cultural	shifts	to	gain	purchase.		
Landscapes	of	possibility	
Balmer	and	Herreman	(2009)	note	that	the	dominant	metaphor	in	biology	
has	 shifted	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Human	 Genome	 Project,	 from	 the	 literary	
allegory	 of	 reading	 the	 book	 of	 life,	 to	 the	 computational	 metaphors	 (e.g.	
writing	 software	 for	 the	cell)	 and	engineering	metaphors	 (e.g.	designing	and	
building	 life)	 used	 by	 synthetic	 biology.	 As	 Konopka	 asserts,	 “the	 machine	
metaphor	 is	 perhaps	 the	most	 powerful	 conceptual	 tool	 of	modern	 biology”	
(2002:	398).	The	development	of	 such	metaphors,	and	of	 the	programmes	of	
work	these	metaphors	both	describe	and	bring	to	life,	would	therefore	seem	to	
be	 linked	 to	 the	 engineering	 language	 that	pervades	biological	discourse.	As	
discussed	 in	 chapter	 four,	 words	 such	 as	 ‘mechanism,’	 ‘program,’	 ‘design,’	
‘control,’	 ‘feedback,’	 ‘regulation,’	 ‘switch,’	 ‘input,’	 ‘output,’	 and	 ‘efficiency,’	
which	 Nicholson	 (2012)	 contends	 have	 their	 basis	 in	 the	 mechanistic	
conception	 of	 the	 organism,	 are	 now	 commonplace	 in	 biology	 once	 more.	
Playing,	 as	 they	 do,	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 description	 and	 conception	 of	
synthetic	biology.	Such	shifts	 in	 the	 language	of	biology	are	arguably	 just	an	
example	of	language	evolving,	a	process	that	happens	as	much	in	science	as	it	
does	 elsewhere.	 However,	 according	 to	 Keller,	 this	 process	 is	 not	 only	
inevitable,	it	is	essential	to	our	understanding	of	the	world.	Indeed,	she	writes	
that	“our	understanding	of	the	natural	world	could	scarcely	progress	without	
such	evolution”	(Keller	2000:	144).		
Drawing	on	Keller’s	work	then,	synthetic	biology’s	use	of	such	engineering	
terminology	may	well	 be	 shaping	 the	 perceived	 landscapes	 of	 possibility	 for	
the	 discipline	 and	 those	 working	 within	 it,	 as	 well	 as	 altering	 our	
understandings	 of	 the	 natural	 world.	 As	 was	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 four,	
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synthetic	 biology	 has	 taken	 its	 engineering	 terminology,	 and	 the	
accompanying	engineering	approach	 that	 it	 suggests,	 to	heart,	 and	 this	 is	 in	
turn	shaping	the	way	in	which	both	the	work	of	synthetic	biologists,	and	the	
products	of	their	work,	are	conceived.	Take	for	example	the	following	quotes	
from	Drew	Endy:	
“Most	 engineers	 have	 not	 looked	 at	 self-replicating	 machines	
before”	(Endy	quoted	in	Lentzos	et	al.	2008:	317).		
“The	 question	 arises,	 how	 do	 we	 design	 reproducing	 machines	
whose	designs	we	can	also	understand?	It’s	a	new	problem	for	most	
engineers,	 so	 figuring	 that	 one	 out	 is	 going	 to	 be	 pretty	 exciting”	
(Endy	quoted	in	Lentzos	et	al.	2008:	317).	
Here	Endy	does	not	refer	to	the	products	of	synthetic	biology	as	organisms,	
nor	those	looking	at	them	as	biologists,	or	even	synthetic	biologists,	but	rather	
he	 terms	 such	 products	 “self-replicating	 machines”	 and	 “reproducing	
machines,”	 and	 those	 investigating	 and	 designing	 them,	 “engineers.”	 Such	
language	is	powerful.	As	Rose	and	Miller	assert,	language	can	be	seen	as	a	kind	
of	 intellectual	 technology	 for	 rendering	 the	world	 thinkable	 and	 practicable	
(P.	 Miller	 and	 Rose	 1990;	 N.	 Rose	 and	 Miller	 2010).	 Thus,	 the	 mechanical,	
practical,	 interventionist	 language	 synthetic	 biologists	 are	 embracing	 can	 be	
seen	 to	 be	 affecting	 the	way	 they	 think	 about	 and	 act	within	 the	world.	 As	
Vincent	writes,	despite	diversity	in	their	engineering	ideals	and	practices,	“all	
synthetic	biologists	seem	to	share	the	conviction	that	designing	or	redesigning	
organisms	 is	making	 the	 future”	 (2013:	 26).	 Thus,	 through	 their	 speech	 acts,	
synthetic	biologists	are	shaping	“a	specific	vision	of	the	future,	as	being	in	the	
hands	 of	 humans,”	 (Vincent	 2013:	 26).	 Furthermore,	 they	 are	 following	 this	
conviction	with	action	that	is	ultimately	shaping	reality.	
Taking	 these	 insights	 from	Keller,	Vincent,	 and	Miller	 and	Rose	 then,	we	
can	 perhaps	 think	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	 adoption	 of	 metaphors	 and	
terminology	from	various	fields	of	engineering	as	not	only	an	act	of	discipline	
building,	as	was	be	discussed	in	chapter	four,	but	also	as	an	influence	on	both	
the	scope	of	the	discipline,	and	on	the	synthetic	biologists’	understandings	of	
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the	 natural	 world.	 Yet	 it	 goes	 further	 than	 this,	 as	 the	 conviction	 that	
organisms	 can	 be	 treated	 as/like	 machines	 is	 arguably	 challenging	 the	
machine/organism	divide	in	a	whole	new	way,	something	that	was	discussed	
in	chapter	five.	Yet	to	dig	even	deeper,	the	language	shifts	we	are	seeing	within	
synthetic	biology	are	arguably	part	of	a	wider	cultural	shift	within	our	modern	
society	 generally.	A	 shift,	 that	 is,	 towards	 the	 increasing	 technologisation	 of	
our	lives	and	world,184	which	is	influencing	the	emergence	of	the	notion	of	life	
as	engineerable	material.		
The	‘technologisation’	of	life	
Karen	Kastenhofer	(2007)	maintains	that	the	idea	of	life	as	technology	is	the	
result	 of	 an	 epistemic	 cultural	 shift	 within	 the	 life	 sciences	 towards	 a	
technoscientific	paradigm.	To	this	ends,	she	argues	that	shifts	in	the	epistemic	
cultures	of	fields	such	as	synthetic	biology	(as	was	discussed	in	chapter	three)	
are	part	of	a	more	general	shift	in	the	epistemic	cultures	of	the	life	sciences.	A	
shift	 that	 she	maintains	 is	 being	 prompted	 by	 the	 continual	 convergence	 of	
the	life	sciences	within	the	field	of	biotechnology.185	Kastenhofer	writes	of	this	
convergence	 that	 it	 “can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 cultural	 assimilation	 under	 a	
technoscientific	 paradigm”	 (2007:	 367).	 Her	 subsequent	 definition	 of	 the	
technosciences186	that	result	from	such	a	cultural	assimilation,	does	appear	to	
describe	 synthetic	 biology	 rather	 well.	 She	 writes,	 “[t]he	 resulting	
technosciences	 favour	 specific	 epistemic	 characteristics,	 such	 as	 easily	
																																								 								
184	See,	for	example,	the	current	discussions	regarding	robots	taking	over	more	and	more	jobs	
and	tasks	(M.	Ford	2015;	McNeal	2015).	
185	The	 other	 examples	 mentioned	 by	 Kastenhofer	 (2007)	 are	 molecular	 biology,	 genetics,	
agricultural	science,	biomedicine,	pharmacy,	and	biophysics.	
186	The	 term	 “technoscience”	 was	 first	 coined	 by	 Belgian	 philosopher	 Gilbert	Hottois	 in	 the	
1970s	 and	 was	 subsequently	 popularised	 by	 members	 of	 the	 science	 studies	 community	
including	Bruno	Latour	 (Hopkins	 1928),	 and	Donna	Haraway,	 (1987).	As	Keller	 describes	 it,	
“[t]he	term	came	to	be	employed	to	underscore	the	illusory	character	of	the	classical	divides	
between	representing	and	intervening,	looking	and	touching,	pure	and	applied	science,	and	to	
do	away	with	 these	divides.	 It	was	a	manifestly	polemical	 intervention,	 aimed	at	debunking	
the	myth	of	pure	science”	(2009b:	293).	However,	she	acknowledges	that	this	is	no	longer	the	
use	 to	which	 the	 term	 is	 put.	Writing	 that,	 “[t]hese	days,	 however,	we	do	not	use	 the	 term	
‘technoscience’	 as	 a	 political/intellectual	 intervention,	 or	 as	 a	 statement	 of	 disillusionment,	
but	simply	as	a	characterization	of	the	way	things	are”	(2009b:	293).		
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controllable	 scientific	 objects,	 controlled	 experimental	 settings,	 high-
throughput	practices,	a	‘black	boxing’	of	elements	in	the	experimental	system,	
and	 an	 orientation	 towards	 functionality	 and	 applicability	 rather	 than	
discovery	or	‘Verstehen’	(comprehension)”	(Kastenhofer	2007:	367).		
If	Kastenhofer	is	correct	that	there	is	a	general	shift	within	the	life	sciences	
towards	the	technoscientific	(a	view	supported	by	Keller	(2009b)	and	Clarke	et	
al.	 (2010)),	 then	 this	would	help	 to	explain	 the	emergence	 in	 recent	years	of	
fields	such	as	synthetic	biology.	Fields,	 that	 is,	which	 lie	at	 the	crossroads	of	
biology	 and	 engineering	 embracing	 elements	 from	 both	 disciplines.	 Such	 a	
paradigm	shift	would	also	support	the	notion,	forwarded	herein,	that	biology	
and	engineering	have	 reached	a	point	of	 convergence.	While	also	helping	 to	
explain	 why	 those	 from	 biology	 and	 engineering	 backgrounds	 are	 now	
interested	 in	 engaging	with	 each	 other,	where	 such	 engagement	 has	 been	 a	
stumbling	 point	 in	 the	 past.	 Yet,	 identifying	 an	 epistemic,	 or	 paradigmatic	
shift,	 as	 Kastenhofer	 attempts	 to	 do,	 is	 not	 akin	 to	 a	 claim	 that	 societal	
attitudes	 have	 uniformly	 shifted.	 Indeed,	 despite	 this	 current	 momentum	
towards	 the	 technologisation	 of	 life,	 and	 towards	 seeing	 life	 as	 engineerable	
material,	there	are	those	who	have	voiced	concerns	over	such	combinations	of	
biology	 and	 engineering,	 who	 see	 the	 technologisation	 of	 life	 as	 potentially	
problematic.	
	Resistance	to	the	technologisation	of	life	
Despite	 writing	 extensively	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 biotechnology	 Bud,	 for	
example,	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 an	 inherent	 juxtaposition	 in	 the	 term	
“biotechnology”.	He	notes	that:	
“‘Bio’	 suggests	 natural;	 it	 connotes	 all	 those	 living	 things	 whose	
lives,	it	often	seems,	would	be	better	but	for	the	human	species.	By	
contrast	 ‘technology’	 evokes	 human	 control	 over	 nature.	 The	
combination	of	 the	 two	has	often	 seemed	deeply	disturbing,	 even	
monstrous,	 as	 amalgams	 of	 people	 and	 machines	 have	 been	
described”	(1993:	2-3).		
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Such	concerns	have	indeed	been	raised	in	regards	to	synthetic	biology	by	the	
ETC-group	 (ETC	 Group	 2007,	 2010),	 the	 media	 (Pauwels	 and	 Ifrim	 2008;	
Pauwels	 et	 al.	 2012),	 and	 the	 public	 (Pauwels	 2009).	 All	 of	 whom	 have	
expressed	discomfort	with	synthetic	biology’s	engineering	approach	to	life	and	
have	 raised	 concerns	 that	 tinkering	 with	 life,	 and	 seeking	 to	 control	 it,	 is	
inherently	dangerous	and	must	be	carefully	managed.	While,	for	others,	their	
concern	with	the	combination	of	biology	and	engineering	revolves	around	its	
impact	on	biology	as	a	fundamental	science.	
Foremost	 amongst	 such	 detractors	 of	 the	 technologisation	 of	 life	 is	
microbiologist	 Carl	 Woese.	 Woese	 argued	 that	 science	 is	 impelled	 by	 two	
main	factors,	technological	advance	and	a	guiding	vision,	and	that	it	is	key	to	
the	successful	development	of	a	science	that	these	two	are	in	balance.	Woese	
contended	 that	 without	 the	 necessary	 technological	 advances,	 the	 science	
cannot	move	 forward,	 but	 “without	 a	 guiding	 vision	 there	 is	no	 road	 ahead;	
the	 science	 becomes	 an	 engineering	 discipline,	 concerned	 with	 temporal	
practical	 problems”	 (Woese	 2004:	 173).	 It	 is	 to	 this	 fate	 that	Woese	 believes	
molecular	 biology	 has	 fallen.	 He	 writes	 that	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 twentieth	
century,	 molecular	 biology	 considered	 all	 of	 the	 big	 problems,	 such	 as	 the	
human	genome,	to	be	solved,	and	thus	he	argues	that	molecular	biology	lost	
its	 guiding	 vision.	 With	 the	 focus	 shifting	 from	 understanding	 to	
manipulating,	 Woese	 argues	 that	 molecular	 biology	 has	 become	 an	
engineering	discipline	obsessed	with	fundamental	reductionism.		
While	Woese	 (2004)	does	not	write	on	 the	 subject	of	 synthetic	biology,	 a	
field	 that	 emerged	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 his	 life,	 given	his	 aversion	 to	 biology	
becoming	 an	 engineering	 discipline,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 imagine	 that	 he	 would	
support	it.	For	although	synthetic	biology	arguably	has	a	guiding	vision,	in	its	
desire	to	make	biology	easier	to	engineer,	such	a	vision	is	scarcely	in	line	with	
Woese’s	support	for	basic	science	and	understanding.	He	wrote,	for	example,	
that	“[a]	society	that	permits	biology	to	become	an	engineering	discipline,	that	
allows	that	science	to	slip	 into	the	role	of	changing	the	 living	world	without	
trying	to	understand	it,	is	a	danger	to	itself”	(Woese	2004:	173).		
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Woese	 claimed	 that	 the	 danger	 of	 such	 a	 reductionistic,	 interventionist	
approach	is	that,	 ‘it	stripped	the	organism	from	its	environment;	separated	it	
from	its	history,	from	the	evolutionary	flow;	and	shredded	it	into	parts	to	the	
extent	 that	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 whole	 –	 the	 whole	 cell,	 the	 whole	 multicellular	
organism,	 the	 biosphere	 –	 was	 effectively	 gone”	 (Woese	 2004:	 179).	 Thus,	
despite	what	has	appeared	to	be	a	slow	but	steady	movement	within	biology	
towards	a	convergence	with	engineering,	such	an	approach	to	the	science,	and	
its	 associated	 conception	 of	 life	 as	 engineerable	material,	 has	 its	 detractors.	
Just	as	all	previous	conceptions	of	life	have	had.		
However,	 what	 is	 different	 here	 is	 that,	 as	Woese	 states,	 at	 this	 point	 of	
convergence,	and	under	this	conception	of	life,	for	the	first	time	biology	runs	
the	risk	of	losing	its	status	as	a	fundamental	science	by	becoming	little	more	
than	a	tool	for	engineering.	He	writes,	“[b]iology	today	is	 little	more	than	an	
engineering	 discipline.	 Thus,	 biology	 is	 at	 the	 point	 where	 it	 must	 choose	
between	two	paths:	either	continue	on	its	current	track,	 in	which	case	it	will	
become	 mired	 in	 the	 present,	 in	 application,	 or	 break	 free	 of	 reductionist	
hegemony,	 reintegrate	 itself,	 and	press	 forward	once	more	as	 a	 fundamental	
science”	(Woese	2004:	185).		
If	he	were	still	alive,	Woese	would	perhaps	support	the	post-genomic	shift	
of	biology,	given	its	drive	to	return	attention	to	biology’s	whole,	and	to	engage	
with	 fundamental	 research.	 However,	 given	 that	 at	 least	 some	 synthetic	
biologists,	 including	 Endy	 (2008),	 Tucker	 and	 Zilinskas	 (2006),	 and	 indeed	
some	 members	 of	 the	 Centre	 (as	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 four),	 envision	 the	
future	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 as	 being	 dominated	 by	 engineers,	 it	would	 seem	
that	 synthetic	 biology,	 and	 the	 other	 disciplines	 arising	 at	 the	
biology/engineering	 crossroads,	 are	 pressing	 on	 down	 the	 first	 of	 Woese’s	
paths.	Whether	these	two	trends	in	biology	continue	side-by-side,	examples	of	
the	two	paths	Woese	spoke	of,	or	whether	one	falls	out	of	favour	as	the	other	
persists,	remains	to	be	seen.		
 268 
Conclusion	
What	 we	 can	 predict,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	 way	 we	 understand	 and	 ‘do’	
biology	is	likely	to	continue	evolving.	Especially	given	Gayon’s	(2010)	assertion	
that,	 despite	 millennia	 of	 investigation	 and	 examination,	 there	 remains	 no	
scientific	consensus	on	the	definition	of	biology’s	defining	concept,	 ‘life.’	Yet,	
despite	this	lack	of	consensus,	as	each	of	the	various	dominant	conceptions	of	
life,	 detailed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 arose,	 they	 captured	 the	 imagination	 of	 those	
who	study	life	and	biology.	Thus	shaping	not	only	the	scientists’	‘landscapes	of	
possibility,’	but	also	the	direction	and	focus	of	the	science	of	biology	itself.		
Each	of	these	conceptions	of	life	drew	on	those	that	came	before,	reframing	
past	 ideas	and	repurposing	language,	but	still	 forming	a	trail	of	thought	that	
spans	 back	 2366	 years	 to	 Aristotle’s	 concept	 of	 life	 as	 animation.	 As	 I	 have	
highlighted	 in	 this	 chapter,	 throughout	 the	 twists	 and	 turns	 of	 this	 trail	 of	
thought,	mechanism	and	the	technologisation	of	life	have	slowly	been	growing	
more	 and	 more	 persistent,	 and	 burrowing	 deeper	 and	 deeper	 into	 our	
understandings	 of	 life.	While	 this	 has	 been	 a	 slow	 process	 it	 has,	 as	 I	 have	
outlined	 above,	 arguably	 brought	 biology	 to	 a	 point	 of	 convergence	 with	
engineering.	 A	 point	 where	 ideas,	 language,	 and	methods	 from	 engineering	
are	shaping	the	way	biology	is	spoken	about,	understood,	and	engaged	with.	A	
point	 where	 not	 only	 organisms,	 their	 tissues,	 their	movements,	 their	 cells,	
and	 their	DNA	are	understood	mechanistically,	but	where	 it	 is	believed	 that	
engineers	can	use	this	conception	of	life	to	build	biological	machines.	Life,	it	is	
maintained,	 not	 only	 resembles	 engineerable	 material,	 it	 is	 engineerable	
material.	
From	 this	 position,	 synthetic	 biology,	 with	 its	 heavily	 mechanistic	
reductionism,	 is	 clearly	 building	 on	 the	 work	 of	 modern	 biotechnology.	
Drawing	 on	 the	 biotechnological	 notion	 that	 biology	 is	 a	 manufacturing	
technology,	 synthetic	 biologists	 are	 addressing	 the	 perceived	 ‘failure’	 of	 the	
human	 genome	 project	 to	 produce	 a	 digital	 parts	 list	 for	 an	 organism	 by	
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attempting	to	design	and	build	their	own	standardised,	universal	parts	list.187	
A	 parts	 list	 that,	 some	maintain,	 can	 then	 be	 used	 to	 construct	 organisms.	
Thus	 they	 are	 seeing	 life	 as	 the	 raw	 materials,	 like	 any	 other	 construction	
materials,	for	the	development	of	engineering	projects.	Mechanism	here	is	not	
just	 an	 explanatory	 or	 descriptive	 tool	 but	 rather;	 as	 the	 focus	 shifted	 from	
understanding	 to	 building,	 biology	 has,	 arguably,	 finally	 entered	 its	 long	
anticipated	synthetic	phase.		
Furthermore,	 while	 synthetic	 biology,	 with	 its	 drive	 to	 design	 and	 build	
synthetic	 organisms,	 fits	 underneath	 the	 umbrella	 of	 biotechnology,	 it	
nevertheless	 bears	 a	 significant	 difference	 to	 the	 biotechnology	 that	 came	
before.	 This	 difference	 lies	 with	 the	 role	 of	 engineers.	 Engineers	 have,	 as	 I	
outline	above,	 long	played	a	part	in	modern	biotechnology,	however	this	has	
ordinarily	been	in	a	supportive	role,	designing	and	engineering	the	equipment	
and	 processes.	 In	 synthetic	 biology,	 as	 in	 other	 contemporary	 disciplines	
emerging	at	the	crossroads	of	biology	and	engineering,	the	role	of	engineers	is	
much	more	 central,	 and	 the	 targets	 of	 their	 engineering	 concepts,	methods,	
and	 approach	 are	 the	 organisms	 themselves.	 Indeed	 synthetic	 biology	 has	
embraced	 engineering	 so	 completely	 that	 it	 is	 conceived	 of	 by	 some	 as	 an	
engineering,	rather	than	a	biological,	discipline.		
This	swing	within	the	life	sciences	towards	engineering	has	been	termed	a	
technoscientific	 shift	 by	Kastenhofer	 (2007).	A	 term	 she	uses	 to	 encapsulate	
this	epistemic	shift	 in	our	 interactions	with,	and	 interpretations	of,	 life.	This	
shift	 is,	 I	 contend,	 having	 a	 profound	 impact	 on	 our	 conception	 of	 life.	 As	
emerging	 hybrid	 disciplines	 such	 as	 synthetic	 biology,	 strive	 to	 apply	 their	
highly	mechanistic	version	of	 reductionism	to	their	encounters	with	biology,	
they	 are	 bringing	 into	 being	 a	 new	 conception	 of	 life,	 life	 as	 engineerable	
material.	 Consequently,	 and	 in	 conclusion,	 I	 would	 respond	 to	 Jacob’s	
question	of	what	analysis	will	next	break	down	biology	and	reconstitute	it	in	a	
new	space,	with	the	answer:	engineering.	We	are,	I	believe,	rightly	or	wrongly	
																																								 								
187	Most	notably	the	iGEM	Registry	of	Standard	Biological	Parts	which	currently	contains	over	
20000	documented	parts	(iGEM).	
 270 
seeing	the	beginnings	of	a	new	conception	of	life	that	fits	into	our	increasingly	
technologised	world.	This	 conception	 is	of	 life	 as	 engineerable	material,	 and	
synthetic	biology	is	its	poster	child.	
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Chapter	Seven:	Conclusion	
As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 four,	 the	 prevailing	 rhetoric	 surrounding	 the	
emerging	discipline	of	synthetic	biology	frames	it	as	an	unproblematic	hybrid	
endeavour,	which	draws	on	both	engineering	and	biology	but	which	is	neither	
solely	 one	 nor	 the	 other.	 A	 biotechnological	 discipline,	 which	 is	 applying	 a	
rational	 engineering	 approach	 to	 biology	 in	 order	 to	 design	 and	 produce	
synthetic	 organisms	 that	 perform	 predetermined,	 desired	 functions	 as	
biological	machines.	 Yet,	 underneath	 the	 gloss	 of	 synthetic	 biology,	 the	 so-
called	harbinger	 of	 the	next	 industrial	 revolution,	 is	 a	world	 brimming	with	
stories,	 stories	 that	 are	 obscured	 by	 this	 oversimplified	 rhetoric.	Within	 the	
newly	established,	dedicated,	academic	research	centre	where	I	undertook	my	
research	 I	 encountered	 stories	 of	 conflict	 and	 compromise,	 confusion	 and	
classification,	 constraint	 and	 collaboration,	 all	 encapsulated	within	 synthetic	
biology’s	attempt	to	control	life	at	a	molecular	level.	Thus	in	attempting	to	lift	
the	 lid	 on	 synthetic	 biology,	 to	 see	 how	 accurately	 the	 prevailing	 rhetoric	
played	out	in	practice,	I	discovered	a	far	messier	and	more	interesting	world.	
The	stories	of	this	world,	which	weave	their	way	through	this	thesis,	thus	paint	
a	much	fuller	picture	of	the	developing	discipline	than	the	rhetoric	alone.	
From	these	many	stories	I	have	teased	out	two	overarching	tales.	The	first	is	
the	 story	 of	 the	 formation	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 as	 it	 played	 out	 in	 a	 newly	
established,	 dedicated,	 academic	 research	 centre.	 I	 have	 offered	 here	 an	
ethnographic	 account	 of	 the	 hard	 work,	 conflict,	 collaboration,	 and	
compromise	 that	 such	 an	 attempt	 at	 disciplinary	 formation	 requires.	A	 case	
study	that	ultimately	explores	the	features	of	the	emerging	discipline	that	go	
unrecognised	by	 a	 prevailing	 rhetoric	 that	 conceals,	 rather	 than	 illuminates,	
the	 reality	 of	 the	 discipline’s	 day-to-day	 work.	 Whereas	 the	 second	
overarching	 story	 within	 this	 thesis,	 explores	 the	 work	 to	 bring	 to	 fruition	
synthetic	 biology’s	 goal	 of	 applying	 a	 stringently	 reductionistic	 and	
mechanistic	approach	to	biology,	and	the	history	behind	this	approach.	I	have	
focused	not	on	whether	such	reductionism	 is	appropriate	but	 rather	on	how	
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the	practical	and	conceptual	challenges	its	application	entails	are	navigated	by	
the	synthetic	biologists	at	the	Centre,	and	ultimately	how	synthetic	biology’s	
embrace	 of	 engineering	 and	 reductionism	 is	 shaping	 the	 way	 biology	 is	
thought	about	and	‘done.’188		
Disciplinary	formation	
The	story	of	the	emergence	of	synthetic	biology,	as	it	played	out	within	the	
Centre,	is	woven	through	chapters	two,	three,	and	four.	The	Centre	itself,	that	
gleaming,	glass-walled	space	spread	over	two	levels	of	the	Engineering	School	
of	 a	 prestigious	 UK	 university,	 and	 filled	 with	 people	 and	 equipment,	 is	
evidence	 in	 and	 of	 itself	 of	 the	 funding	 being	 poured	 into,	 and	 the	
infrastructure	being	assembled	in	the	name	of,	synthetic	biology.	As	Leonelli	
and	Ankeny	(2015)	attest,	 such	 infrastructural	 features	and	resources	are	key	
to	the	creation	of	resilient	scientific	communities.	Collaborative	communities	
that	must	move	beyond	short-term	projects	in	order	to	establish	themselves	as	
disciplines	in	their	own	right.	Leonelli	and	Ankeny	(2015)	term	the	distinctive	
and	 shared	 ensemble	 of	 elements	 required	 for	 such	 an	 establishment	 a	
‘repertoire,’	while	Fujimura	(1987)	refers	to	the	alignment	of	such	elements	as	
the	 formation	of	 ‘doability.’	 Both,	 as	 I	 argue	 in	 chapter	 four,	 can	be	 seen	 as	
core	 elements	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 new	 epistemic	 culture,	 and	 thus	 a	 new	
discipline.	However,	while	the	Centre	clearly	displayed	the	necessary	physical	
and	 material	 components	 of	 a	 repertoire,	 it	 was,	 I	 discovered,	 the	 social,	
conceptual,	and	practical	elements	that	required	greater	effort	to	instigate.		
Indeed,	the	synthetic	biologists	at	the	Centre	had	the	disciplinary	name,	the	
laboratories,	 the	 people,	 the	 equipment,	 the	 high	 profile	 cross-research	
council	funding,	the	conferences	to	attend,	and	the	journals	to	publish	in.	All	
factors	 at	 the	 experiment,	 laboratory,	 and	 social	 levels	 that,	 according	 to	
Fujimura	(1987),	need	to	be	aligned	in	order	to	establish	a	scientific	problem	
																																								 								
188	Given	 that	 this	 case	 study	explores	one	 site,	 located	 in	one	country,	during	one	year,	 the	
findings	 I	present	here	may	not	ring	 true	 for	other	sites,	countries,	and	times.	Nevertheless,	
my	findings	were	supported	by	my	many	observations	of	other	synthetic	biology	settings	and	
meetings,	in	the	U.K.,	the	U.S.	and	Japan.	
 273 
as	 doable.	 However,	 instituting	 the	 practical	 and	 conceptual	 norms	 to	 aid	
collaboration	 and	 cooperation	 between	 synthetic	 biologists	 hailing	 from	
biology	and	those	from	engineering	was	far	from	easy.	Yet	the	common	call	for	
such	 norms	 from	 both	 Leonelli	 and	 Ankeny	 (2015),	 and	 Fujimura	 (1987),	
suggests	 they	 play	 a	 key	 part	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 resilient	 research	
community	which	is	focused	on	a	doable	problem.	As	such,	chapters	three	and	
four	 explored	 the	 challenges	 of	 establishing	 such	 practical	 and	 conceptual	
norms	within	the	emerging	hybrid	discipline	of	synthetic	biology.	
Clearly,	 despite	 the	 rhetoric	 about	 synthetic	 biology	 being	 a	 hybrid	
discipline,	achieving	the	hybridisation	of	ideas	from	biology	and	engineering,	
and	the	collaboration	between	engineers	and	biologists	that	this	requires,	is	a	
challenging	 task.	 Chapter	 three	 explicitly	 explored	 this	 challenge	within	 the	
Centre,	 arguing	 that	 the	 difficulties	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	 face	 in	 bringing	
the	 two	 ‘sides’	 of	 the	 discipline	 together	 stem	 from	 the	 epistemic	 cultural	
differences	 between	 biology	 and	 engineering.	 Indeed,	 through	 ethnographic	
observations,	 and	 both	 informal	 and	 formal	 interviews,	 I	 became	 aware	 of	
significant	disparities	between	those	who	hailed	from	biology	and	those	from	
engineering,	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 language	 use,	 knowledge	 base,	 methods,	
research	 questions,	 research	 objects,	 and	 general	 approach	 to	 research	 and	
data.	These	differences,	it	became	apparent,	are	the	cause	of	frustrations	and	
tensions,	 misunderstandings	 and	 miscommunications,	 and	 are,	 I	 maintain,	
hurdles	 that	need	to	be	overcome	 in	order	 to	establish	a	clear,	coherent,	yet	
hybrid,	epistemic	culture	for	the	developing	discipline.		
I	 argued	 in	 chapter	 three	 that	negotiating	 these	hurdles	 requires	 that	 the	
synthetic	 biologists	 bridge	 the	 epistemic	 cultural	 divide	 between	 the	 two	
‘sides’	 of	 the	 discipline,	 and	 throughout	 my	 fieldwork	 I	 observed	 clear	
attempts	 to	 do	 so.	Driven	 by	 a	 desire	 and	determination	 to	 ‘make	 synthetic	
biology	 work’	 those	 at	 the	 Centre	 were	 largely	 working	 hard	 to	 bridge	 this	
epistemic	gap,	and	these	efforts	form	part	of	the	story	of	the	unsung	struggles	
to	bring	 the	discipline	of	 synthetic	biology	 to	 life.	 Efforts,	 that	 is,	which	 are	
glossed	 over	 by	 the	 prevailing	 rhetoric	 that	 presents	 it	 as	 easy,	 and	
straightforward.	 These	 efforts	 included	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 shared	 language	
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(even	 if	 it	 did	 not	 sit	 well	 with	 everyone),	 the	 sharing	 of	 research	 objects	
(though	they	 interacted	with	 them	in	very	different	 forms,	 i.e.	as	colonies	of	
organisms	 to	 experiment	 with	 or	 as	 numbers	 to	 feed	 into	 mathematical	
equations),	and	the	formation	of	hybrid	research	projects.		
Through	my	fieldwork	I	encountered	two	distinct	strategies	for	drawing	on	
both	 sides	 of	 the	 discipline’s	 knowledge	 base,	 research	 questions,	 and	
methods,	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 such	 hybrid	 projects.	 These	 two	 strategies,	
namely	 the	 formation	 of	 close,	 collaborative	 working	 relationships,	 and	 the	
attempts	 by	 primarily	 doctoral	 students	 to	 become	 interdisciplinary	
individuals	were,	 I	 contend,	 playing	 a	 role	 in	 the	 establishment	 of	 synthetic	
biology	 as	 a	 coherent	 discipline	 with	 a	 coherent,	 and	 distinct	 approach	 to	
engaging	with	 biology.	Within	 both	 strategies,	 the	 synthetic	 biologists	were	
attempting	 to	 move	 beyond	 the	 limits	 of	 their	 previous	 training	 (either	 by	
working	closely	with	someone	with	a	different	knowledge	and	skill	base,	or	by	
acquiring	 new	 knowledge	 and	 skills	 themselves),	 and	 in	 this	 way	 they	were	
striving	 to	 achieve	 the	 generation	 of	 new	 science,	 and	 new	 scientific	
knowledge,	 which	 is	 central	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 new	 discipline.	 Yet	
despite	 the	 commitment	 to	 such	 a	 hybrid	 approach,	 I	 would	 argue	 that	
synthetic	 biology	 has	 not	 yet	 achieved	 the	 cohesion	 of	 an	 established	
discipline.	That	is,	although	chapter	three	tells	the	story	of	a	discipline	in	the	
process	 of	 hybridising,	 of	 merging,	 or	 fusing,	 I	 argue	 that,	 due	 to	 the	
persistent,	 epistemic	 cultural	differences	within	 the	discipline,	 it	has	not	 yet	
achieved	this	ends.		
The	 state	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	 hybridity,	 as	 I	 discuss	 in	 chapter	 three,	
brings	 to	 mind	 cell	 fusion.	 During	 the	 formation	 of	 new	 disciplines	 like	
synthetic	 biology	 there	 are,	 I	 contend,	 intermediate	 states	 between	 the	
component	parts	being	separate	entities	and	their	merging	to	become	a	single	
hybrid	 entity.	 Furthermore,	 I	 contend	 that	 an	 interdiscipline	 like	 the	
reproductive	sciences,	which	involves	distinctive	subworlds	(A.	Clarke	1998),	is	
quite	different	to	one	like	physics,	which	has	coalesced	to	such	a	degree	that	it	
has	 formed	 a	 cohesive	 	 singular	 discipline	 (albeit	 with	 internal	 specialities).	
Both	 kinds	 of	 interdisciplinary	 research	 community	 are	 formed	 through	
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collaboration	 but	 I	 contend	 that,	 as	 they	 draw	 on	 different	 kinds	 of	
collaboration,	we	can	draw	on	different	 intercellular	 interaction	analogies	 to	
explore	them.		
In	 the	 case	 of	 interdisciplinary	 collaborations	 such	 as	 the	 reproductive	
sciences,	where	the	aim	is	to	create	a	research	community	with	shared	objects,	
but	 different	 disciplinary	 approaches	 to	 engaging	 with	 them,	 I	 draw	 on	 the	
analogy	of	intercellular	interactions	within	the	immune	system.	The	immune	
system	 involves	 different	 types	 of	 cells	 communicating,	 interacting,	 and	
‘cooperating’	 on	 a	 common	 goal,	 but	 remaining	 distinct	 and	 independent	
throughout.	 Meanwhile	 interdisciplinary	 endeavours	 such	 as	 physics,	
neuroscience,	and	synthetic	biology	are,	I	contend,	better	represented	by	the	
analogy	of	cell	fusion.	However,	where	physics	has	achieved	the	merging	and	
hybridising	of	 its	constituent	nuclei,	or	epistemic	cultures	 (mathematics	and	
natural	philosophy),	 in	order	 to	become	a	 cohesive	 interdiscipline,	 synthetic	
biology	has	not.	Rather,	while	it	has	a	shared	disciplinary	boundary,	analogous	
to	 a	 cell	 wall,	 and	 is	 working	 towards	 having	 shared	 universal	 disciplinary	
components	(language,	research	objects,	questions,	methods	etc.),	it	does	not	
yet	 have	 a	 unified	 epistemic	 cultural	 ‘nucleus.’	 As	 such,	 although	 synthetic	
biology	 is	working	hard	 to	 overcome	 its	 internal	 epistemic	 cultural	 division,	
given	the	persistent	talk	of	‘us’	and	‘them’	and	the	‘wet-lab’/biology,	and	‘dry-
lab’/modelling	 ‘sides’	 of	 the	 discipline,	 it	 has	 not	 yet	 achieved	 this.	 I	 would	
therefore	contend	that	as	a	discipline	synthetic	biology	is	yet	to	undergo	the	
equivalent	of	nuclear	 fusion.	 It	 is	 in	a	grey	zone	between	being	two	distinct,	
but	 interacting,	 disciplines,	 and	 being	 a	 cohesive,	 hybrid	 discipline,	 with	 a	
hybridised	 epistemic	 culture.	 This,	 I	maintain,	 is	 a	 boundary	 spanning	 zone	
which,	as	I	shall	discuss	below,	parallels	that	of	the	products	they	make.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 challenges	 of	 negotiating	 this	 disciplinary	 boundary	
spanning	 zone,	 by	 bridging	 the	 epistemic	 cultural	 divide	 between	 the	
discipline’s	two	sides,	is	not	the	only	challenge	that	synthetic	biology	faces	as	
it	 strives	 to	 establish	 itself	 as	 a	 coherent	 discipline	 working	 on	 a	 doable	
problem.	Rather,	as	stated	above,	the	Centre’s	 inhabitants	face	both	conflicts	
and	 compromises	 as	 they	 strive	 to	 establish	 the	 discipline’s	 practical	 and	
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conceptual	 norms.	 As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 four,	 synthetic	 biology	 not	 only	
strives	 to	 hybridise	 the	 disciplines	 of	 engineering	 and	 biology,	 but	 does	 so	
with	 the	 expressed	 goal	 of	 engineering	 biology	 (Endy	 2005).	 However,	 this	
application	of	an	engineering	approach	to	biology,	like	the	hybridisation	of	the	
disciplines,	 is	 a	 lot	 easier	 said	 than	 done.	 As	 addressed	 in	 chapter	 four,	
underpinning	 synthetic	 biology’s	 engineering	 approach	 is	 an	 emphasis	 on	
synthesis	 over	 analysis.	 A	 prioritisation	 that	 has	 become	 a	 key	 conceptual	
element	of	synthetic	biology’s	developing	repertoire.		
Such	 a	 prioritisation	 of	 synthesis,	 and	 adherence	 to	 the	 language	 and	
modes	of	working	of	engineering	 is,	 for	 synthetic	biology,	not	only	an	act	of	
repertoire	 building	 but	 of	 establishing	 disciplinary	 borders.	 To	 these	 ends,	 I	
found	 that	 those	 within	 the	 Centre	 drew	 heavily	 on	 an	 idealised	 version	 of	
what	engineering	is,	in	order	to	demarcate	the	field	of	synthetic	biology	from	
biology	 and	 align	 it	 with	 engineering.	 By	 appropriating	 engineering’s	
supposedly	 efficient,	 rigorous,	 and	 logical	 approach,	 the	 Centre	 framed	
synthetic	 biology	 as	 distinct	 from	 ‘traditional’	 biology.	 Presenting	 it	 as	 a	
discipline	 with	 a	 revolutionary	 way	 of	 interacting	 with,	 and	 ultimately	
controlling,	 biology	 and	 life.	 Nevertheless,	 while	 this	 appropriation	 was	
shaping	 the	 emerging	 discipline’s	 conceptual	 and	 practical	 norms,	 the	
engineering	 practices,	 which	 were	 professed	 to	 make	 up	 these	 new	 norms,	
were	all	a	lot	harder	to	apply	in	reality.	
Standardisation,	 the	 abstraction	 hierarchy,	 the	 design	 cycle,	 and	 using	
mathematical	modelling	 for	design	and	control	 (rather	 than	 representation),	
are	 all	 core	 elements	 of	 the	 Centre’s	 engineering	 approach.	 Yet	 these	
engineering-derived	 concepts	 and	 processes	 all	 currently	 require	 significant	
modifications,	 or	 omissions,	 in	 order	 to	 be	 applicable	 to	 biology.	 This	
difficulty	 is,	 in	 large	 part,	 due	 to	 our	 dearth	 of	 understanding	 regarding	
biology,	as	recently	demonstrated	by	syn3.0.189	This	degree	of	ignorance	makes	
the	goal	of	fully	standardising	and	characterising	bio-parts	problematic,	to	say	
																																								 								
189	The	minimal	cell	with	a	genome	of	473	genes,	 149	of	which	are	not	understood	(Clyde	A.	
Hutchison	et	al.	2016).	
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the	 least.	 Furthermore,	 this	 situation	 makes	 the	 application	 of	 engineering	
concepts	and	practices,	designed	as	they	are	for	the	manipulation	and	control	
of	standardised	and	well-characterised	materials,	challenging.	Thus	I	argued	in	
chapter	 four	 that,	 although	 the	 prevailing	 rhetoric	 surrounding	 synthetic	
biology	 suggests	 that	 applying	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	 biology	 is	
straightforward,	in	the	Centre	at	least,	this	application	required	a	fair	amount	
of	kludging.		
No	 single	 element	 of	 the	 engineering	 approach	was	 applied	 seamlessly	 to	
biology	within	the	Centre;	rather,	the	synthetic	biologists	I	spoke	with	did	the	
best	 they	 could	with	 approximations	 and	modifications.	 Indeed,	 despite	 the	
gulf	 between	 the	 reality	 of	 the	 engineering	 content	 of	 their	 work	 and	 the	
prevailing	 rhetoric,	 they	 seemed	 to	 be	making	 their	 kludged	 version	 of	 the	
engineering	 approach	 work.	 The	 language,	 research	 questions,	 experiments,	
models,	data	gathering,	and	working	relationships,	of	those	at	the	Centre	were	
all	 being	 altered	 by	 this	 kludged	 version	 of	 an	 engineering	 approach.	 Thus,	
despite	 its	 challenges	 and	 limited	 applicability,	 those	 at	 the	 Centre	 were	
ultimately	using	 it	 to	 shape	 the	 repertoire,	 and	 the	practical	 and	conceptual	
norms,	 for	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 community.	 Moreover,	 given	 that	 the	
research	 problem	 they	 are	 seeking	 to	 render	 doable	 is	 the	 application	 of	 an	
engineering	approach	to	biology,	through	standardising	the	Centre’s	approach	
to	 their	work	 using	 this	 assortment	 of	 kludged	 concepts	 and	 practices	 from	
engineering	they	are	also,	ultimately,	increasing	the	doability	of	this	research	
agenda.	However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	note	 that	 this	 is	not	 the	 same	as	 saying	
that	biology	will	prove	to	be	engineerable	in	the	way	the	rhetoric	they	adhere	
to	professes	it	will.	Indeed,	whether	or	not	synthetic	biology	will	ever	manage	
to	design	and	build	organisms	from	the	‘bottom	up’	using	solely	standardised,	
well-characterised	 bioparts,	 is	 something	 even	 synthetic	 biologists	 are	
uncertain	of,	optimistic	about	certainly,	but	uncertain	of	nonetheless.	
As	such	I	would	contend	that	the	story	of	synthetic	biology’	emergence,	as	
it	played	out	in	the	Centre	during	my	fieldwork,	was	one	of	an	interdiscipline	
in	the	process	of	merging	its	constituent	parts.	This	 is	a	challenging	process,	
which	 may,	 or	 may	 not,	 yield	 a	 new	 cohesive	 hybrid	 discipline	 with	
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characteristics	 of	 both	 biology	 and	 engineering.	 Cell	 fusion,	 after	 all,	 has	 a	
high	failure	rate.	However,	at	 least	for	now,	the	hybridisation	I	observed	was	
incomplete,	and	the	 internal	struggles	 to	create	the	conceptual	and	practical	
norms	 for	 the	 developing	 hybrid	 discipline	were	 very	 real.	 These	 challenges	
were	 being	 tackled	using	 the	 application	of	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	 just	
about	everything	–	the	language,	the	experimental	questions,	the	data,	and	the	
research	strategies.	However	the	engineering	approach	being	applied	was	not	
the	hallowed,	 pure,	 idealised	 approach	of	 engineering	 that	 synthetic	 biology	
ostensibly	embraces.	In	practice,	this	was	a	kludged	engineering	approach,	an	
improvised,	 inelegant	 engineering	 that,	 despite	 its	 cobbled	 together	 nature,	
was	 nevertheless	 shaping	 the	 discipline,	 and	 its	 emerging,	 hybrid,	 epistemic	
culture.	
Reductionism	and	complexity	
The	 second	 story	 that	winds	 through	 this	 thesis	 also	 takes	 as	 its	 starting	
point	 the	 discipline’s	 claims	 regarding	 applying	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	
biology.	However,	where	the	story	of	synthetic	biology’s	emergence	examines	
the	 practical	 aspects	 of	 such	 an	 engineering	 approach,	 and	 the	 ways	 it	 is	
negotiated	and	enacted	across	an	epistemic	cultural	divide,	this	second	story	
explores	 the	 conceptual	 challenges	 of	 applying	 the	 approach’s	 explicit	
reductionism	 and	 mechanism	 at	 the	 biological	 coalface.	 The	 engineering	
approach	itself,	its	goals,	concepts,	and	language	are	replete	with	reductionism	
and	 mechanism.	 Yet,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 there	 is	 still	 so	 much	 that	 is	
unknown	about	biology,	and	this	realm	of	the	unknown	is	a	hindrance	to	the	
application	of	reductionism.		
As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 one,	 Francis	 Crick	 (1966)	 argued	 that	 the	way	 to	
refute	vitalism,	the	sworn	enemy	of	reductionism,	would	be	to	create	a	living	
organism	 synthetically.	 However,	 he	 contended	 that	 understanding	 the	 cell	
was	 a	more	 important	 goal.	 Venter	 claimed	 to	 have	 achieved	 this	 first	 goal	
with	 Synthia,	 declaring	 ‘her’	 to	 be	 a	 synthetic	 organism,	 however	 with	 his	
subsequent	‘synthetic’	organism	syn3.0	he	acknowledged	that,	as	a	third	of	the	
organism’s	genome	defied	understanding,	his	team	had	not	yet	achieved	this	
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second,	more	 fundamental,	 goal.	This	degree	of	 uncertainty	undermines	 the	
application	of	reductionism,	and	its	drive	to	explain	life	completely	in	physico-
chemical	 terms,	 and	 therefore	 also	 the	 ability	 to	 create	 synthetic	 organisms	
from	 standardised,	 well-characterised	 parts	 (though	 this	 has	 never	 been	
Venter’s	 approach	 to	 synthetic	biology190).	 Indeed,	 as	 Jim	Collins,	 one	of	 the	
early	 proponents	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	 reductionistic	 approach	 to	 biology,	
acknowledges,	 “synthetic	 biology	 projects	 are	 frequently	 thwarted	 when	
engineering	 runs	 up	 against	 the	 complexity	 of	 biology”	 (2014:	 155).	 Leaving	
synthetic	 biologists	 in	 a	 situation	 whereby	 they	 “do	 not	 yet	 know	 enough	
biology	to	make	synthetic	biology	a	predictable	engineering	discipline”	(2014:	
155).		
Thus,	 there	 remains	 a	 clear	 gap	 between	 the	 reality	 and	 the	 rhetoric	 of	
applying	 a	 reductionistic,	 mechanistic,	 engineering	 approach	 to	 biology.	
Within	the	Centre	I	encountered	this	gap	in	both	the	efforts	to	hybridise	the	
discipline,	 by	 bringing	 the	 engineers	 and	 biologists	 together,	 as	 discussed	
above,	 and	 within	 the	 struggles	 those	 at	 the	 Centre	 faced	 in	 trying	 to	
conceptually	 and	 practically	 adhere	 to	 the	 reductionism	 of	 the	 engineering	
approach.	Foremost	amongst	the	causes	of	this	latter	challenge	appeared	to	be	
the	realm	of	the	unknown	in	biology,	which	is	often	alluded	to	using	the	term	
‘complexity.’	While	this	may	seem	to	be	a	major	hindrance	to	their	adherence	
to	 a	 conceptual	 model	 of	 life	 drawn	 from	 engineering,	 according	 to	 Paul	
Feyerabend,191	such	an	incompatibility	between	a	new	conceptual	system,	and	
current,	observable,	‘reality’	is	not	uncommon.	Indeed	Feyerabend	argues	that,	
“hardly	any	theory	is	consistent	with	the	facts”	(1993:	50)	and	thus	the	test	of	a	
new	conceptual	system’s	value	comes	only	after	we	“wait	and	.	.	.	ignore	large	
masses	of	critical	observations	and	measurements”	(1993:	113).		
																																								 								
190	As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 one,	 Venter	 adheres	 to	 the	 genomes	 approach	 rather	 than	 the	
parts-devices-systems	 approach	 that	 prioritises	 standardisation,	 characterisation,	 and	
abstraction.	
191	It	 should	 however	 be	 noted	 that	 Feyerabend’s	work	 concerned	 the	 experimental	 sciences	
rather	than	those,	like	synthetic	biology,	which	seek	to	build	artefacts.		
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Drawing	on	the	work	of	Feyerabend,	Dan-Cohen	(2016)	argues	that	 in	the	
case	of	synthetic	biology,	biology’s	complexity	has	been	ignored,	and	ignored	
intentionally.	 Indeed	 she	 writes	 that	 within	 synthetic	 biology,	 those	 hailing	
from	 engineering	 have	 made	 use	 of	 “selective	 ignorance	 of	 the	 biological	
substrate	 .	 .	 .	 in	 order	 to	 evacuate	 biology	 of	 some	 naturalized	 content	 and	
recolonize	 it	 with	 new	 conceptual	 frameworks	 and	 knowledge	 practices”	
drawn	 from	 engineering	 (Dan-Cohen	 2016:	 10).	 This	 embrace	 of	 ignorance	
regarding	 biology’s	 complexity,	 which	 initially	 drove	 the	 discipline	 forward,	
was	also	clear	in	Alan’s192	belief	that	“we	don’t	need	 to	know	how	 it	works,	we	
just	 need	 to	 know	 the	 inputs	 and	 outputs.”	 Thus,	 despite	 the	 increasing	
acknowledgment	 within	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 community	 that	 complexity	
needs	 to	 be	 addressed	 (Dan-Cohen	 2016),	 within	 the	 Centre	 I	 observed	 an	
oscillation	 between	 this	 standpoint	 and	 that	 expressed	 by	 Alan.	 A	 position	
characterised	 by	 a	 continued	 embrace	 of	 engineering’s	 reductionistic	
approach,	 and	a	 sustained	belief	 that	 engineering’s	 simplicity	will	 ultimately	
overcome	biology’s	complexity.	This	kind	of	optimism,	Keller	(2009a)	notes,	is	
underpinned	 by	 our	 growing	 understanding	 of	 self-organised	 complexity.	 A	
situation	that,	she	argues,	 is	 leading	some	to	hope	that	a	 full	account	of	 life,	
and	its	complexities,	may	finally	be	within	grasp.	
Nevertheless,	the	persistence	of	the	synthetic	biologists’	hope	and	belief	in	
this	promise	of	synthetic	biology,	even	in	the	face	of	the	significant	practical	
and	epistemic	difficulties	 they	encountered,	brings	 to	mind	 the	 literature	on	
the	sociology	of	expectations.	Yet,	where	 this	 literature	often	casts	hope	and	
hype	 as	 hyperbolic	 and	 performative	 tools	 used	 in	 the	 public	 and	 academic	
spheres	 to	set	expectations	and	priorities,	and	attract	 investment	 in	order	 to	
manifest	 a	 particular	 future	 (Borup	 et	 al.	 2006;	 Kitzinger	 2008;	 Van	 Lente	
2012),	here	we	see	hope	in	action	as	a	motivating	and	formative	feature	of	an	
emerging	discipline	at	 the	personal	 level.	A	source,	 that	 is,	of	motivation	 for	
the	practitioners	themselves,	which	must	be	maintained	in	order	for	them	to	
keep	pushing	forward	in	the	face	of	great	obstacles.		
																																								 								
192	One	of	the	Centre’s	directors.	
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Indeed,	the	synthetic	biologists	I	encountered	were	still,	largely,	hoping	to	
use	 their	 version	 of	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	 design	 and	 build	 novel	
biological	 entities	 that	 will	 produce,	 or	 act	 as,	 industrialisable	 products,	 in	
spite	 of	 the	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 unexplained	 complexity	 in	 their	
dealings	with	biology.	As	discussed	in	chapter	five,	this	conundrum	ultimately	
raises	 questions	 about	 which	 category	 these	 ‘products’	 might	 ultimately	 fit	
into	–	machines,	organisms,	or	a	 third,	as	yet	undefined,	boundary	spanning	
or	hybrid	category.	Given	the	discipline’s	drive	to	align	itself	with	engineering,	
to	embrace	reductionism,	and	to	view	and	treat	life	as	engineerable	material,	I	
would	not	have	been	surprised	to	find	that	the	members	of	the	Centre	saw	the	
‘products’	 of	 their	 work	 as	 machines,	 or	 at	 least	 as	 being	 indistinguishable	
from	machines.	However,	as	explored	in	chapter	five,	I	found	the	members	of	
the	Centre	to	be	genuinely	conflicted	about	how	to	categorise	what	they	were	
producing.		
Despite	 synthetic	 biology	 ostensibly	 being	 the	 current	 pinnacle	 of	
reductionism	 and	 mechanism	 in	 biology,	 those	 trying	 to	 enact	 its	
reductionistic	engineering	approach	within	biology	were	struggling	 to	do	so.	
There	 was	 a	 sense	 that	 many	 thought	 they	 ‘should’	 see	 their	 ‘products’	 as	
machines,	 but	 they	 found	 themselves	 reluctant	 to	 categorise	 them	 as	 such.	
This	 reluctance	 was	 sometimes	 attributed	 to	 the	 ‘products’’	 lack	 of	 certain	
characteristics,	 characteristics	 that	 would	 distinguish	 them	 as	 machines.	
These	 features	 were,	 namely,	 being	 well	 understood,	 controllable,	 stable,	
reliable,	and	designed	and	built	from	‘scratch,’	all	of	which	would	require,	as	a	
basis,	the	full	understanding	of	the	underlying	biology.	
Yet,	there	were	also	arguments	made	that	the	discipline’s	‘products’	do	not,	
currently,	 fit	 into	 the	 category	 of	 ‘machine’	 due	 to	 characteristics	 they	 do	
possess,	 characteristics	 that	 demarcate	 them	 as	 organisms,	 as	 being	 alive.	
These	 distinguishing	 characteristics,	 or	 as	 Keller	 (2002)	 would	 have	 it,	
honoured	 differences	 in	 the	 human	 category	 of	 life,	 were	 the	 ability	 to	
reproduce,	 self-repair,	 evolve,	 and	 exercise	 free	 will,	 among	 other	
potentialities.	While	 some	 within	 the	 Centre	maintained	 that	 it	 was	 only	 a	
matter	 of	 time	 before	 such	 characteristics	 of	 life	 could	 be	 controlled,	 and	
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those	of	machines	could	be	engineered	into	the	discipline’s	 ‘products,’	others	
upheld	a	belief	in	the	existence	of	a	fundamental	difference	between	animate	
and	inanimate	entities	that	wasn’t	so	easy	to	overcome.		
Thus	even	within	synthetic	biology	there	was	some	resistance	to	excessive	
mechanism	and	reductionism,	and	the	understanding	of	life	such	an	approach	
promotes.	 This	 is	 despite	 the	 discipline	 arguably	 being	 the	 epitome	 of	 the	
reductionist	 mechanisation	 of	 life,	 where	 mechanism	 underpins	 their	 very	
interactions	 with	 biology.	 While	 this	 resistance	 was	 explained	 in	 terms	 of	
biology’s	 complexity	 rather	 than	 any	 vital	 principle,	 some	 nevertheless	
maintained	that	 life	was	 ‘different,’	biology	was	 ‘biology,’	and	organisms	were	
‘not	machines.’	Yet,	 such	assertions,	 and	 the	belief	 that	biology	 is	 inherently	
different	 from	 engineering,	 and	 thus	 resistant	 to	 engineering’s	methods	 and	
approaches,	 were	 often	 accompanied	 by	 claims	 that	 taking	 an	 engineering	
approach	to	biology	was	appropriate	and	would	likely	prove	successful.		
While	ostensibly	conflicting,	 I	would	argue	that	such	mixed	responses	are	
an	 unsurprising	 result	 of	 the	 hybrid	 discipline	 they	 align	 themselves	 with.	
Given	 that,	 in	 spite	 of	 their	 embrace	 of	 both	 mechanism	 as	 a	 way	 of	
interacting	 with	 biology,	 and	 of	 the	 methods	 and	 discourse	 of	 an	 idealised	
version	of	 engineering,	many	of	 the	members	of	 the	Centre	 still	hailed	 from	
the	 life	 sciences.	 These	 synthetic	 biologists	 had	 spent	 many	 years	 learning	
about,	and	encountering,	all	that	we	do	not	yet	completely	understand	about	
life,	and	all	the	ways	in	which	it	is	remarkable.	It	was	then,	I	would	contend,	
hard	 to	 set	 aside	 biology’s	 tendency	 to,	 as	Malcolm	 puts	 it	 in	 chapter	 four,	
“deconstruct	things”	in	order	to	generate	knowledge,	in	order	to	focus	only	on	
engineering’s	 affinity	 for	 constructing	 things	 in	 order	 to	 generate	
industrialisable	products.		
Furthermore,	 I	 would	 contend	 that	 biological	 organisms	 are	 not	 only	
perceived	as	being	different	from	entities	engineers	have	traditionally	worked	
on	 and	 with,	 but	 that	 they	 fundamentally	 are	 different.	 Typically	 engineers	
take	simple,	 standardised,	well-characterised	parts	and	put	 them	together	 to	
build	a	complex	construct.	Whereas	 in	 synthetic	biology	 they	are	 faced	with	
the	arguably	more	challenging	task	of	starting	with	a	complex	construct	(the	
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organism),	 one	 that,	 despite	 the	 reductionistic	 rhetoric,	 is	 not	 completely	
understood.	 They	 are	 then	 trying	 to	 deduce	 the	 function	 of	 its	 constituent	
parts,	in	order	to	standardise	and	characterise	them,	so	that	they	can	use	these	
parts	to	build	other	complex,	and	controlled,	constructs.	Consequently,	while	
many	 of	 those	 at	 the	 Centre	 find	 themselves	 striving	 forward	 with	 the	
engineering	approach,	they	do	so	while	also	maintaining	an	awareness	of	the	
biological	limitations.	The	practical	and	conceptual	hurdles,	complexities,	and	
knowledge	gaps	that	 is,	which	would	need	to	be	negotiated	 in	order	to	truly	
succeed	in	applying	the	reductionistic,	mechanistic	approach	required	to	truly	
equate	 biological	 matter	 with	 other	 engineering	 materials.	 I	 contend,	
therefore,	 that	 this	 familiarity	with	both	sides	of	 their	discipline,	 the	entities	
each	 side	 deals	with	 (organisms	 in	 the	 case	 of	 biology	 and	machines	 in	 the	
case	 of	 engineering),	 and	 the	 complexities	 of	 applying	 reductionism	 to	
biology,	results	in	the	hybrid	category	many	at	the	Centre	chose	to	assign	their	
‘products’	to.	
Indeed,	 following	 some	 deliberation,	most	 of	 the	members	 of	 the	 Centre	
settled,	often	uncertainly,	for	assigning	the	discipline’s	 ‘products’	to	a	liminal	
zone,	 rather	 than	 to	either	 the	category	of	machines	or	organisms.	A	blurry,	
grey,	boundary	 spanning,	hybrid	category	between	machines	and	organisms,	
where	 the	 ‘products’	 are	 not	 fully	 one	 or	 the	 other,	 but	 rather	 are,	 as	Max	
would	have	it,	“machiney-something	elseys.”	This	uncertainty,	displayed	by	all	
but	one	of	the	members	of	the	Centre,	in	regards	to	such	classification	is,	as	I	
argued	in	chapter	five,	indicative	of	the	complexity	that	lies	within	such	a	task.	
A	 complexity	 made	 all	 the	 more	 so	 by	 the	 unpredictability,	 and	
uncontrollability,	 of	 the	 biological	 organisms	 they	 work	 with,	 and	 thus	 the	
difficulty	 of	 rigidly	 applying	 the	 hallowed	 reductionistic,	 mechanistic	
approach.	
Furthermore,	 the	 struggles	 those	 at	 the	 Centre	 faced	 in	 categorising	 the	
entities	 they	 produced	 appears	 to	 highlight	 a	 parallel	 situation	 between	 the	
discipline	and	its	products.	Given	that,	in	both	cases	there	is	uncertainty	about	
classification.	 Much	 as	 synthetic	 biology	 currently	 fits	 within	 a	 blurry,	
boundary	spanning,	interdisciplinary	space,	so	too	do	its	products	belong	in	a	
 284 
grey	 area,	 at	 least	 in	 the	minds	of	 those	who	 create	 them.	As	 such,	 I	would	
contend	that	 in	their	uncertainty,	and	in	their	grapplings	with	reductionism,	
the	 synthetic	 biologists	 at	 the	 Centre	 are	 crafting	 a	 boundary	 spanning	
conceptual	 category,	 for	 the	boundary	 spanning	products,	 of	 their	 boundary	
spanning	 discipline.	 A	 category	 that	 allows	 their	 products	 to	 concurrently	
possess	 characteristics	of	both	organisms	and	machines	without	 the	need	 to	
definitively,	and	permanently,	claim	them	as	one	or	the	other.	Thus	much	like	
light	 can	 simultaneously	 be	 both	 a	 wave	 and	 a	 particle,	 perhaps	 synthetic	
biology	can	be	both	biology	and	engineering	and	its	products,	both	machine	
and	organism.		
Such	 a	 hybrid	 category	 would	 not	 only	 challenge	 the	 long	 held	
machine/organism	 divide,	 but	 would	 also	 challenge	 our	 concepts	 and	
evaluations	 of	 both	 life	 and	 machines.	 While	 many	 of	 those	 at	 the	 Centre	
expressed	 a	 reticence	 regarding	 making	 grand	 claims	 for	 synthetic	 biology,	
their	 emerging	 discipline	 is	 undoubtedly	 making	 waves.	 While	 these	 are	
currently	small	fluctuations	on	the	surface	of	the	life	sciences	they	may,	with	
time,	grow	larger	and	ripple	out	further,	potentially	shifting	our	conception	of	
life,	 our	 understanding	 of	 biology,	 and	 our	 attitude	 towards	 the	 biological	
products	 of	 biotechnical	 research	 and	 development.	 Yet	 these	 small	 waves	
may	also	dissipate,	fail	to	gain	momentum,	and	ultimately	blend	back	into	the	
surface	of	the	life	sciences.	A	surface	that	will	instead	rise,	fall,	and	move	with	
some	 other	 conceptual,	 epistemic,	 and	 practical	 shift.	 So,	 perhaps	
unsatisfyingly,	 nothing	 about	 the	 future	 of	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 certain.	 As	
discussed	 in	 chapter	 six,	 the	 study	 of	 life	 has	 shifted	 conceptually	 and	
practically	 time	 and	 again.	 The	 conceptions	 of	 life	 distinguished	 by	
Canguilhem	 (2000),	 those	 of	 life	 as	 animation,	 life	 as	 mechanism,	 life	 as	
organisation,	 and	 life	 as	 information,	 may	 not	 have	 been	 the	 only	 ways	 in	
which	 life	has	been	understood	 in	 the	 last	2500	years.	But	 they	are	 the	ones	
that	 have	 gained	 traction	 and	 sufficient	 following	 to	 significantly	 shape	 the	
scientific	and	societal	 imagination.	Consequently,	while	 I	would	suggest	 that	
synthetic	biology	and	its	engineering	approach	have	the	potential	to	shape	the	
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scientific	and	societal	imagination,	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	they	gain	the	
required	traction	to	do	so.	
Life	as	engineerable	material	
As	 addressed	 in	 chapter	 six,	 the	 conceptions	 of	 life	 listed	 above	 have,	
through	their	discursive	and	conceptual	practices,	crafted	what	Keller	(2000)	
refers	 to	 as	 the	 scientists’	 ‘landscapes	 of	 possibility.’	 Which	 have	 in	 turn	
shaped	their	thoughts	and	actions	and	therefore	the	direction	and	focus	of	the	
science	 itself.	 Yet	 despite	 significant	 conceptual	 differences	 between	 these	
shifts	in	the	landscapes	of	possibility	for	the	life	sciences,	I	suggest	that	there	
has	been	slow	but	steady	movement	towards	a	point	of	convergence	between	
biology	and	engineering	since	Aristotle’s	time.	This	has	taken	the	form	of	an	
increasing	 reliance	 on	mechanism	 as	 an	 explanatory	 tool	 for	 understanding	
the	form	and	function	of	increasingly	minute	components	of	living	organisms,	
and	 thus	 the	 slow	 creep	 of	 reductionism	 deeper,	 and	 deeper,	 into	 our	
conceptions	of	 life.	This	tightening	embrace	of	mechanism	and	reductionism	
is	clear	 in	 the	 increasingly	 interventionist	approach	 to	biology	 that	has	been	
prominent	since	the	late	nineteenth	century,	as	well	as	in	the	birth	of	modern	
biotechnology	in	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century.		
These	 two	 developments	 have,	 I	 argue,	 been	 instrumental	 in	 biology’s	
increasing	focus	on	synthesis,	rather	than	description	or	analysis,	as	a	way	of	
interacting	with	‘life.’	Thus,	with	this	in	mind,	chapter	six	traced	the	roots	of	
synthetic	 biology’s	 reductionism	 by	 mapping	 the	 conceptual	 and	 practical	
shifts	that	have	brought	us	to	this	point	of	convergence	between	biology	and	
engineering.	 A	 meeting	 of	 the	 disciplines	 that	 is	 not	 only	 evident	 in	 the	
growing	 number	 of	 disciplines	 forming	 at	 their	 intersection	 but	 also,	 as	
Kastenhofer	(2007)	claims,	a	more	general	epistemic	shift	 in	the	 life	sciences	
towards	a	technoscientific	paradigm.		
Synthetic	 biology	 epitomises	 this	 incursion	 of	 technology,	 and	 indeed	
engineering,	 into	 the	 life	 sciences,	 a	 shift	 that	 is	 arguably	 mirrored	 by	 an	
increasing	trend	towards	the	technologisation	of	our	lives	and	our	interactions	
with	 the	 world	 around	 us.	 Thus,	 despite	 the	 conceptual	 and	 practical	
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difficulties	 discussed	 above,	 within	 the	 social	 and	 scientific	 context	 of	 this	
technoscientific	 shift,	 synthetic	 biology	 continues	 to	 strive	 forward	 with	 its	
brand	of	reductionism.	Advancing	its	simplification	of	life	with	developments	
like	 syn3.0	 (Clyde	 A.	 Hutchison	 et	 al.	 2016),	 and	 spreading	 its	 engineering	
approach	 further	 into	 the	 life	 sciences.	 This	 desire	 for	 expansion	 is	 perhaps	
most	 striking	 in	 the	 recent	 proposals	 for	 a	 human	 synthetic	 biology	
consortium	(Callaway	2016).	Under	the	name	of	the	‘Human	Genome	Project	–	
Write,’	 this	 public-private	 initiative	 is	 coalescing	 around	 the	 aim	 of	
synthesising	 a	 human	 genome	 from	 scratch,	 much	 as	 Venter’s	 team	 have	
synthesised	 small	bacterial	genomes.	This	 is	being	proposed	with	 the	aim	of	
developing	technologies	that	would	reduce	the	cost	of	engineering	and	testing	
large	 genomes	 in	 cell	 lines,	 while	 also	 addressing	 issues	 of	 human	 health193	
(Boeke	et	al.	2016).		
Although	 some	 within	 the	 synthetic	 biology	 community	 are	 calling	 into	
question	the	justification	for	this	project	(Callaway	2016),	the	momentum	it	is	
gaining	 further	 suggests	 that	Kastenhofer’s	 (2007)	 claim,	 regarding	a	 shift	 in	
our	interaction	and	interpretation	of	life,	has	weight.	Indeed,	in	chapter	six	I	
take	Kastenhofer’s	argument	a	step	 further,	arguing	that	such	an	embrace	of	
the	technoscientific	within	the	life	sciences	is	resulting	in	a	conceptual	shift	in	
the	way	life	is	being	understood,	studied,	engaged	with,	and	spoken	about.	A	
shift,	 I	maintain,	 towards	 seeing,	 and	 treating,	 life	 as	 engineerable	material.	
This	 conceptual	 change	 is,	 as	 I	 see	 it,	 the	 overarching	 story	 of	 synthetic	
biology.	 The	 story	 of	 an	 endeavour,	 among	 other	 parallel	 endeavours,	 to	
control	 life	 at	 the	molecular	 level,	which	 is	 gaining	 traction	 at	 this	 point	 in	
history	 in	 a	way	 that	 previous	 attempts	 at	 creating	 a	 ‘synthetic	 biology’	 did	
not.	
While	 the	 current	 attempts	 to	 embrace	 an	 engineering	 approach	 to	
studying	 and	 interacting	 with	 biology,	 as	 synthetic	 biology	 does,	 may	
																																								 								
193	Human	health	challenges	which	have	been	highlighted	as	potential	targets	for	the	project	
include	 growing	 transplantable	 organs,	 engineering	 immunity	 to	 viruses	 into	 cell	 lines,	 and	
engineering	cancer	resistance	into	therapeutic	cell	lines	(Boeke	et	al.	2016).	
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ultimately	 fail	 to	 shape	biology’s	 landscapes	of	possibility,	 such	an	approach	
does,	at	least	at	this	point	in	time,	appear	to	hold	the	potential	to	make	such	
influential	 waves	 within	 the	 life	 sciences.	 As	 discussed	 previously,	 with	 its	
reliance	 on	 tools,	 concepts,	 methods,	 and	 participants	 drawn	 from	 both	
biology	 and	 engineering,	 synthetic	 biology	 is	 a	 discipline	 emerging	 at	 the	
crossroads	of	the	two	disciplines.	A	point	of	convergence	between	engineering	
and	 biology,	 the	 likes	 of	 which	 Compton	 and	 Bunker	 (1939)	 argued	 is	
instrumental	in	intellectual	advances.	Furthermore,	the	engineering	discourse,	
and	 the	 machine	 metaphor	 that	 synthetic	 biology	 embraces,	 have	 been	
described	as	“the	most	powerful	conceptual	tool	of	modern	biology”	(Konopka	
2002:	398).	As	such,	and	as	the	reaction	to	Craig	Venter’s	‘Synthia’	showed,	the	
engineering	approach194	embraced	by	synthetic	biology	is	clearly	capturing	the	
collective	consciousness.		
With	 its	 determination	 to	 design,	 control,	 and	 ultimately	 engineer	 life	 to	
behave	in	certain	desired	and	determined	ways,	synthetic	biology	is	taking	the	
technologisation	of	 life	 to	a	new	 level.	Mechanism	is	no	 longer	 just	a	way	of	
understanding	 life,	 through	 analogy,	 but	 rather	 of	 interacting	 with	 life,	 “a	
veritable	 methodology	 with	 which	 to	 construct	 complex	 biological	 systems	
from	first	principles”	(de	Lorenzo	and	Danchin	2008:	822).	Furthermore,	such	
work	 is	 not	 only	 being	 done	 in	 the	 name	 of	 engineering,	 but	 by	 engineers	
themselves.	 Despite	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 synthetic	 biology’s	 future,	 and	 the	
resistance	expressed	by	some	to	its	approach,	I	ultimately	argue	in	chapter	six	
that,	like	the	growing	number	of	other	disciplines	emerging	at	the	intersection	
of	biology	and	engineering,	synthetic	biology	is	promoting	a	new	conception	
of	life,	that	of	life	as	engineerable	material.		
Given	the	ripples	the	discipline	is	making	with	this	new	conception	of	life,	
with	 its	bridging	of	engineering	and	biology’s	epistemic	cultural	divide,	with	
integrating	 an	 engineering	 approach	 into	 biology,	 albeit	 a	 kludged	 one,	 and	
with	 potentially	 necessitating	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 boundary	 spanning	 category	
																																								 								
194	In	 all	 its	manifestations,	 i.e.	 the	 parts	 and	 pathways	 approaches,	 the	 genomes	 approach,	
and	the	systems	approach	discussed	in	chapter	one.	
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for	its	 ‘products,’	synthetic	biology	certainly	appears	to	be	forging	a	new	way	
of	doing,	thinking,	and	speaking	about	biology.	This	may	all	come	to	nothing,	
but	we	may	also	look	back	at	the	early	twenty-first	century	as	the	point	where	
biology	and	engineering	converged,	a	point	after	which	our	understanding	of	
life	was	never	the	same	again.	
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